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ABSTRACT 
This thesis re-examines the Eisenhower administration's policies in Latin America, 
focusing specifically on the case study of Brazil (1953-1961). In doing so it moves 
beyond the existing historiography, which has divided the field in to two distinct camps. 
The Traditional school, led by scholars like Stephen Rabe and Mark Gilderhus, has 
argued that US policy during this time was informed by national security concerns and 
the fighting of the Cold War. However, the Revisionist school, led by scholars such as 
Walter LaFeber and James Siekmeier, has argued that US policy was more concerned 
with fighting Latin economic nationalism and extending the American economic system 
throughout the region. It is the contention here that there were, in fact, two separate 
objectives underpinning US policy at this time - economic preponderance and the need 
to be seen to be "winning" the Cold War - and that it was the relationship between these 
two aims that was the defining characteristic of US policy during this period. This 
division arose out of the way that US foreign policy evolved in the post-World War Two 
era and, therefore, was not a deliberate construct by US officials. As a result, there was 
an inherent tension within US policy between those aims in the strategic sphere and those 
in the economic sphere. Establishing a link between these two distinct areas of policy is 
the major theme of this thesis: as is demonstrated throughout, the lack of a defining 
Grand Strategy within US policy would prove to be enormously problematic for the 
Eisenhower administration as they struggled to reconcile the tensions between the 
differing aspects of their Latin American policy. Whilst this trend will be highly 
prominent in this analysis of US-Latin American relations, it is with respect to Brazil that 
the full impact of this tension between economic idealism and strategic pragmatism 
becomes most evident. By adopting an analytical framework that incorporates both 
strategic and economic aspects of US policy, this thesis expands upon the existing 
historiography relating to the field and offers up a new appraisal of the US approach in 
the Cold War period. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
"A NEW SYNTHESIS IN US-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS" 
This thesis will re-examine the Latin American policies of the Dwight D. 
Eisenhower administration, ' using the case study of Brazil and putting forward an 
alternative framework with which to analyse US policy in Latin America. By doing so, it 
will offer a broader appraisal of the Eisenhower administration's approach and serve as a 
test-case for a new understanding of US policy during the early Cold War era; one that 
moves beyond the existing historiographical debates and offers a more nuanced analysis 
of US aims and objectives. Its basic premise will be to engage with a crucial issue that 
has so far not been addressed satisfactorily by either of the existing schools of thought - 
the Traditionalist or the Revisionist. 2 Currently, neither the Traditionalist nor the 
Revisionist school of thought offers up an analytical framework that incorporates both 
economic and strategic factors into US policy. This has left the following key question 
unanswered: Why did the Eisenhower administration persist in pursuing an economic 
policy that was so clearly undermining its strategic interests in the region? 
3 
In order to illustrate the centrality of this question, it is necessary to begin by 
outlining the gap that exists in the current literature on US-Latin relations during the 
Eisenhower period. As we will see, the approach taken by scholars with regard to this 
topic is one endemic in the writing of Cold War history in general. In order to address 
this gap, we will need to interrogate the period surrounding the start of the Cold War in 
' For good biographies of Eisenhower, see: Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1984); Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1990); Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait of a Hero (Boston, Massachusetts: Little Brown, 1974); 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: The White House Years, 1953-1956 (London: Heinemann, 
1963); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Peace: The White House Years, 1956-1961 (New York: 
Doubleday and Company, 1965) 
2 Normally, Orthodox and Revisionist are traditional terms used to describe the historiography relating to 
the early Cold War period; in the more modem era they have been expanded upon by the post-revisionist 
movement, which will be discussed at more length later in this chapter. However, the use of "Traditional" 
and "Revisionist" here is a result of my own categorising of particular works in order to highlight the gap 
that exists in the prevailing historiography. 
' An early essay that did look to understand the tension between economic and strategic factors that existed 
in US policy toward Latin America is: Christopher Mitchell, "Dominance and Fragmentation in US Latin 
American Policy" in Julio Cotter and Richard Fagen (eds), Latin America & the United States (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1974) Mitchell's essay, though, does not go into enough detail or 
accord enough importance to the impact of strategic/Cold War factors on the thinking of US policymakers. 
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order to understand the aims and intentions behind US policy and illustrate those factors 
impacting upon US officials. This will suggest that there is a need for a study of US 
policy in the Cold War period that encompasses both economic and strategic factors in 
order to highlight the irreconcilability that existed between these two aims within US 
policy. 
BEYOND TRADITIONALISM AND REVISIONISM IN US-LATIN AMERICAN 
RELATIONS: 
In writing the preface to Aid, Nationalism and Inter-American Relations, James 
Siekmeier's study of US policy toward Latin America in the Eisenhower era, Arnoldo de 
Leon highlighted the way that the field had split into two divergent arguments. He wrote, 
For years after World War II, the conventional interpretation for explaining 
United States interests and involvement in Latin America contended that US 
policymakers were driven by imperatives of the Cold War: it appeared 
necessary for the US to intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American 
countries lest communism spread into what many believed the last line of 
defense of the United States. Wanting to keep Latin America free seemed 
nothing out of the ordinary in that epoch; it reflected an aspect of containment 
constituting part of the larger world struggle. Recently, however, a younger 
generation of historians has come to reconsider the Cold War as a driving 
force behind international intervention, and many who specialize in foreign 
relations between the United States and Latin America have been swayed by 
such an argument... Forgoing the old school that understood containment as 
the motivation behind internationalism, Siekmeier (as do others), maintains 
that combating economic nationalism actually served as the stimulating 
impulse in the role US officials laid out for dealing with Latin America, circa 
1945-1960... economic nationalism in Latin America grew from the 
wellspring of native patriotism, and advocated self-determination and 
indigenous programs shaped to help the masses. As such, it ran contrary to 
US trade and financial interests in the continent... US intervention in 
countries to the south thus seemed urgent: fighting economic nationalism 
instead of communism lay behind US foreign policy toward Latin America. 4 
The approach taken by Sielaneier - and hailed by de Leon - was a direct challenge to the 
Traditional school of thought, which argued that US policy was dominated by the Cold 
4 Arnoldo de Leon writing the Preface to: James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism, and Inter American 
Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia and the United States, 1945-1961 (New York: The Edward Mellen Press, 
1999) p i-ii 
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War and the fight against communism and which had previously dominated the study of 
US policy toward Latin America. Though some scholars - namely William Appleman 
Williams and Walter LaFeber of the Wisconsin school - had put forward arguments that 
apportioned US motivations to economic desire, 5 the foremost monographs in the field 
had traditionally contended that US policy toward Latin America in the 1950s was 
dominated by the Eisenhower administration's fervent anti-communism and the fighting 
of the Cold War. The leading scholar in the Traditionalist school6 is Stephen Rabe who 
has argued: `During the 1950s, they [the Eisenhower administration] interpreted inter- 
American affairs almost solely within the context of the Soviet-American 
confrontation. ' Rabe's views are supported by a number of prominent historians, who 
support the central argument that US policy was essentially dictated by Cold War 
concerns. 8 The emergence of Siekmeier's book, though, rejuvenated the argument put 
forward by Williams and LaFeber, and was further supported in 2003 by Matthew 
Loayza's article "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise. "9 However, though this 
approach has offered up an alternative appraisal of US policy toward Latin America, it 
has had the effect of imposing a stark dichotomy upon the field: US policy in the 
Eisenhower era was now assumed to have been dominated by either national security 
imperatives or economic determinism. Such an approach directly hinders our 
understanding of US policy toward Latin America; yet it is a problem that has been 
caused by a similar trend in more general Cold War historiography. 
5 See: William Appleman William, The Tragedy ofAmerican Diplomacy (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1959) Third Edition 1972; Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States and 
Central America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983) Second Edition 1993 
6 Again, this refers to my labelling of those scholars pursuing a traditional approach toward US policy in 
Latin America rather than the Cold War in general. 
Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower: The Foreign Policy of Anti-Communism and Latin America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988) p 177 
s See: Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations since 1889 (Wilmington, 
Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000); Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1994); Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America: A History ofAmerican 
Diplomacy, 1776-2000 (London: Routledge, 2005); Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: US Responses to 
Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910-1985 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976) 
Revised Edition 1985 
9 Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin 
American Nationalism, 1953-1%1", Diplomacy and Statecraft (Volume 14, No. 3, September 2003) 
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There is a more obvious gap in the historiography dealing with US-Brazilian 
relations, with there being very little contemporary work dealing with the bilateral 
relationship between Washington and Rio de Janeiro during the Eisenhower era. An 
excellent early study was Stanley Hilton's essay, "The United States, Brazil, and the 
Cold War", which charted the breakdown in the bilateral relationship between 1945 and 
1960.10 In a similar vein, but far more comprehensive, is Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etat 
by Michael Weis, which charts the evolution of US-Brazilian relations between 1945 and 
1964.11 Elizabeth Cobbs, in The Rich Neighbor Policy, views US-Brazilian relations via 
a study looking at the work of private individuals such as Nelson Rockefeller and Henry 
Kaiser. 12 Like Hilton and Weis, Gerald Haines has also considered US-Brazilian 
relations in the aftermath of World War Two, but he takes the argument that the US 
deliberately tried to slow-down Brazilian development and only looks at the period up 
until 1954.13 The choice of Brazil as a case-study for the argument in this thesis was 
informed by the paucity of existing material dealing with the US relationship with Latin 
America's biggest country during a vitally important period of time. None of the studies 
cited above details US-Brazilian relations in light of ongoing events in the global Cold 
War. Moreover, none of them offers up an analytical framework that moves beyond the 
traditional narratives of Traditionalism and Revisionism. The reason that studies of US- 
Brazilian relations have been so neglected is due to the importance apportioned by both 
schools of thought to the role that the Eisenhower administration played in Guatemala 
and Cuba. These rather high-profile interventions have ensured that scholars have used 
these case studies to prove their own arguments. Accordingly, this study will also 
analyse events in Guatemala and Cuba; but it will do so in order to fit them in with the 
wider argument that underpins this thesis. This approach will move beyond the 
Traditionalist versus Revisionist debate and offer up a wider understanding of the Cold 
War period. As we shall see, examining US policy in Brazil will illustrate the multi- 
10 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-60: End of the Special Relationship" 
in Journal ofAmerican History (Volume 68, No. 3,1981) pp 599-624 
" Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etat: Brazilian-American Relations 1945-1964 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1993) 
12 Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992) 
13 Gerald Haines, The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of US Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World 
1945-1954 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1989) 
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faceted nature of the Eisenhower administration's Latin American policy and, also, 
provide a deeper understanding of the impact that US regional strategy had on US- 
Brazilian relations. 
The adoption of an either/or approach in analysing US policy toward Latin 
America and Brazil raises an obvious problem. `Singular narratives based on ideological 
conceptions ignore the pluralism in the world, ' writes David Ryan. 14 This truism, 
however, applies whether the `singular narrative' is siding with the national security or 
economic determinist model; both are equally restrictive appraisals and fail to offer a 
multi-faceted view of the aims and intentions underpinning US policy. With respect to 
the study of US policy in Latin America, both the Traditional and Revisionist schools 
have left a number of key questions unanswered: 1) Why did US economic policies 
toward Latin America continue to advocate an approach that was so clearly unpopular 
amongst the Latin nations? 2) Why, when US officials were aware of the affect that their 
economic approach was having on Latin anti-American sentiment, did the US refuse to 
engage more fully with Latin economic demands and concerns? 3) Were the changes in 
US policy that occurred in 1956,1958 and 1959 for economic or strategic reasons? 4) 
What impact did all of this have on US-Brazilian relations? And, 5) were these patterns 
in policy unique to the Eisenhower administration; if not, why? 
By outlining a "new" framework within which to study US policy toward Latin 
America during the Eisenhower period, this thesis will suggest that the answers to the 
questions outlined above offer a more nuanced appraisal of intra-hemispheric relations at 
this time. It will argue that there were, in fact, two separate aims underpinning US policy 
toward Latin America - the aim of expanding American economic influence and power 
throughout the region, and the aim of being seen to be "winning" the Cold War and 
eradicating any anti-American or pro-communist sentiment in the area. Indeed, as we 
shall see, a major part of the argument here will be in establishing the inherent tension 
between US economic and security objectives in their approach toward Latin America 
'4 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge, 2000) p 203; Gabriel Kolko, 
Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980 (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1988) p3 
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and Brazil. However, in order to establish the presence of two separate aims within US 
policy, it is necessary to consider the way that the Cold War and the way that we have 
viewed it have impacted upon our understanding of this period in history. In order to 
pursue a framework that moves beyond the Traditionalist versus Revisionist argument 
we also need to understand what the intentions of US officials in the post-war world 
were and identify the way that the Cold War developed. By doing this we will be able to 
discern the bifurcated nature of US policy, which is vital for this study of US-Latin 
American relations. 
ORTHODOXY VERSUS REVISIONISM IN COLD WAR DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: 
As we can see, the field of US relations with Latin America in the Eisenhower 
period is beset by a split historiography, offering up two divergent opinions neither of 
which fully convinces when explaining the actions of US officials during this time. It is, 
however, a trend symptomatic of the field of Cold War history in general. As Scott Lucas 
has noted, in writing about the "victory" of the West in the Cold War, `the Groundhog 
Day battle of "orthodox" versus "revisionist" explanations of US foreign policy --- had 
Washington secured the free world or was it driven by a quest for economic dominance? 
-- was played out again and again. ' 15 Why, though, has this trend of orthodoxy versus 
revisionism endured for so long? In essence, it is due to the fact that whilst elements of 
both arguments are clearly identifiable in the historical record dealing with the early 
Cold War period, no synthesis has as yet emerged which manages to tie together both the 
economic and national security side of US policy satisfactorily. The announcement of a 
Postrevisionist argument in the 1980s was supposed to offer a successful synthesis of the 
Orthodox and Revisionist arguments. Yet this did not prove to be the case. In fact, 
writing in 1993, Bruce Cumings stated, 
The formulation that wishes to reign can be put simply: there is the orthodox literature on the Cold War, which was followed by the revisionist literature 
which was then followed by the postrevisionist literature... If this were 
15 Scott Lucas, "Negotiating Freedom" in Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford (ads), The US Government, 
Citizen Groups and the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, 2005) 
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"thesis: antithesis: synthesis, " it might work. But it turns out that we do not 
know the thesis, the antithesis is badly understood, and the synthesis struts 
forth as a Whig attempt on a Chinese menu, choosing one from Column A 
and one from Column B only to produce a dish that resuscitates "orthodoxy" 
for a new generation. 16 
Or, in other words, those studies purporting to offer up an appraisal linking economic 
and strategic aims in US policy have only ended up reaffirming the Orthodox national 
security argument. '? A major cause of this dominant historiographical trend has been the 
willingness of scholars to proclaim the idea that the US "won" the Cold War: the 
perception of American supremacy in triumphing over Soviet communism has 
reaffirmed the sense of moral right within existing appraisals of the Cold War period and 
distorted our understanding of the East-West conflict. `Americans were imbued with a 
tradition and had "great expectations" and.. . could rarely see 
beyond them-'18 Victory in 
the Cold War confirmed the nature and the propriety of these `expectations'. '9 
Even here, however, there are problems. Whilst we can strongly argue against the 
idea that US policy in the Cold War was staunchly defensive and solely designed to 
protect America from the threat posed by Soviet communism, we need to be pragmatic 
about the impact that anti-communism and the emerging Cold War mentality had on US 
officials during the 1945-60 period. It is clear that the emerging stand-off between 
Washington and Moscow did impact heavily upon US officials. The major question is: 
how did this impact upon existing US aims and intentions? Did it come to encompass all 
16 Bruce Cumings, "Revising Postrevisionism, Or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History, " in 
Michael Hogan (eds) America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p 21-22 
" In fact, Cumings goes on to cite Warren Kimball who proclaimed that: `Postrevisionism is "orthodoxy 
plus archives"' Ibid p 37 
18 David Ryan, H-Diplo Article Commentary on Frederik Logevall "Critique of Containment" www. h- 
net. ore/-diplo/commentaries/PDF/Rvan-Logevall Accessed on August 8 2006 
19 Scott Lucas writes: `For many US historians, it wasn't enough to claim diplomatic and economic victory. 
Moral supremacy had to be claimed by closing off the historical tale, by establishing that "we" had been 
right all along. Through the facade of "national security", these historians have attempted to reduce the 
Cold War to a struggle in which the United States pragmatically defended itself and the Free World against 
the Soviet menace. A US ideology is given token acknowledgement but is then set aside; to address it 
would undermine the national security thesis, which holds that the real threat comes from the expansionism 
of Soviet ideology. ' Scott Lucas, Freedom's War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union 1945-56 
(Manchester. Manchester University Press, 1999) p 3-4; See also: Lloyd Gardner, "Long Essay" on Cold 
War History, Review of John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History www. h- 
net or iplo/essgys/garden Accessed on August 20 2006 
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areas of US policy and become the defining characteristic of American policy - in effect, 
a "grand strategy"? Or, did it merely serve as a convenient framework around which to 
galvanise Congress, the American public and foreign allies and legitimise Washington's 
aims of global hegemony? In order to obtain a full understanding of US objectives in the 
early Cold War period it is necessary to briefly outline the way that the Cold War 
evolved - and illustrate some of its major themes - so that we can identify precisely what 
intentions underpinned US policy by the time that Eisenhower came to office in 1953. 
By doing so, we will see that the Cold War framework became an integral part of US 
strategy, but, crucially, that this did not override pre-existing American aims for the post- 
war world with regard to economic preponderance. This is vital for our study of US- 
Latin American relations: by establishing clearly the presence of two separate aims 
within US policy in the Cold War period we will be able to see the desirability of a new 
synthesis for analysing the policies of the Eisenhower administration in Latin America 
and Brazil. 
BEYOND THE COLD WAR: IDENTIFYING POST-WAR ECONOMIC AIMS IN US 
POLICY 
The presence of two separate aims within US foreign policy in this period arises 
out of the way that the Cold War era developed. Put simply, the gradual evolution of the 
East-West stand-off meant that original US aims for the immediate post-war period 
continued to exist as powerful elements within US policy. These ideas can be traced right 
back to the American entry into World War Two itself. Following the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor on December 7 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt told the American 
people: `We are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows. '20 
Roosevelt's statement highlighted the recognition within Washington that it would not be 
enough to triumph solely in the conflict against Germany, Japan and the Axis powers. 
There also needed to be a victory in the post-war world so that prosperity flourished and 
future peace was assured under the banner of American tutelage and American 
20 Fireside Chat by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 9 1941 Taken From: 
www. presidency. ucsb, edu/ws/index Accessed on August 20 2006 
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institutions; in short, a Pax Americana. Achieving this would - it was believed - prevent 
a repeat of the years following World War One when the Great Depression and the 
problems of the 1930s set the scene for the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939.21 
The ideas of American Exceptionalism and Manifest Destiny would be globalised by the 
entrance of the US into World War Two. As Michael Hunt writes, with the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, `went the last obstacle to a renewal of the Wilsonian crusade.. . It was time 
the United States dedicated itself to rooting out absolutely and forever "the sources of 
international brutality. "'22 The principles that would guide this shaping of the post-war 
world had been outlined in August 1941 by the Atlantic Charter, created by Roosevelt 
and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in an incident that gave us one of the 
most iconic images of the war: Churchill and Roosevelt, side-by-side, and putting forth 
the blueprint for the modem age. The most telling sections of the document are points 
three, four and five, which most strikingly depict the approach that would inform US 
policy in the post-war era. 
They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under 
which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self 
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them; they 
will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to finther the 
enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on 
equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are 
needed for their economic prosperity; they desire to bring about the fullest 
collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of 
securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and 
social security. 23 
The post-war world, then, would be constructed around the ideals of liberal 
capitalist democracy and the creating of a world-order that was structured around 
American principles. Of course, such ideals tied in neatly with Henry Luce's 
announcement of the "American Century"; an article that appeared in Time magazine and 
in which Luce foresaw, 
21 For information on this period see: Piers Brendon, The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s (London: 
Pimlico, 2000) 
22 See: Michael Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) p 146- 
150 
27 "The Atlantic Charter", Joint Declaration by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill, August 10 1941. Taken From: http: //usinfo. state. aov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53. htm 
Accessed on March 4th 2006. 
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America as the dynamic center of ever-widening spheres of enterprise, 
America as the training center of the skilful servant of mankind, America as 
the Good Samaritan, really believing again that it is more blessed to give than 
receive, and America as the powerhouse of the ideals of Freedom and Justice 
- out of these elements surely can be fashioned a vision of the 20th Century to 
which we can and will devote ourselves in joy and gladness and vigour and 
enthusiasm. 24 
The US economic system was seen as the ideal vehicle to drive the American Century; 
therefore, extending the American economic system as far and as wide as possible became 
vitally important for those US officials planning for the post-war era. Indeed, David Ryan 
notes: `The primary aim of the United States was therefore not the defence of democracy 
or its territorial integrity, but the need to maintain open societies, open, that is, to US 
economic penetration. ' 25 American planning for the post-war world is outlined by Noam 
Chomsky in What Uncle Sam Really Wants, where he writes, `During World War II, 
American planners were well aware that the United States was going to emerge as a world- 
dominant power, in a position of hegemony that had few historical parallels, and they 
organized and met in order to deal with this situation. ' The result was what came to be 
known as "Grand Area" planning. Chomsky states, `The Grand Area was a region that was 
to be subordinated to the needs of the American economy', or as one planner put it: `it was 
to be the region that is strategically necessary for world control ... the geopolitical analysis 
held that the Grand Area had to include at least the Western Hemisphere, the Far East, and 
the former British Empire ... the Grand Area was also to include western and southern 
Europe and the oil-producing regions of the Middle East; in fact, it was to include 
everything, if that were possible. '26 
24 Henry R Luce, "The American Century" Life Magazine (February 17 1941) Reprinted in: Diplomatic 
History (Volume 23, No. 2, Spring 1999) p 159-172; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: Tice Rise and Fall of the 
American Empire (New York: Penguin, 2003) 65-7; Thomas Paterson & J. Garry Clifford, America 
Ascendant: US Foreign Relations since 1939 (Lexington, Massachusetts: DC Heath & Company, 1995) p 
18-19 
25 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000) p 123 
26 Noam Chomsky, What Uncle Sam Really Wants (Boston: Pluto Press, 2003); American Foreign Policy, ' 
Speech by Noam Chomsky, Harvard University, 19th March 1985, 
http: //www. chomsky. infO/talks/19850319. htm Accessed on 15th March 2005; Gabriel Kolko, Politics of 
War, (USA: Random House, 1968); Melvyn Leffler, Preponderance of Power, (USA: Stanford University 
Press, 1992) 
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By the end of World War Two, leading US policymakers had become imbued with 
the idea of "The American Century": a thriving, prosperous world characterised by an 
enduring peace and directed through American ideals and institutions. 7 `A closed, 
fragmented, stagnant economy would burgeon under the influence of outside capital and 
markets, ' writes Michael Hunt. `In this process American institutions would provide the 
models, and American experience would serve as the inspiration. '28 As Paterson and 
Clifford note, `American ideology and economic needs influenced US leaders to project 
the nation's power. '29 It is, however, crucial to note that this stance was not just informed 
by hegemonic ambitions, but, also, by more altruistic motivations; US officials believed 
that expanding their system throughout the world would be highly beneficial and 
prosperous for all. There was a strong element of self-interest involved, however. This 
point is conceded by Geir Lundestad, who in arguing that post-war American expansion in 
Europe was at the request of the European nations, notes that: 
American foreign policy was determined primarily by America's own 
interests, not by invitations from outside. This point is obviously true, so true, 
in fact, that it was made explicitly clear in my Journal of Peace Research 
article: "I just take it for granted that the United States had important 
strategic, political, and economic motives of its own for taking on such a 
comprehensive world role. 00 
And yet, even here, it is important to note that US officials believed that their own self- 
interest was also in the best interests of others. 31 
27 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power (1992) p 16 
28 Michael Hunt, Ideology in US Foreign Policy (1987) p 160 29 Thomas Paterson & J. Garry Clifford, America Ascendant (1995) p 57 
30 Geir Lundestad, "`Empire by Invitation' in the American Century" Diplomatic History (Volume 23, No. 
2, Spring 1999) p 189-218 
31 As William Appleman Williams writes in examining the US role in Cuba between 1898 and 1970, US 
actions were, `Not the result of malice, indifference, or ruthless and predatory exploitation. American 
leaders were not evil men. They did not conceive and excuse some dreadful conspiracy. Nor were they 
treacherous hypocrites. They believed deeply in the ideals they proclaimed, and they were sincere in 
arguing that their policies and actions would ultimately create a Cuba that would be responsibly self- 
governed, economically prosperous, and socially stable and happy. All, of course, in the image of 
America. ' William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1959) Third Edition 1972 p 2; Hans Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States 
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969) p vii; This approach also recalls Melvyn Leffler's categorization of 
US officials as `wise' and `foolish' men in: Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power (1992) p 495-511 
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We can see that US aims in the immediate aftermath of World War Two were to 
develop a prosperous and thriving world-system under the auspices of American 
institutions and American ideals. The result would be an enduring peace and continued 
hegemony for the US. But this is only half of the story; we also need to identify the impact 
that the developing mindset of the Cold War had on US officials and outline the affect that 
his had on pre-existing US aims for the post-war world. 
BEYOND THE COLD WAR: IDENTIFYING THE EVOLUTION OF US NATIONAL 
SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD 
In order to understand the way that US objectives developed in the early-Cold 
War period, it is necessary to look at the way that the national security framework 
evolved within the mindsets of US officials. Whilst the actual mechanisms created to 
deal with emerging national security threats have been documented thoroughly 
elsewhere, we need to broaden our understanding of what US aims and intentions toward 
the Soviet Union were in the period before Eisenhower took office. 
32 By understanding 
this, and linking the themes drawn out here to the economic argument outlined above, we 
will be able to identify the presence of a two separate aims within US policy; two aims 
that came about due to the unique way that the Cold War evolved and which would be 
evaluated, analysed and approached via the Manichean worldview. 
In the immediate post-war era, US officials did not consider the Soviet Union as 
a direct threat to the US. As Melvyn Leffler has clearly pointed out, `worries there were, 
but at the time of Roosevelt's death American officials did not regard the Soviet Union 
as an enemy and were not frightened by Soviet military prowess. At the end of the war, 
US officials did not think that they were engaged in a zero-sum game of power politics 
32 For information on the creation of the national security state, see: Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of 
Power (1992); Michael Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security 
State 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); for an internationalist view, see: Joyce 
and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1972) 
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with the Soviet Union. '33 The immediate question, then, is: how did the situation move 
from that outlined by Leffler to the presence of a dominant national security agenda 
within US policy by 1950? It is the argument here that the containment policy outlined 
by George Kennan in 1946 and 1947 was designed to meet the American need to expand 
its economic system whilst - at the same time - keeping a constant vigil over the Soviet 
Union. The problem was that international and domestic support for US post-war aims 
would be hard to galvanise without the existence of a unifying threat behind which to 
mobilise Congressional, domestic and international support. 
Yet it is, however, necessary to be careful here: this argument is not to suggest 
that US officials "invented" or "created" the idea of a Soviet threat to the US. It is, 
instead, to contend that pre-existing fears and differences were presented and 
essentialised in such a way as to necessitate a firm stance by US officials. Arnold Offner 
has accurately summarised the way that US officials became increasingly concerned 
about the Soviet Union, arguing that President Truman feared that the failure to address 
the potential threat posed by the USSR might undermine American aims for the post-war 
world. He writes: `the man who became president in April 1945 was less an incipient 
internationalist than a parochial nationalist given to excessive fear that appeasement, lack 
of preparedness, and enemies at home and abroad would thwart America's mission to 
"win the peace" on its terms. '34 The answer was to galvanise American society and 
international allies around the need to be seen to be facing up to this threat. `A 
polycentric world was more difficult to deal with but, perhaps as importantly, it would be 
considerably more difficult to unify and solidify not just the "West" but also internal US 
society, without a singular opponent, ' writes David Ryan. 35 This approach toward 
attaining international and domestic support was, though, part of a wider trend. 36 
33 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power (1992) p 5,15 
34 Arnold Offner, "`Another Such Victory': President Truman, American Foreign Policy and the Cold War" 
Diplomatic History (Volume 23, No. 2, Spring 1999) p 126-156 
35 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000) p 12 
36 Thomas McCormick notes: `The Cold War itself, however, is merely a subplot, part of a larger story that 
some historians call America's "hegemonic project". An important part of that project was managing the 
Soviet Union, but it was never the only part and not always the most important. That hegemonic project 
also sought to manage Germany and Japan, America's wartime adversaries, and Great Britain, a wartime 
ally, as well as the Third World and the American citizenry itself. The architects of American global 
dominance viewed those nations and the American public as obstacles to their envisioned world order of 
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And yet it is here that the problem for US officials began to emerge: whilst anti- 
Soviet rhetoric did successfully galvanise domestic and international support behind US 
policies, it also increased the Truman administration's commitment to be seen to be 
winning the Cold War. This was not, of course, a problem whilst the US appeared to be 
winning the bipolar struggle. Neither the Truman Doctrine nor the Marshall Plan should 
be considered as being solely anti-communist or anti-Soviet. They did, however, frame 
existing US policies within a dualistic worldview. Following President Truman's speech 
to Congress on March 12,1947, Head of the Policy Planning Staff, George Kennan, 
bemoaned the fact that the US offer of aid to Greece and Turkey was being viewed 
solely from a Cold War perspective. Instead, Kennan suggested that the "Truman 
Doctrine" should be seen as a blueprint for the American vision of the post-war order. 
He wrote, 
Steps should be taken to clarify what the press has unfortunately come to 
identify as the "Truman Doctrine", and to remove in particular two damaging 
impressions which are current in large sections of American public opinion. 
These are: a. That the United States approach to world problems is a 
defensive reaction to communist pressure and that the effort to restore sound 
economic conditions in other countries is only a by-product of this reaction 
and not something we would be interested in doing if there were no 
communist menace; b. That the Truman Doctrine is a blank check to give 
economic and military aid to any area in the world where the communists 
show signs of being successful. It must be made clear that the extension of 
American aid is essentially a question of political economy in the literal sense 
of that term and that such aid will be considered only in cases where the 
prospective results bear a satisfactory relationship to the expenditure of 
American resources and effort. 37 
In other words, Truman's speech should be seen as a call-to-arms for the modem era not 
as a solely defensive response to the Soviet threat as this undermined the validity of the 
American programme. Kennan's argument is consistent with the idea that anti-Soviet 
economic internationalism and collective security. ' Thomas McCormick, America's Half-Century: United 
States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and Ater (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989) Second 
Edition p xiii 
37 PPS/1: Policy with Respect to American Aid to Western Europe, May 23 1947 FRUS 1947 Volume III 
pp 223-230 
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rhetoric served more as a unifying theme within US policy rather than a dominant 
rationale. Diane Kunz makes a similar point about the Marshall Plan - the Truman 
administration's huge offer of aid to Europe to rebuild their economies - writing: 
Certainly, American aid contributed to the successful recovery of Europe and 
helped launch the unprecedented post-war European boom. But it was sold to 
Congress and the American people as a device to stop the flow of 
communism. That it did so is far less clear. The chances of Marshall Plan 
clients such as the Benelux countries or Britain going communist were slim to 
nonexistent. Historians are increasingly dubious that American aid turned the 
"Red Tide" in France and Italy. 38 
By framing these policies within a strident Cold War framework, the Truman 
administration was able to galvanise support for their approach; and, in the case of the 
Marshall Plan, was able to implement policies under the auspices of the Cold War that 
met pre-existing US objectives with regard to economic expansion. This was fine whilst 
the US appeared to be winning the Cold War: containment could be said to be working 
whilst Soviet expansion was negligible and there was no direct challenge to the 
assertions of US officials that the bipolar struggle was being won. The overriding 
problem, though, was that once the USSR made any significant gains, or the spread of 
communism was perceived to gather pace, US officials would be faced with the prospect 
that they might, in fact, be seen to be losing the Cold War. This is a crucial point. By 
1950, following the Soviet explosion of a nuclear device, the Fall of China to 
communism and the outbreak of the Korean War, US officials had to confront the fact 
that they could be seen to be losing the Cold War; a shift that would severely undermine 
the credibility of the American system and of the Truman administration. `In 1949 and 
1950, new developments reinforced older fears, ' writes Melvyn Leffler. 39 
These events caused an urgent reassessment within Washington. The outcome 
was NSC-68, a document that significantly accelerated the idea that the Soviet Union 
posed a serious threat to the US: `The issues that face us are momentous, involving the 
38 Diane Kunz, "When Money Counts and Doesn't: Economic Power and Diplomatic Objectives" 
Diplomatic History (Volume 18, No. 4, Fall 1994) p 451-462 
39 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power (1992) p9 
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fulfilment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. '40 Once the 
events of 1949 and 1950 began to challenge the idea that the US system would triumph 
over the evils of communism, the only way forward was escalation - escalation of both 
rhetoric and action. Whilst the alarmist and immediate scenario outlined in NSC-68 
would not endure as a model for American foreign policy, it did ensure the presence of 
deep national security concerns as a constant factor underpinning US policy. However, it 
did not eradicate those models outlined earlier that dictated the US approach toward the 
post-war world before the Cold War mentality took hold. Therefore, we can see that 
there were, in fact, two separate policies underpinning the US approach in this period. 
Crucially, though, they were presented within a singular narrative, which had the effect 
of strengthening the commitment of the US to be seen to be winning the Cold War. It is a 
point accurately made by Robert Kagan and William Kristol, who write: 
The original post-war goal of promoting and defending a decent world order 
became conflated with the goal of meeting the challenge of Soviet power. The 
policies that the United States should have pursued even in the absence of a 
Soviet challenge - seeking a stable and prosperous international economic 
order; playing a large role in Europe, Asia and the Middle East; upholding 
rules of international behaviour that benefited Americans; promoting 
democratic reform where possible and advancing American principles abroad 
- all these became associated with the strategy of containing the Soviet Union. 
In fact, America was pursuing two goals at once during the Cold War: first, the 
promotion of a world order conducive to American interests and principles; 
and second, a defense against the immediate obstacle to achieving that order. 41 
US foreign policy toward Latin America in the 1950s, then, would be governed by the 
inflexibility imposed by the approach outlined above. Strategic and economic 
considerations would underpin the US approach, but would also impact a severe tension 
onto the making of US policy in Latin America and Brazil. 
APPLYING THIS "NEW' MODEL TO US POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
BRAZIL IN THE 1950S: 
40 NSC-68 United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 141950 Taken From: 
www. fas. orgJirp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68 Accessed on August 24 2006 
41 Robert Kagan & William Kristol, "The Present Danger", The National Interest (Number 59, Spring 
2000) Taken From: www. thenewamericancenturyorg/def natl sec odf 07. pdf p5 Accessed on 
January 17s' 2006. 
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From the evidence presented above, it is clear that this bifurcated foreign policy 
was not a deliberate construct; it was a consequence of the way that the post-war world 
and the mindset of US officials had evolved in the period between 1945 and 1950. It is 
this lack of intent on the part of US officials that reaffirms the problems imposed upon 
the study of US policy in the Cold War era by the divergence of the Orthodox and 
Revisionist schools of thought. Perhaps the biggest single factor which has gone 
unanalysed by existing studies is the impact that these two aims within US policy had on 
each other. Both the Orthodox school - by drawing all foreign policy events under the 
umbrella term of "national security" - and the Revisionist school - by similarly 
encompassing foreign policy events under the banner of "economic determinism" - have 
failed to interrogate the interaction between economic and security issues within US 
policy. However, one of the major themes of this thesis will be to establish the constant 
presence of a clear tension between US aims in the security sphere and US aims in the 
economic sphere. Due to the way that US policy evolved - with economic and security 
policies developing separately - US officials in the Eisenhower period would 
consistently struggle to reconcile the two aims that made-up its approach. It is only by 
adopting a framework that incorporates both of these elements that it becomes clear just 
how often US aims in the economic sphere were undermined by events in the security 
sphere and vice-versa. By establishing the presence of this tension between economics 
and security within US policy, this study will expand on existing studies and deepen our 
understanding of the way that US policy evolved during Eisenhower's time in office. In 
those chapters dealing with US-Latin American relations we will identify how this 
tension manifested itself on the making of US policy; however, it is in the chapters 
looking at US-Brazilian relations that we will most clearly be able to witness the impact 
that this tension between economics and security had on the position of the United 
States. 
There will also be several smaller themes that will develop throughout this thesis. 
Firstly, we will continue to examine the way that US global policy impacted upon the 
administration's approach toward Latin America. This will enable us to link those events 
is 
in the Cold War to the evolution of US foreign policy in Latin America and Brazil. 
Secondly, we will see the limits of US hegemony in Latin America: despite enjoying a 
preponderance of power over their Latin neighbours, the US would struggle to impose its 
will on the Latin countries. This will be highly apparent in Brazil, but it is also true of 
both Guatemala and Cuba. 42 Once the administration began apportioning more emphasis 
to its national security role in Latin America (post-January 1956), the importance of a 
strong bilateral relationship between Washington DC and Rio de Janeiro began to 
assume more importance for US officials. As we shall see, however, the ability of both 
the US and Brazil to construct a strong bilateral relationship at this time would be 
undermined by the inherent tensions within US policy. 
Thirdly, a fuller understanding of the internal dynamics of the Eisenhower 
administration will also emerge. A great deal of literature has been devoted to analysing 
the question of whether it was Eisenhower or Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that 
was the driving force behind US foreign policy in this period. 3 It has, however, now 
been established that Eisenhower did play an integral part in establishing his 
administration's foreign policy (assisted, of course, by Foster Dulles). Therefore, this 
study will move beyond the task of investigating presidential input or culpability and 
highlight the role played at different times by the varying departments within the 
government bureaucracy, in order to obtain a wider appraisal of the policymaking 
apparatus within the Eisenhower administration. " The administration's foreign policy 
42 This pattern of the Latin American nations being able to exert an increasing influence on diplomatic 
relations with the US has been an increasingly prominent theme in the historiography produced recently on 
bilateral relations between the US and Latin American countries. An excellent recent summary of this can 
be found in: Max Paul Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent 
Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations, " in Diplomatic History (Volume 27, No 5, 
November 2003) pp 621-636 
43 The best review of "Eisenhower Revisionism" is provided by: Stephen Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism: 
The Scholarly Debate" in Michael Hogan (eds), America in the World: The Historiography ofAmerican 
Foreign Policy since 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p 300-326. See also: Robert 
McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists" in Political Science 
Quarterly (Fall, 1986) pp 453-473; Richard Immerman, "Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An 
Agonizing Reappraisal" in Diplomatic History (Summer 1990) pp 319-342 
44 Other recent works on Eisenhower that adopt this approach or that seek to develop our understanding of 
Eisenhower's role in the policymaking process include: Chris Tudda, The Truth is Our Weapon: The 
Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2006) p 2-4; Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle 
at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Chester J. Pach, "Thinking 
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processes were developed by the National Security Council, the Departments of State 
and Defense, the Operations Coordinating Board, the Central Intelligence Agency and 
the Treasury Department, as well as a number of other interest groups. 45 Whilst, with 
respect to Brazil, the role of the US Ambassador in Rio De Janeiro (and the US 
Embassy) was highly important in implementing US policy 46 Furthermore, it will 
become apparent that the various Assistant Secretary of States for Inter-American Affairs 
- John Moors Cabot, Henry Holland and Roy Rubottom - were vitally important in 
guiding US policy toward Latin America on a day-to-day basis. There were, of course, 
internal debates as to the best way forward with regard to Latin America, and these will 
be outlined in the relevant sections. For example, throughout Eisenhower's time in office 
there was a group of officials - including Milton Eisenhower, John Moors Cabot, Harold 
Stassen, Walter Bedell Smith, Thomas Mann and Douglas Dillon - that advocated a 
change in US economic policy toward Latin America. The relative success enjoyed by 
this group would depend on the state of US interests in the region; but it will become 
clear that even those officials recommending a change in approach did not advocate 
policies that challenged basic American economic principles such as "free trade, free 
currency and free investment". 
Fourthly, we will identify the fact that direct US intervention during the 
Eisenhower period only occurred when economic and security objectives collided: this 
was true of both Guatemala and Cuba, where initial economic antipathy was turned into 
overt hostility by the challenges presented to US strategic and security objectives by the 
Guatemalan and Cuban governments. Finally, by adopting a framework that looks at 
both economic and strategic factors in US policy, we will see that the administration 
came to apply a view toward the region that was increasingly dominated by national 
security concerns. In its first three years in office, the administration would make 
economic objectives the main focus of its approach toward the region - the one obvious 
Globally and Acting Locally" in Kathryn Statler and Andrew johns (eds) The Eisenhower Administration, 
the Third World and the Globalization of the cold war (Lanham, Mary land: Bowman and Littlefield, 
2006) 
as Groups like the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, the Foreign Operations Administration and the 
American Business Lobby also played a prominent role. 
46 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) emphasises the importance of the 
US Embassy in Rio in the policymaking process. 
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exception to this would be Guatemala. However, following the Soviet Economic 
Offensive in 1956, the events of Vice President Richard Nixon's tour of the region two 
years later, and the coming to power of Fidel Castro in Cuba in 1959, US officials would 
emphasise national security objectives as being of the utmost importance. But even then, 
we will see that they continued to retain a staunch belief in the appropriateness of their 
economic principles 47 As a result, US aims in the security sphere would continue to be 
consistently undermined by the administration's refusal to significantly alter its 
economic approach. 
In order to draw out all of these primary and secondary themes, the thesis is 
divided into three distinct sections, each containing two chapters. The first section 
encompassing Chapters One and Two will examine US-Latin American relations and 
US-Brazilian relations during the Eisenhower administration's first two years in office. It 
will establish the way that the death of Josef Stalin in March 1953, and the subsequent 
changes in US Cold War policy impacted upon the administration's approach toward 
Latin America. Although events during this period were somewhat overshadowed by the 
deterioration in US-Guatemalan relations, we will analyse this as part of our wider study 
of US policy toward Latin America; identifying the themes that made intervention 
inevitable and illustrating the way that they fit in with the approach being taken by the 
US in Latin American and Brazil. 
Chapters Three and Four make up the second section, which will cover the period 
between 1954 and the spring of 1958. Here we will examine the impact of the 
administration's shift toward beginning to impose a strategic importance to their 
relationship with both Latin America and Brazil. This was in keeping with events in the 
global Cold War, as a shift in Soviet foreign policy and a noticeable move away from 
Europe and toward the Third World began to impact heavily on US policy. The shifting 
context of US-Latin American relations was confirmed by the Soviet Economic 
" For recent work outlining the need to view the administration's foreign aid policies for security purposes 
as being separate from the administration's general foreign economic policies, see: Michael Adamson, 
"`The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy? ': The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign 
Aid, and the Third World" in Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the 
Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War (2006) Chapter 3 
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Offensive, launched in January 1956 and which, for the first time, raised the possibility 
that the US might be seen to be losing the Cold War in Latin America. As a result, the 
administration reshaped its regional policies in an attempt to accord far more importance 
to their military assistance policies and aim toward repairing the stability of the US 
position in the area. The same trend would also inform US policy toward Brazil in the 
same period. 
The third section will look at the final period of the Eisenhower administration, 
encompassing the aftermath of the Nixon trip, the rise of Castroism in Cuba and the 
severe deterioration in US-Brazilian relations. These chapters mark the period when US- 
Soviet tensions moved definitively to the Third World and due to both this and the Nixon 
trip the Eisenhower administration would reappraise its policies again in an effort to 
meet its increasingly urgent national security aims. The Cuban Revolution in December 
1958 would make this process even more urgent and would allow those US officials 
recommending a change in economic policy a chance to state their case and set the 
policy agenda. Underlying all three of these sections will be the inherent tension between 
US economic and security aims; once the dust clears, we will see that the `tragedy of 
American diplomacy' toward Latin America and Brazil during the Eisenhower period, 
was the inability of the administration to reconcile the two predominant aims that made 
up US policy in the early-Cold War era. 
48 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy ofAmerican Diplomacy (1959) 
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CHAPTER 1: 1953-1954 
"FORGING A LATIN AMERICAN POLICY" 
INTRODUCTION: 
The policy that the Eisenhower administration would pursue in Latin America 
would be heavily influenced by the ideals outlined in the Introduction to this thesis - 
namely the simultaneous pursuit of American economic preponderance and the need to 
be seen to be winning the Cold War. ' This approach was informed by both the way that 
US foreign policy and the existing world system had evolved since 1945, and by the 
ingrained beliefs and convictions of those officials who made up the Eisenhower 
government. President Eisenhower retained a strong belief in both the elements that had 
characterised US policy since the end of World War Two: effective, but not militaristic, 
containment of the communist threat; and, the widespread extension of American 
economic principles. 2 This chapter will outline the way that the administration's Latin 
American policy evolved in the face of these two overriding policy commitments 
between 1953 and 1954 and highlight the inherent tension that would come to 
characterise the administration's approach and, which would ultimately begin to 
undermine any chance the US had of fully achieving their aims in either the economic or 
the national security sphere. 
It will begin by examining the impact that Josef Stalin's death had on the 
administration's Cold War mentality and by charting the evolution of their main foreign 
policy statement - NSC 162/2 - outlining the major characteristics of this approach and 
illustrating how they match those that would form the basis of the administration's policy 
in Latin America. It will then examine the ideals and objectives behind the policy 
' See the Introduction to this thesis for an appraisal of the ideas and themes underpinning the development 
of the US commitment to being seen to be winning the Cold War 
2 For information on Eisenhower's foreign policy ideals when he came to office, see: Robert Bowie and 
Richard Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998) pp 11-81; Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 
1953-1961 (London: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1996) pp 6-19; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: 
A Critical Appraisal ofAmerican National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982) pp 125-134 
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document NSC 144/1, examining in some detail the development and intention of the 
clauses it contained, before considering the example of US intervention into Guatemala 
as an illustration of the impact that the tension between economic and security aims had 
on US policy. Finally, it will outline the administration's response to the problems that 
had emerged in the first eighteen months in office through the revised document NSC 
5432/1. 
There will be a number of themes that will continually resurface during this 
investigation of the US approach in the Western Hemisphere. Firstly, in keeping with the 
bipolar and utilitarian context that US officials superimposed upon this era, these 
divergent aims would be pursued under the auspices of singular policy documents. 
Economic objectives and national security aims would be outlined in homogenous policy 
statements that would inherently blur the distinctions between the two; this made it 
increasingly difficult for US officials to identify the tension between the two aims, as 
they viewed US policy as being a singular construct. This trend would become even more 
marked during the second Eisenhower administration, when changes in the nature of the 
Cold War and local events in Latin America compelled the US to become more 
concerned about the strategic issues facing them in the region. Secondly, the Eisenhower 
administration was formulating its Latin American policy whilst its global national 
security strategy was undergoing a comprehensive reappraisal: the shift in dynamic that 
Stalin's death imposed upon Washington's conventional view of the Cold War would 
compel the administration to implement an overarching policy review, aimed at outlining 
US national security policy in this new phase of the ideological struggle with the Soviet 
Union. 
Thirdly, as well as this understandable emphasis on Cold War imperatives, the 
administration would also devoutly adhere to its economic commitments regarding the 
spread of foreign private investment. The administration's faith in private investment 
would, in effect, be as prominent as its anti-communism. 3 Finally, the role of the Latin 
3 See: Burton Kaufiran, Trade & Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1982); Michael Adamson, "'The Most Important Single Aspect of our 
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nations themselves in this diplomatic relationship will come across strongly, especially in 
those chapters relating to US-Brazilian relations. Whilst the US was rather sanguine 
about pursuing its economic and national security aims simultaneously, it would not be 
an approach shared by the Latin Americans. The reason that the tension within US policy 
became such a defining factor in inter-hemispheric relations was because US policy did 
not sufficiently account for the actions and motivations of the Latin Americans. These 
themes will be the major elements that characterise this study of US-Latin American 
relations, and, as will be demonstrated throughout, all of them acting together will create 
the situation that ultimately led to the failure of the administration's Latin American 
policy. Underpinning all of these factors, though, will be the clear presence of an overt 
tension between US security and economic aims: this will be evident not just in 
Guatemala, but, also, as we will see in Chapter Two, in Brazil where the US would 
pursue its economic objectives to the ultimate detriment of its strategic aims. 
THE LIMITS OF ROLLBACK: STALIN'S DEATH AND THE DEBATE OVER 
"LIBERATION" 
On March 4 1953, news filtered through to Washington that Josef Stalin, the 
Soviet leader, had suffered a fatal stroke4. Stalin had been the embodiment of all that was 
inherently "evil" about the Soviet Union: the name, the face and the persona associated 
with the grave threat that confronted the United States in Eastern Europe. Stalin's death 
removed one of the main pillars behind the evolution of the Cold War era but, more 
importantly, it challenged the Eisenhower administration to make good on their election 
campaign promises of `liberating' Eastern Europe and `rolling back' the Iron Curtain. 
The debate that would emerge within the administration over how the US should respond 
would highlight the inherent problems within the strategy outlined by Eisenhower and 
Foreign Policy? ': The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World" in Kathryn Statler 
and Andrew Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third Worl4 and the Globalization of the 
Cold War (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) 
4 Stalin had, in fact, been taken ill on March 1, but his ill-health did not become common knowledge until 
three days later, his death was formally, and finally, announced on March 61953 
S See: Republican Party Platform of 1952. Taken From: 
hiiR: //www. presidency. ucsb. edu/ws/index. php? pid=25837 Accessed on August 24 2006 
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Dulles on the election trail. Moreover, it would bring about a wholesale reappraisal of US 
national security policy, which had direct implications both on the way the administration 
structured its national security strategy and on the way they approached their relations 
with Latin America. 
Upon hearing of Stalin's death, the question facing the Eisenhower administration 
according to Walt Rostow was: `Should the United States initiate a proposal to undo the 
split of Europe and actively propose a democratic unified Germany, within a structure of 
appropriate security and economic arrangements? '6 On a narrower scale, the main issue 
facing the US was whether they should use the occasion of Stalin's death to attempt to 
"destabilise" the Soviet government. Eisenhower's newly appointed Special Assistant for 
Psychological Operations, C. D. Jackson, immediately came out in favour of trying to use 
Stalin's death as a political tool: his immediate response was to recommend doing, 
everything possible to overload the enemy at the precise moment when he is 
least capable of bearing even his normal load... it is not inconceivable that out 
of such a program might come further opportunities which, skilfully 
exploited, might advance the real disintegration of the Soviet empire. ' 
He was supported in this by Rostow (who, at the time, served on Jackson's staff) and who 
has written, `our bias.. . was for an American policy in the wake of Stalin's death which 
did what it could to encourage domestic changes toward a more liberal and nationalistic 
Soviet Union rather than one which looked with high expectations to a prompt and 
definitive resolution of the Cold War. '8 Jackson and Rostow recommended that 
Eisenhower make a keynote speech in which he should state: `Stalin's death marks the 
end of an era and opens up fresh options for the Russian peoples. In particular it offers 
them a unique opportunity to remake their relations with the rest of the world. '9 
6 Watt W. Rostow, Europe after Stalin: Eisenhower's Three Decisions of March 111953 (Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1982) p3 
7 Memorandum from C. D. Jackson Special Assistant for Psychological Operations to Robert Cutler Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, March 41953, US DDRS, 1997 9045 quoted in: Scott Lucas, 
Freedom's War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union 1945 - 1956 (London: Manchester University 
Press, 1999) p 169 
8Walt Rostow, Europe After Stalin (1982) p 38 
9 1bid 
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Klaus Larres has argued that President Eisenhower himself was initially 
enthusiastic at such a prospect. `Eisenhower and his advisers were keen on using a major 
presidential speech to undermine the position of the new leaders in the Kremlin and 
possibly begin rolling back Soviet power and influence, ' writes Larres. 10 Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, it would be that `great liberator of the 1952 campaign' 11, Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles, that would forcefully put a stop to plans for a presidential 
address. 12 The debate between Jackson and Rostow, and Dulles and the Department of 
State, would highlight a serious difference of opinion within the administration as to the 
exact way forward for the US in terms of policy towards the Soviet Union. Events were 
even more confused within the Kremlin, as Stalin's refusal to anoint a successor meant 
that his death created a dangerous and competitive power vacuum: upon confirmation of 
his death, the inevitable jostling for position and battle for power began amongst the 
remaining elite (namely KGB chief Lavrenti Beria, soon to be Party Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev, Prime Minister Georgi Malenkov, Ansastas Mikoyan and Vyacheslav 
Molotov the Soviet Foreign Minister)13. It was this power vacuum that Jackson and 
Rostow had perceived as providing the US with the chance to seize the initiative against 
the USSR and launch a successful psychological offensive against the Soviets. 
It was not to be. Dulles held firm, and slowly brought Eisenhower round to his 
way of thinking. The delays involved proved so lengthy that Georgi Malenkov, the Soviet 
Prime Minister and new de facto leader, undercut the US and gave a speech welcoming 
warmer relations between the US and the Soviet Union. 14 Eventually, in April 1953, 
10 Klaus Larres, "Eisenhower and the First Forty Days after Stalin's Death: The Incompatability of Detente 
and Political Warfare", Diplomacy and Statecraft (Volume 6, Number 2, July 1995) pp 431-469 
" Scott Lucas, Freedom's War (1999) p 170 
12 The State Department had been averse to any attempts to engineer and exploit Stalin's death since the 
formulation of Operation Cancellation in October 1952. See Lucas (1999) p 170 
13 For details on the Soviet power struggle in the wake of Stalin's death see: Dmitri Volkogonov, The Rise 
and Fall of the Soviet Empire: Political Leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev (London: 
HarperCollinsPublishers, 1998) pp 177-201; William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man, His Era (USA: 
Free Press, 2003) pp 236-266; Robert Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia (London: Penguin 
Books, 1997) pp 327-338 
" For full details on Malenkov's speech and the debates within the administration over how to respond see: 
Scott Lucas, Freedom's War (1999); Walt Rostow, Europe After Stalin (1982); Klaus Larres, "Eisenhower 
and the First Forty Days after Stalin's Death" (1995); Chris Tudda, "Reenacting the Story of Tantalus: 
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Eisenhower responded with what has become know as his `Chance for Peace' speech, 
delivered to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Struggling to counter 
Malenkov's speech, Eisenhower had little choice but to deliver a speech that though 
offering peace did so on terms that would never be acceptable to Moscow. As Scott 
Lucas writes: `[T]he address.. . was never a serious effort at negotiation; no one in the 
Administration expected the Soviets to accept the US conditions... it was a concerted 
effort to win over world opinion. ' 15 This episode demonstrated to Eisenhower and his 
advisors the lack of clear direction in US policy; consequently, Eisenhower would order a 
reappraisal of policy that would result in the document NSC 162/2, or, as it has become 
known, "The New Look". 16 
OPERATION SOLARIUM: THE AIMS AND INTENTIONS OF THE `NEW LOOK' 
FOREIGN POLICY 
The New Look foreign policy was the result of an intense bureaucratic procedure 
within the Eisenhower administration, which became known as Operation Solarium. '? 
Solarium incorporated three task-forces whose remit was to outline a "new" US foreign 
policy with respect to the Soviet Union, which took account of the failings so far 
encountered with transferring the rhetoric of liberation and `roll-back' into a viable 
policy. Importantly, though, any retooled policy would retain the same basic precepts that 
had underpinned US policy since 1946: a strong form of vigilance against the USSR and 
an emphasis on expanding the American economy and maintaining American economic 
Eisenhower, Dulles and the Failed Rhetoric of Liberation", Journal of Cold war Studies (Volume 7, 
Number 4, Fall 2005) pp 3-35 
15 Scott Lucas, Freedom's War (1999) p 174; Walt Rostow, Europe After Stalin (1982); Klaus Lanes 
agrees writing, `The President had, after all, merely asked the new Soviet Leadership to alter its entire 
foreign policy in exchange for American goodwill. ' Lanes, "Eisenhower and the First Forty Days after 
Stalin's Death" (1995); Ken Osgood, "Form before Substance: Eisenhower's Commitment to 
Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy", Diplomatic History (Volume 24, Number 3, 
July 2000) pp 405-435 
16 This process would be expedited by the failings again displayed during the East German uprising in June 
1953: here, as with the aftermath of Stalin's death, the administration failed to follow up on its grand 
claims regarding helping the `subjugated' peoples of Eastern Europe break free from their oppressors. 
17 Named after the room in the White House where President Eisenhower and his advisors thought up the 
operation 
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health. 18 In early 1953, a draft of a basic national security policy statement, paid 
testament to this when it outlined the following objectives: `To meet the Soviet threat and 
to improve the power position of the United States and the rest of the free world in 
relation to the Soviet Bloc ... In meeting the Soviet threat, to avoid seriously weakening 
the US economy or undermining our fundamental values and institutions. "9 Taking these 
two guiding objectives as its basis, Operation Solarium would be designed to create a 
policy that, in the words of Said Dockrill, would embrace, `not only the nation's military 
and foreign policy concerns but also its domestic and economic stability. ' Dockrill goes 
on to outline the administration's theory in forging NSC 162/2, which was: `If the nation 
knew precisely what were its basic national security interests which would be defended 
against external threats and if the administration carefully selected the "means of 
defending these national goals", the United States would remain economically strong, 
while retaining its world leadership role. '20 
The three task forces (A, B and C) were instructed to formulate a policy based on 
their particular remit. Gaddis describes the process: 
18 A major issue of contention in this quest for economic vitality was the question of whether or not to 
support an increase in trade between the Western powers and the Soviet Bloc. In May 1952, the German 
Bundestag had called `for an expansion of East-West trade to the greatest extent possible. ' Eisenhower 
strongly supported this proposal, arguing `that the USA could not insist that its allies implement 
comprehensive restrictions on East-West trade and expect Western Europe to comply with this demand in 
the interests of "free world" unity. ' The Truman administration had begun to relax its stance towards this 
issue during 1952, and Eisenhower would enthusiastically strive to relax the US position on East-West 
trade for two reasons. Firstly, it matched his belief that an expanded world economy was vital for the future 
of the world system, and secondly; he was `anxious to avoid the conflict and confrontation that had 
characterized US-Western European relations... during the Truman era. ' By July, this approach had become 
a little more coherent, with Richard Hall of the NSC staff informing Vice President Richard Nixon: 
`Interference in trade between the free world and the Soviet bloc should take place only where a clear 
advantage to the free world would accrue from such interference. ' US policy on this issue would eventually 
be codified (despite some rather lively debate between Eisenhower and his advisors in the document NSC 
152/2, which did in fact relax the US position on the issue of East-West trade. 
See: Ian Jackson, `The Limits of International Leadership: The Eisenhower Administration, East-West 
Trade and the Cold War, 1953-54. ' Diplomacy and Statecraf, (Vol. 11, No. 3, November 2000) pp 113- 
138; National Security Council Progress Report on the Implementation of NSC 104/2, January 19 1953. 
Economic Defense 1953 (1), Box No 27, Disaster File Series, Eisenhower Library; National Security 
Council Progress Report on the Implementation of NSC 104/2, January 19th 1953. Economic Defense 1953 
(1), Box No 27, Disaster File Series, Eisenhower Library. 
19 Draft Document on Basic National Security Policy, undated. Basic National Security Policy 1953-54 (2), 
Box No 1, NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower Library. 
20 Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy 1953-1961(1996) p1 
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At the President's request, three separate study groups were set up at the 
National War College, each charged with making the strongest possible case 
for its assigned option. These included: (1) continuation of the Truman 
strategy of "containment"...; (2) a strategy of "deterrence", which involved 
drawing clear lines around the periphery of the communist world, with the 
implied threat of nuclear retaliation against those who crossed the line; and 
(3) "liberation" - the use of political, psychological, economic and covert 
means to attempt to "roll-back" existing areas of Soviet influence. 
Gaddis goes onto assert that, `in the end, Eisenhower approved only the first of these 
options, with a slight modification in the direction of the second'21; or, as Stephen 
Ambrose writes: `In practice... Eisenhower and Dulles continued the policy of 
containment. There was no basic difference between their foreign policy and that of 
Truman and Acheson. '22 NSC 162/2 (the document that emerged from Operation 
Solarium) would be the final word on the question of whether or not the Eisenhower 
administration would live up to its election pledges to `roll-back' communism. Far from 
being a blueprint aimed at winning the Cold War, the New Look would adhere to 
traditional policy covenants and, in effect, set the tone for the administration's approach 
throughout the world. 
Much has been made by scholars of the threat of "massive retaliation"23 outlined 
in NSC 162/2. Ambrose states that, `the key to the New Look was the American ability 
to build and deliver nuclear weapons. Put more bluntly, Eisenhower's military policy 
rested on America's capacity to destroy the Soviet Union. '24 This, though, is too 
simplistic an approach. As McCormick suggests, the idea behind the doctrine of 
"massive retaliation" was to devise a model of defense that also (in keeping with 
Republican Party fiscal policy) cut costs. 25 However, it was not just economic 
21 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: (1982) p 146 
22 Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (USA: Penguin Books, 1978) 
Eighth Edition 1997 p 129 
z3 The threatened use of nuclear weapons to resolve a situation 
24 Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (1997) p 131 
1 McCormick writes: `The post-war decrease [in defense spending] reflected the so-called New Look 
strategy of the Eisenhower administration, with its emphasis upon strategic and tactical nuclear weaponry 
("more bang for the buck"), and its disinclination to risk Korean-style conventional warfare to repress 
revolutions in the periphery. It also reflected the President's own embryonic concern about the perils of 
creating a domestic Frankenstein (the "military-industrial complex", as he later termed it) and pressures 
from non-Keynesian, fiscal conservatives in his own party to reduce budget deficits. ' Thomas McCormick, 
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sensibilities that informed the New Look. There was also a conscious effort to devise a 
policy that met the US need for an approach that not only countered the Soviet Union 
but, which also promoted the economic vitality of the American system. Gaddis outlines 
the multi-faceted policy approach contained in the document (moving away from the 
idea that it was solely based on nuclear deterrence), but, crucially, sees the 
administration's strategy as being solely motivated by anti-communism. 
It would be a mistake to view the Eisenhower administration's "New Look" 
strategy as revolving primarily around that ... threat to use nuclear weapons 
upon minimal provocation. Rather, the central idea was that of asymmetrical 
response - of reacting to adversary challenges in ways calculated to apply 
one's own strengths against the other side's weaknesses, even if this meant 
shifting the nature and location of the confrontation. The effect, it was 
believed, would be to regain the initiative while reducing costs. Nuclear 
weapons were a major component of that strategy, to be sure; but so too were 
such other elements such as alliances, psychological warfare, covert action 
and negotiations 26 
Gaddis's analysis, whilst correct in citing the multi-faceted nature of the New Look, does 
not go far enough in exploring the aims and intentions of the administration's policies. 
Although the bipolar framework continued to impact a heavy influence on US officials 
and, undoubtedly played a major part in informing NSC 162/2, we cannot ignore the 
presence of those US aims that remained from the early post-war period. The health and 
continued expansion of the American economic system continued to be as important a 
goal for US officials as "fighting" communism. What NSC 162/2 sought to do was to 
outline a policy that adhered to both of these defining policy objectives. Although the 
document would concentrate mainly on issues of security, it would also outline a policy 
that was aware of the necessity of not undermining Washington's `economic stability'. 
In their book Waging Peace, Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman highlight the 
debate within the administration over the economic aspects of the New Look. The 
Treasury Department, headed by staunch fiscal conservative George Humphrey, took the 
America 's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1989) Second Edition 1995 p 105 
26 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (1982) p 147-8 
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position that: `The risk of dangerously weakening the US economy by prolonged deficits 
or high taxes due to security expenditures was as serious as the Soviet threat and 
demanded rapid balancing of the budget without raising taxes. ' The view of the State 
Department and the Department of Defense was that the, `United States must meet the 
minimum costs of the policies essential to its security; defense spending at the current 
levels will not seriously damage the economy even if higher taxes prove necessary. ' 
There was, though, some form of consensus, with all members agreeing, `that a strong 
and expanding US economy was essential for the security of the country and the free 
world over a sustained period. ' As Bowie and Immerman go on to summarise, President 
Eisenhower was forthright about the economic aspect of US policy. 
The concept of "trade not aid" was central to Eisenhower's initial foreign 
economic policy. He strongly favoured liberalized trade and believed that, 
coupled with foreign private investment, it would make possible tempering 
and ultimately ending government assistance while fostering global growth. 
He believed just as strongly that the United States had to lead the fight against 
the centrifugal force of economic nationalism. Challenging protectionist 
sentiment in Congress, he requested a three-year extension of the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act in his first State of the Union address. "[S]timulating 
international trade" as the basis for "healthy growth" was a core component 
of NSC 162/2 27 
Aggressive anti-communism and liberal capitalist economic theory are linked more 
neatly by Michael Hogan, who writes: `if the Soviet threat suggested no limit on US 
defense spending, NSC 162 quickly countered with a long analysis of the connection 
between economic and military security. A sound economy was the bedrock of defense 
production, it said, not to mention higher living standards and free political 
institutions. ' This argument fits in with the `world-systems' theory interpreted by 
Thomas McCormick and Immanuel Wallerstein 29 McCormick, especially, sees the 
27 Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, Waging Peace (1998) pp 144-211 
29 Michael J Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945- 
1954 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p 406 
29 Thomas McCormick, America's Half-Century (1995); Immanual Wallerstein, The Modern World 
System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the World Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: 
Academic Press, 1974) Although dealing with a period well in advance of the Cold War era, Wallerstein 
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extension of the prevailing economic system as being a vital tool in a successful foreign 
policy by a hegemonic power. 30 
However, it is important not to apply too much emphasis to the aim of extending 
the American economic system; instead, it needs to be analysed alongside the security 
element of US policy so that a full appraisal of US aims and intentions can be reached. 
This approach was illustrated in the Introduction to this thesis by the quote taken from 
Robert Kagan and William Kristol's essay entitled "The Present Danger". Kagan and 
Kristol suggest that irrespective of the Soviet Union, the US would have sought to 
`promote' and `defend' a `decent world order' built upon American principles such as 
"free trade, free investment and free capital. " This was in keeping with sentiments 
expressed by President Eisenhower in a letter to his brother, Milton, in December 1954, 
telling him that, `in the case of South America we want to establish a healthy relationship 
that will be characterized by mutual cooperation and which will permanently endure. 
This will apply whether or not the Communist menace seems to increase or decrease in 
intensity. ' 31 
The reason that NSC 162/2, and the development of the New Look foreign policy, 
is important for this study of US-Latin American relations is that it reaffirms the 
contention that the US was pursuing two separate aims in the Cold War era. This was a 
global policy: the containment of the Soviet Union and the extension of the American 
economic system were the major objectives underpinning US policy and would remain so 
uses terms such as "core", "periphery" and "semi-periphery", which would be vital in the world-systems 
analysis that was applied to the Cold War period. 
30 He writes, `A single hegemonic power-has a built in incentive to force other nations to abandon their 
national capitalism and economic controls and to accept a world of free trade, free capital flows, and free 
currency convertibility. As the world's most dominant economic power, a hegemonic power has the most 
to gain from such a free world and the most to lose from nationalistic efforts to limit the free movement of 
capital, goods and currencies. ' Thomas McCormick, America's Half-Century (1995) p 4-5; David Ryan, 
US Foreign Policy in World History (London: Routledge, 2000) 
31 Letter from President Eisenhower to Dr. Milton Eisenhower, December 11954, DDE Diary December 
1954 (2), Box No 8, DDE Diary Series; see also: Letter from President Eisenhower to Mr Edgar N. 
Eisenhower, January 12 1954, DDE Diary, January 1954 (2), Box No 2, Whitman File, Eisenhower 
Library. 
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throughout Eisenhower's presidency. 32 NSC 162/2 would outline a policy that did not 
differ significantly from Truman-style containment. Although it would outline the threat 
of "massive retaliation", and reliance upon covert operations as a cost-effective way of 
conducting foreign policy, it would not instigate any major changes in US approach. It 
would, though, quash any lingering hopes that officials such as Walt Rostow and CD 
Jackson might have had that the administration could possibly adhere to its electoral 
promise to `roll-back the Iron Curtain. ' Crucially, in the context of this study, it gives a 
full appraisal of the perspective that the administration had of the Cold War and the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, it outlines the way that economic theory and the objective of 
expanding the American economic system were incorporated by US officials into a 
homogenous national security strategy. Whilst this may have been an adequate approach 
for Eastern Europe, though, it would lead to intense difficulties in Latin America. The 
main thrust of this thesis (and, indeed, this chapter) will be to examine the way that US 
policy proceeded in Latin America and to illustrate the inherent "tension" between 
economic sensibilities and national security that would continually manifest itself on the 
hemispheric relationship between Washington and the those nations south of the Rio 
Grande. As we shall see, once this global approach was applied to Latin America it 
would begin a prolonged period of frustration for US officials as their aims in the 
strategic sphere very often clashed with their aims in the economic sphere. The important 
point to note is the separation between the two objectives, despite them being 
incorporated into singular policy documents. The impact that this had on the US position 
in Latin America will become even more apparent in Chapter Two, which looks at US- 
Brazilian relations during the early Eisenhower period. There we will see that the clash 
between economic and security aims within US policy would have a serious impact on 
the US position in Brazil. 
FORGING A LATIN AMERICAN POLICY: THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DEBATE 
32 However, it would manifest itself differently depending on the characteristics of each individual area; 
therefore, US policy in Latin America was markedly different to that in Eastern Europe. 
34 
In keeping with the dominant trends in the historiography of the Cold War 
outlined in the Introduction of this thesis, the literature produced on US-Latin American 
relations during the Eisenhower era has also been beset by the impulse to cite US policy 
as having been motivated by either national security concerns or economic determinism. 
There is a clear absence of a study attempting to link these two elements of US policy 
and provide a more nuanced and comprehensive analysis of US policy in Latin America. 
In establishing the fact that there were two main aims underpinning US policy, we have 
already seen that the global policy of the Eisenhower administration would be one based 
around the objectives of `containing' the Soviet Union or any overt outbreak of anti- 
Americanism and the threat it was perceived to pose to the free world, and a widespread 
expansion of the American economic system and economic principles. These guiding 
ideals would remain true with respect to the administration's approach in Latin America; 
however, US policy there would be different in context to that outlined in NSC 162/2 
and would be designed to take into account the individual characteristics and 
requirements facing the Eisenhower administration in the region. First and foremost, the 
Soviet Union posed little discernible threat to Latin America. As a region, it remained 
very much a US "sphere of influence". This does not, though, mean that Cold War 
imperatives played no part in informing the Eisenhower administration's approach in the 
region. 
As we have already seen, any form of anti-American sentiment was deemed by 
Washington to be an issue of national security: this endured irrespective of whether that 
anti-Americanism was communist or nationalist in tone. 33 Nationalism or anti- 
Americanism would, in the context of the Manichean world view, be equated with 
communism and national security. US officials would come to view any economic or 
social doctrine different to that they prescribed as setting a dangerous precedent and 
therefore, becoming an issue of immediate concern within the Cold War framework. 
33 As David Ryan writes: 'Throughout the period from the 1940s onward, US policy reacted negatively to Third World nationalism that was driven by revolutionary groups or by economic models that detracted from the preferred US agenda for increasing liberalisation of trade and economic openness. This was not 
exactly new to US policy, but now it was conditioned by the Cold War constructs that lent it increasing intensity. Therefore independent or leftist nationalism was frequently undermined and was justified through ideologies derived from the new Cold War constructs. ' David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History 
(2000) p 140 
35 
Again, it is important to reiterate that this was not a deliberate construct imposed by US 
officials to make their policies more acceptable; it was a consequence of the way that the 
existing world order had evolved since 1945. As anti-Soviet rhetoric became a more 
accepted part of everyday American life, the pressure on US policymakers to construct a 
worldview around that rhetoric became overwhelming. 34 
Cold War imperatives, then, assumed a degree of importance within US-Latin 
American relations that was far removed from the area's actual importance vis-ä-vis the 
Soviet Union. However, it would (as the revisionist school suggests) be the economic 
aspect of the hemispheric relationship that would become the most important factor in 
inter-American relations. It would be this gap between economic and security concerns 
that would serve as the defining feature of the Eisenhower administration's policy in 
Latin America. The fact that both of them played an integral part in US strategy has 
fostered a divided literature. Both the Traditional and Revisionist schools have put 
forward strong arguments as to the nature of US policy at this time; but, as outlined in 
the Introduction, they have done so whilst reinforcing the traditional utilitarian constructs 
of Diplomatic History during the Cold War period. Traditional scholars35 have stressed 
the administration's preoccupation with "waging" the Cold War as being the most salient 
feature of diplomatic relationships in the Western Hemisphere, whilst the Revisionists36 
put forward the argument that US policy was dictated by their desire to defeat the threat 
of economic nationalism and expand the American economic system. 
Stephen Rabe asserts the role that east-west tensions played in determining US 
policy in Latin America in the 1953-4 period. He writes: 
The United States needed Latin America's support in the struggle with the 
Soviet Union, and it wanted to eliminate internal Communist subversion from 
34 It should be noted here that when Eisenhower came to office the era of McCarthyism was still in full 
flow. The Wisconsin Senator's "witch-hunt" against any he `accused' of being communist sympathisers 
had become a very prominent part of US life. As such, the pressure was on US officials not to relax their 
position with regard to its foreign policy. See: Edward R. Murrow, "The Menace of McCarthyism (1947- 
54) in John Pilger eds, Tell me no Lies: Investigative Journalism and its Triumphs (London: Vintage, 2005) 
26-45 
s Stephen Rabe; Mark Gilderhus; Joseph Smith and Cole Blasier for example 
36 James Siekmeier, Walter LaFeber, Matthew Loazya for example 
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the hemisphere. In pursuit of hemispheric solidarity, the Eisenhower 
administration would, in 1953 and 1954, offer money, medals, and military 
support to Latin American leaders who were anti-Communists, including 
those who were dictators. It would also prepare to destroy a popularly elected 
government in Guatemala. 37 
Rabe's argument considers US policy solely within the Cold War framework; all events 
relating to US policy in that area should, in his view, be related to the global struggle 
against the Soviet Union. Mark Gilderhus supports this, writing that, `During the 1950s, 
Cold War issues preoccupied the leaders of the Eisenhower administration in Latin 
America. Anticommunism, the hallmark of US policy, required order, stability, and 
constant vigilance against radical subversion. '38 The Revisionist case, however, puts 
forward a markedly different case. James Siekmeier writes, 
Washington officials main fear was that economic nationalism would 
undermine the inter-American economic system---that is, a system that 
promoted a freer flow of goods and investment between North and South 
America, and which had been nurtured by US officials since the late 19th 
century ... the United States wanted Latin America to industrialize 
in a way 
that would benefit the United States... for US policymakers, friendly United 
States-Latin American relations---a clear benefit for the norteamericanos39-- 
-rested on interdependent and strong economies in the region. 
0 
It is a viewpoint agreed with by Matthew Loayza, who highlights the `centrality of 
economic affairs to the inter-American policies' of the Eisenhower administration and 
writes, `for the duration of his presidency, Eisenhower and his advisors hoped to 
convince Latin American leaders to introduce liberal capitalist economic policies that 
facilitated the free flow of capital and commodities throughout the hemisphere. 41 
37 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower: The Foreign Policy of anti-Communism and Latin America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988) p 26 
38 Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: US Latin American Relations Since 1889 (Wilmington, Delaware: 
Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000) p 139 
39 Term used in Latin America, and which Siekmeier uses to denote the US Government. 
'0 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia and the United 
States 1945-61. (New York: The Edward Mellen Press, 1999) p 9-13; see also, Walter LaFeber, Inevitable 
Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1983) 2od 
edition 1994p 113-137 
" Matthew Loayza, "An `Aladdin's Lamp' for Free Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and 
Latin American Nationalism, 1953-61", Diplomacy and Statecraft (Volume 14, Number 3, September 
2003) pp 83-105 
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As we can see, academic opinion on the Eisenhower administration's early 
policies toward Latin America divides into the predominant schools of thought. 
However, as discussed earlier, such a neat division between economic determinism and 
national security does not give a comprehensive enough view of US policy during the 
Eisenhower era. The main problem is that neither approach takes a wide enough view of 
US policy: whilst there has been some overlap between the two, no one study has taken 
such an approach as its main rationale 42 It is this imbalance in the historiography that the 
argument outlined in this thesis addresses. As we will see in the remainder of this 
chapter, by adopting an analytical framework that considers both economic and strategic 
factors in US policy we not only get a fuller understanding of US policy toward Latin 
America, but we also reach a deeper appraisal of what is meant by the terms economic 
determinism and national security. National security objectives did not just mean anti- 
Soviet or, indeed, anti-Communist; it was applicable to any government that adopted a 
position that advocated an alternative model of development or economic radicalism - 
whether that was communist, nationalist or even neutralist. Similarly, economic 
determinism does not mean a policy based around the pure pursuit of profit for American 
institutions; instead, it builds upon the theories put forward by William Appleman 
Williams and scholars from the Wisconsin School like Lloyd Gardner, Thomas 
McCormick and Walter LaFeber. 43 This form of economic determinism maintains that 
US foreign economic policy was constructed around the central aim of developing a 
thriving and prosperous world economy with American models of development and 
American institutions at the heart of the global economic boom. 
The Eisenhower administration's policy in Latin America would be structured 
along the same lines as those which would inform the evolution of NSC 162/2 and the 
42 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) touches on the role that anti- 
communism played in US policy; Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America (2005) incorporates 
a more nuanced view of events; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) provides information on the economic 
aspect of US policy but, again, firmly within aCold War context 
43 For a good explanation of Williams and the Wisconsin School, see: Bruce Cumings, "Revising 
Postrevisionism, Or the Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History", in Michael Hogan eds America in the 
World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) p 30-4; Michael Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1987) p 8-11 
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New Look, although the emphasis between security and economics would be different to 
that outlined with respect to US policy towards the Soviet Union. This raises an obvious 
question: what did this mean with respect to the specifics of US policy in Latin America 
in 1953? Firstly, it meant that the US approach would be developed around the twin aims 
of expanding American economic influence and silencing any anti-American dissent, 
which could possibly be construed as being a boost for the Soviets; secondly, in keeping 
with the Manichean framework, US policy in both of these areas would be incorporated 
into homogenous policy documents - blurring the distinctions between the two and 
making it increasingly difficult for administration officials to perceive the problems that 
such a structure impacted upon their aims; and finally, it would be a policy rooted in 
America, concerned with American institutions and ideals and highly negligent of the 
hopes, aspirations and intentions of the Latin nations themselves. This one-sided 
approach would lead to intense pressures within the inter-hemispheric relationship that 
would increasingly come to undermine the US approach. Although the Traditional versus 
Revisionist debate does not wholly apply to US-Brazilian relations, those same themes 
that will be drawn out here will also be in evidence in those chapters looking at the 
relationship between Washington and Rio. 
FORGING A LATIN AMERICAN POLICY: NSC 144/1 - ECONOMIC EXPANSION 
AND "WINNING" THE COLD WAR 
The administration's first policy document for Latin America would be NSC 
144/1, which was implemented as government policy on March 18 1953. It emerged less 
than two months after Eisenhower came to office and, as such, is testament to the surety 
that the administration had about its approach in the Western Hemisphere. Not all 
members of the administration were pleased with the rapid production of the document. 
Walter Bedell Smith, the Under Secretary of State, described it as having been, `prepared 
in some haste and representing a shotgun approach. ' However, the speed with which 
the document emerged does signal that the administration had a clear conception of the 
" Memorandum of Discussion at the 137th Meeting of the National Security Council, March 18 1953, 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954. Volume IV The American Republics. (Washington: The 
United States Government Printing Office, 1983) p 2; Stephen Rabe (1988) p 31 
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issues facing them in the region. As with the policy discussions that would take place in 
the debate over the New Look policy, the US approach in Latin America would begin 
with the twin aims of expanding the American economic system and silencing anti- 
American dissent. With Rabe and Gilderhus arguing that the administration's approach 
was dictated solely by Cold War considerations, attention has focused heavily on the 
language used by Foster Dulles in his testimony before Congressional Committees. 
Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Dulles stated, `Conditions in 
Latin America are somewhat comparable to conditions as they were in China in the mid- 
thirties when the Communist movement was getting started. 945 Rabe confirms that `in 
executive congressional hearings, he testified that... "the trouble is that now, when you 
put it through the wringer, it comes out red. "'46 As Gabriel and Joyce Kolko argue, 
though, Dulles's testimonials before Congress were not always as straightforward as they 
initially seemed. 47 Dulles was perfectly aware that the use of stark rhetoric could gain the 
congressional approval he wanted for the administration's foreign policy and, as it had 
been in the presidential election, was clearly a vital political tool 48 
45 Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations Since 1899. (USA: Scholarly 
Resources Inc, 2000) p 141 
46 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 31; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 142 
47 Kolko writes, `Dulles' detractors regarded him as legalistic, given to excessive moralism, and somehow 
under the delusion that Christian doctrine specially guided him... one should not make too much of this 
interpretation, for, however much Dulles was attracted to Christian theology and talked about it, his 
conduct of diplomacy was of a radically different, much less ethereal order. Dulles was pragmatic and 
politically astute, and when forced to make a choice between obvious evils he did not delude himself about 
their meaning. His concern for congressional approval was far greater than his contemplation of the 
righteous theological course, and his deference to Congress inhibited his action time and again ... 
from the 
first day he addressed Congress ... 
he initiated the process of promising everything to everyone in Congress, 
from the "liberation" of Eastern Europe to peace, so that he might continue the main contours of America's 
historic expansion in the world. ' Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United 
States Foreign Policy 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972) p 678; see also, Leonard 
Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dulles and their Family Network (New 
York: The Dial Press, 1978) ; Richard Immerman ads, John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold 
War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) 
48 A more telling excerpt from the congressional record, though, is the 1954 exchange between Dulles and 
Senator Capehart of Indiana, which highlights the way that "communism" had become a somewhat 
confused term. As Siekmeier writes when introducing the quote, `the definition of communism... depended 
on the person using the term, and could be so broad as to include anyone or anything that opposed the 
United States. ' Senator Capehart pointed to this in 1954, telling Dulles: `[It] seems to me like all 
communism is is an attack upon the private ownership of property, period. ' The Secretary of State was 
somewhat candid in response, telling the Senator, 'I have great sympathy with that you say sir' James 
Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 164 
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At the NSC Meeting of February 18 1953, head of the CIA, Allen Dulles, 
outlined the problems facing the Eisenhower administration in Latin America. 49 He 
warned that the general situation in Latin America was, `deteriorating not only in terms 
of cordiality of relationships with the US, but. in the economic and political spheres of 
most of the Latin American states'; more worryingly, Dulles also noted that the region 
was susceptible to four major trends: `economic nationalism, regionalism, neutralism, 
and increasing Communist influence. '50 All of these trends were equally problematic for 
the US, especially given the emphasis that their foreign policy had on expanding foreign 
private investment. 51 In order to encourage private businesses to invest in Latin America, 
the region needed to be politically and economically stable: anti-American protests, 
seizure of privately owned land and property, and economic development outside of the 
US-prescribed model all needed to be prevented in order to make the region more 
attractive to private investors. This applied whether those events were inspired by 
communism, nationalism, anti-Americanism or neutralism; under the auspices of the 
Cold War, these ideologies were analysed not for those reasons underpinning them, but 
for their impact on US objectives. 
The aim for US officials was to develop a fully functioning and prosperous 
regional economy. James Siekmeier quotes Henry Holland52 in order to illustrate the 
desirability of such a policy, writing: "`jt)he economy of this hemisphere is a whole 
compromised of interrelated parts. The more smoothly those parts fit together, the 
stronger is the whole"' Siekmeier takes this point further, stating, 
49 Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 142 also cites this document but positions it solely within 
a Cold War context, writing: `Allen Dulles ... spoke of "deteriorating" relations with Latin America, marked by a "Communist infection" in Guatemala, and warned of an "approaching crisis"'. 
50 Memorandum of Discussion at the 132nd Meeting of the National Security Council, February 18 1953. 
DDE Papers, NSC Series, Whitman File. 
51 This was apparent in both the discussions for NSC 162/2 and the document itself. See: Robert Bowie and 
Richard Immerman, Waging Peace (1998); Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New Look National Security 
Policy (1995); See tdso Burton Kaufman, Trade and Aid (1982) who writes: 'By sharply cutting back on 
foreign aid and substituting an expanded program of foreign trade and private investment abroad, the 
president hoped to ensure a sound domestic economy and world economic growth at the same time' p 14; 
Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise" (2003) writes: 'In regard to economic matters, 
his [Eisenhower's] administration sought to convince other world leaders to accept the rules of a liberal 
capitalist world system based on the free flow of capital and commodities' p 85 
52 Holland would replace John Moors Cabot as Assistant Secretary of State for inter-American affairs in 
1954. 
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With this observation, Holland succinctly summed up why Washington 
leaders desired to suppress Latin American economic nationalism... in 
Holland's ideal inter-American system, comparative advantage should rule: 
countries would produce and sell only those items that they could produce 
more cheaply and more efficiently than competitors. That meant that Latin 
Americans would be destined to produce and export relatively low-profit raw 
materials, and would S urchase relatively high-profit manufactured goods 
from the United States. 
The sections contained within NSC 144/1 would be partly designed to achieve these 
economic aims; however, they would also have a strong national security element 
running through them, as the administration unconsciously sought to bring its twin 
objectives for the region together into one policy statement. Again, it is worth reiterating 
that this doubled-edged approach underpinning US foreign policy at this time was not a 
deliberate construct; it was a result of the way that US post-war aims had competed with 
evolving national security concerns in the period between 1945 and 1950. The next stage 
in this chapter is to consider US aims in both the economic and the security spheres 
separately and how they were outlined in NSC 144/1, before drawing out the major 
themes from this policy and depicting the tension that this twin approach impacted upon 
US policy in Latin America. 
NSC 144/ 1- PART 1: ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES 
The centrality of economic considerations to the administration's approach was 
highlighted at the NSC meeting of March 18. During the meeting, several members of 
the administration made it clear that they felt the draft policy document did not go far 
enough in attempting to foster a climate in Latin America that encouraged the spread of 
foreign private investment. Harold Stassen, the former Governor of Minnesota and head 
of the Foreign Operations Administration, told the meeting: `while on the whole he was 
pleased with the report [NSC 144/1], it failed to take into account with sufficient force 
one point that he felt to be of very great importance. It did not reflect the need for Latin 
S3 James Siekmeier, Aic4 Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 155-56; Holland quote taken 
from Robert Burr and Arthur Schlesinger Jr, eds. Dynamics of World Power (New York, 1973) p 286-7 
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American capitalists and business men to provide better treatment for their workers and 
to take a more progressive and responsible role in the development of the economies of 
their countries. ' Treasury Secretary, George Humphrey, agreed, outlining his belief that 
in order to expand the American economic system and to encourage further growth in 
Latin America the US should use high-ranking business officials to publicise the US 
doctrine of economic liberalism. `If we could find a few first-rate business men and send 
them as our ambassadors to the key Latin American nations, ' Humphrey said, `it would 
do far more good than any amount of money we could dole out. ' Yet economic 
objectives were only part of the program outlined in NSC 144/1. 
The actual objectives outlined in the document were: 
A. Hemisphere solidarity in support of our world policies, particularly in the 
UN and other international organizations; B. An orderly political and 
economic development in Latin America so that the states in the area will be 
more effective members of the hemisphere system and increasingly 
important participants in the economic and political affairs of the free world; 
C. The safeguarding of the hemisphere, including sea and air approaches, by 
individual and collective defensive measures against external aggression 
through the development of indigenous military forces and local bases 
necessary for hemisphere defense; D. The reduction and elimination of the 
menace of internal Communist or other anti-US subversion. E. Adequate 
production in Latin America of, and access by the United States to, raw 
material essential to US security; F. Support by Latin America of collective 
action in defense of other areas of the free world; G. The ultimate 
standardization of Latin American military organization, training, doctrine 
and equipment along US lines. 55 
Wide-ranging in scope, the aims outlined in the first part of the document illustrate the 
multi-faceted nature of the administration's policy towards Latin America, with the 
objectives being specifically designed to attain US aims in both the economic and 
security spheres. The overriding problem for the administration was how to link their 
objectives in the different spheres. In formulating the document, US officials had been 
54 Memorandum of Discussion at the 137"' Meeting of the National Security Council, March 18 1953 FRUS 
1952-1954 Volume IV p 2-6 
"Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, NSC 144/1, March 18 1953 FRUS 
1952-1954 Volume IVp 6-10 
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motivated by two striking issues that they needed to address in the region: the reshaping 
of US-Latin economic relations along the lines of "free trade, free capital and free 
investment" and, the stemming of the rising tide of anti-American nationalism in the 
region, which in the bipolar framework of the Cold War was being perceived by 
administration officials as an increasingly dangerous challenge to US credibility. 
However, as NSC 144/1 and the annex which fed into the document highlighted, officials 
within the Eisenhower administration were aware of the potential incompatibility of their 
goals. 
As well as the objectives outlined above, NSC 144/1 also depicted some of the 
major themes in the inter-hemispheric relationship. In fact, the document illustrated the 
extent of the problem facing the US in Latin America and also analysed the reason for 
the growing level of nationalism in the area. It stated: 
There is a trend in Latin America toward nationalistic regimes maintained in 
large part by appeals to the masses of the population. Concurrently, there is 
an increasing popular demand for immediate improvement in the low living 
standards of the masses, with the result that most Latin American 
governments are under intense domestic pressures to increase production and 
to diversify their economies... A realistic and constructive approach to this 
need which recognizes the importance of bettering conditions for the general 
population, is essential to arrest the drift in the area toward radical and 
nationalistic regimes. The growth of nationalism is facilitated by historic anti- 
US prejudices and exploited by the communists. % 
Despite recognising this, though, the document itself would not go on to formulate a 
viable solution for addressing this major problem. Instead, it would remain solely 
concerned with the twin aims of expanding the American economic system and in 
seeking to silence anti-American nationalism. It is here that we begin to discern the 
overriding contradiction within the Eisenhower administration's policy: although 
recognising the challenge that Latin nationalism posed to them, US officials would fail to 
engage with the issue successfully and prove unable to design a viable solution. As 
Siekmeier writes, `the United States wanted Latin America to develop, but not into a 
strong competitor that could hurt the dominant US economic position. ' However, this led 
56 Ibid; also quoted in: David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000) p 153 
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to its own problems as, `limited Latin American economic growth would not be able to 
provide for the growing populations of the region. '57 Constrained by their economic and 
security principles, the Eisenhower administration would not adequately outline a 
solution to this problem in NSC 144/1. 
Although the problem of increasing nationalism had been outlined by the 
administration in NSC 144/1, it did not put forward an adequate solution to the problem 
of underdevelopment in the region. Deep-rooted economic imperatives remained to the 
fore, and in the economic section of the document, Clause Seven outlined the 
administration's economic approach. It read: 
The United States should seek to assist in the economic development of 
Latin America by: 
a. Encouraging Latin American governments to recognize that the bulk of 
the capital required for their economic development can best be supplied by 
private enterprise and that their own self-interest requires the creation of a 
climate which will attract private investment. 
b. Continuing the present level of International Bank loans and Export- 
Import Bank loans, and where appropriate, accelerating and increasing 
them, as a necessary supplement to foreign private investment... 
The economic section of the document would not outline how the administration 
could address the crushing financial disparity that was so prevalent in the majority of the 
Latin nations, and as Stephen Rabe highlights, in signing the paper President Eisenhower 
was signalling that `he would not endorse any new military or economic aid program for 
Latin America until there was a complete review of policy. '58 The annex that fed into 
NSC 144/1 would outline the impact that such an economic approach was having on US 
aims in the region: `The people of Latin America are becoming increasingly aware that 
90% of the wealth of the Western Hemisphere (less Canada) is produced by one of the 
American republics - the United States - while 10% is produced by the remaining 20 
57 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 158; Matthew Loayza, "An 
Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise" (2003) illustrates the problems faced by the administration in facing 
up to the nationalist/communist threat, writing: `Although US policymakers viewed the rise of nationalist 
and communist sentiment in Latin America with alarm, their responses to these two threats to US interests 
were muted and ineffective' p 84 
sa Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, NSC 144/1, March 18 1953 FRUS 1952-1954 
Volume 1V p 6-10; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 32 
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American states. ' Such disparity was inevitably breeding resentment, and as a result, `a 
doctrine labelled "nationalism" or "colonialism" has gained wide popular acceptance in 
the area. '59 The Eisenhower administration, then, clearly recognised that Latin economic 
nationalism was being engendered by the financial disparity that existed within the 
region. Siekmeier recognises this and outlines the administration's approach to 
"defeating" economic nationalism but, crucially, he also recognises how it was conflated 
with Cold War imperatives: `The solution to containing communism... was the same as 
the answer to containing nationalism --- to expand and strengthen the inter-American 
economic system. '60 Yet this approach does not go far enough, as it neglects to provide 
an explanation for those elements of US policy that were clearly concerned solely with 
security but that did not form part of the administration's economic strategy; as a result, 
the contradictions that emerged between US aims in the economic sphere and US aims in 
the security sphere are not dealt with sufficiently by either school of thought. And it is 
those security elements of US policies that we need to consider next. 
NSC 144/1- PART 2: NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
As we have seen, there was clearly a strong economic element running through 
US policy toward Latin America as outlined in NSC 144/1. As Sielaneier (and the 
Revisionists) contend, the administration wanted to "defeat" Latin economic nationalism 
in order that they might expand the American system throughout the hemisphere and 
protect the health of the US economy. However, the analysis of NSC 144/1's economic 
agenda provided above also illustrates the fact that within those economic objectives 
59 Annex to NSC 144 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America", 
March 6 1953, NSC 144 - Latin America (2), Box No 4, Office of the Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, Eisenhower Library. The annex to NSC 144 gives a great deal of attention to the poverty 
in Latin America, as well as outlining the basic problems facing the US in the region: '(1) A wide-spread 
tendency toward immediate political change which produces instability, weakness and demagoguery; (2) a 
great disparity in wealth and power between the United States and Latin America which, aided by old 
prejudices, keeps alive anti-Americanism and stimulates economic nationalism; and (3) communism. ' 
60 James Siekmeier, Aiaa Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999); It is an approach reaffirmed by 
Walter LaFeber, who writes, `Eisenhower and Dulles consequently fell back on the old approach of 
emphasizing private investment and Export-Import Bank loans, then supplemented this approach with 
increased military ties' Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993) p 111 
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there was a strong link to elements of national security. Although the administration had 
recognised that the growth of nationalism in the region was linked to the huge social and 
economic disparity that was so prevalent in the region, its adherence to its strict fiscal 
principles meant that it had not addressed the burning issue posed by NSC 144/1 - how 
to halt the rising tide of nationalism in Latin America? It is here that the crux of the 
problem with the administration's approach fully emerges; for it is the tension that would 
emerge between this basic economic aim and US strategic objectives that would become 
the defining feature of the Eisenhower administration's policy. 
According to NSC 144/1, the March 6 annex to the original draft of the 
document, and leading members of the administration at NSC meetings in February and 
March, there was a clear understanding that Latin nationalism would continue to develop 
whilst the vast majority of Latin people continued to live in poverty. The solution, put 
forward in the final draft of March 18, was the widespread expansion of US economic 
principles. The defeat of Latin nationalism would, ultimately, benefit not only the United 
States (as it matched their original post-war aim of economic preponderance) but also the 
Latin nations themselves. There was, though, a crucial problem with this approach: it did 
not fit the policy pursued by the administration in the security sphere and, as such, 
created an irreconcilable tension in US policy that would only become fully apparent 
when the strategy was applied to individual countries 61 
As we have seen already, officials within the Eisenhower administration were 
content that the Soviet Union posed no immediate threat to Latin America. Despite the 
deteriorating situation in Guatemala, any fears of actual Soviet expansion into the area 
were comfortingly low. As Siekmeier argues, 'US policymakers... rarely discussed the 
prospect of Soviet-backed regimes coming to power in the region, in part, because the 
threat was small. ' We have, though, established the fact that in spite of this, 
Eisenhower officials were burdened with the increasing need to be seen to be winning 
the Cold War; an inflammatory election rhetoric and the nature of the East-West conflict 
61 For example Guatemala later in this chapter and Brazil in Chapter 2: however, it is a model that endures 
throughout the region. 
62 James Siebeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 166 
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that had developed since 1945, meant that the US could not afford to allow any form of 
anti-Americanism to develop in the region. To do so would, in the minds of US officials, 
invite criticism of being `soft' on communism and undermine the validity of the 
Eisenhower administration and the prestige of the American system. It was this aim that 
would form the basis of the administration's approach in the national security field in 
this early period. In an effort to quell Latin determinism and vocal dissonance, the 
administration would continue the Truman administration's policy of seeking close 
cooperation with Latin dictators 63 
Administration officials viewed the support of Latin America's dictators as being 
the most efficient way of silencing anti-American dissent, a trend that fits into a wider 
discourse on the condescending attitude that many officials in Washington had of the 
Latin American's capacity for dealing with democracy. In the objectives listed for NSC 
144/1, it had been that which outlined `the reduction and elimination of the menace of 
internal Communist or other anti-US subversion' that had most directly addressed the 
national security issues that the administration perceived to be confronting them in Latin 
America. The vague language between `Communist' and `other anti-US subversion' 
highlights the blurring of any previous distinctions between communism and 
nationalism: for US officials in the 1950s, all anti-Americanism was a threat of strategic 
importance. 65 The document advocated, `a greater utilization of the Organization of 
63 This had been a prevalent theme in US policy since 1950, when George Kennan visited the region. 
Gaddis Smith describes Kennan's subsequent report: `The report, per se, did not influence policy. But as an 
unvarnished statement of widely held attitudes and for its claim that the Monroe Doctrine justified, indeed 
demanded, support by the United States for repressive political regimes in Latin America, it is a seminal 
document. ' Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine 1945-1993 (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1994) p 68. For more on Kennan's trip, see: Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America (2005) p 
115-118; Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993) who quotes Kennan's report, stating 'it is better to 
have a strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by 
communists' p 109; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 134-136 
64 Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998) examines the history of US racial attitudes towards Latin 
America; for the wider view see: Michael Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987); Max Paul Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: 
Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations", Diplomatic History (Volume 27, Number 
5, November 2(03) pp 621-636; Annex to NSC 144 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with 
Respect to Latin America", March 6 1953, NSC 144 - Latin America (2), Box No 4, Office of the Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Library 
65 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000) 
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American States', as this would confer hemispheric legitimacy upon US actions and 
would `avoid the appearance of unilateral action and identify our interests with those of 
the other American states. ' In addition, the document also outlined a number of avenues 
that would provide for US intervention in particular circumstances, stating that though 
the US should refrain `from overt unilateral intervention in the internal political affairs of 
the other American states', this did not `preclude multilateral action through the inter- 
American system. ' Finally, NSC 144/1 recommended the `assisting through the OAS, or 
by such other means as may be available, those American states which are resisting 
pressures from their neighbours, whenever such pressures are inimical to US interests 
and the inter-American system. ' However, as Rabe points out, the Annex to NSC 144/1 
offered evidence that the administration would `consider' unilateral intervention in the 
hemisphere if `overriding security interests' so dictated. 
The national security interests of the administration in Latin America, then, 
outlined an approach that was geared up to challenge any form of communist or other 
anti-US subversion and, which would, if possible, seek to act through the auspices of the 
OAS; only resorting to unilateral intervention if no other option appeared viable. In the 
bipolar framework that now dominated US officials' appraisal of world events, silencing 
Latin nationalism was imperative. However, expanding the economic system of the US 
throughout Latin America was of equal importance for the administration and, as shown 
in this chapter, the two goals would dominate the intentions of NSC 144/1. This, though, 
would impose an overwhelming and irreconcilable tension upon US policy in the region: 
the aim of expanding "free trade, free investment and free capital" throughout the region 
would be consistently hindered by the Cold War expediency of supporting authoritarian 
leaders who were repressing social and economic reform. In Chapter Two we will 
witness the impact that this tension had on US-Brazilian relations, with the relationship 
between Washington and Rio de Janeiro being directly affected by those elements that 
have been outlined in this chapter. However, perhaps the clearest way to illustrate the 
66 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, NSC 144/1, March 18 1953 FRUS 1952-1954 
Volume IV p 6-10; Annex to NSC 144 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to 
Latin America", March 6 1953, NSC 144 - Latin America (2), Box No 4, Office of the Special Assistant 
for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower Library; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 32 
49 
way that this tension impacted upon US aims and objectives is by examining US policy 
towards Guatemala, leading up to the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in June 
1954. It will become clear that the intervention in Guatemala was, in fact, a stark 
demonstration of the inherent problems within US policy in Latin America; not a 
definitive demonstration of Washington's economic or national security agenda. 
GUATEMALA: A CRISIS OF ECONOMIC AND SECURITY PROPORTIONS 
The case study of Guatemala has been a source of both high intrigue and intense 
speculation by scholars of US-Latin American relations. Like much of the field, a 
historiographical divide has arisen over the exact causes behind US intervention in 1954. 
Again, these competing schools of thought have generally formed into two camps: 
firstly, that which argues that the US was motivated by Cold War concerns (they thought 
Arbenz was a communist; Arbenz was a communist)67; and secondly, the opposite view, 
which contends that US intervention was motivated by Arbenz's actions in seizing a 
huge tract of land from the all-powerful United Fruit Company or for more general 
economic reasons. 8 It is the contention of this thesis, though, that US intervention was 
motivated by both economic and security considerations and that, crucially, it was only 
the two factors working in tandem that provided the catalyst for US intervention. Had US 
policy been motivated by solely economic or Cold War considerations then it is doubtful 
that they would have intervened to overthrow Arbenz; an indication for this comes from 
67 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) see Chapter Three; Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala 
(Texas: Univeristy of Texas Press, 1983); Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: US Responses to 
Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1915-1985 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976) 
Revised Edition 1985; Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 
1944-1954. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991); Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe 
Doctrine (1994) 
"James Siekmeier, Aiat Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999); Walter LaFeber, Inevitable 
Revolutions (1993); David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000); David Ryan, "US Ideology 
and Central American Revolutions in the Cold War", in Will Fowler eds. Ideologues and Ideologies in 
Latin America (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997); Stephen Schlesinger & Stephen Kinzer, 
Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Harvard University, Revised Edition, 2005); 
Blanche Wiesen-Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, 1981) 
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the stark contrast between the evolution of events in Guatemala and those in Bolivia69, 
which highlights the fact that US intervention was, in fact, a result of a particular set of 
circumstances and was not representative of the administration's approach to Latin 
America. 
The history of the 1944 Guatemalan Revolution has been covered thoroughly 
elsewhere by specialist scholars70: it is sufficient here to state that since overthrowing the 
much-reviled dictator Jorge Ubico, Presidents Juan Jose Arevalo and, latterly, Jacobo 
Arbenz had followed a program of ongoing social and economic reform that greatly 
troubled US officials in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. It was not just 
Guatemalan social and economic reform that perturbed US officials, though; Arbenz's 
overt demonstration of thriving Guatemalan nationalism was becoming increasingly 
serious for an American government that, as we have already seen, viewed the spread of 
nationalist sentiment in alarming terms. This section will outline the reasons that the 
situation in Guatemala became such an overwhelming issue of importance for the 
Eisenhower administration; identify the key themes within that evolving position - 
highlighting the presence of clearly identifiable US objectives with respect to both 
economic and security considerations, and; detail the way the administration mobilised 
Latin support and why, ultimately, they had to adopt a unilateral solution. 
Much has been made by some academics looking at US intervention in 
Guatemala of the high-level links between the dominant United Fruit Company" and 
69 Where a similarly revolutionary regime was "de-radicalized" by US aid and support rather than 
overthrown. See: James Siekmeier, "Persistent Condor and Predatory Eagle: The Bolivian Revolution and 
the United States, 1952-1964" in Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, 
the Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War (2006); Kenneth Lehman, "Revolutions and 
Attributions: Making Sense of Eisenhower Administration Policies in Bolivia and Guatemala" in 
Diplomatic History (Spring 1997) 
70 For information on the Guatemalan Revolution and the policies it followed, see: Piero Gleijeses, 
Shattered Hope (1991); James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999); Richard 
Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala (1983); Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States (1999) also provides 
some context pp 337-344; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) pp 42-46 
71 United Fruit, or UFCO, dominated the Guatemalan economy and most of its infrastructure, controlling all 
the major road networks and owning the sole major port in the region. It was also, comfortably, the leading 
land-owner in the nation. As a result, Guatemala's economy was semi-feudal and backwards; reliant solely 
upon the activities of UFCO. See: Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope (1991); Stephen Kinzer and Stephen 
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several leading members within the Eisenhower administration. 72 Conspiracy theories 
have abounded, but it can be strongly argued that ties between the administration and 
United Fruit are of secondary importance in this situation: instead, there is a wider theme 
to engage with. 73 Arbenz's economic reforms did not just threaten UFCO, but also, the 
economic hegemony of the US throughout Latin America. As Siekmeier writes, `the 
Guatemalan Revolution directly threatened not only the control US economic interests 
traditionally held over the Guatemalan economy, but norteamericano economic 
hegemony in Latin America. Guatemalan economic nationalism... threatened 
Washington leaders' concept of the only acceptable inter-American economic system. '74 
The fact that there was more at stake than simply the expropriation of United Fruit's 
property is highlighted by Walter LaFeber in his analysis of Foster Dulles' response to 
Arbenz's Agrarian Reform. 75 The Reform, implemented in 1951, appropriated land that 
was currently not in use and, which would be compensated by using those values on the 
landowners own tax returns in the previous year. 76 Secretary Dulles rejected this 
proposal as he wanted the act to be repealed. As LaFeber states: `If Dulles could force 
restoration, the Agrarian Reform Law and its multi-fold implications for Guatemalan 
development would be dealt a near-fatal blow, the United States economic leverage 
enhanced, and the Good Neighbor system saved. '77 
Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit (1982; James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 
214-5 
72 It is true that both Dulles brothers, Assistant Secretary John Moors Cabot and Eisenhower's personal 
secretary, Ann Whitman, all had strong ties to UFCO See: Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States (1998) 
p 337-8; James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) Chapter 5; Gaddis Smith, 
The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine (1994) p 79; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 58; this 
speculation was increased by the administration's decision in June 1953 to `suspend' an Anti-Trust suit 
against United Fruit as, found by the NSC, the `filing of an anti-trust suit at this time would effect adversely 
the national security, particularly the conduct of foreign relations, of the United States. ' Memorandum by 
Executive Secretary James Lay for the members of the National Security Council, June 11953, NSC 152/3 
- US Economic Defense Policy (2), Box No 5, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
Eisenhower Library 
73 Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America (2005) pp 118-123 
74 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 227; Walter LaFeber, 
Inevitable Revolutions (1993) p 121-7 
7' For details on Arbenz's land reform act, which expropriated a large swathe of United Fruits' land, see: 
Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope (1991); Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 45-7; James Siekmeier, A14 
Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 219-222; Blanche-Wiesen Cook, The Declassified 
Eisenhower (1981) p 224-7 
76 Blanche Wiesen-Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (1981) p 224-5 
77 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993) p 122; James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter- 
American Relations p 221 
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There was, then, clearly a strong economic theme underpinning Washington's 
long-held hostility towards Arbenz. His implementation of economic and development 
policies that were outside of those prescribed by the US immediately made him a concern 
for US officials. As Siekmeier has contended, Arbenz's `land reform, perhaps the most 
serious challenge of any Central American nation to the United States domination of the 
region's economy, endangered the stability of the isthmus. '78 However, this is not enough 
on its own to make intervention and the overthrow of Arbenz inevitable79; to fully 
understand why the Eisenhower administration decided to move for Arbenz's removal 
from power, we need to consider the Cold War constructs that also underpinned US 
policies in the region at this time. We have already seen that within the Eisenhower 
administration "nationalism" was being conflated with "communism. " Arbenz was 
certainly a nationalist, and his overt championing of a developmental model outside of 
that proposed by the US made him a serious national security concern. In the bipolar 
framework of the Cold War, all dissent was, in effect, a potential boost for the Soviets 
and a threat to the American system. Arbenz, therefore, could not be allowed to keep on 
flouting American hegemony. Allen Dulles encapsulated this growing feeling within the 
administration when he wrote: `They have flaunted us and consistently got away with it. 
It is time they were brought to realize that this could not continue. '80 
Initially, this branding of Arbenz as a communist could be said to stem from the 
fact that he was pursuing an alternative model of development. As David Ryan writes, 
78 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 221 
79 For evidence of US policy in a nation that was a threat of solely economic considerations, a view of their 
approach with respect to the Bolivian Revolution is recommended. There, as in Guatemala, a revolutionary 
regime had seized power and embarked on a policy based on economic radicalism and expropriation. 
However, instead of undermining it, Washington actually decided to `de-radicalise' the revolutionary 
government through the use of economic aid in certain areas, which would bring the Bolivian government 
much closer to the US. For a detailed analysis of this, and the difference between it and the Guatemalan 
case study, see: James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) Chapter 5; 
Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) Chapter 4; Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant (1985); Kenneth Lehman, 
"Revolutions and Attributions: Making Sense of Eisenhower Administration Policies in Bolivia and 
Guatemala", Diplomatic History (Volume 21, Number 2, Spring 1997) pp 185-213; James Siekmeier, 
"Persistent Condor and Predatory Eagle" (2006) 
80 Memorandum for the Record, by the Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, March 8th 1953. 
Susan K. Holly, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954. Guatemala. (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 2003) P 79 
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`Attempts to depart from or to significantly alter the preferred US interpretation of the 
system was, in the prevailing Manichean outlook, seen as a threat from communism, 
axiomatically linked to the Soviet Union. '81 However, in the era of McCarthyism, and 
against a backdrop of increasing tensions between the US and the Soviet Union, the use 
of the term "communist" quickly raised the stakes with respect to the US stance against 
Arbenz. Matters were made even more inflammatory by the efforts of the United Fruit 
Company who, rallying against Arbenz's land reform and diluting of their influence, 
mounted a wide-scale public relations program to `prove' that Arbenz was indubitably a 
communist and, therefore, that he had to be removed from power. 82 By the spring of 
1953, it had become a matter of US prestige and credibility that Arbenz be removed from 
office, and to ensure that the American system was restored in Guatemala. We can, 83 
81 David Ryan, "US Ideology and Central American Revolutions in the Cold War" (1997); David Ryan, US 
Foreign Policy in World History (2000) p 153-4 
82 The efforts of UFCO were wide-ranging and, as such, have been given a thorough examination by 
academics of the period, see: James Siekmeier, Aia Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) who 
writes, `One energetic lobbyist for UFCO was crucial in both tagging Arbenz as a communist and 
convincing the National Security Council that it should install a leader amenable to foreign-investment 
driven capitalist development' p 222-3; Blanche Wiesen-Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (1981) writes, 
`as soon as the agrarian reform law was published, the UFCO went into high gear. The company's chief 
weapon was to charge "communism"... Edward L. Bernays, "the father of public relations, " a master 
manipulator... directed psychological warfare for United Fruit' p 226; Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United 
States (1997) p 338 
83 This fact, raised some dissent within the administration over the US role in Guatemala, as Washington's 
European allies played down American fears about the damage that the situation there posed to US 
credibility. Louis Halle informed Robert Bowie of the Policy Planning Staff that `the widespread 
impression abroad is: (a) that the US has become hysterical about the communist menace so that it is losing 
its head in dealing with it; and (b) that this is leading the US to commit acts of international lawlessness. ' 
Such sentiments did not tame the American approach and, in fact, the administration sought to coerce 
European support for their Guatemalan policy. This came in the shape of a phone call between Dulles and 
the US Ambassador at the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge. Once the OAS had mandated hemispheric 
action against any communist led country, and Arbenz had been labelled undeniably as a communist by the 
evidence of the arms shipment, the only remaining obstacle was the UN. Guatemala tabled a motion 
alleging US aggression, a move that much to Eisenhower's annoyance was not immediately renounced by 
Britain and France. Dulles called Ambassador Lodge and informed him: `The President said he thinks that 
you should let the British and French know that if they take independent line backing Guatemalan move in 
this matter, it would mean we would feel entirely free without regard to their position in relation to any of 
their colonial problems ... if they feel they can take independent line, the counterpart will be that they must 
consider that we will be free equally to be independent when any of the matters such as North Africa, 
Middle East etc come up before the UN. ' The failure of US officials to heed European advice over their 
"credibility" is markedly similar to the situation that emerged in 1963 when President John F. Kennedy 
ignored international opinion over the issue of US credibility in Vietnam. Memorandum from Louis Halle 
to Robert Bowie, 23 June 1954, Records of the Policy Planning Staff 1954, Record Group 59, Lot 65D101, 
Box 79, National Archives, College Park, Maryland; David Ryan, "US Ideology and Central American 
Revolutions (1997); Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles and Ambassador Lodge, June 24th 1954. Box No7 DDE Diary June 1954 (1), DDE Diary Series. 
Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library. Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) also includes details of this 
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therefore, clearly see that the US had both economic and, crucially, security motivations 
for becoming embroiled in Guatemala. US intervention was a stark demonstration of the 
twin aims that underpinned US policy in Latin America; intervention would have been 
highly unlikely without the confluence of the two separate aims within US policy. 
Once the decision was taken to oppose Arbenz, the US quickly began to 
implement a strategy aimed at bringing about his removal from office. The US began to 
use military assistance to Guatemala's neighbours as a tool by which to try and 
"encourage" the Guatemalan military (who were moderately opposed to Arbenz) to 
instigate a coup. The Division of Research for Latin America in the Department of State 
outlined the administration's thinking behind their approach to supply Honduras, EI 
Salvador and Nicaragua with military materiel. 
Assuming an effectively initiated and sustained program of military 
assistance to El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, together with an equally 
effective isolation of Guatemala in the hemisphere, it is likely that the 
opposition to Arbenz will become more critical and militant and that 
important Army and political leaders now supporting Arbenz will calculate 
that the present regime is not in the best interests of either the nation or 
themselves. 85 
Louis Halle, the State Department official predominantly concerned with 
Guatemala, repeated this sentiment in his policy paper "Our Guatemalan Policy", when 
he wrote: `We have been withholding military equipment from Guatemala and have been 
concluding military agreements with Guatemala's neighbors that would call for 
supplying them with such equipment. This policy was calculated to create dissatisfaction 
conversation, citing Lodge's report that Eisenhower's `announcement was received with great solemnity' 
by Britain and France p 60; for information on the Vietnam situation see: Frederik Logevall, Choosing 
War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the War in Vietnam (Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1999) 
84 Coupled with the deliberate efforts to cut any military aid to Guatemala from either the US or any of her 
European allies. The American Ambassador in Sweden admitted that the `Guatemalans were frantically 
trying to buy arms in Western Europe, ' but were unable to due to concerted US efforts at persuading their 
allies not to sell to them. Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 36 
85 Special Paper Prepared in the Division of Research for Latin America, Department of State, May 26 
1953, FRUS 1952-1954 Guatemala p91 
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in the Guatemalan Army. '86 Eventually the pressure told on Arbenz and, in desperation, 
he purchased a consignment of arms from the Czech government in the spring of 1954.87 
The US seized on the shipment of arms from the Soviet bloc as being irrefutable proof of 
Arbenz's communist tendencies. Halle saw the shipment as being both positive and 
negative: on the one hand, `the fact that Guatemala can and does buy arms from behind 
the Iron Curtain in defiance or contempt of the US may hurt our prestige in the 
Hemisphere and elsewhere. It also sets a bad example inside the Hemisphere, suggesting 
alternatives to dependence on the US. ' This was tempered though with the belief that, 
`the shipment has a favorable effect on US security interests to the extent that it arouses 
other Latin American states to the danger posed by Communist influence in 
Guatemala. '88 Stephen Rabe is more assured of the benefits that Arbenz's actions gave to 
US efforts to oust him. `The arms shipment seemed to be the final piece of proof that 
Communists dominated Guatemala and were aiming to expand communism throughout 
Central America. '89 
By the time that Arbenz received the Czech consignment of arms, Foster Dulles 
had already obtained a mandate to act against Arbenz from the other Latin nations at the 
tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas, Venezuela in 1954.90 Although Latin 
support had not been as unanimous as Dulles had been hoping for, he had, through the 
use of a promise of holding an economic conference later in the year, obtained an overt 
anti-communist hemispheric resolution. The shipment of arms from the Czech 
government removed the burden of proof from the administration's shoulders: Arbenz 
was undoubtedly a communist91 and the US had the hemispheric authority to intervene 
86 Memorandum by Louis Halle, "Our Guatemalan Policy", May 28 1954. FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV pp 
1140-1147 
87 Kenneth Lehman, "Revolutions and Attributions" (1997) 
88 Memorandum by head of the Policy Planning Staff, Louis Halle, "Our Guatemalan Policy", May 28 
1954, FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV pp 1140-1147 
89 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 57 
90 Dulles faced an intense battle at Caracas, much more problematic than he had been anticipating. For full 
details, see: David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000); Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) 
Chapter 3; James Siekmeier, Ai4 Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) Chapters 4 and 5; 
Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000); Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine (1994) 
80-82; Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope (1991) 
9' Or, at least, in the words of Ambassador John Peurifoy, he would `do until one comes along' David 
Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000) p 154 
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multilaterally. Instead, of multilateral intervention, though, the US would pursue a 
unilateral overthrow of Arbenz through covert operations. 92 The result, however, was the 
same and Arbenz fled from Guatemala on June 30 1954; in his place was put Castillo 
Armas, whose accession to power would usher in an era of dictatorship, totalitarianism 
and repression. 
US-backed intervention in Guatemala would change the shape of US-Latin 
American relations indelibly. It shattered the myth that the "good neighbour" policy was 
still in existence, and as Gaddis Smith strongly asserts: `When the truth became known 
in the years ahead, the whole affair would do great damage to any lingering pretension 
that truth and the Monroe Doctrine as applied in the Cold War years were sisters. 93 The 
American role had been informed by both economic and strategic considerations: the 
willingness of Arbenz to operate outside of the American economic system, and the 
Manichean framework that US officials used to analyse his overt nationalism, made 
intervention inevitable. It would, though, be the exception rather than the norm in US 
affairs in Latin America during the Eisenhower era. Intervention in Guatemala followed 
on closely from a similar episode in Iran in 1953. However, such incidents of directly 
undermining or attempting to remove the government of another country would occur 
during the Eisenhower era only when there was a simultaneous threat to both US 
economic and security interests. (The most obvious example is, of course, Cuba where 
US opposition to Castro would arise due to the fact that Cuban policies threatened both 
economic and security interests of the US - this will be discussed in Chapter Five). 
94 
More typical, was the US response to the Soviet Economic Offensive of 1956, or 
the Nixon incident in 1958, where the response of the US was to reappraise their policies 
92 Details on the lead up to and the activities involved in overthrowing Arbenz after the Caracas Conference 
can be found in: Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope (1991); Richard Immerman, The CM in Guatemala 
(1983); Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988); Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, Bitter Fruit (1982); 
Blanche Wiesen-Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (1981) 
93 Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine (1994) p 88 
94 US policy in Indonesia is a further interesting example of US intervention during this period. See: Robert 
McMahon, "The Point of No Return: The Eisenhower Administration and Indonesia, 1953-1960" in 
Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the 
Globalization of the Cold War (2006) 
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in order to try and meet the challenges posed by those incidents rather than considering 
intervention. Similarly, in Brazil, disagreements over the bilateral economic relationship 
and the subsequent collapse of the incumbent administration would not lead to any 
proposals of intervention either; instead, the Eisenhower administration would attempt to 
repair its position through policies in keeping with American objectives. The legacy of 
Guatemala, then, was not that it paved the way for similar interventions throughout the 
Third World, but that it outlined the circumstances that would trigger US intervention in 
another country's political sphere - namely that both US economic and strategic interests 
had to be under direct threat. As we will see in Chapter Two, the case study of Brazil 
presents a fascinating contrast with that in Guatemala: whilst US-Brazilian economic 
relations were beset by mistrust and barely concealed rancour, there would not be any 
suggestion of possible US intervention. This is because despite the problems in the 
bilateral relationship, the Brazilian government neither advocated an economic program 
different to that promoted by the US nor directly threatened Washington's national 
security interests in a way that necessitated direct action. 
REAFFIRMING THE SYSTEM: FORMING NSC 5432/1 
As demonstrated, the overthrow of Arbenz was the ultimate manifestation of the 
twin aims of economic preponderance and the Cold War expediency of quelling anti- 
American dissent impacting upon US policy in Latin America. It was, though, a singular 
occurrence and was certainly not representative of the administration's policy. In fact, it 
would be five years before the two factors would collide to such an extent as to make 
such a form of intervention necessary again. For the purposes of this thesis, it is the 
aftermath of intervention in Guatemala that is of most interest. As we shall see, the 
policy pursued by the Eisenhower administration remained very close to the ideals and 
objectives that had been outlined in NSC 162/2 and NSC 144/1. However, the US role in 
Guatemala certainly marked the watershed for the early period of the Eisenhower 
administration's Latin American policy. The impact of their ousting of Arbenz would be 
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keenly felt throughout the hemisphere: not just in Guatemala95, but also in the general 
context of US relations with Latin America. After Caracas there would be an unease 
amongst Latin nations clearly worried about their own future relationship with the US96. 
It would also, though, impact upon the Eisenhower administration, as several officials 
began to air their belief that the US needed to modify its policies in the region. As the US 
began to plan for the Economic Conference at Rio, and to reappraise their policy in order 
to formulate a new policy document, there was an increasing debate within the 
administration as to the future conduct of US policy in Latin America. 
The situation in Guatemala had begun as an issue of economic concern for the 
administration before mutating into a national security problem. Crucially, the difficulty 
for the US came from the fact that in pursuing this major security objective they had 
compromised their efforts in the economic sphere by agreeing to participate in an 
economic conference at Rio de Janeiro. The final progress report on NSC 144/1 
indicated as much, when although it considered existing US policy to be `satisfactory', it 
was markedly unenthusiastic about US achievements in the economic field. It stated: 
`The outlook for foreign private investment has improved in Argentina and Panama and 
deteriorated in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic. Elsewhere there has been little 
change. '97 As outlined earlier, expanding foreign private investment was a key theme in 
the administration's policy and, thus far, US officials had not managed to meet their aims 
in this sphere; intervention in Guatemala had assumed primacy, and as a result, the US 
had overlooked its economic objectives whilst it sought to achieve a positive outcome 
there. The importance of economics in the inter-hemispheric relationship had been 
stressed in the planning meetings held before the Caracas Conference. Daniel Arzac, of 
95 The impact of Castillo Armas' regime and his successors devastated Guatemala. Blanche Wiesen-Cook 
(1981) writes, 'for the people of Guatemala, Eisenhower's 1954 legacy has been an endless battle against 
terror and death' p 292; Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine (1994) meanwhile is equally 
maudlin, stating that, 'The Castillo Armas regime in Guatemala and its successors into the 1990s mocked 
democracy and maintained a reign of terror against the poor' p 88; LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993) 
agrees: 'Guatemalan history was being recycled back to 1994, only this time, the revolution was to take a 
more radical and violent turn' p 127; Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America (2005) p 122 
% See LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993) who writes: 'In 1954, Eisenhower and Dulles saved the 
stem temporarily, and, ultimately, at tremendous cost' p 127 
Third Progress Report on NSC 144/1, United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to 
Latin America, May 25 1954, FRUS 1952-1954. Volume IV (1983) p 45-64 
59 
the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) wrote, `Latin America is an area of vital 
importance to the United States. This is especially true in the economic field. '98 
Reshaping the nature of their economic policy would be the defining feature of the 
administration's approach in the remainder of 1954: their security policy was already 
defined, with the support of authoritarian, non-communist and pro-US regimes being 
seen as the most viable short-term solution to the problem of quelling nationalist 
sentiment. 99 
The faith of the US in the benefits of expanding foreign private investment 
remained undiminished. Siekmeier writes: `Although policy makers did see limits to 
private sector, foreign capital-driven growth in the less industrialized world, they did not 
lose faith that ultimately it was the only proper source of development funding'; however, 
as `private capital flowed only to certain countries and industries, by the mid-1950s the 
norteamericanos decided to give economic aid as a way to stimulating private sector 
investment. ' 100 Once the decision was taken to rewrite US policy for Latin America on 
June 15, a draft policy statement quickly outlined the administration's approach. It stated: 
Economic development in Latin America must be speeded up by increasing 
Latin American trade, helping to finance sound projects and encouraging a 
climate conducive to private investment; but without providing grant aid 
except to fulfil special commitments and in emergency situations. ' ' 
The quest to reaffirm American economic principles via a revised policy 
document (NSC 5432/1) would take place during an internal debate within the 
administration over the best way forwards for the US in attempting to achieve their 
economic aims in the area. Whereas the forging of NSC 144/1 had been mostly 
consensual, there would be a great deal more discussion within the policy making 
" Memorandum from Daniel N Arzac Jr to Dr Horace Craig, February 4 1954 OCB 091.4 Latin America 
(FILE#1) (1) December 1953 - March 1954, Box No 71, OCB Central File Series, Eisenhower Library 99 See Lars Schoultz (1998) who writes, `... the United States had to make certain that its friends held the 
reins of power in Latin America ... the primary goal of United States policy toward Latin America was to 
prevent "another Guatemala" by ensuring that friends like Castillo Armas held power' p 344-5 
00 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 170 
101 Draft Policy Document by the NSC Planning Board for the National Security Council, August 18 1954, 
Box No 13, NSC 5432/1 Policy Toward Latin America, White House Office - Office of the Special 
Assistant for National Security Affairs,. NSC Series - Policy Papers Sub-series, Eisenhower Library. 
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apparatus as to how the US should pursue its economic objectives. 102 The internal debate 
centred on the issue of whether or not the United States should provide more aid to Latin 
America: one group said yes, the other, predictably, said no. 103 However, the issue at 
stake is more important than a simple, partisan debate over whether the US should 
increase aid payments to the region; it was the beginning of a long, drawn-out, evolution 
within the Eisenhower administration's economic approach that would, eventually, lead 
to a change in stance in the mid to late 1950s. In the following chapters, we will see that 
this gradual shift in policy, coupled with the enduring vigilance that the administration 
retained against any overt anti-Americanism, would continue to exert an increasing 
tension onto the administration's approach. Therefore, the beginning of the debate in 
1953-54 becomes more significant when it is applied to this longer-term context. 
Although those officials advocating an increased level of funding would prove to be 
relatively unsuccessful at this stage, they would manage to air ideas that would ultimately 
become more acceptable to the administration during its second term in office. 
Milton Eisenhower, the President's brother and chief advisor on Latin American 
issues, 104 would be amongst the most influential officials to advocate a change in policy. 
He toured the region in 1953 at his brother's behest and, in his report, 105 he `argued for 
increased economic aid. ' 106 He also touched on potentially vital issues such as the 
exponential population growth in the region and the Latin Americans dependence upon 
the sale of raw materials. Although he concluded his report by recommending that, 
`public loans for the foreign-currency costs of sound economic development projects, for 
102 This coincided with a more concerted effort by the Latin American nations themselves to engender a 
change in US lending policy. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), run 
by Argentinean economist, Raul Prebisch, would conduct an in-depth study, which would conclude that 
although Latin America did, in fact, require an increased level of private investment, it also needed to be 
sanguine about the need for 'state-funded development. ' For information on this, see: James Siekmeier, 
Aic4 Nationalism and Inter-American Relations (1999) pp 170-3; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 75-6; 
Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise" (2003) p 97-100; Andre Gunder Frank, 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 1969) 
103 James Siekmeier, Ai4 Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 173 
104 For more information on the Milton Eisenhower's status on Latin American affairs within the 
administration, see: Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988); James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter- 
American Relations (1999); Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) 
'°5 Which, by his own admission, was relatively weak and lacklustre --- see: Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower 
(1988) p 66-7 
106 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 179 
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which private financing is not available, go forward on a substantial scale', and that, 
`economic cooperation, extended to help the people of Latin America meet their great 
aspirations, will redound to their benefit and to ours, ' 107 this was not a radical approach. 
As Matthew Loayza points out: `Dr Eisenhower's celebrated 1953 report ... which 
recommended increased lending to and stockpile purchases from Latin America, 
nevertheless emphasized that Latin Americans must rely primarily on private capital for 
their development financing. ' 108 Not revolutionary, then, but certainly a softening of the 
hard-line fiscal approach to foreign economic policy rigorously maintained by Treasury 
Secretary George Humphrey. 109 
Further arguments would be made along the same lines as Milton Eisenhower by 
Assistant Secretary of State, John Moors Cabot, and head of the FOA, Harold Stassen. 
Both agreed with Dr Eisenhower's premise that spiralling population and increasing 
dependency upon raw materials was certain to hinder Latin development, and that 
expanding foreign private investment might not be enough on its own to foster economic 
prosperity in the region. Cabot was, perhaps, more forthright in his analysis than Milton 
Eisenhower had been. 110 According to Rabe, Cabot `questioned whether foreign 
investment could resolve all of Latin America's economic problems', as even in countries 
that appeared to enact legislation attractive to trans-national corporations, `foreign 
investors stayed away because of an inadequate economic infrastructure and poor human 
resources. ' 11 Although Milton Eisenhower and Cabot's approach gained some sympathy 
from both Dulles and President Eisenhower, ' 12 it ran into the `determined and relentless 
opposition' of Treasury Secretary Humphrey, who vetoed any significant shift in 
107 See: A Summary of Dr Milton Eisenhower's Report to the President, "United States - Latin American 
Relations", November 1953, Box No 4, Milton S Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library 
108 Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise (2003) p-96 
109 For further information on Milton Eisenhower's trip to Latin America, see: James Siekmeier, Aid 
Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 179-181; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 66-7; 
Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat: Brazilian-American Relations 1945-1964 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico, 1992) p 70-72; Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and 
Latin America (New York: Doubleday Press Inc, 1963) 
11° Cabot had actually accompanied Dr Eisenhower on his trip of Latin America. See: Milton Eisenhower, 
The Wine is Bitter (1963); Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) 
11 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 69 
112 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 180-4; Mark Gilderhus, The 
Second Century (2000) p 150-1 
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economic policy towards Latin America. "3 As a result of his stance, Cabot was `given 
the choice of changing his views, resigning, or becoming ambassador to Sweden' 114; he 
chose the latter and was replaced by Henry Holland. 
It would, though, be FOA Chief, Harold Stassen, that would make the most 
strident call for a change in policy. At the NSC meeting of September 2 1954, Stassen 
stated that, `he considered the Latin American situation serious and our program to meet 
it inadequate. ' He went on to quantify this remark by citing the case where the US had 
`greatly improved the situation in Iran by the expenditure of a modest sum of money' and 
that `similar action was urgently needed in Latin America to check inflation, attract 
capital, and build confidence in the future. ' Stassen's views were countered by Walter 
Bedell Smith and the new Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry 
Holland. Smith felt that, `Congress would not appropriate funds for a large economic aid 
program', whilst Holland argued that the administration's new policy document (NSC 
5432) would be sufficient to achieve US aims, stating that while he `would agree 100% 
with Governor Stassen on the need for a more vigorous program, he believed that 
vigorous implementation of NSC 5432 would result in a realization of US objectives. ' 
Stassen replied by stating his belief that: `It would be impossible, in his view, to change 
the present "climate" in Latin America without US Government action. "'s 
It is clear that since intervention in Guatemala there was certainly a more 
noticeable air of disagreement within the administration over the future of their Latin 
American policy. The reason for this is relatively straightforward: although the overthrow 
of Arbenz had met US national security goals and, had demonstrated the leverage that 
113 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 68 
114 James Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism and Inter-American Relations (1999) p 183; Stephen Rabe, 
Eisenhower (1988) p 68-9; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 151 
15 Memorandum of Discussion at the 212th Meeting of the National Security Council, September 2 1954, 
FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV p 67-71; Anecdotal evidence for Stassen's position was provided by another 
member of the FOA at a meeting of the OCB a week after the National Security Council met. Having just 
returned from a tour of Latin America, he reported that he had consistently been asked two questions: `The 
first of which was; why did we give so much aid to the rest of the world and so little to Latin America? The 
other question asked was: Did the US actually wish to impede Latin American trade with Europe? ' 
Memorandum for the Record of First Meeting of the OCB Working Group on NSC 5432/1, September 9 
1954, OCB 091.4 Latin America (File #2) (5) July-December 1954, Box No 72, OCB Series, Eisenhower 
Library 
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Washington exerted over the region, it had also highlighted gaps in US policy. The 
difficulties that Foster Dulles faced in gaining Latin support for his resolution at Caracas 
pointed to a widening gap between US aims and the aims of the Latin nations. This had 
led to increasing anger in Latin America; in pursuing their security aims in Guatemala, 
the Eisenhower administration had undermined their economic aims. Robert Woodward, 
the Assistant Secretary of State for the region and the Chairman of the OCB working 
group on Latin America, highlighted this in a memorandum to the members of the OCB 
on June 30 1954. He wrote: 
Insufficient attention has been given within the US Government to the 
interests and problems of the Latin American countries as a whole... it has 
now become necessary to restate our continuing political and economic 
interests in the Latin American area.. . There are continuing sources of 
irritation within the hemisphere which are exploitable for Communist 
propaganda purposes... it is important to take early action to eliminate or 
reduce these causes of friction since our failure to deal firmly and 
constructively with these problems means the continuance of the internal 
political situation in Latin America in which even friendly governments are 
driven to seek leverage through a show of acceptance of US support ... it is 
necessary to redefine and develop our fabric of economic relations with the 
Latin American countries. ' 16 
The major differences between NSC 5432/1 and NSC 144/1, then, would be in seeking 
to address those areas that US policy had not, thus far, been successful in. The most 
pressing one of these was, of course, that of seeking to expand the role that foreign 
private investment played in fostering economic development in the region. However, in 
testament to the efforts of Milton Eisenhower, Robert Woodward, John Moors Cabot and 
Harold Stassen, "7 NSC 5432/1 did include a slight change in the lending policy of the 
US. The document would allow for an increase in the level of financing provided by the 
16 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Robert Woodward to the 
Executive Officer of the OCB, "Special Report on the Implementation of NSC 144/1, June 30 1954, OCB 
091.4 Latin America (FILE# 1) (8) March - June 1954, Box No 72, OCB Series, Eisenhower Library "7 These were not the only US officials advocating a shift in US lending policy. At the 1954 Princeton 
Conference, CD Jackson instructed MIT economists Walt Rostow and Max Millikan to write a "new" 
economic policy for the administration. Although too radical to be accepted as policy, the plan did fit in 
with the ideas expressed by those other more liberal elements of the administration and had a strong 
influence on other members of the administration. See: James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter- 
American Relations (1999) p 186-194; Blanche Wiesen-Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (1981) p 328; 
Walt Rostow and Max Millikan, "A Proposal for a New United States Foreign Policy", 23 July 1953, File 
"Economic Policy (3)", Box No 2, Dodge Series, Eisenhower Library; 
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Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im or EXIM), stating that the United States should: `finance 
through development assistance loans the initiation or acceleration of projects or 
activities which are in the basic US interest and which, in the absence of much additional 
assistance, would not be undertaken or, if undertaken, would not be carried forward at 
the rate required by US foreign policy objectives. ' 118 
The key elements of NSC 5432/1 would be in seeking to redress the imbalance 
between security and economic aims that had been highlighted by the Guatemalan 
situation. In addition to the increase in Ex-Im Bank lending authority in the region, 
though, the document would also include a much more strident call for increasing the 
expansion of foreign private investment in the area, stating: 
While recognizing the sovereign right of Latin American countries to 
undertake such economic measures as they may conclude are best adapted to 
their own conditions, encourage them by economic assistance and other 
means to base their economies on a system of private enterprise and, as 
essential thereto, to create a political and economic climate conducive to 
private investment, of both domestic and foreign capital. ' 19 
Elements related to security issues were not ignored, however, and NSC 5432/1 
illustrated the fact that the administration had learnt from their experience in Guatemala 
and, at the same time, demonstrated the extent to which communism had become 
conflated with nationalism or anti-Americanism. Clause 3 of the document is of central 
importance as, in effect, it highlights the administration's commitment to solving those 
problems inherent in US-Latin relations and intrinsically links the problem of 
nationalism with the Cold War framework. It read: 
Latin America needs US assistance for the solution of these problems and 
will become increasingly subject to Communist intervention and subversion 
unless such assistance is forthcoming. Realizing the increasing importance of 
helping Latin America to reverse those trends which offer opportunities for 
18 Statement of Policy by the National Security Council NSC 5432/1, September 3 1954, FRUS 1952-1954 
Volume IV p 81-86; James Siekmeier, Atd Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 182; 
Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 70 
19 NSC 5432/1, September 3 1954, FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IVp 81-86; James Siekmeier, Aid 
Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 168-9 
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Communist penetration, the US should give greater emphasis than heretofore 
to its Latin American programs in order to safeguard and strengthen the 
security of the hemisphere. 120 
But as we have already seen in this chapter, such a homogenous strategy was not 
compatible with the twin aims of economic preponderance and national security; this 
would be demonstrated in stark terms in Rio de Janeiro, at the economic conference 
promised by Dulles, in November of 1954. Here, the US would singularly fail to engage 
with the Latin agenda and would, instead, mount a strong defence of their existing 
economic position; this would be in keeping with their economic approach but, as we 
shall see, undermined US strategic objectives in the region. 
CONCLUSION 
The objective of this chapter was to take a broad sweep of US policy towards 
Latin America in the period 1953-54. Rather than being chronologically exacting, it was 
intended to draw out the major themes and characteristics of US policy in order to give a 
full appraisal of the aims and intentions of the Eisenhower administration in the region in 
order to aid our appraisal of US-Brazilian relations in Chapter Two. By starting with the 
death of Stalin and the evolution of NSC 162/2 (the New Look), the chapter established 
the basic precepts behind the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy: firstly, the 
vigilant containment of the Soviet "threat"; and secondly, the continuing quest to expand 
American economic influence and extend the American system of "free trade, free capital 
and free investment", as far and as wide as possible. 121 Although the concepts contained 
within the New Look were debated throughout 1953, it is clear that the same principles 
120 Ibid 
121 Niall Ferguson writes of this enduring aspect of US policy to try and "export" the American system, 
writing: `It is often argued that American policy makers since Woodrow Wilson have renounced 
imperialism, seeking instead to encourage the spread of Wilsonian principles: international law, democracy, 
and the free market. Somehow - presumably because they are so self-evidently good - these ideas have 
"come to dominate international affairs. " The most that the United States therefore needs to do is "act as 
the chief of the constabulary" to prevent any unenlightened forces from challenging this benign world 
order. ' Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (London: Penguin Books, 
2004) p 22-3 
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that would come to form the basis of US policy towards the Soviet Union would also be 
the central themes of US policy toward Latin America. The death of Stalin is vitally 
important in allowing us to witness the evolving debate within the administration as to 
how they should conduct their foreign policy: the resulting document, NSC 162/2, lay 
down the basic principles that would be at the heart of the Eisenhower administration's 
foreign policy. In Latin America, though, those guiding principles would take a different 
shape than that outlined for US policy towards the Soviet bloc. Understanding that the 
Soviets posed little discernible threat to the region, US officials would vigorously pursue 
their economic ideals whilst attempting to quell both Latin nationalism and anti- 
Americanism that might serve to undermine the American system. 122 
NSC 144/1 that would lay down the defining principles of the US approach 
towards Latin America in the 1950s and, though it would be added to and refined 
throughout the decade, it would remain as the basic blueprint of the Eisenhower 
administration's approach. It sought to homogenise US economic and security aims into 
one coherent policy statement, viewing anti-Americanism as communism and conflating 
radical economic doctrines with security considerations. However, as was highlighted in 
the section on Guatemala, the fact that the US had two separate aims in the region would 
consistently serve to undermine US objectives. This will become even more apparent in 
Chapters Two and Three: Chapter Two will illustrate the US attitude towards economic 
policy in Brazil, which will be shown to hinder their national security aims as well as 
giving a more thorough appraisal of the details within the US strategy towards the 
region, 123 whilst Chapter Three will chart the administration's struggle to achieve their 
economic aims in the face of both Soviet economic expansion and a rising tide of Latin 
American nationalism --- a process that will begin with an analysis of the US stance at 
the Rio Economic Conference in November 1954. What will become increasingly 
apparent is that in spite of the administration recognising their problem with respect to 
122 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000) writes: `Nationalist opposition to US power 
and hegemony was rarely tolerated. Autarky diminished the sphere of the global economy, questioned the 
certainty of the preferred model of development, and questioned the credibility and prestige of the US 
civilisation' p 155 
123 This will include a more detailed examination of economic approach and the impact that the support of 
Latin dictators and the use of military aid had on the US standing in both Brazil and the region as a whole 
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their economic (and, latterly, their security) aims, the overwhelming tension that would 
be impacted upon to the US approach by the divergence between these two separate 
objectives would make it progressively more difficult for the administration to meet their 
aims. As was shown in the latter part of this chapter, administration officials recognised 
that their strident approach to meeting what had become a national security threat in 
Guatemala had hindered their economic aims. Consequently, NSC 5432/1 would contain 
clauses124 that were designed to address this problem in US-Latin American relations. 125 
The next stage in this thesis will be to examine the way that the major themes highlighted 
in this chapter impacted upon US-Brazilian relations, and to evaluate the administration's 
success in pursuing its economic and security aims in the Western Hemisphere. 
124 Including a more vehement statement of intent with respect to expanding foreign private investment in 
the region and increased lending capacity for the Export-Import Bank 
125 It would also call for a more successful utilisation of the Organisation of American States (OAS) as a 
forum through which to foster US-Latin cooperation, see: NSC 5432/1, September 3 1954, FRUS 1952- 
1954 Volume IV p 81-87 
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CHAPTER 2: US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS 1953-1954 
"THE (UN)SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" 
INTRODUCTION: 
This chapter will outline the way that the Eisenhower administration's Latin 
American policies impacted upon US-Brazilian relations. Although the ongoing debate 
between Traditional and Revisionist historians will not be as evident in this chapter as in 
the last one, the major elements of that historiographic dispute - whether or not US 
policy was mainly focused on economic or security concerns - will again play an 
important role in aiding our analysis of US-Brazilian relations during this period. The 
narrative of US-Brazilian relations during the 1952-1954 period will reveal that an 
argument based on either economic or security considerations does not convince when 
applied to the Brazilian case study. The reasons for this will become apparent throughout 
this chapter; but it is necessary here to introduce them briefly. Firstly, as with the events 
outlined in Chapter One, we will see that the Eisenhower administration's approach 
toward Brazil was informed by both economic and security considerations, but with the 
emphasis in this early period firmly on the meeting of economic objectives. This came 
about due to the overwhelming problems in the bilateral economic relationship and due to 
the efforts of the US to try and reshape the Brazilian economic system in a way more in 
keeping with traditional American ideals. 
Secondly, by imposing either the Traditional or Revisionist arguments upon the 
Eisenhower administration's efforts to achieve their economic aims in the region, we can 
see that neither manages to fully explain the intentions behind the US approach. For 
example, if, as the Revisionists argue, US policy was concerned with economic 
expansion and eliminating Latin economic nationalism, then the policies that the 
Eisenhower administration pursued in Brazil with regard to meeting its economic 
objectives make little practical sense. As will become clear, the administration's 
approach centred on eliminating the Joint Brazil United States Economic Development 
Commission (JBUSEDC) and opening up Brazilian petroleum reserves to foreign 
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investors in an effort to normalise the bilateral economic relationship and bring it more 
into line with the approach taken in the other Latin countries. However, the net result of 
this rather overt interference in the Brazilian economy was to strengthen Brazilian 
nationalism. Paradoxically, this factor also helps to refute the Traditionalist argument that 
US policy was solely concerned with security considerations. As we saw in Chapter One, 
fervent Latin nationalism was as much of a threat to US national security interests in 
Latin America as communism was. We also highlighted the fact that US officials were 
aware of this. Therefore, for the US then to pursue a policy that directly challenged both 
its economic and strategic interests strongly indicates that US policy must have been far 
more multi-faceted than the predominant historiography would suggest. There are, then, 
two major aims for this chapter. 1) To build on the framework outlined in Chapter One 
and reach a fuller, more nuanced understanding of the aims and intentions of US policy 
toward Brazil during this period; and 2) To answer one striking question that has, thus 
far, not been fully answered by scholars: just how did the situation arise whereby the 
Eisenhower administration pursued a policy in Brazil that seriously undermined its 
strategic interests? As we will see in this chapter, the answer to this question is that 
Washington made a conscious decision to prioritise the attainment of its economic 
objectives in Brazil; a move that ultimately undermined the US strategic position in the 
region. This will reinforce the argument outlined in the previous chapter and give a fuller 
understanding of why the administration pursued such an approach in Brazil. 
In order to analyse the evolution of US-Brazilian relations in this period, the 
chapter will be divided into five distinct sections. Firstly, that which evaluates the state of 
US-Brazilian relations when Eisenhower came to power; secondly, a section looking at 
the attempts of the Eisenhower administration to end the "special relationship" between 
the US and Brazil that President Truman had attempted to rejuvenate; thirdly and most 
importantly, a section analysing the development of the economic relationship between 
Washington and Rio, including the termination of the Joint Commission and attempts to 
implement US standards in Brazil; fourthly, a consideration looking at the paradoxical 
strengthening of the relationship between the Pentagon and their counterparts in Brazil, a 
development that given the fractured nature of Brazilian political society that had a major 
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impact on the US position in Brazil; and finally, a section highlighting the deterioration 
of the bilateral relationship up until August 1954, when Getulio Vargas, the president of 
Brazil, committed suicide. ' 
By looking at these periods we will be able to identify the way that US-Brazilian 
relations changed when the Eisenhower administration came to office in January 1953. 
The Truman administration had adopted a variable approach toward Brazil since the end 
of World War Two: initially, they had attempted to break-off the previously close 
relationship, but following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 Truman attempted to 
regenerate a close relationship in order to secure Brazilian support for US action in 
Korea; the direct consequence of this was the inauguration of the JBUSEDC. When 
Eisenhower came to office, however, US policy quickly adopted the ideals outlined in 
Chapter One and US officials began to implement a significantly different approach 
toward Brazil; the Joint Commission was terminated unilaterally and the US began to 
bring their relationship with Brazil into line with that which they had with the other Latin 
nations. This altered the whole dynamic of the bilateral relationship as Brazil's economic 
problems began to clash with the "trade not aid" approach of the Eisenhower 
administration. The outcome was a severe deterioration in bilateral accord, which, in part, 
led to the events of August 1954 and the collapse of the Vargas administration. We will 
also see that the US was continually unable to implement changes in policy toward Brazil 
easily due to the problems encountered in convincing the Brazilians of the viability of 
such a move; an obvious illustration of this point is the debate over the termination of the 
Joint Commission. Furthermore, we will witness the continuing internal debate within 
the Eisenhower administration over the best way forward in terms of economic policy for 
the US, with the termination of the Joint Commission angering some officials. Most 
importantly, though, underpinning this evaluation of US-Brazilian relations will be the 
' For good biographical and informative studies of Vargas, see: Robert Levine, Father of the Poor?: 
Vargas and His Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil 
(2002) Chapter 4; Richard Bourne, Getulio Vargas of Brazil, 1883-1954: Sphinx of the Pampas (London, 
1974); Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 (USA: Oxford University Press, 1967) 
2 For more on this, see: Max Paul Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: 
Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations" in Diplomatic History (Volume 27, No. 5, 
November 2003) 
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indelible tension between US economic and security objectives, whereby in pursuing 
their economic agenda US officials quite evidently undermined their strategic interests. 
A FLUCTUATING ALLIANCE: US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS BEFORE 1953 
Since the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine in December 1823, Latin 
America had been marked out as an area of direct US influence. In fact, the doctrine was 
a signal of both expanding American influence in their hemisphere and the deterioration 
of European interest in colonising that area of the world. 3 It was, however, the end of the 
nineteenth century before American influence over Latin America began to assume the 
mantle of dominance that it has held ever since. A burgeoning American economy, and a 
growing political awareness as to the merits of the region, began to inform US policy 
and, by 1900, the US was exerting an increasingly powerful presence over the area. 4 As 
US interests in Latin America increased, Brazil assumed a growing level of importance: it 
was the largest nation in the region; had a vast abundance of untapped raw materials; an 
extensive and strategically important coastline; and, offered potentially lucrative 
possibilities for American investors. The overthrow of the Brazilian monarchy in 1889, 
and the subsequent embracement of Republicanism, only increased the growing affinity 
between the US and Brazil. 5 By 1945, the ties between the US and Brazil were fully 
3 As Eric Hobsbawm has written: `Neither the British nor anyone else saw a good reason for antagonizing 
the USA by challenging the Monroe Doctrine. ' Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914 (London: 
Abacus, 1987) p 58: for more on the Monroe Doctrine see: Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin 
America: A History ofAmerican Diplomcy, 1776-2000 (London: Routledge, 2005); Mark Gilderhus, The 
Second Century: US-Latin American Relations Since 1889 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources 
Inc, 2000); Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998); Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States & 
Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter American Relations (London: Heinemann Eductational 
Books, 1974); Walter LaFeber, The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad 1750 to the 
Present (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989) 2" Edition 1993 
4 See: Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) pp 1-37; Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin 
America (2005) pp 42-60 
5 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coups D'Etat: Brazilian American Relations, 1945-1964 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1993) writes: `Prior to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1889, Brazilian- 
American relations were cordial, but not close. United States politicians considered the existence of a 
monarchy in a "republican" hemisphere an anomaly ... the US became the first non-Latin American nation 
to recognize Brazil's new government... American assistance in suppressing a rebellion to restore the 
monarchy in 1893 further advanced amity' p 8; Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America (2005) 
p 55-7; Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil, 1500-2000 (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002) Chapter 
3 
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forged. Brazil had offered staunch support during World War Two, and the US `supplied 
half of Brazil's imports and bought over 40 percent of its exports. '6 For all intents and 
purposes, it appeared to be a strong, mutually beneficial alliance; however, that would 
change in the post-war era. 
The relationship between the US and Brazil would alter dramatically in the post- 
World War Two period. 7 As Michael Weis writes, 
Although few were aware of impending changes, the joyous victory parades 
that greeted the return of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in 1945 marked 
the end of a half-century of close collaboration or unwritten alliance between 
the United States and Brazil. Although this unwritten alliance had served both 
nations well, the new administration in Washington faced with global 
responsibilities and perspectives, abandoned this special relationship... Within 
but a few years the enormous amount of Brazilian-American goodwill 
constructed over many decades had been dissipated, and a growing 
ambivalence characterized Brazilian-American relations. 8 
In order to understand the reasons for this deterioration, we need to view US-Brazilian 
relations within the context of the evolving pattern of the US strategy for Latin America. 
As we have already seen, the perspective of US officials in the post-war era switched 
from a regional to a global view. Within this global structure, Latin America's role was 
clearly defined: it was to be a staunch ally in international organisations; to supply the 
US with necessary raw materials; and to act as a receptacle for the widespread expansion 
of foreign private investment and American economic principles. 
As World War Two progressed, a consensus began to emerge within the 
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt as to what approach the US should take with 
respect to Latin America once the war was over. This consensus was based around 
economic development. David Green writes, `All during the war, the President had been 
6 Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues (Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1993) 
Chapter 7 
7 Excellent outlines of this period can be found in: Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold 
War, 1945-1960: End of the Special Relationship" in The Journal ofAmerican History (Volume 68, No. 3, 
December 1981) pp 599-612; Simon Hanson, "Brazilian-American Relations: Case Study in American 
Foreign Policy, " Inter American Economic Affairs 5 (1952) pp 3-35 8 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat (1993) p 7; Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy: 
Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) p 5-6 
73 
stressing the idea that Latin American economic development would benefit the United 
States. '9 The Latin nations expected to be rewarded for their support during the war 
through a "Marshall Plan for Latin America"; as Joseph Smith asserts, `They [the Latin 
Americans]... confidently expected that the close wartime relationship and the "Good 
Neighbour Policy" would continue into the post-war period. ' 10 This sense of expectancy 
was even more acute for Brazil who, as the largest of the Latin American countries, had 
its sights firmly set on becoming a great power in the post-war era. A clear sign that 
Latin America would not be accorded the importance they felt they deserved from the 
US came when Washington unilaterally cancelled `wartime contracts without notice 
before the end of 1945'; a move that forced Brazil to declare war on Japan in order to 
continue receiving lend-lease aid from the US. 11 The stance taken by US delegates at the 
Chapultepec Conference in Mexico City confirmed the fact that US policy in the post- 
war era would not be based around American funding of Latin economic development 12 
In keeping with the main argument of this thesis, we can already (in 1945) divine the 
presence of a clearly identifiable split in US policies between the economic sphere and 
the security sphere. 
The signing of the Rio Pact in 1947 marked the highpoint of US-Latin 
cooperation in the post-war era. It was, though, a solely political agreement, making no 
reference to the economic issues that the Latin nations were so keen to resolve. Connell- 
Smith identifies it as being, `the first of the "Cold War pacts" and the forerunner of the 
North Atlantic Treaty' 13; but it is more objective to consider the agreement outside of the 
Cold War context. Put simply, the pact was an attempt to extend American power in the 
region by asserting US dominance in the military and political spheres. Crucially, the 
9 David Green, The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the Good 
Neighbor Policy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971) p 129 
'0 Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America (2005) p 111 
" Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat (1993) p 17 
12 Mark Gilderhus writes: 'To avoid "shortsighted" policies, Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
affirmed his belief in free trade as the best means of expanding commerce, enhancing prosperity, reducing 
world tension, and promoting peace... Overall, the discussion placed the United States in opposition to 
Latin American efforts to escape from the "economic vassalage to the more industrialized countries. "' 
Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 118; Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America 
(2005) p 114; Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States & Latin America (1974) Chapter 6 
13 Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States & Latin America (1974) p 196 
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debates surrounding the pact were not used to discuss economic issues. 14 From the latter 
stages of World War Two it was apparent that US officials saw the economic future of 
Latin America as being dependent upon attracting large amounts of private investment. 
This was especially evident in the US approach toward Brazil, with Brazilian hopes of 
large-scale economic assistance being dashed by Washington's insistence that 
development be funded by an influx of private capital. As Stanley Hilton has argued, 
`[An] important ingredient in Brazil's failure to obtain the economic cooperation it 
desired was Washington's conviction that its development needs could best be met by 
private capital. Rio de Janeiro, in order to attract foreign investors, was expected to 
adhere strictly to a program of economic liberalism, eschewing statism and 
nationalism. '" 
As the Cold War mindset evolved in Washington a clearly identifiable security 
element also became a major part of US policy in the region. The Rio Pact saw the US 
codify the Monroe Doctrine and assume de facto control over the political and military 
spheres of Latin America. This objective was completed in 1948 at the Ninth Pan- 
American Conference in Bogota, Colombia, where the Organization of American States 
(OAS) was formalised. 16 Between 1946 and 1950, the Truman administration worked 
toward extending US control over the Western Hemisphere. However, the continued 
refusal of US officials to listen to Latin requests over economic development was 
beginning to exert an increasing tension on the relationship between Washington and 
their southern neighbours. 
" Joseph Smith writes `While carefully avoiding discussion of economic matters, American officials 
displayed much keener interest in grasping opportunities to assert their country's exclusive political and 
military leadership of the hemisphere. ' The Rio Pact essentially `outlawed' war in the Western Hemisphere 
by stating unequivocally that, 'an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered 
as an attack against all the American States. ' For the US, this severely reduced the likelihood of any 
conflict between the Latin nations, and, for the Latin Americans, it meant that the US would not "legally" 
be able to intervene in another Latin country without receiving an approval from two-thirds of the Latin 
American states. See: Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America (2005) p 115; Michael Weis, 
Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat (1993) p 19; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 122-3; 
Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States & Latin America (1974) p 196-7 
15 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 603 16 `The OAS was valuable for American diplomacy because it provided a convenient tool that could be 
used to prevent external political influence and interference in the Western Hemisphere. ' Joseph Smith, The 
United States and Latin America (2005) p 116 
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This characteristic of US policy was a disappointment for all the Latin nations. It 
was, though, most keenly felt in Brazil. The extent to which the bilateral relationship had 
deteriorated in the early Cold War era'7 can be identified in the Brazilian response to 
Truman's attempt to elicit Brazilian military support when the Korean War broke out in 
1950.18 The majority of the Latin nations refused the American request to send troops to 
Korea19; but the refusal of Brazil, who had been such a staunch ally in World War Two, 
is an illustration of how far the relationship between them and the US had deteriorated 
since 1945.20 The main reason for this deterioration was due to the differing objectives 
that the two countries had in the economic sphere. 21 Recognising this, Truman would 
attempt to regenerate the relationship between the US and Brazil in an effort to obtain 
Brazilian support for the war in Korea and to give the US a staunch ally in Latin America 
during this time of increased tension. 22 `For two years Truman officials sought to recreate 
a "special relationship" with Brazil. '23 As Elizabeth Cobbs states, US officials `saw 
advantages to the United States in strengthening Brazil's infrastructure and economy and 
17 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat (1993) details the disintegration of US-Brazilian 
cooperation in the early Cold War period. The situation was exacerbated by the actions of State Department 
official, Adolf Berle (who would also court controversy with his actions in Argentina). Berle attempted to 
give a speech promoting US support for democracy in Brazil (as Getulio Vargas the leader at the time did 
not have constitutional legitimacy); although a move to electoral governance was planned for later in 1950, 
Berle's speech `seemed to place the US firmly on the side of the opposition and caused an immediate 
uproar in Brazil. ' As a result, the Army overthrew Vargas. In 1950, Vargas `still blamed Berle and 
(Spruille) Braden for the Coups ... 
[and] never completely trusted the Americans again' p 18 
18 The Korean War marked a significant shift in US foreign policy: it led to the implementation of NSC 68 
and also initiated a new era in the Cold War. For information on NSC 68 and the Korean War, see: Melvyn 
Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War 
(Stanford, California Stanford University Press, 1992); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War 2 
Volumes (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981,1990); Joyce & Gabriel Kolko, The 
Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1972); Michael Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National 
Security State 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
19 Only a small `token force' from Colombia accepted the US call to arms 
20 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 606-9; Joseph Smith, A History 
of Brazil (2002) p 191-2 
21 As Weis writes, `economic issues, especially development (industrialization), dominated post-war 
Brazilian-American relations. ' Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat (1993) p 23 
22 As Joseph Smith writes, the Brazilians were quick to blame US policy for the widespread antipathy 
towards the war in Korea: `The Brazilian government pointedly blamed American economic policy for the 
negative response, ' with Joao da Fontoura, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, reporting, '"If [Washington] had 
elaborated a recovery plan for Latin America similar to the Marshall Plan for Europe... Brazil's present 
situation would be different and our cooperation in the present emergency could probably be greater- 
Jo seph Smith, The United States and Latin America (2005) p 117 23 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat (1993) p 31 
76 
in sustaining among Brazilians a sense of reciprocity in their relationship with the US. '24 
The legacy of this rapprochement would be the Joint Brazil United States Economic 
Development Commission (JBUSEDC): a bilateral organisation set up to facilitate 
Brazilian economic development through the provision of agreed loans, but which would, 
in fact, turn out to be a further problem in the US-Brazilian relationship. 5 
The ongoing debate between Washington and Rio over possible Brazilian support 
for the war in Korea took place in the period following the election of Getulio Vargas in 
1950. Vargas had dominated Brazilian politics since 1930. Although the approach taken 
by the Eisenhower administration in 1953 and 1954 would impact severely on Vargas, it 
is important to recognise that it was he, more than anyone else, who was responsible for 
the state of Brazil by the 1950s. As Robert Levine has noted, `He [Vargas] crafted a new 
role for government and a drive for industrialization, economic development and national 
integration. In a very real sense, we can say that modern Brazil was born in 1930 and 
came to maturity on August 24,1954. '26 In order to begin this process, Vargas imposed a 
dictatorship through two military-backed coups (in 1930 and 1937) and centralised the 
Brazilian political system. It was only in 1945 that he would allow free elections to be 
held; a move that led to both his removal from office and to the Brazilian Armed Forces 
turning firmly against him. 7 Vargas returned to office in 1950, though, winning the 
national election and eschewing the authoritarianism of before for a more democratic 
approach. However, his second period in office would be beset by political and economic 
problems. Firstly, Vargas would have to try and come to terms with a fractured and 
disparate political structure, which made it intensely difficult for him to govern 
effectively. As Joseph Smith has detailed, this was a severe problem for Vargas: `Instead 
of ruling by decree as he had done for most of his previous period of power, he would 
now have to develop a working relationship with the politicians in the National 
24 Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) p 75 2s The mechanisms of the JBUSEDC and the problems that emerged with it will be discussed later in this 
chapter 
2 6 Robert Levine, Father of the Poor? (1998) p2 
" Robert Levine, Father of the Poor? (1998) p 72-4 
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Congress-several political parties existed and none possessed an overall majority. '28 
Secondly, Vargas had to try and reconcile the competing theories of economic 
development that were being put forward as ways of making Brazil an industrial 
powerhouse. With balance of payments and inflationary problems blighting the Brazilian 
economy at this time, the Vargas administration was forced to try and find a compromise 
between the route of economic liberalism - the market and the economy regulating itself, 
fuelled by foreign private investment - and the more centralised and parochial model 
being suggested by powerful nationalist elements within Brazil. 29 Fatefully, Vargas 
would not prove able to bridge this widening gap and it would be a major cause of the 
domestic instability that would be so apparent during the 1953-54 period. It was against 
this backdrop of economic disputes and a fractured political structure that US-Brazilian 
relations would take place after Eisenhower came to office. Whilst this was, in many 
ways, a legacy of Vargas's near-two decades of dominating the Brazilian polity, it would 
also set the scene for the inherent problems that would confront the US in their attempts 
to implement their regional approach in Brazil. Some of these tensions were, however, 
already apparent during the Truman administration's final year in office. 
By 1952, the dominant trends in the US-Brazilian relationship that would endure 
throughout the Eisenhower era were firmly established. 30 The developments in the 
bilateral relationship during 1952 would directly illustrate the future problems that would 
confront the Eisenhower administration with respect to implementing their Latin 
American strategy in Brazil. During the Truman administration's final year in office, the 
Brazilian leader, President Vargas, would come under increasing pressure from both 
powerful nationalist factions within Brazil (who wanted Brazil to pursue an independent 
economic policy) and the Brazilian military (who continued to exert a huge influence 
over Brazil's political structures). In January, Vargas introduced a decree that limited the 
28 Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002) p 157; Robert Levine, Father of the Poor? (1998) p82; Ronald 
Schneider, Brazil: Culture and Politics in a New Industrial Powerhouse (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1996) 
29 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) pp 81-100 
30 The period of close cooperation had come to an end; US economic policy had driven a wedge between 
Washington and Rio; cooperation in the security and military spheres was, though, still ongoing, and; 
internal problems relating to Brazil's economic and political stability were beginning to have an increasing 
influence on Brazilian foreign policy. 
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amount of profit remittances on foreign capital invested in Brazil, thus directly hindering 
US efforts to attract foreign investment to the region. Vargas had been forced to act by 
the rather parlous domestic situation in Brazil. In response, the US had to try and broker a 
solution without appearing too overbearing: to do so would only serve to further inflame 
nationalist, anti-Yankee sentiments in Brazil. 3' The dispute over profit remittances, 
though, was a minor issue compared to the continuing problems caused by the activities 
of the JBUSEDC. Although the precise nature of the problems caused by the Joint 
Commission will be dealt with later in the chapter, it is necessary to make reference to 
the strain that the Commission's activities were impacting upon the bilateral relationship. 
Although implemented to provide loans to aid Brazilian economic development, the 
Commission was run via the auspices of the World Bank and, as such, was controlled 
through strict US economic principles. A "turf war" between the World Bank and the 
Department of State had severely hindered the Commission's activities and this was 
putting an intense strain on both the bilateral relationship and Vargas's political 
position. 2 As Eisenhower prepared to take office, US-Brazilian relations were at a 
crucial point. The implementation of the Joint Commission had been intended to repair 
the damage done to the bilateral relationship since 1945. However, the inherent problems 
within the Joint Commission's lending structure imposed new difficulties on President 
Vargas, as he sought to stave off intense domestic pressures, which included a lack of 
political support; continuing crises in the economic sector; and, staunch opposition from 
the Brazilian military. 33 
3' Herschel Johnson, the American Ambassador in Brazil, told Assistant Secretary Ed Miller that: `if we are 
patient and can convince President our sincere intent to assist economic development in Brazil, I am certain 
we shall work out a solution' Telegram from the US Ambassador in Brazil Herschel Johnson to the 
Department of State, January 5 1952, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954 Volume IV 
(Washington D. C: United States Government Printing Office, 1983) p 571 
32 More details on this turf battle within the US and the mechanisms and problems with the Joint 
Commission will be provided later in the chapter. For information on the JBUSEDC and the Vargas 
administration during the Truman era, see: Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) pp 75-93; 
Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat (1993) pp 48-56; Stanley Hilton, "The United States, 
Brazil, and the Cold War" (1982); Telegram from the US Ambassador in Brazil Herschel Johnson to the 
Department of State, May 8 1952; Telegram from Ambassador Johnson to the Department of State, May 22 
1952; Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Ed Miller to 
Ambassador Johnson, May 31 1952, FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IVpp 575-581 
33 Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002) pp 155-9; Robert Levine, Father of the Poor? (1998) pp 82-6; 
Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) 
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Between 1945 and 1950, the US attempted to achieve its economic aims in Latin 
America by refusing to negotiate over aid agreements and, instead, strongly promoting 
the use of foreign private investment as a viable source of development funding. At the 
same time, they used alliances such as the Rio Pact to assert their power over the region 
and to achieve their security aims in the region. As already stated, though, this impacted 
an intense tension on US policy; by 1950, the bilateral relationship had deteriorated 
severely due to Latin frustration with US economic policy in Latin America. As a result, 
the Truman administration attempted to revive the `special relationship' through the use 
of the Joint Commission. Again, though, economic pragmatism would undermine US 
security aims and, by 1952, the bilateral relationship was floundering. All of this, though, 
was taking place at the same time that the political and economic situation in Brazil was 
evolving during President Vargas' second term in office. Increasingly, during the 
Eisenhower administration's first two years in office, Vargas' attempts to seek 
accommodation with the US and placate his internal political opponents, would clash 
with the policies being implemented by the White House. As we shall see in the next 
section, the approach taken by the Eisenhower administration would only serve to 
exacerbate those tensions: in strongly pursuing their economic policies and in dispelling 
any notions that the Brazilians might have had about a continuing "special relationship", 
the new administration would only serve to undermine the increasingly fragile stability of 
Brazil and, therefore, would come to directly threaten US security objectives in both 
Brazil and Latin America. 
`PUTTING BRAZIL IN ITS PLACE34': RESCINDING THE SPECIAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
The existing literature on US-Brazilian relations during the Eisenhower era is 
remarkably sparse: only Michael Weis in Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat, and 
Elizabeth Cobbs in The Rich Neighbor Policy deal specifically with the bilateral 
relationship at this time. Even then, Cobbs cites her analysis of US-Brazilian relations 
34 Elizabeth Cobbs (1993) p 93 
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within the wider field of examining the activities of private individuals such as Nelson 
Rockefeller and Henry Kaiser. Weis, on the other hand, deals specifically with the 
bilateral relationship, analysing the deterioration in US-Brazilian relations from 1945 up 
until the overthrow of the Goulart administration in 1964; he does not, though, deal with 
the inconsistencies within US policy, especially with respect to the dichotomy between 
economic and security aims. 35 A similar approach can be found in Stanley Hilton's essay, 
"The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War. "36 Gerald Haines, in The Americanization 
of Brazil, examines the evolution of the relationship between 1945 and 1954, arguing that 
US policy was to deliberately hinder Brazilian economic development but within the 
context of the more orthodox Cold War framework. 37 There are, of course, other 
monographs that include details on US-Brazilian relations as part of a wider thesis38, and 
these will be referenced throughout this chapter. However, by adopting a position that 
analyses the bilateral relationship within the wider context of the emerging tensions 
within US regional policy, this study will further develop the arguments of those scholars 
outlined above. 
Upon coming to office in January 1953, the Eisenhower administration had two 
general problems facing it in Brazil. Firstly, how to reshape the bilateral relationship so 
that economic policy was centred on foreign private investment rather than loans; and 
secondly, how to formulate a bilateral relationship that was relatively amicable and which 
would eradicate instability in Brazil. For their part, the Brazilians wanted to continue 
with the renewed sense of amicability that had emerged in the final years of the Truman 
administration, but only if their warnings about economic development were taken 
35 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat (1993); Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy 
(1992) 
36 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) 
37 Gerald Haines, The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of US Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World 
1945-1954 (USA: Scholarly Resources Inc, 1993) 
38 Examples of this include: Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower: The Foreign Policy ofAnti-Communism and Latin 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1988); Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin 
America: A History ofAmerican diplomacy, 1776-2000 (London: Routledge, 2005); James Siekmeier, Aid, 
Nationalism, and Inter American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia and the United States 1945-1961 (New 
York: The Edward Mellen Press, 1999); Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States & Latin America: An 
Historical Analysis of Inter American Relations (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1974); Lars 
Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998); Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American 
Relations Since 1889 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000) 
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onboard. 39 Michael Weis outlines the situation facing the new administration, also 
touching on the problems they faced in the military sphere and the internal problems that 
were so prominent in Brazil. He writes: 
While Truman officials had made a determined effort to reconstruct the 
special Brazilian-American relationship, US objectives remained unfulfilled. 
The joint commission had not completed its work and Brazil's Congress had 
not ratified the MAP (Military Assistance Pact) treaty, or resolved the 
petroleum issue40. Moreover, Brazil entered 1953 with economic disaster 
imminent; inflation and the balance-of-paýyments41 problem had worsened, 
and foreign private investment had ceased. 4 
There were clearly, then, a number of impending problems confronting the Eisenhower 
administration in Brazil when they came to office. As we shall see, the administration's 
response would be to focus on the economic side of the relationship in an effort to expand 
the role that foreign private investment played in funding Brazilian economic 
development. This marked a definitive change in US policy; moving away from the 
Truman administration's latter-day policy of seeking accommodation to an overt policy 
of "putting Brazil in its place. " 
In adopting this approach and focusing on the economic principles outlined in 
NSC 144/1, the Eisenhower administration would neglect the security issues that had also 
39 In December 1952, Brazilian Finance Minister Oswaldo Aranha wrote to Secretary of State in-waiting, 
John Foster Dulles, and told him: `Brazil believes that the new US administration and its eminent President 
are disposed to issue new directives which will contribute to the success of US foreign policy... Brazil 
remains today as in the past the country through which the United States can most directly influence the 
orientation of the hemisphere nations. It is induitable that hemisphere policy, due to mutual errors, 
especially economic ones, in these last times has lost ground to communist propaganda and nationalist 
upsurgings, and is tending towards collapse-leaving aside for the moment the other American countries, 
Brazil alone, if aided in her economic development, will be a decisive factor in the Atlantic, not only in a 
peacetime economy.. . but also in war, to which Brazil can give as she always has given, the contributions 
which the US may require' Memorandum from Brazilian Finance Minister Oswaldo Aranha to Proposed 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, December 24 1952, Memoranda of Meetings - November 1952, Box 
No 8, Subject Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library 
40 In 1952, President Vargas had, under intense pressure from opposition elements including the military, 
signed a law banning foreign private companies from investing in the Brazilian petroleum industry and had, 
instead, created a state controlled corporation to deal with Brazil's petroleum industry - Petrobras 41 In the post-1945 era, balance-of-payments problems were a recurring theme for Brazil. This problem 
arose when the nations expenditures (or imports) totalled more than their incomings (or exports); it was a 
problem exacerbated by Brazil's huge debts, which when due to be paid back only deepened the balance of 
payments problems. Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002); Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) 
42 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coups D'Etat (1993) p 56 
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been apparent in the document. The consequence of this was that President Vargas's 
political position would, in fact, become even more precarious; the political capital he 
expended on seeking a close relationship with the US came to backfire upon him and he 
would eventually commit suicide in August, 1954. This led to a period of instability as 
the next presidential elections were not scheduled until 1955; in the meantime, the US 
would be forced to try and repair their position in Brazil and, at the same time, pursue 
their economic objectives whilst dealing with an interim regime. The same patterns that 
had become apparent in the US-Brazilian relationship between 1945 and 1952 will 
remain strongly in evidence. However, the Eisenhower administration's Latin American 
policy irrevocably altered the nature of the relationship between Washington and Rio. 
Analysing US policy in Brazil during 1953 and 1954 will reaffirm the central argument 
of this thesis: namely, that the US had two separate goals within their regional policy and 
that there was clearly an overriding tension between these two separate aims, which very 
often served to undermine their aims in the other area. 
As already outlined in this chapter, the problems that had emerged within the 
bilateral relationship since 1945 had, in the main, been caused by two issues. Firstly, the 
disparity between the stated economic objectives of Brazil and those of the US; and 
secondly, because of Brazil's growing disenchantment at what they felt was a betrayal of 
their previously good relationship with the US. The policies pursued by the Eisenhower 
administration would, in effect, commit the US more heavily to both of those policies 
outlined as being a source of Brazilian frustration. The characteristics of US policy in 
Brazil are highlighted by Elizabeth Cobbs, who writes, `the [Eisenhower] administration 
was.. . more willing to 
live with the disgruntlement of Brazil because of its strong 
commitment to private investment and its policy of minimizing the traditional bilateral 
relationship. 43 
For the Eisenhower administration uniform multilateralism was a key element of 
their Latin American approach. By not affording any one nation more importance than 
any of the others they hoped to construct a more cooperative hemispheric relationship. In 
43 Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) p 95 
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NSC 144/1 the administration outlined the benefits to the US of treating all the nations of 
the region equally. It stated that the `United States should achieve a greater degree of 
hemisphere solidarity' by: 
A greater utilization of the Organization of American States ... which will 
avoid the appearance of unilateral action and identify our interests with those 
of the other American states... Consulting with the Latin American states, 
whenever possible, before taking actions which will affect them or for which 
we wish their support ... Evidencing greater consideration of Latin American 
problems at the highest levels of government by according sympathetic 
attention to representatives of Latin America, by exercising care in public 
statements relating to the area, and through such methods as visits by high 
government officials and distinguished private citizens to Latin American 
states. 45 
(Such sentiments were in keeping with Foster Dulles' now infamous remark to 
Eisenhower that, `you have to pat them a little bit and make them think that you are fond 
of them'46). This process began in earnest on April 12; Eisenhower spoke before the 
OAS, telling them, 
Ours is an historic and meaningful unity. It has been --- for our whole 
continent --- an honest and productive unity. It can be --- for other areas of 
the world --- a prophetic and inspiring unity. For it is triumphant testimony, 
before all the world, that peace and trust and fellowship can rule the conduct 
ý 
44 An approach that was, in the argument put forward by Kenneth Osgood, in keeping with the 
administration's emphasis on the effectiveness of public diplomacy; especially with regard to the Third 
World. See: Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and 
Abroad (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2006) Chapter 4; Kenneth Osgood, "Words and 
Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower's Propaganda War in the Third World" in Kathryn Statler and 
Andrew Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the Cold 
War (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Jason Parker, "Cold War II: The Eisenhower 
Administration, the Bandung Conference and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era" in Diplomatic 
History (Volume 30, No. 5, November 2006) pp 867-892 
45 NSC 144/1 "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America", March 18 
1953, FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV p 6-10; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower: The Foreign Policy ofAnti 
Communism and Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1988) writes: `To demonstrate 
that the administration did not "neglect" Latin America, officials tried to "dramatize" US interest in Latin 
America' p 33 46 Phone Call between Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower, February 26 1953,1-4/53 
folder, Box No 10, Telephone Series, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library, Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower 
(1988) p 33; Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States (1998) p 332; Michael Hunt, Ideology and US 
Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Jason Parker, "Cold War II" (2006) 
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of all nations, large and small, who will respect the life and dignity of each 
47 other. 
Eisenhower's speech was specifically designed to appeal to the aspirations of the Latin 
nations, with the first progress report on NSC 144/1 noting: `The appearance and 
message of the President before the Council of the OAS commemorating Pan American 
Day was the outstanding instance during the period of sympathetic attention to Latin 
American representatives. '48 Further support for this approach came from Harry 
Guggenheim, a former US Ambassador to Cuba. He met with Eisenhower and told him, 
`the State Department is not properly organized to give the sensitive South Americans 
the feeling that they are really important in our scheme of things. ' Guggenheim 
recommended to the President that an "Ambassador at Large" be appointed for the Latin 
region. Eisenhower, who wanted to follow up on the decision to send his brother Milton 
on a tour of the region, supported the idea, telling Under-Secretary Walter Bedell Smith: 
`If we should deem it desirable to continue the work Milton started by getting some 
outstanding American to accept the post of Ambassador at Large, I would be quite ready 
to go along with such a plan A9 The reasons behind this were outlined more thoroughly 
by Daniel Arzac of the OCB, who sent a memorandum to CD Jackson explaining, 
The Latin Americans must be convinced of the friendliness of the American 
people and Government towards them. They must be convinced that we like 
and appreciate their culture, that we value their friendship and that we respect 
them as political equals. The solution does not lie in the field of propaganda. 
In order to convince the Latin Americans of these truths there must be more 
than official declarations and aspirations. Cynical as to our motives and 
doubtful that Americans at grass-roots level... are concerned about Latin 
America's problems, the Latin Americans will not be convinced so long as 
47 Address by President Eisenhower before the Council of the Organization of American States, April 12 
1953, Public Papers of the Presidents - Dwight D. Eisenhower - 1953 (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1960); 
4g Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State Walter Beedel Smith to the Executive Secretary of the NSC 
James Lay, "First Progress Report on NSC 144/1", July 23 1953, FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV p 10-26 
49 Memorandum from President Eisenhower to Under-Secretary of State Walter Beedel Smith, August 7 
1953, DDE Diary Aug 53-Sep 53 (2), Box No 3, DDE Diary Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library; 
Guggenheim repeated his sentiments early in 1954, see: Letter from President Eisenhower to Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles, January 16 1954, DDE Diary January 1954 (2), Box No 5, DDE Diary Series, 
Whitman File, Eisenhower Library 
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we do not actually, consciously, and in practice... appreciate their culture, 
value their friendship, and respect their political equality. 50 
Just before it left office, the Truman administration had attempted to repair its special 
relationship with Brazil, but the Eisenhower administration was determined to reverse 
this decision and put their relationship with Brazil on the same footing as their 
relationship with the other Latin nations. By doing this and by appearing to be more 
sympathetic towards Latin problems, the administration hoped to be able to foster a more 
cooperative spirit in the region, which would lead to a renewed sense of stability. 
The effect that this change in approach had on US officials thinking with regard 
to the bilateral relationship with Brazil, can be seen in the responses of Milton 
Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles to a letter written by a prominent US citizen living in 
Brazil, Fleur Cowles, in October 1953.51 Ms Cowles recommended that the US afford 
more importance to Brazil in the context of US relations in Latin America. However, 
neither Milton Eisenhower nor John Foster Dulles agreed. Milton Eisenhower wrote to 
his brother and informed him: 
I think you should be very careful in singling her (Brazil) out from among the 
other Latin American nations. The leaders and peoples of all Latin American 
countries are proud and sensitive. They could easily be offended if we 
indicated in any way that our relations with the largest powers of Latin 
America are more important to us than our relations with the smaller ones. 
Secretary Dulles agreed in his own letter to President Eisenhower, stating, 
I agree with Dr Eisenhower's analysis, in which he maintains that Mrs. 
Cowles has overlooked some important considerations with Brazil and warns 
against offending the other Latin American countries by singling out Brazil 
for special attention... American goals in Brazil could be affected best within 
our present program of increased attention to all the countries of this area. '52 
30 Memorandum from Daniel N Arzac of the Operations Coordinating Board for the Attention of CD 
Jackson on Cultural Relations between the US and Latin America, August 20 1953, PSB 091.4 Latin 
America, Box No 15, Psychological Strategy Board Central File Series, NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower 
Library 
51 Ms Cowles had, in fact, been the US representative at Queen Elizabeth H's Coronation earlier in the year 
52 Letter from Dr. Milton Eisenhower to President Eisenhower concerning Fleur Cowles Comments on US- 
Brazilian Relations, October 91953; Memorandum from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to President 
Eisenhower, November 10 1953. John Foster Dulles, November 1953, Brazil (11), Box No 4, International 
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With NSC 144/1 calling for a unified approach towards placating Latin sensibilities 
regarding the perceived lack of attention they had received from the US since 1945, there 
was no room in US policy for a "special relationship" with Brazil. US strategic 
objectives dictated that hemispheric stability was more important than the US 
relationship with Brazil. 53 As a result, the Eisenhower administration would deliberately 
distance themselves from the previous closeness of the relationship between Washington 
and Rio; or, as Elizabeth Cobbs states: `To Brazilians this meant being treated like 
"another one of the Latin American republiquetas. "'54 As a paper produced within the 
OCB pointed out, `Brazil is annoyed by the fact that whereas formerly Presidents of the 
United States and Secretaries of State treated Brazil as an important country, she is now 
relegated, along with Haiti and Honduras, as another Latin American republic. '55 
Although this reapportioning of emphasis damaged Brazilian prestige, and served as part 
of a concerted attempt to `run down' the special relationship, it was merely a prelude to 
the problems that would emerge once the administration began to implement its regional 
economic policy in Brazil. In keeping with the strict fiscal approach underpinning US 
policy during the Eisenhower era, the administration would seek to be proactive in 
imposing its economic approach upon Brazil. The US had considered reapportioning the 
emphasis of their Latin American diplomacy as an expedient way of improving the 
general state of their relationship with the countries of the region. However, as we shall 
see in the following section, their economic approach in Brazil (centred on eradicating 
the Joint Commission and bringing US-Brazilian economic relations into line with the 
rest of the region) would have a seriously negative impact on the bilateral relationship, 
which would (unintentionally) undermine US aims in the security sphere. 
Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library; Gerald Haines, The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of US 
Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World 1945-1954 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 
1989) p 76-9; Elizabeth Cobbs (1993) p 96; Milton Eisenhower, The Wine Is Bitter: The United States and 
Latin America (New York: Doubleday & he, 1963) 
S3 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1982) p 612-3 
K Republiquetas means "little republics, " Elizabeth Cobbs (1993) p 96 
55 Memorandum for the Executive Officer of the OCB by Charles H. Taquey, May 6 1954, OCB 091.4, 
Latin America (File#1) (4) March - June 1954, Box No 71, OCB Central File Series, Eisenhower Library. 
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THE US ECONOMIC APPROACH: THE BRAZILIAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
LOAN REQUEST 
The aim of this section will be to illustrate the way that the Eisenhower 
administration's economic policy in Latin America manifested itself on the bilateral 
relationship and to examine the impact that this had on the US position in Brazil. As we 
saw in Chapter One, the administration's economic approach would be focused upon 
extending the role that foreign private investment played in funding Latin economic 
development. The administration wanted to engineer a significant change in America's 
economic relationship with the Latin nations. The president made this point at a Cabinet 
Meeting on July 3,1953, bemoaning the fact that `we put a coin in the tin cup and yet we 
know the tin cup is still going to be there tomorrow. '56 In short, the president wanted to 
implement a policy that would prevent the `tin cup' from reappearing. 57 This stance 
would have a major impact on US-Brazilian relations, with the edict of the time 
stipulating that, `If the Latin Americans did not provide a propitious environment for 
private investment, the United States needed to prod them to produce such a situation'58; 
a belief that was put forward with more urgency in the administration's second policy 
document, NSC 5432/1. Due to the methods used by the Truman administration to 
regenerate the previously close alliance between Washington and Rio, the bilateral 
relationship had become one that was dependent upon the provision of emergency loans. 
When Eisenhower came to office, the major challenge in Brazil was to move away from 
this reliance upon loans and, as per NSC 144/1, help to create an economic development 
system that was based on foreign private investment. It is here that Rabe's argument that 
US economic policy should be viewed as being part of their Cold War approach does not 
go into enough detail59; the administration's efforts to expand their economic aims in 
I Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting of July 3 1953, Box No 2, Cabinet Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower 
Library; Stephen Rabe (1988) p 65; Matthew Loayza, "An `Aladdin's Lamp' for Free Enterprise: 
Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin American Nationalism, 1953-61", Diplomacy and Statecraft 
(Vol 14, No 3, September 2003) p 83 
51 Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp" (2003) p 83 
59 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 168 
59 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 64-83; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) writes: 'Ike's 
economic views conformed with convention by regarding free trade and private investment as the main 
requisites for peace and prosperity. Eisenhower regarded mass poverty, hunger, and insecurity as threats, 
that is, as incitements to the spread of communism' p 149-154 
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Brazil would only serve to undermine both the stability of the Vargas government and 
the strategic position of the US. This is in spite of the recognition in the annex to NSC 
144/1 that US economic policies and financial disparity were causing an increase in 
Latin discontent-60 
Just how this approach would impact upon US policy in Brazil became apparent 
in the first few weeks of the administration's time in office, through their response to a 
Brazilian request for a balance of payments loan of $300 million. It is important to 
recognise that the stance taken by the US with respect to this loan request was motivated 
solely by the economic objectives within the administration's policy. It was only in 1954, 
when the full consequences of their policies became apparent, that the security 
considerations that made up the other side of the US strategy would be taken into equal 
consideration. The reason that the administration felt able to pursue their economic 
agenda so forcefully was that they were convinced that they would be able to retain a 
healthy position in Brazil by their efforts at forging a strong military alliance between the 
Pentagon and their Brazilian counterparts. Extending the American economic system 
into Brazil, though, would prove to be a difficult task for the Eisenhower administration. 
As we have already seen, President Vargas' complicated political position, and the 
presence of powerful nationalist elements in Brazil, made the extension of free market 
capitalism a tough sell for the US. The Eisenhower administration would, however, 
display a stark determination in implementing their economic strategy and it would be 
led, in the first instance, by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Treasury Secretary 
George Humphrey. 61 
The Brazilian request for balance of payments assistance seemed to fulfil the 
worst fears amongst the fiscal conservatives within the Eisenhower administration as to 
the state of US-Brazilian relations. As Rabe writes, it conferred legitimacy onto the 
notion that, `the Democrats had put inter-American relations on a "come and get it" 
60 See Chapter 1 
61 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 613 
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basis. '62 The consensus quickly emerged that the US should not fully accede to the 
Brazilian request. On February 20 1953, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Thomas 
Mann, wrote to Foster Dulles to tell him, `the Brazilian Government has applied to the 
Export-Import Bank for a 3-year, $350 million loan, ' and that `Under Secretary (Walter 
Bedell Smith) ... 
had decided that the United States should not approve a loan in excess of 
$100 million. ' Treasury Secretary Humphrey agreed. Michael Weis notes: `Within the 
US government, strong opposition to the loan emerged immediately... George Humphrey 
opposed the loan in principle as a bad precedent and unwarranted use of the EXIM 
(Export-Import Bank). '63 Foster Dulles also agreed and attempted to force the Brazilians 
to accept a lower payment. However, they refused; telling the Secretary of State that, 
`they had been led to believe by the previous administration that they would get $250 
million. ' Dulles, sceptical about this claim by the Brazilians, called former Assistant 
Secretary of State Ed Miller. Miller told Dulles that, `though he did not get into an exact 
figure', they had been `trying to find a solution to the payments problem... no exact figure 
was involved but $250 million was mentioned. ' Miller's confirmation of the Brazilian 
story did nothing to weaken Dulles' resolve; he had already reported to President 
Eisenhower and told him, 
they are threatening overthrow of the government, communism etc... he 
should tell the Ambassador that we will give them $100 million and expect 
them to work it off with their creditors and not be blackmailed, for once we 
start paying out it will become a tremendous financial burden, for any country 
who wants to yell "communism" will come in for loans. 
However, Eisenhower was growing increasingly concerned about the US reputation if 
they reneged on their promise to Brazil and began to soften his stance. Dulles called 
Treasury Secretary Humphrey and told him: `The President is disposed in the 
circumstances to go ahead on this but shave it down as much as you can. 'M At his staff 
62 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 65 
63 Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American ffairs, Thomas Mann, to the 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, February 201953. FRUS 1952-1 4, Volume VI. p 607; Michael 
Weis (1993) p 65; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) writes, `Eisenhow wanted to ve the loan, and his 
secretary of the treasury, George Humphrey, wanted to dump the "inheri ess"' 65 
64 Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann, to the 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, February 20 1953. FRUS 1952-1954, Volume 4. p 607; Phone Call 
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meeting four days later, Dulles explained Eisenhower's decision as having been 
motivated by the desire not to lay `the new administration open to possible charges of bad 
faith with regard to commitments made with the old Administration. '65 Eisenhower later 
confirmed this at the July 3 Cabinet meeting. 66 
The inability of the administration to counter the Brazilian loan request had 
proven to be intensely frustrating for Secretary Dulles and George Humphrey. They saw 
it as a direct refutation of their economic policy and became even more determined to 
successfully expand foreign private investment in Brazil and Latin America. Humphrey 
made his feelings clear at the NSC meeting of March 18,1953: 
Humphrey informed the Council that it had already proved necessary for the 
Export-Import Bank to advance $300 million to Brazil in order to enable it to 
pay for materials which it had purchased from private interests in the United 
States. This was a case, and a not very edifying one, of straight overbuying by 
the Brazilians. Unless something could be done to stop it... it would set the 
pattern for further expenditures and further requests for loans in the 
future ... Secretary Humphrey said that this sort of transaction obviously 
needed to be much more carefully policed by this Government in the future. It 
was already too late when he got the chance to acquaint himself with this 
most recent transaction... these matters had very serious implications for the 
future, and it would be necessary for us to cut off in the near future 67 
Between Secretary of State Dulles and Former Assistant Secretary of State Ed Miller, February 20 1953; 
Phone Call between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, February 20 1953; Phone Call Between 
Secretary of State Dulles and Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, February 20 1953Telephone 
Memoranda January-April 1953, Box No 1, Telephone Calls Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, Eisenhower 
Library. 
65 Minutes of the Secretary's Staff Meeting, Department of State, February 24 1953. FRUS 1952-1954 
Volume IV. pp 608-609; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) writes: `they agreed that the United States was 
"hooked", because the money had been promised and the Truman administration had in 1950 loaned $125 
million to Brazil's rival, Argentina' p 65; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Qtats (1993) p 65; 
Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter (1963) writes, 'He [Eisenhower] had scarcely sat down in the 
presidential chair when he learned that the Truman administration had committed the United States to a 
$300 million balance of payments loan to Brazil' p 188 
66 `In regard to Brazil, the president noted that he had opposed the recent loan until he saw that the United 
States good faith was involved' Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting of July 3 1953, Box No 2, Cabinet Series, 
Whitman File, Eisenhower Library; the Brazilian response is given in Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is 
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67 Memorandum of Discussion at the 137th National Security Council Meeting, March 181953, FRUS 
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In order to close off the avenue of the Export-Import Bank as a possible source of 
loans in times of crisis for the Latin Americans, President Eisenhower would, in the 
aftermath of the Brazilian loan situation, `eliminate the EXIM as a source of 
development loans'; leaving it to concentrate on `facilitating trade. 69 Such determination 
in the economic sphere, though, could quite possibly damage the bilateral relationship. 
This was made clear by Fernando Lee, an Emissary sent by President Vargas, in a 
meeting with Secretary Humphrey. Lee made it quite clear that US economic policy was 
inflaming anti-American feeling in Brazil. 
Without questioning the validity of United States policy since the war with 
respect to other areas, or of United States assistance on the grand scale to war 
devastated countries, Fernando [Lee] thought he represented the sentiment of 
a large body of articulate Brazilian opinion, which is normally very friendly 
to the US, by saying that Brazil felt neglected or forgotten by the country to 
which it was traditionally and directly committed as friend and ally. While 
Brazil could not, and did not, expect direct compensation for the blood and 
treasure it had donated to the common cause-it had not expected disregard 
or an attitude, as Fernando put it, of "please don't bother me now, I'm 
awfully busy. " Brazil had perhaps, fallen into some bad habits during this 
period and its policies perhaps had become influenced by a relatively small 
body of chauvinists (aided and abetted by Communists), but he felt that 
official United States attitudes may have contributed to the development of 
positions and the adoption of measures by his own government inconsistent 
with its traditional policies, especially towards the United States... The 
successful frustration by relatively small, unfriendly, groups in Brazil, of the 
will of the people as a whole to permit the development of petroleum 
resources which he thinks are here, are in large measure due to the lack of 
assistance available to friendly Brazilians, and the lack of continuing 
goodwill and interest of the US toward this country. He said that he was 
convinced that if the US government does not insist on specific quid pro quos 
for the several measures of cooperation and assistance which Brazil needs 
from the US, the Brazilian Government will, in the reasonably near future, 
succeed in adopting legislation which will attract foreign capital into 
industries which will expand production of basic necessities and strengthen 
the fabric of Brazilian society. 
" Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'etats (1993) p 65; Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, 
and the Cold War" (1981) 
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As we can clearly see, this comment illustrates that fact that US economic 
policies (especially attempts to export free market capitalism to the region) were having 
a negative impact on the level of anti-American and nationalist sentiment in Brazil (It 
was markedly similar in tone to the warning contained in the annex to NSC 144/1 
highlighted in the previous chapter). It is testament to the single-mindedness of US 
officials in pursuing their economic objectives in Brazil that they did not choose to alter 
their position. In fact, Assistant Secretary John Moors Cabot, though recognising the 
validity of Lee's argument, replied unenthusiastically stating, 'Fernando's views are 
valuable as an expression of a responsible Brazilian friend, and they do indicate a 
problem we should try and solve. '69 Despite this warning, however, the administration 
would continue with the stance taken over the Brazilian loan request in its policy towards 
the future of the Joint Commission. 
US ECONOMIC POLICY: THE END OF THE JBUSEDC 
Since its inception in 1951, the Joint Brazil United States Economic 
Development Commission had endured a difficult time. Designed to rejuvenate the 
bilateral relationship it had, in fact, had quite the opposite effect. These problems were 
directly caused by the way that the Commission was designed. In an effort to devolve 
responsibility for the loaning process away from the White House, the Truman 
administration had designed the Commission in such a way that agreed upon loan 
requests would go from the Commission to either the Export-Import Bank or the World 
Bank. A fierce turf battle erupted between these two financial institutions as both wanted 
to be the main driving force behind the Commission's loan process. Eventually it was 
resolved that the majority of requests would go to the World Bank. As Elizabeth Cobbs 
writes: `Under the terms governing the commission, it was the State Department, not the 
69 Letter from Minister-Counsellor of American Embassy in Rio Walter N Walmsley to Assistant Secretary 
of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot on Meeting between Brazilian Emissary Fernando 
Lee and Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, March 211953; Reply by John Moors Cabot to Walter 
Walmsley, April 3 1953, Folder - Brazil, Box No 1, RG 59, Entry 1131, Records for the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, John M Cabot 1953-1954, Country File, Lot 56 D 13, 
National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
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government of Brazil, that decided which of the two banks was to be approached on any 
given loan. The Eximbank approved all joint commission projects submitted to it. The 
World Bank, however, refused to consider the majority of loan applications ever 
submitted and in fact after 1954 did not make another loan to Brazil for four years. '70 
The problem lay in the role of the President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, who 
came to dominate the Joint Commission's loaning process. A strict fiscal conservative, 
he would insist on applying a strict banker's perspective onto those loan requests 
71 submitted. 
The frustration caused by Black's intransigent approach had impacted upon not 
just the Brazilians but, also, those US officials assigned to dealing with the Joint 
Commission. Although Black was taking an economically prudent view of the 
Commission's activities, it was a stance that impacted a huge stress upon the bilateral 
relationship as Brazil came to consider the JBUSEDC as another case of the US not 
making good on its promises to Brazil. 72 Tensions also arose, however, within the US 
government as those officials charged with implementing the Commission grew 
increasingly frustrated at the strict economic doctrine being applied to the Commission's 
work. Chief amongst these was State Department official Merwin Bohan, who had been 
an integral part of the Commission's workings and who was growing progressively more 
frustrated at what he felt was a betrayal of the Commission's objectives. The dispute 
between Bohan 73 and the World Bank is a crucial factor in analysing the role that 
70 Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) p 80 
Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'dtats (1993) writes: `Although just six months previously 
Eugene Black had given Lafer [Brazilian Foreign Minister] assurances of support, he slammed the door on 
Brazilian expectations' p 52; Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) outlines the role that 
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not giving any more funds until Brazil mended its ways, and he opposed any new loans by the US 
government as well. ' P 81-93 
Z The delays that came to characterise the Commission's loaning process drove a severe wedge between 
the US and Brazil. As Cobbs writes, `tensions between the World Bank and the Vargas government never 
really abated'; If anything, these tensions got worse, as Black attempted to use the World Bank's role in the 
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Policy (1992) p 87 
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economic objectives played in US policy and strongly points towards the existence of a 
separate economic agenda within the US approach. 74 The dispute between the World 
Bank and the Export-Import Bank would be finally settled when Eisenhower came to 
office. `Policy under Eisenhower coincided much more closely with the views and 
interests of the World Bank ... the administration entered with a bias against foreign aid 
and a determination to decrease the Eximbank's autonomy and scope, ' notes Elizabeth 
Cobbs. 75 In addressing the future of the Joint Commission, the Eisenhower 
administration, like Eugene Black and the World Bank, would apply an economic 
conception to the issue; ignoring the political ramifications for President Vargas and 
without considering the impact on US security issues in Brazil. Again, we see the 
underlying tension between US security and economic aims. 76 
74 For more information on the dispute between Bohan and the World Bank, see: Resume of Discussion 
held at the Presidential Palace, Rio de Janeiro, July 5 1952; Minutes of the 197d'Meeting of the National 
Advisory Council in International Monetary Fund and Financial Problems, October 10 1952; Memorandum 
from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Ed Miller to the US Ambassador in Brazil 
Herschel Johnson, October 17 1952; Memorandum of a Conversation by Sterling Cottrell of the Office of 
South American Affairs between Merwin Bohan and Eugene Black, January 12 1953, FRUS 1952-1954 
Volume IV pp 587-605; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'dtats (1993) p 54-56; Elizabeth Cobbs, 
The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) p 81-93 
75 Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) p 94 
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orientation. Bohan was clearly concerned that the political advantages of forming the Commission (namely, 
bringing President Vargas more into line with US policy) were being threatened by the World Bank's 
insistence on applying a strict economic scale of reference to the Commission's work. Bohan informed 
Black that continued delays could, `completely wipe out the prestige of the Joint Commission... profoundly 
affect US-Brazil relations and alienate President Vargas'; Black, in keeping with his conservative persona, 
informed Bohan that `as a banking institution the IBRD would not and could not contravene fiscal 
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95 
In April, 1953, the US informed the Vargas administration of its desire to 
terminate the Joint Commission. 77 Although it had been scheduled to end in 1953, the 
constant delays that had typified its existence meant that the Brazilians were hopeful that 
it would be allowed to continue beyond that date. Vargas needed to try and prolong the 
lifespan of the commission due to the intense political and economic difficulties that he 
faced domestically. Despite his public bluster in declaring that Brazilian difficulties `are 
faced and conquered with determined courage, ' the harsh realities of the situation in 
Brazil were all too apparent. 78 As Time Magazine reported, Brazil's `foreign trade debts 
stood at an all-time high of $850 million, the cost of living was up 30% in twelve months, 
strikes for wage rises of 40% to 50% were sweeping the country, and the outlawed 
Communist Party was flourishing. '79 The extent of the financial problems in Brazil had 
also been hinted at during the March 18 NSC Meeting, where Under-Secretary Smith 
stated that the `State Department expected the Brazilians to come back very shortly with 
another request on the Export-Import Bank, this time for $400 million. '80 Due to 
fractured majority that served as Vargas's power base, the Brazilian leader was unable to 
implement the wide-ranging reforms that were necessary to address Brazil's chronic 
economic problems-81 US officials were insistent that adopting foreign private investment 
and the principles of "free trade, free capital and free investment" would ease the 
situation; but the nationalist tendencies in Brazil were so deep-rooted that any significant 
move in this direction was politically unfeasible for Vargas. 
82 We saw in Chapter One 
just how determined the administration was to achieve its goals in Latin America, as it 
aggressively pursued its main security objective of solving the problems posed by 
Arbenz. The situation in Brazil proves that this determination was equally prevalent in 
the administration's attempts to meet its economic objectives. 
77 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 614-5; Thomas Skidmore, 
Politics in Brazil (1967) p 117-8 
78 For information on the continuing political and economic problems in Brazil at this time, see: Robert 
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The parlous situation confronting Vargas domestically would force him to plead 
with the Eisenhower administration to extend the life of the Commission. The Brazilian 
leader had staked a great deal of political capital on the "special relationship" promised 
by Truman, and if this gamble failed he was likely to come under increasing pressure 
from both his political opponents and the Brazilian military. 83 Although both Merwin 
Bohan and the Vargas Government wanted the Joint Commission to continue in its work, 
the decision had already been taken and the US would move ahead with its plans to 
terminate it in June. The administration was being motivated by its desire to meet its 
economic objectives in the region and, as stated earlier, would only consider the 
ramifications in the security sphere in the summer of the following year. Until then, 
Washington would continue to rely on the alliance between the Pentagon and the 
Brazilian military as a way of trying to ensure that overt anti-Americanism or strident 
nationalism was kept relatively quiet. As highlighted throughout this section, though, 
nationalism was highly evident in Brazil and this is where Siekmeier's argument does not 
go far enough: expanding the American economic system was not going to dissipate 
nationalist sentiments in Brazil84, and although seemingly aware of this, the 
administration was so committed to the ideas of liberal capitalism that they could not see 
beyond their current policy. Michael Weis confirms the administration's lack of foresight 
with respect to the political and security consequences of their actions in Brazil, writing: 
Over the next four months, any goodwill established by the commission 
evaporated as the US pursued its termination while Brazil tried to salvage as 
much as possible... In their zealous pursuit of fiscal conservatism, the 
hardliners showed a complete disregard for the internal political 
consequences within Brazil and the stability of the Vargas administration if 
funding dried up. '85 
83 On April 27 the US Ambassador, Herschel Johnson, met with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, who told 
Johnson that for `purely internal political reasons' the Vargas administration, `earnestly hopes we will 
accede to Brazilian requests which is contained in his draft note for termination of the commission on 
December 30 instead June 30 this year' Telegram from Ambassador Johnson in Brazil to the Department of 
State, April 27 1953. FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV. p 609; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'dtats 
(1993) also details Vargas' attempts to prolong the life of the Commission and, indeed, his attempts to 
expedite the funding process' p 64 
84 As shown in the annex to NSC 144/1 and in Fernando Lee's address to Secretary Humphrey 
81 W. Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etat (1993) p 66-67 
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It was not just the `hardliners' that were responsible for this stance, though; we have 
already identified the fact that in the early period of the administration's time in office 
there was a general consensus as to the best way forwards for the US in Latin America. It 
was only in the aftermath of the Caracas Conference and intervention in Guatemala that 
officials like John Moors Cabot, Milton Eisenhower and Harold Stassen became more 
vocal in their calls for a reappraisal of US policy. 
Bohan, fighting against the economic emphasis of US policy in Brazil, continued 
to try and salvage some of the political goodwill that the commission had built up. In 
May, he sent a memorandum to the State Department, highlighting the options open to 
the US. They were: 
1. To follow present policy that joint commission can be terminated on June 
30 whether agreement reached or not with the Brazilians... 2. Acquiesce in 
desire to continue joint commission until December 31... 3. Complete 
program of the joint commission by reaching agreement on foreign financing 
plan prior to June 30 thus removing valid substantive objections to 
termination on that date. 
In Bohan's opinion, the third option appeared to be the most attractive, as this would, 
`permit meeting Brazilian public conception of the US commitment, relieve the US from 
joint responsibility of implementation program during the period when the Brazilian 
Government finds it particularly difficult to take sustained economic action and allow the 
US to retire from joint commission program with all flags flying. '86 The evidence 
presented suggests that the leading policymakers within the administration were applying 
sb Telegram from Ambassador Johnson in Brazil to the Department of State, May 5 1953; Telegram from 
US Ambassador in Brazil Herschel Johnson to the Department of State, May 6 193, FRUS 1952-1954 
Volume IV p 612-613; President Vargas continued to try and broker a deal by sending Governor Amaral 
Peixoto to Washington to try and use agreements on Brazilian natural resources as a tool for extending the 
life of the Joint Commission. The Governor met with Eisenhower and `handed him a memorandum 
regarding the possibility of a titanium contract ... then handed the President a memorandum about uranium 
in Brazil, ' before finally handing, `the President a memorandum regarding Brazil's desire to continue the 
Joint Commission for Economic Development for another six months' Memorandum of a Conversation 
between President Eisenhower, the Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro Amaral Peixoto & the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot, May 7 1953. Brazil (11), Box No 4, 
International Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library 
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a strictly economic appraisal to the Joint Commission. Although the administration had 
received several warnings as to the potential problems that their approach in Brazil might 
cause US officials were determined to implement their economic strategy; especially in 
the aftermath of the $300 million balance of payments loan earlier in the year. As well as 
the administration's determination with respect to their economic approach, it is equally 
apparent that the US was giving little consideration to its security objectives in Brazil. 
Those security elements of US policy, which had been outlined in NSC 144/1, had been 
overtaken in importance by events in the economic sphere. Although the US continued to 
cultivate a close relationship with the Brazilian military they refused to consider the 
possibility that their actions in the economic sector might lead to a dangerous level of 
instability. Part of the reason for this is that it was assumed that if Vargas did fall from 
power then he would be replaced by the pro-US Brazilian military; however, this was far 
from certain and was something of a risk for the administration to be taking with Latin 
America's largest nation. 87 
Despite the entreaties of President Vargas and Merwin Bohan, the decision had 
already been taken within the Eisenhower administration to unilaterally terminate the 
Joint Commission. On May 8,1953, Secretary Dulles cabled Ambassador Johnson and 
informed him that, `the Department believes Joint Commission should terminate on June 
30. ' Although Dulles was prepared to come to an arrangement over the outstanding loan 
applications that had been submitted via the Commission, he was adamant that any 
payments would be reliant upon the health of the Brazilian economy. He wrote: 'US 
Government, Brazilian Government and lending institutions all desire to see Brazil's 
economic development be financed as rapidly as possible'; but this had to be `within 
Brazil's borrowing capacity to prevent the over-extension of credit and default of 
repayments. If this principle is accepted then Brazil's capacity becomes key and limit to 
financing. ' There would be no `advance commitments' that were not `unrelated to 
Brazil's financial position. ' Dulles wanted to ensure that Brazilian access to loans would 
be dependent on them meeting stringent economic performance targets. This would allow 
the US to begin implementing the economic criteria that they considered to be vital for 
87 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 122-131 
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the success of the policy objectives. For Brazil to receive the loans they desired, they 
would have to meet the strict economic criteria set down by Dulles. 
In keeping with the security aims within US policy, though, Dulles also wanted to 
try and ensure that the decision to terminate the Joint Commission was not used by 
Vargas as a method of bolstering his political standing through the use of strident anti- 
Americanism or nationalism. He wrote: 
[The] Department appreciates possible internal political repercussions and 
possible attacks upon the US as a result of terminating Commission-the 
extent of these developments will depend largely on how termination is 
presented to Brazilian public and officials. If no effort is made to place 
constructive view on above plan reaction could be severe. If intelligent 
sincere effort made by Brazilians and Embassy to present new plan in 
favourable light and early publicity initiative taken to forestall critics then 
repercussions could be minimized. 8 
Dulles hoped to be able to shut-down the Joint Commission and, through the use of an 
`intelligent' public relations operation, to prevent the outbreak of any serious political 
ramifications for the Eisenhower administration. It was, however, a flawed concept: by 
applying an economic approach to the Joint Commission's future, the US would 
overlook the political motivations that had underpinned the Commission's formation 
and, as a result, would severely undermine Vargas's political position. It is here that the 
crucial point surrounding the US decision to terminate the Commission comes to light. 
Although the US approach had been informed solely by their regional economic 
objectives, the consequence of their actions would be most apparent in the political 
sphere. 89 Merwin Bohan recognised this and wrote to the State Department to indicate 
the error that had been made in applying an economic approach to the work of the 
JBUSEDC. 
[By] January 1953 there was no one in the Department with a personal 
knowledge of the events leading up to the establishment of the Joint 
88 Telegram from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the Embassy in Brazil, May 8 1953 FRUS 1952- 
1954 Volume IV p 613-614 
89 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 614-5 
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Commission or of its first year of operations. This explains.. . why the true 
nature of the Joint Commission began to be lost sight of, for the 
Commission was the heart of a political not an economic program ... the 
objective was political - only the implementation was economic. Improving 
the balance of payments or bettering the managerialractices on Brazilian 
railroads, for example, were problems, not objectives. 90 
Although Vargas was able to negotiate an extension to the Commission's 
lifespan, this would be in name only and the JBUSEDC would no longer exist as a 
functioning entity in the bilateral relationship 91 In an effort to meet Foster Dulles' aim of 
closing the commission amicably the US did need Vargas's consent to terminate the 
Commission, which is how the Brazilian leader was able to negotiate an extension with 
regard to the termination date. 92 However, it was a minor concession, and for the US the 
major aim of terminating the commission and beginning to realign US-Brazilian 
economic relations had been achieved. It was to come at a major political cost, though: 
Vargas had staked a great deal of his political credibility on a strong relationship with the 
US, and the termination of the Joint Commission would impact a severe strain on 
Vargas's position. As has been shown throughout this section, the Eisenhower 
administration's implementation of the economic objectives outlined in NSC 144/1 had 
been pursued with a high level of determination. The stance taken over the $300 million 
EXIM Bank loan had indicated that the bilateral economic relationship would be 
remodelled under Eisenhower; however, it was the approach taken by the US with regard 
to the Joint Commission that was most indicative of the key components within US fiscal 
policy. Ultimately, though, this had been pursued with scant regard for either the 
90 Memorandum from Merwin Bohan, the US Commissioner on the Joint Brazil-United States Economic 
Development Commission to the Department of State, May 20 1953, lbid, p 617; Michael Weis, Cold 
Warriors & Coup D'dtats (1993) writes, `Politically the joint commission was disastrous' p 70; Elizabeth 
Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) p 99 
91 Until December 1953; the JBUSEDC stopped being an issue in US-Brazilian relations from the moment 
Milton Eisenhower came to Brazil as part of his `goodwill tour' in July, see: Milton Eisenhower, The Wine 
is Bitter (1963); Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coup D'dtats (1993) p 68-70 
92 Assistant Secretary John Moors Cabot told Walter Bedell Smith, that the `Department desires a voluntary 
agreement with Brazil to close out the Commission, rather than terminating it unilaterally. Since President 
Vargas now feels strongly that he cannot agree to close on June 30, the Department has proposed an 
extension until August 31 or September 30 provided that the Brazilians will agree now to close on either of 
those dates' Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot 
to the under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, June 11953, FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV, p 621-622; 
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political situation in Brazil or the status of US security aims, an eventuality that came 
about due to the disparate nature of US economic and security aims. As we shall see in 
the final sections of this chapter, the result would be political turmoil in Brazil and, in 
due course, the undermining of US political and strategic objectives. Although the close 
relationship that had been cultivated with the Brazilian military would remain, the level 
of political instability in Brazil would reach dangerous levels and would come to threaten 
US security objectives. 
US SECURITY AIMS IN BRAZIL: STRENGTHENING THE MILITARY ALLIANCE 
So far, this chapter has illustrated the way that the Eisenhower administration 
attempted to implement their regional policy in Brazil by focusing on the `running down' 
of the bilateral relationship and on the efforts made to restructure the nature of Brazilian 
economic development. As we saw in Chapter One, though, there was also a clear 
emphasis on security issues within US-Latin American relations. The third way that US 
regional policy would transpose onto Brazil would be in the efforts made by the 
Eisenhower administration in the strategic sphere. As we have already seen, the quelling 
of overt Latin discontent was a major security objective for US officials in the region: 
American efforts at meeting their security objectives in Brazil would, like their regional 
approach, be constructed around the use of military assistance agreements as a method of 
quelling instability. The use of military assistance had been identified by administration 
officials as an effective way of achieving US security aims in Latin America. In Chapter 
One it was shown how the administration had used military assistance agreements with 
those nations bordering Guatemala as a way of boosting US influence and of increasing 
the pressure on Arbenz. More widely, however, the use of military assistance agreements 
had been highlighted as a relatively easy way of forming strong links between the US and 
the Latin nations. Traditionally, the military establishments in Latin America had held a 
great deal of political power, and by cultivating a strong, amicable relationship with 
them, the US believed that they would be able to meet their security aims and a eradicate 
overt nationalist sentiment. Stephen Rabe highlights the logic behind US military policy 
toward Latin America, writing: `Whereas the strategic benefits of inter-American military 
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cooperation may have been slight, the political advantages of military aid were 
significant. Training and assistance programs gave the Eisenhower administration access 
to the Latin American military caste... military officers either ruled or dominated many 
Latin American nations. '93 
US military policy went further than just forging an alliance with Latin American 
militaries, though; it also sought to assert US control over both Latin military spending 
and what equipment they were supplied with. The purpose of this was twofold. Firstly, 
US officials wanted Latin nations to be armed well enough so that they would be able to 
contribute to hemispheric defense if the need arose, and secondly; it extended the level of 
American power in the region by intrinsically linking Latin military development to the 
role played by the US. NSC 144/1 clearly outlined the administration's intentions with 
respect to their military objectives. It read: 
The United States should encourage acceptance of the concept that each of 
the Latin American states is responsible for maximizing its contribution 
to... the internal security of its own territory ... the defense of its own 
territory ... [and] the allied defense effort. -The United States should take 
political, economic or military action, as appropriate, to insure the continued 
availability of US bases in Latin America... Where necessary the United 
States should assist in the protection of sources and processing facilities of 
strategic materials... In providing military aid and seeking military 
commitments the United States should not encourage Latin American nations 
to contribute to the military effort to an extent which would jeopardize their 
economic stability ... In addition, the United States should... seek the ultimate 
standardization along US lines of the organization, training, doctrine and 
equipment of Latin American armed forces. 
The Truman administration had recognised the usefulness of military cooperation as a 
diplomatic tool in their dealings with Latin America in the policy document NSC 56/2.95 
A large part of Latin America's importance to the US lay in its role as a vital strategic 
" Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 36; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 154; Lars 
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base for the US in times of war. 96 In keeping with the ideas that would form the basis of 
NSC 162/2 (the New Look), though, military policy in the Eisenhower era would retain 
an emphasis on being cost-effective. Put simply, although the administration would 
actively seek to cultivate a close relationship between themselves and the Latin military 
establishment it would not be at the cost of economic stability. The annex to NSC 144/1 
outlined this stating, 
Experience in military collaboration with Latin American countries since the 
war has shown that many of them have a desire for military equipment in 
excess of their economic capability to support.. . No matter how sound a 
policy and program for inter-American military collaboration may be, the 
difficulties of timing and implementation will require constant coordination 
of all the changing political, economic, and military factors affecting United 
States over-all security interests in Latin America. 97 
The Eisenhower administration's military policy in Latin America would, then, retain the 
central elements that fed into its overall conception of foreign policy. Its intended 
purpose would be to strengthen the bonds between Washington and the Latin military 
elites, to assume control of Latin military spending and `standardize' the equipment they 
received, and to create a strong, reliable ally in an area of huge strategic and financial 
importance to the US. In Brazil, military assistance would be used primarily to enhance 
the already strong bond between the Pentagon and the Brazilian military and to form a 
bulwark against the rising tide of nationalism. However, the continuation of a strong 
relationship between the Brazilian and American militaries would come to exacerbate the 
existing problems in the bilateral relationship; as the US imposed its economic approach 
onto Brazil, and as Vargas's political position continued to disintegrate, the increasingly 
disenchanted Brazilian military would move against the Brazilian leader. The problem for 
the US was that the military did not seek to form an alternative government; its intention 
was to oust Vargas from power, not to replace him. 
% During World War Two, the Latin American nations had supplied the US with vital raw materials, 
strategic bases, harbours and support 
' Annex to NSC 144, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, 
March 6 1953, NSC 144 - Latin America (2), Box No 4, Office of the Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs, Eisenhower Library; Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense, "Defense comments 
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As a result of the administration's rigid fiscal approach to the region'98 US 
military policy in Latin America would consistently fail to meet its objectives": no aid 
would be forthcoming to help facilitate Latin purchases of US equipment and the high 
prices and lengthy delays involved in procuring US military materiel would lead the 
Latin nations to seek the armaments they desired from Europe. 100 Despite these problems, 
however, the alliance between the US military and the Brazilian military continued to 
thrive in 1953 and 1954. This was mainly due to the strong links that had developed 
during World War Two. It was also down to the successful conclusion of a bilateral 
Military Assistance Agreement and the US policy of continuing to emphasise the "special 
relationship" that they enjoyed with the Brazilian military-101 After `running down' the 
closeness of the traditional bilateral relationship, and realigning the economic 
relationship, the administration believed that the close military alliance would not only 
enable them to maintain stability in Brazil but, also, to exert more influence over the 
existing government. 
When Eisenhower came to office a Military Assistance Agreement was awaiting 
ratification by the Brazilian Congress. Dulles proposed that Eisenhower use the occasion 
" President Eisenhower outlined the extent to which US military policy would be dictated by economic 
imperatives in a speech to Congress in May 1953. He stated: `To accomplish this objective we must avoid 
so rapid a military build-up that we seriously dislocate our economies. Military strength is most effective - 
indeed it can be maintained - only if it rests on a solid economic base' Special Message to the Congress on 
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Dwight D. Eisenhower - 1953. (1960) pp 256-258 
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of his meeting with the Brazilian Minister of War to expedite the process. General 
Cardoso visited Washington in March 1953. Dulles penned a briefing memo for the 
president, outlining what topics he should discuss with the General. He wrote: `Excellent 
effect would be achieved in Brazil through comment by you to the Minister on Brazil's 
military cooperation with us in World War Two and your hope for continued close 
collaboration ... you might 
indicate that this Government has military equipment ready for 
shipment as soon as Brazil ratifies the Military Assistance Agreement. ' 102 Dulles knew 
that the Brazilian Army still had a powerful voice in Brazilian politics, and if President 
Eisenhower could convince General Cardoso of the merits of the US plan then that could 
provide the US with significant leverage over Vargas. `Foreign participation in 
development would best enable Brazil to get on with the job and Army support of 
sensible legislation could be decisive. ' 103 As we can see, Dulles and Eisenhower were 
fully prepared to use a close relationship with the Brazilian military as a means of 
meeting both their security and their economic aims. Ratifying the pending Military 
Assistance Agreement was vital if the US was going to be able to meet this aim. 
The immense amount of political power that the Brazilian military continued to 
hold made them a desirable ally for the Eisenhower administration in aiming to meet its 
strategic objectives. Indeed, it is striking that as the US was terminating the Joint 
Commission they were also raising the possibility of establishing a Joint Defense Board 
with Brazil; a move that would further the alliance between the Pentagon and the 
Brazilian military. 104 An indication as to the closeness of the relationship between the US 
102 As it was, the Brazilian Congress would ratify the agreement in the aftermath of the granting of $300 
million of EXIM loans. Dulles continued and recommended that Eisenhower use the prospect of an 
amicable relationship with the Brazilian Armed Forces as a way of preventing the Brazilian nationalisation 
of its petroleum industry. it would be helpful for you to stress to the Minister the military, as well as the 
economic, benefits to Brazil and to Western Hemisphere Defense if Brazil becomes self-sufficient in 
petroleum. ' 
03 Memorandum from Secretary of State Dulles to President Eisenhower, March 4 1953, John Foster 
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and Brazilian military is provided by the fact that whilst waiting for the Military 
Assistance Agreement to be ratified, US officials were already working with delegates 
within the Brazilian Armed Forces to implement the plan once the Brazilian Congress 
had agreed to it. Walter Walmsley, the American Charge in Brazil, reported that: 
`although Brazilian promulgation completed only mid June, the US and Brazilian 
military groups had anticipated planning phases, designating Brazilian units for 
hemispheric defense, and making plans for their supply. ' 105 There was a clear line of 
communication open between the Pentagon and their Brazilian counterparts irrespective 
of the status of the diplomatic relationship; it was this allegiance between the two 
militaries that gave the Eisenhower administration the security to implement their 
economic policies and to terminate the Joint Commission. As Vargas's political position 
continued to collapse in the wake of the Joint Commission's termination and continuing 
economic crises in Brazil, a State Department official speculated that: `A coup d'etat by 
the Army would not seriously affect our interests... it would be unfortunate in 
principle... though our practical security objectives might even be enhanced. ' 106 This 
strategy, though, assumed that any collapse of the Vargas administration would lead to 
the installation of a Military government. As we will see, this would not come to pass. 
Instead, a dangerous political vacuum would emerge that would threaten US interest; a 
situation that had been increasingly likely in the later stages of Vargas's presidency due 
to the fractured nature of the Brazilian political system and the intense tensions that the 
Brazilian leader was under. 
END OF THE VARGAS ADMINISTRATION: THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
BRAZLIAN GOVERNMENT 
105 Telegram from the Charge in Brazil Walter Walmsley to the Department of State, July 16 1953, FRUS 
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By the end of 1953, the bilateral relationship was severely strained due to the 
effect that the implementation of US policy had impacted upon US-Brazilian relations. 107 
The administration's retraction of "special relationship" status from Brazil had been part 
of the US strategy of homogenising their approach towards Latin America. The 
termination of the Joint Commission, however, had been informed by US economic 
objectives. 108 President Vargas had, in attempting to bridge the divide between the 
idealism of liberal economic theory and firebrand Brazilian nationalism, staked a good 
deal of his political goodwill on the benefits to be found in a close relationship with the 
US. 109 Between December 1953 and the summer of 1954 the relationship between 
Washington and Rio collapsed as the Brazilian leader sought to stabilize the internal 
political situation in his country and the Eisenhower administration continued to adhere 
to the guidelines put forward in NSC 144/1. ' 10 US officials had made the extension of 
foreign private investment, and the implementation of American economic principles, 
the primary aim of their policy in Brazil. As shown in this chapter, they terminated the 
Joint Economic Commission unilaterally and resisted Brazilian calls for increased levels 
of developmental funding. However, this approach was quite clearly having an adverse 
effect on the status of US-Brazilian relations, and the US was increasingly being put in a 
position whereby it was turning down Brazilian requests for aid and loan payments. "' 
Walter Walmsley, the American Charge in Rio, outlined this problem to John 
Moors Cabot in September 1953 and informed him that: `I agree that we should avoid 
being "propositioned with bigger and better Brazilian plans", and I think we can do so, 
but we can not expect to keep friends by blows. ' 
112 The Brazilian perspective was made 
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clear to US officials by the newly appointed Brazilian Ambassador, Joao Carlos Muniz, 
who on presenting his letter of credence at the White House, stated: 
The Latin American peoples also are traversing a critical period in the process 
of their history. My country, whose territory is set in the heart of South 
America, could not possibly avoid sensing all the anxieties, all the 
aspirations, all the exigencies of the Latin American conscience. The Latin 
American movement is characterized by the awakening of its peoples to the 
imperative necessity of attaining living standards on a par with their 
conception of the dignity of man. The struggle against poverty, against 
endemic diseases, against ignorance, constitutes the absorbing concern of the 
peoples of Latin America today ... the crucial problem of the Latin American 
peoples today is that of economic development. " 3 
Despite the ongoing problems in the bilateral relationship, Brazilian officials 
continued to request aid in raising social and economic standards in their country. The 
American response was to stress the importance of the Latin nations attaining more 
private investment. But a report compiled for the National Security Council suggested 
that the problem in funding Latin development was not an indigenous one; instead, it 
illustrated the fact that the majority of economic capital in Latin America came from 
domestic sources and that there needed to be an increase in the amount of capital 
invested by US firms in the region as for the last couple of years this figure had begun to 
decline. 
Since World War Two total domestic and foreign investment in Latin 
America has averaged about $7 billion annually, with domestic investment 
accounting for over 90% of the total ... During 1952 US private direct 
investment in Latin America amounted to $582 million, of which $278 
million represented net inflow of new capital and $304 million undistributed 
subsidiary earnings. In 1953 estimated net inflow of new capital dropped to 
$113 million... recent changes in the private investment climate appear to be 
Entry 1131, Records for the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, John M Cabot, 
Country File, Lot 56 D 13, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. 
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generally unfavourable. An intense spirit of economic nationalism continues 
to operate against the desire and the need for development. 114 
The message contained in the report was clear: the rising level of economic nationalism 
in the region was having a serious effect on the level of US capital that was being 
invested in Latin America, which was only deepening the financial problems in the 
area. "' This problem was especially prevalent in Brazil, where the intense political and 
economic problems confronting the Vargas administration were not only increasing the 
level of instability but were also providing nationalist groups with an increasing level of 
popular support. A National Intelligence Report highlighted the growing political 
problem in Brazil, stating: 
The political situation in Brazil is characterized by growing social unrest 
and increasing nationalism. The chief factors in this situation are (a) Brazil's 
sustained effort to maintain a high rate of economic development with the 
emphasis on industrialization; (b) the accompanying inflation and rapid 
urbanization, which have caused particular distress among urban lower 
income groups; (c) Brazil's failure to obtain from the US the amount of 
financial assistance to which it feels entitled. These conditions facilitate 
ultranationalist and Communist agitation! 16 
We can discern, from the evidence presented, that US efforts at pursuing their 
economic agenda in Brazil had provided the catalyst for a serious deterioration of 
internal political and economic stability. Although Vargas was, to a large extent, 
responsible for the shape of the Brazilian polity by 1954, the policies pursued the 
Eisenhower administration had exacerbated those tensions that were already apparent 
within the Brazilian political structure. 
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vocal Brazilian nationalism became, the more chance there was of US credibility being 
undermined, which in the Manichean worldview being used by US officials became a 
boost for the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the climate for attracting foreign investment 
was also under threat. The Intelligence Report continued to say that, `substantial foreign 
private investment is precluded by the prevalent nationalistic attitude toward such 
investment and by the uncertain economic outlook. ' 118 By the spring of 1954, events in 
Brazil were trapped in a relentless circle: the deteriorating economic situation required 
increased levels of capital investment, but the growing nationalist forces in Brazil 
prevented President Vargas from enacting the legislation needed to take such a step; the 
Brazilian military began to oppose Vargas's rule more stridently, further preventing him 
from altering his policies; and, with US policy continuing to ignore Brazilian objectives, 
Vargas took a fateful step to the `left' and away from the US. ' 19 In pursuing the aims laid 
down in NSC 144/1, the Eisenhower administration had exacerbated the problems that 
were so apparent within the Brazilian polity. The Brazilian leader had staked a great deal 
of political capital on a close relationship with the US and, as Washington terminated the 
Joint Commission and refused Brazilian requests for balance of payments loans and 
EXIM Bank funding, Vargas's position became increasingly difficult. In an effort to 
regain some popular support he moved away from the US and pursued a more 
nationalistic policy agenda. 120 
Although these efforts had a negative impact on US-Brazilian relations, they were 
not enough to save Vargas's political position. The rancour that had emerged in the wake 
of the US decision to terminate the Joint Commission and the continuing problem of 
Brazilian economic disarray had taken hold of Brazilian political circles. The crisis 
deepened when the middle-class became enraged by Vargas's decision to issue a 100 
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120 These efforts included implementing a more nationalistic economic policy and forming a state-run 
petroleum company, Petrobras, a move which directly opposed US aims to expand foreign private 
investment in the region. Further problems in the bilateral relationship were encountered with respect to 
Brazilian loan requests and through a new willingness to pursue an independent approach at the United 
Nations. See: Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 72-77; Stanley Hilton, "The United 
States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 616 
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percent rise in the minimum wage, and the situation came to a head in August 1954 when 
Carlos Lacerda, a newspaper editor and powerful anti-administration spokesman, was 
wounded by a group of Vargas's bodyguards. Opponents in the Brazilian Congress began 
calling for the president's resignation, and although the would-be-assassin was 
apprehended and tried, Vargas was to be held responsible. The Brazilian Military chose 
this moment to denounce Vargas's presidency. On August 23, more than thirty generals 
signed a manifesto calling for Vargas's resignation. 121 After initially agreeing to take a 
leave of absence, Vargas instead committed suicide in the early hours of August 24. His 
death left a political vacuum in Brazil, as the next presidential elections were not 
scheduled until 1955. US officials had assumed that in the event of Vargas falling from 
power then the Brazilian military would form a new government, but this did not happen; 
instead, an interim administration would take office and the Eisenhower administration 
would be faced with the challenge of pursuing their aims with what was effectively a 
"lame-duck" government. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have identified the impact that the Eisenhower administration's 
reshaped global and regional policies had on US-Brazilian relations. As we have seen, 
the administration consciously decided to prioritise the implementation of its economic 
programme in Brazil. After taking over from Harry Truman, the Eisenhower 
administration quickly began to integrate its own brand of fiscal conservatism and 
economic development along traditional capitalist lines as being the major element 
behind its approach toward economic relations with Brazil: despite being ideologically 
compatible with pre-existing US aims with respect to achieving economic preponderance 
121 The Manifesto said: `considering that the criminal inquiry has brought to light ample corruption in 
circles closest to the President of the Republic... considering that these facts compromise the moral 
authority that is indispensable for the President of the Republic to exercise his mandate' and `considering 
that the extended actual political crisis is causing the country irremediable damages in the economic area 
and could possibly end in serious internal commotions ... the signatories below, generals of the army, 
conscious of their duties ... feel that the best path to calm the people is the resignation of the President of the 
Republic' Manifesto to the Brazilian People, August 23 1954, Taken From: Jordan M. Young, Brazil: End 
of a Civilian Cycle (USA: Facts on File, 1972) p 15-16; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coup D 'Etats 
(1993) p78; Robert Levine, Father of the Poor? (1998) p 87-9; Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) 
p 122-143 
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and constructing a flourishing economic world-system, this approach was wholly at odds 
with the aims and desires of the Brazilian government. Identifying this leads us to ask an 
important question: why did the US implement a policy approach that was so deeply 
unpopular with the Brazilians? 
There are two possible answers. Firstly, it could be argued that the Eisenhower 
administration's approach was in keeping with the president's ideas on global 
containment and that by imposing US economic principles (such as foreign direct 
investment) on Brazil he was safeguarding it from slipping out of the capitalist orbit. 
Secondly, and in direct contrast to the first solution, it could equally be argued that the 
administration was acting in accordance with long-held economic objectives in Latin 
America; a set of objectives that - as we saw in the Introduction to this thesis - had been 
sharpened into a global strategy by the situation facing the United States at the end of 
World War Two. There is some merit in the first answer: Eisenhower did indeed see the 
extension of American economic principles as a bulwark against communist expansion. 
But, in the same way that the US was content to support undemocratic regimes in the 
region when it suited their strategic aims, it seems logical to suggest that had they been 
pursuing a predominantly strategic approach that they would have been flexible enough 
to adapt this policy once it became clear just how unpopular it was proving to be in 
Brazil. Therefore, we need to take the second answer into consideration: the lack of 
flexibility in US policy is instructive, and cannot be solely apportioned to Eisenhower's 
fiscal conservatism. Instead, we need to accept that there was clearly more behind the 
advocacy of Washington's economic approach than national security concerns. Rather 
than adopting the position that the administration misread the situation in Brazil, from 
the evidence presented it is evident that US officials had a clearly conceived idea of the 
program they wanted to implement: that was a return to basic US economic ideals that 
had been outlined by officials in the Roosevelt administration from 1943 onwards. The 
fact that this approach ran so contrary to US national security interests - as suggested in 
NSC 144/1 and outlined in Chapter One - strongly indicates that there was clearly more 
than one element underpinning US policy. As this chapter has demonstrated, in pursuing 
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their economic interests with such determination, the Eisenhower administration severely 
undermined it strategic interests in Brazil. 
In order to offer a solution as to how US policy came to be undermining its 
objectives in differing spheres, it is necessary to view their pursuit of economic 
expansion and their pursuit of Cold War national security aims as separate objectives. 
The impact that this had on US policy in Brazil has been demonstrated throughout this 
chapter. By the autumn of 1954, Vargas' death had left a sizeable political vacuum in 
Brazil; one that would not, constitutionally at least, be filled until January 1956. US 
policy in the economic sphere had accelerated the disintegration of Vargas's power base 
as Brazil was hit by continual economic crises and major political instability. Even the 
man who had dominated politics in Brazil since 1930 could not remedy the set of 
circumstances that confronted him by February, 1954.122 The administration's aim of 
suppressing Latin nationalism and eradicating any overt anti-Americanism from the 
region was reliant upon hemispheric stability in both the political and economic spheres: 
their decision to make economic objectives a priority in Brazil had, in effect, negated 
their security aims and directly threatened the stability of the region. Chapters Three and 
Four will chart the evolution of US policy in the period between 1954 and the spring of 
1958 -a period defined by a significant move in the nature of the Cold War. As the twin 
aims of US policy continued to clash, the evolving debate within the administration as to 
how to reshape their foreign policy in order to deal with the "new" phase in the Cold 
War began to impact significant changes on US-Latin relations. 123 The advent of a more 
assertive Soviet foreign policy would force the administration to give more emphasis in 
their policy to meeting their national security objectives; however, their success in this 
would be consistently hindered by their strict adherence to prevailing economic 
objectives. 
122 Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002); Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) 
123 The most immediate example of this will come in the following chapter with an analysis of the Rio 
Economic Conference and the impact that this had on the US position in the region 
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CHAPTER 3: US-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 1954-1958 
"A CHANGE IN CONTEXT" 
INTRODUCTION: 
In 1956, the Soviet Union made a concerted effort to expand its economic and 
diplomatic relations in Latin America. This caused the Eisenhower administration to 
reassess its policy in the region, bringing about a rethink in US strategy and a significant 
shift towards trying to shore-up their security objectives in the area. This shift was part of 
a wider trend within global affairs, which saw the focus of the Cold War move away 
from the European mainland towards the less-developed areas of the world. ' This chapter 
will identify the major changes in the global situation and assess what impact this had on 
US strategy, before going on to illustrate the effect it had on US Policy in Latin America. 
What will become apparent is that the focus of US officials in Latin America would 
become increasingly directed towards strategic concerns. However, despite this, and in 
keeping with the central argument of this thesis, we will see that US policy in the region 
continued to be dominated by two separate objectives: economic expansion and meeting 
the administration's security objectives. 2 
Therefore, the basic goal of this chapter is to answer the following question: Why, 
when US officials were making a concerted attempt to repair their standing in Latin 
America, did they fail to instigate a change in their economic policy? In answering this 
question it will be made clear that there was, indeed, two separate aims underpinning the 
administration's approach and that the tension between these aims were increasingly 
undermining the US position in the region. This argument will be supported in Chapter 
' See: Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad 
(Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2006); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third 
World Interventions and the Making of our Times (Cambridge, UK: Cambri dge University Press, 2005); 
Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the 
Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006) 
2 The role of ideological constructs in US policy is explored more thoroughly in: Michael Hunt, Ideology in 
US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World 
History (London: Routledge, 2000) 
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Four, which will look at US-Brazilian relations in the same period: what will emerge 
there is that as they did regionally, the Eisenhower administration would attempt to 
cultivate an improved relationship with the Brazilian government in order to shore up 
their strategic position. However, this would be undermined by the impact that US 
economic policy had on the bilateral relationship; by the start of 1958, disagreements 
over economic policy had caused the bilateral relationship to reach its lowest point since 
1945. 
This phase in US-Latin American relations has often been played down by 
scholars. The reason for this is that it is the period in-between the cases of US 
intervention in Guatemala in 1954 and the crises in US-Latin relations that emerged at the 
end of the decade. This chapter will argue that it is, in fact, an important period in 
charting the evolution of US-Latin relations in the Eisenhower era. For it not only 
illustrates the evolution of US policy in the second phase of the Cold War, but also, 
starkly demonstrates the deepening tension between strategic objectives and economic 
principles within the US approach. The focus of US policy in Latin America would shift 
significantly, as Washington's national security interests became a much more prominent 
theme in US-Latin relations. This occurred for two reasons. Firstly, the change in the 
dynamic of the relationship between Washington and Moscow and the subsequent shift in 
the focus of the Cold War from the core to the periphery; and secondly, due to the fact 
that the USSR attempted to increase its diplomatic and trade relationships with the 
countries of the region, thus undermining the US position, and forcing US officials to re- 
examine their stance towards the Latin nations. 
Neither the Traditional nor the Revisionist schools of thought provide satisfactory 
explanations for the inconsistencies within US policy in Latin America at this time, and 
both schools understate the importance of this period when seeking to understand US- 
Latin relations 3 Although James Siekmeier establishes the link between the 
3 For the Traditionalist view see: Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower: The Foreign Policy ofAnti-Communism & 
Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1999); Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the 
Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994); Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: 
US-Latin American Relations Since 1889 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000). For the 
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administration's global policy and its changing approach in Latin America, he does not 
interrogate the administration's national security agenda in enough detail4 More 
importantly, both schools fail to address the following pertinent questions: why did the 
administration persist in adopting an inflexible stance with regard to its economic policy 
when this was certain to inflame Latin nationalism? And, why did the administration 
adopt the position it did at the Buenos Aires Economic Conference in 1957 when a 
growing number of US officials strongly recommended a change in approach? This 
chapter will provide an answer to both of those questions. In doing so it will demonstrate 
that despite the change in circumstances surrounding US policy in Latin America, the 
major characteristics of the administration's approach would, in fact, remain the same; it 
was the balance between their economic and security aims that had altered, with security 
considerations now becoming more prominent. This did not, though, mean that economic 
aims were ignored: on the contrary, the administration's economic agenda would 
continue to be a highly important part of US strategy in the region. Highlighting the 
incompatibility of these two aims will be the major theme of this chapter. The first task is 
to outline the changes in the global shape of the Cold War and draw out the major 
elements that this impacted upon the US approach towards the world's under-developed 
areas; once this is established, we will be able to analyse the affect that it had on US- 
Latin American relations. 
Revisionist view see: James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism, and Inter American Relations: Guatemala, 
Bolivia, and the United States 1945-1961 (New York: The Edward Mellen Press, 1999); Walter LaFeber, 
Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1983) Second Edition 1994; Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal 
Conservatism, and Latin American Nationalism, 1953-1961" Diplomacy and Statecraft (Volume 14, No 3, 
September 2003) 
4 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) Chapters 6&7 
S For information on the changing role of economic aid in the Eisenhower administration's foreign policies 
during this period, see: Burton Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953- 
1961 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982); Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, "Neither a Carrot nor a 
Stick: American Foreign Aid and Economic Policymaking in Spain During the 1950s" in Diplomatic 
History (Volume 30, No 3, June 2006); Michael Adamson, "`The Most Important Single Aspect of our 
Foreign Policy? ': The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World" in Kathryn Statler 
and Andrew Johns (eds) The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the 
Cold War (2006) 
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A SHIFTING PARADIGM: THE SECOND PHASE OF THE COLD WAR & THE 
RISE OF THE THIRD WORLD 
Between 1954 and 1956 the focus of the Cold War shifted noticeably from the 
European mainland to those areas of the world that made up the periphery. This change 
in dynamic came about for three reasons. Firstly, the relative economic and political 
stabilisation of Western Europe meant that US officials could look towards achieving 
their aims in those areas that were outside of the core economic nations; secondly, the 
reduction in the technological and nuclear gap between the US and the Soviet Union 
meant that the risk of direct confrontation in Europe began to recede; and thirdly, a new 
era in Soviet foreign policy began to impact a change on US-Soviet relations, as Moscow 
began to implement a more expansive foreign policy than that which had characterised 
the Stalinist era. Nikita Khrushchev's eventual rise to power impacted a significant 
change on US-Soviet relations! Although Stalin had expanded Soviet control over 
Eastern Europe, and provided support to both China and North Korea, he had not made 
any concerted attempt to build economic or diplomatic relations with any nations outside 
of the direct Soviet sphere of influence. 
9 However, his successors (especially 
Khrushchev) sought to expand the Soviet Union's influence on the world-stage. This 
change in the US-Soviet relationship brought about a change in American strategy. A 
paper prepared within the Department of State, commenting upon the policy paper NSC 
550110 in October 1955, commented that, 
6 obviously Europe remained a vitally important area for US officials, but in the 1950s there was a 
dramatic widening of the scope of US-Soviet tensions; moving firmly away from Europe to areas like Asia, 
Latin America, Africa etc 
By the mid-1950s, the economic and political situation in Europe had stabilised: the initial threat of 
economic instability had been staved off and the possibility of a growth in the number of socialist 
governments in the region had been averted. For information on this period, see: Michael Hogan, A Cross 
of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State 1945-1954 (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National 
Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, California Stanford University Press, 
1992) 
8 Khrushchev's accession to power in the Kremlin was not immediate: Stalin was, at first, replaced by 
Malenkov, before Bulganin and Khrushchev came to prominence, before, finally, Khrushchev assumed 
power for himself in 1956. see: William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man, His Era (USA: Free Press, 
2003) 
9 Eastern Europe or the Communist Bloc 
10 NSC 5501 implemented on January 7 1955 was a basic National Security Policy document detailing how 
the US should act towards the USSR NSC 5501, Basic National Security Policy, January 7 1955, Foreign 
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The underlying concepts of NSC 5501 were designed for a world situation 
in which flexibility had just begun to mark Soviet policy, in which the 
requirements of free world strength and cohesion had begun to shift from 
safeguards against imminent aggression to preparations for long-term 
competition, and in which the US had begun to ready itself for the 
possibility of negotiations with Soviet-Communist power ... the coming 
period seems likely to be characterized by decreasing fear of overt Soviet 
aggression... full exercise of Soviet-Communist diplomatic resource; and by 
prolonged negotiations with the USSR, and possibly Communist China. " 
As Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson point out the shift in Soviet policy came 
about due to a number of key factors of both an internal and an external nature. `New 
leadership brought to Soviet Foreign policy a capacity to adapt to new opportunities and a 
flexibility such as had not been seen in Moscow for some time, ' they write. This, 
however, brought its own problems: `Ultimately the Soviet aspiration for superpower 
status, strategic superiority over the West, and undisputed leadership in the [Communist] 
bloc would tempt its leadership to court greater risks than had the more dogmatic but also 
more cautious Stalinist regime. ' 12 In addition to this, though, the new Soviet leadership 
also had to contend with the continued challenge of Mao Zedong's China for leadership 
of the Soviet bloc13, the continuing power struggle within the Politburo that would finally 
end with Khrushchev's accession to power in 1956, and the need to reassert Soviet 
authority in Eastern Europe following the outbreak of nationalist revolt in 1956 in the 
period following Khrushchev's "Secret Speech". 14 
Relations of the United States 1955-1957 Volume XIX National Security Policy (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1990) p 24-38 
11 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, "Department of State General Comments on NSC 5501", 
October 3 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume Mp 123-125 
12 Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War Two (Oxford: Pergamom 
Press, 1984) Second Edition 1985 p 102-4 
13 For information on this see: Dmitri Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire: Political 
Leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 1999) p 230-4; Jung Chang and Jon 
Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Jonathon Cape, 2005) p 421-433; Joseph Nogee and Robert 
Donaldson (1985) p 222-8; William Taubman, Khrushchev (2003) p 335-342 
" At the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev made a dramatic break with Stalin by 
denouncing the former leader's rule in a secret speech to party members: although this was supposed to 
stay secret, news quickly filtered out and began a process of rising independence in the Soviet bloc; a 
process most notable in Poland and Hungary. See: Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, Soviet Foreign 
Policy (1985) p 215-222; William Taubman, Khrushchev (2003) p 171; Stephen Ambrose, Rise to 
Globalism (1998) p 155; Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy (1995) p 158; 
Dmitri Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire: Political Leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev 
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As a result of all these varying factors, Soviet foreign policy became much more 
assertive, much more expansive and much less insular than it had been under Stalin. The 
most obvious example of this is Moscow's attempt to expand its influence in the Third 
World (most evidently in India and Egypt). 15 The impact on the US was to usher in a 
more considered form of approach toward the USSR. As Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles said in May 1955: `we must explore carefully the possibilities that there may be 
some way forward toward just solutions of the problems that now cause tensions between 
the Soviets and the free world.. . The recent Soviet activities give us some reason for hope 
that progress may be made. ' 16 
With both Soviet policy and the focus of US officials moving increasingly toward 
the Third World, the priority aim for the US switched toward ensuring that the `Open 
Door' remained open'7, and in being seen to be preventing any perceived Soviet (or 
communist) successes in expanding their influence. As David Ryan writes: `The rise of 
US power in the post-Second World War period and the proliferation of nation-states 
within a bipolar context necessitated a formula that could ensure the preservation of the 
Open Door, the promise of modernity and material progress, and national security. "8 
This shift to the periphery, though, coincided with a dramatic increase in nationalist 
sentiment within those newly formed nations in the Third World. 19 This secondary phase 
(London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999); Robert Service, A History of Twentieth Century Russia 
(London: Penguin Books, 1997) p 338-341 
15 Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy p 147-159 
16 Outline for a Speech by the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, May 19 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 
Volume XIX p 79-81 
" The Open Door is, of course, a reference to President McKinley's issuing of the Open Door Notes to 
China in 1898, which ensured that China remained economically "open" for the US in the face of Western 
Imperialism. See: Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (USA: Penguin 
Books, 2(03) p 44,259-261; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and 
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (USA: Fontana Press, 1988) (1988) p 314; Michael Hunt, Ideology and 
US Foreign Policy New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Walter LaFeber, The American Age: US 
Foreign policy at Home andAbroad 1750 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989) 
Second Edition 1994 
18 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000) p 156-7 
19 As Thomas McCormick notes: `Worldwide, India's Nehru, Egypt's Nasser, and Yugoslavia's Tito 
collectively tried to make the periphery neutral in the Russo-American Cold War. They sought a "Third 
World" that would be tied to neither side but committed to the primacy of its own development and well- 
being. At the very moment at which the United States put such great store on stability in the periphery, 
much of the periphery seemed committed to a rapid, destabilizing alteration of the status quo. At the very 
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of the Cold War - the move away from the core economic countries towards those on the 
periphery - was, by 1955, inevitable. 
20 These newly independent nations aimed to secure 
their own stability and future prosperity. The major issue for US officials was in ensuring 
that these nations were incorporated into the American-led economic world-order. 
However, in attempting to achieve this, the US would have to counter not just nationalist 
and neutralist sentiment in the Third World, but also the increasing presence on the world 
economic and political stage of the Soviet Union? ' This naturally heightened security 
considerations amongst US officials and, as we shall see in the case of Latin America, it 
caused them to incorporate the national security framework much more heavily into their 
policy deliberations. In Chapter Four, we will see that the same was also true in Brazil as 
the Eisenhower administration would attempt to bolster its relationship with the Brazilian 
government and shore up its strategic aims. 
The major impact that this move toward the Third World had on US policy is that 
it added more impetus to the administration's reappraisal of its policy towards those 
regions of the world. Although Soviet foreign policy would have a major impact on the 
US approach towards the Third World, it was not the sole determinant in seeking to 
point when the top American priority was to integrate the periphery more systematically into the process of 
rehabilitating core economies, much of the periphery seemed inclined to withdraw one foot or both from 
the world-system, or at least wanted to renegotiate the periphery's role within it. ' Thomas McCormick 
(1995) p 118 
20 Paul Kennedy writes: The second main feature of the Cold War, its steady lateral escalation from 
Europe itself into the rest of the world was hardly surprising ... the war had caused immense social and 
political turbulence, from the Balkans to the East Indies; and even in countries not directly overrun by 
invading armies, the mobilization of manpower, resources, and ideas had led to profound changes. 
Traditional social orders lay smashed, colonial regimes had been discredited, underground nationalist 
parties had flourished, and resistance movements had grown up, committed not only to military victory but 
also to political transformation. ' Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change 
and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (USA: Fontana Press, 1988) p 489-90; Similarly, Marc 
Selverstone has argued that, `The ideological battle between capitalism and communism intensified in the 
post-war world as East and West sought to win political allies, and continued to rage during the 1950s and 
1960s amid efforts to shape the economic and political futures of the developing world' Marc Selverstone, 
"The Past is More than Prologue: Reflections on the Cold War and the War on Terror", Passport (Volume 
37, Issue 1, April 20(6) p4 
21 Indeed, from this moment on the "waging" of the Cold War would quite obviously be removed to the 
periphery. There were, of course, obvious flashpoints within Europe -- Berlin etc --- but, in the main, it 
would be those areas of the world outside of the European mainland that would come to dominate US 
foreign policy. Examples of this are: South-East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, China. For 
information on the `shift' to the periphery and for further explanation of events in the Middle East, South- 
East Asia and China, see: Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy (1995); Stephen 
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (1997); Richard Immerman eds, John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the 
Cold War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) 
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explain the change in US strategy that would occur in the mid-1950s: in fact, as we have 
seen, the importance of the Third World had been recognised by US officials since the 
final days of World War Two 22 James Siekmeier supports this point, writing: 
Seven months before he entered office, President Eisenhower wrote to 
Dulles, "the minimal requirement [for US foreign policy]... is that we are 
able to trade freely, in spite of anything Russia may do, with those areas of 
the world that are necessary to the health, strength, and development of our 
economy"... US officials thought that even without the threat from its 
primary Cold-War rival, the Soviet Union, the United States faced problems 
in its policy toward the non-industrialized nations of the world. Washington 
officials feared that the populous Third World would develop autarkically, 
outside of the economic orbit of the industrialized nations. The raw 
materials and potential markets of the non-industrialized world might then 
be out of reach of the United States. 3 
Now, however, with a change in Soviet policy and the more stable situation in 
Europe, the context of US policy toward the Third World had changed (This will be even 
more evident in Chapter Five as the shift to the periphery became far more definitive and 
exerted a greater influence over US policy). US officials were deeply concerned about the 
problems posed by the rapidly increasing phenomenon of Third World nationalism. 24 As 
highlighted in Chapter One, US officials were highly critical of any form of nationalism 
that potentially withdrew that nation from the American economic system. This had been 
an important part of US economic strategy since 1945: by 1956, this process had been 
given an added level of importance by the emergence of a new Soviet foreign policy. 
sz Burton Kaufman states, `the Soviet economic offensive in the Third World was by no means solely 
responsible for the United States' re-examination of its foreign aid program. ' Burton Kaufman, Trade & 
Aid (1982) p 73 
' James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism, and Inter American Relation (1999) p 254-5 
u Gaddis and David Ryan disagree over the US conception of the threat posed by Third World nationalism: 
Gaddis says it was tolerated as `long as it took truly independent [or non-communist forms]', whilst David 
Ryan argues that: `Washington tolerated nationalism if it was confined to political self- 
determination ... autarky 
diminished the sphere of the global economy, questioned the certainty of the 
preferred model of development, and questioned the credibility and prestige of the US civilisation. ' John 
Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post-War American National Security 
Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p 177; David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World 
History (2000) p 155 
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Since coming to office in 1953 there had been a steadily increasing call within the 
administration to rethink US strategy in Latin America. Officials such as Milton 
Eisenhower and Harold Stassen did not believe that the existing policy was fostering the 
kind of economic development that best suited American aims. By 1955, though, this was 
not just a matter of economic importance; the willingness of the Soviet leadership to 
compete for the "hearts and minds" of the Third World, meant that US policy in these 
areas was now inextricably linked to the bipolar framework. 25 Again, though, it is 
important to reiterate that national security did not simply mean anti-communist or anti- 
Soviet; instead, it meant taking action against any event or regime that undermined US 
credibility or threatened the supremacy of the American system. 
In focusing their attentions on national security issues during the mid-1950s, the 
Eisenhower administration would be seeking to re-assert their hegemony and secure their 
dominance against possible Soviet or nationalist incursion. However, their attempts to 
achieve this would be consistently constrained and, indeed, undermined, by their 
continued adherence to basic US economic principles. The resultant and deepening 
tension between these two objectives would cause the US position in Latin America to 
seriously deteriorate. The impact that this trend would have on US policy can be most 
strongly identified with regard to the administration's approach in Latin America. As the 
rest of this chapter will illustrate, the period between the fall of 1954 and the spring of 
1958 would see the Eisenhower administration attempting to define a policy approach 
that would quell Latin nationalist and anti-American sentiment and simultaneously meet 
traditional economic aims regarding the spread of "free trade, free investment and free 
capital. " In continuing to adhere to these economic principles, the Eisenhower 
administration would need to attempt to balance its foreign economic goals with those 
pressures being placed upon it by Congress. Indeed, in 1955 and 1956 the administration 
would face calls for increased protectionist policies to protect American goods and have 
to adopt a conciliatory approach toward a number of cases which actually `contravened 
the principles of free trade. ' In the period covered by this chapter, some elements of 
25 See: Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War (2006); Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns, The Eisenhower 
Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War (2006) 
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American society would actually attack the Eisenhower administration for its approach 
toward the principles of liberal capitalism. However, as we shall see, with regard to 
foreign economic policy - the principles of liberal capitalism would continue to lie at the 
heart of the administration's approach. 26 
US POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 1954-1958: THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
As stated earlier, academic appraisal of this period of US-Latin relations has 
tended to downplay the importance of the era in any analysis of US policy. This is 
especially true of the Traditionalist school. They see the period as sitting between the two 
main supporting incidents of their Cold War synthesis - US intervention in Guatemala in 
1954 and the rise of Castroism in Cuba in early 1959. Gaddis Smith writes that following 
the overthrow of Arbenz, `no other Latin American government for four years after 1954 
imitated the Arbenz regime's toleration of the left, and official Washington could find no 
cause for alarm... President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles paid no attention to 
Latin America. '27 Stephen Rabe agrees, commenting that: `During the mid-1950s, the 
policies the Eisenhower administration "deemed appropriate" for preventing communism 
in Latin America included befriending dictators and belittling economic 
nationalism... these anti-Communist policies achieved the administration's primary 
foreign policy goal for Latin America. '28 By opting to view US-Latin American relations 
solely within a bipolar framework the Traditionalist school focuses too heavily on the 
Guatemalan and Cuban case studies. As a result, the importance of events in the mid- 
26 Burton Kaufman, Trade & Aid (1982) p 74-95; Michael Adamson, "The Most Important Single Aspect 
of Our Foreign Policy? " in Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns, The Eisenhower Administration, the Third 
World and the Globalization of the Cold War (2006) 
27 Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine 1945-1993 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994) p 
88 
2! Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 99; Schoultz makes a similar point, writing `absorbed by events 
elsewhere, a large nation did what it wanted, and its small neighbors accepted what they could not avoid', 
Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998) p340; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin 
American Relations Since 1899 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000) p 150-160; Joseph 
Smith, The United States and Latin America: A History ofAmerican Diplomacy, 1776-2000 (London: 
Routledge, 2005) p 122-127; Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States & Latin America: An Historical 
Analysis of Inter-American Relations (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1974 
125 
1950s is overlooked. Although the changes in US policy at the end of the 1950s are 
addressed, they are considered to have been motivated and informed by immediate 
strategic considerations. 
The Revisionist school does give more attention to this period, however. James 
Siekmeier places a great deal of emphasis on the change that emerged within US 
economic policy in the 1956-58 period, seeing it as being vital in his attempts to 
demonstrate the administration's goal of defeating economic nationalism. `Prodded by 
economic and political problems in Latin America, US officials would, starting in 1957, 
begin to go to much greater lengths to promote economic growth, political stability, and 
pro-United States regimes in the region. US officials feared that if they did not act 
quickly in this regard, nationalistic governments might spring up in the area, endangering 
the inter-American system, ' writes Siekmeier. 29 Walter LaFeber makes a similar point, 
stating: 
The problem, as the administration admitted in a 1954 report, was that its 
policy was trapped in an unrelenting cycle: Latin America could develop 
only if politically stable, but economic underdevelopment brought about 
golpes and instability. Private investors understandably remained leery, 
unless, of course, they could move into such quickly profitable areas as 
minerals and agricultural exports... Before 1957 Eisenhower thought he 
could trust in dictators, private investors, and the CIA, but the dictators and 
investors had failed to develop economic and political systems. The CIA had 
proved only that it could overthrow, not create, an ongoing government. 30 
LaFeber argues that the administration's policy before 1957 had been predicated on the 
idea that by supporting Latin dictators, expanding the role of foreign private investment 
and hoping that the CIA could overthrow any regime that sought to withdraw from or 
challenge the American system, they would be able to control the region. By 1957, US 
officials were beginning to recognise that this approach had not worked. Both Siekmeier 
and LaFeber highlight the period between 1956 and 1958 as being the vital time in the 
change in the administration's economic policy. Rabe, however, disagrees stating that, 
29 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 289 
3° Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1984) Second Edition 1993, p128-138 
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`because it was winning the Cold War in Latin America, the Eisenhower administration 
saw little need to refashion its foreign economic policies. '31 The cause of these divergent 
opinions is that neither school of thought goes far enough in their interrogation of the 
administration's policies. 
In contrast to the arguments put forward by the predominant schools of thought, 
this chapter will argue that, in fact, the Soviet Economic Offensive was an important 
moment in the narrative of US-Latin relations in the 1950s. This idea becomes more 
substantial when adopted alongside the earlier section detailing the change in Soviet 
foreign policy and the increasing shift toward the Third World in the Cold War. And as 
we will see in Chapter Four, US policy toward Brazil would also be characterised by the 
shift engendered by the Soviet Economic Offensive. In the remainder of this chapter, it 
will become evident that there were two major consequences of the Soviet Economic 
Offensive in Latin America: Firstly, as Siekmeier and LaFeber argue, there was, indeed, a 
slight change in Washington's economic approach, with the EXIM Bank initiating more 
loans and the administration demonstrating a willingness to possibly discuss the 
implementation of commodity agreements. This, however, would only represent a 
moderate change in US economic policy and certainly did not alter basic US economic 
principles. Secondly, and of far more importance, is the fact that from January 1956 
onward, US officials began to increasingly view events in Latin America from a national 
security perspective. The Soviet offer of economic aid to the Latin nations raised the 
possibility amongst US officials that they might be seen to be "losing" the Cold War in 
Latin America; a shift that would directly challenge American hegemony in the region, 
which was of special importance due to the fact that Eisenhower was seeking re-election 
in the autumn. Therefore, in an effort to counter this threat, much more emphasis was 
attached to achieving US strategic aims in the region, with a new policy document - NSC 
5613/1 - implementing a policy that focused heavily on military assistance policy as a 
way of boosting the US position in the region and eradicating any threat of Soviet 
influence. 
11 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 92 
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As we will see, however, the major problem with this approach was that it was out 
of touch with events in Latin America: the need for increased economic assistance 
continued to dominate the agendas of the Latin nations in their dealings with the US, and 
the Eisenhower administration's continued refusal to change the basic tenets and 
objectives of its economic policy meant that Latin nationalism continued to increase 
dramatically. 32 The result would be the events of the Nixon trip in April and May 1958, 
when the US came to realise that their attempts to repair their position in the wake of the 
Soviet Economic Offensive had failed comprehensively. In Chapter Four we will see this 
pattern repeated with regard to US policy toward Brazil. There the administration would 
attempt to form a strong working relationship with the new government in an effort to be 
able to successfully conclude pressing military agreements and to boost the levels of US 
support in the region; however, the focus of the Brazilian government would be on 
bringing about a change in US economic policy -a dichotomy that made conflict 
inevitable. 
REAFFIRMING THE SYSTEM: THE RIO DE JANEIRO ECONOMIC CONFERENCE 
In obtaining an anti-Communist resolution at the Caracas Conference in March 
1954, Foster Dulles had been forced to agree to American participation at a specially 
convened economic conference. 
33 Dulles had been acting in accordance with US national 
security objectives 34 But at the Rio de Janeiro Economic Conference in November, it 
would be the administration's economic aims that would determine their approach. 
Understanding this point is crucial in determining the intentions of US officials at Rio. 
What is clear is that US officials were pessimistic about the Conference. Sielaneier 
writes, `the United States faced the unenviable prospect of another economic summit 
3z Those changes outlined by Siekmeier and LaFeber did not bring about a change in basic US economic 
p3rinciples such as development being funded predominantly by foreign private investment 
US officials had been attempting to put off an intra-hemispheric economic conference since the end of 
World War Two. See: Stephen Rabe, "The Elusive Conference: United States Economic Relations with 
Latin America, 1945-1952" in Diplomatic History (Summer 1978) pp 279-294; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower 
(1988) p 15-19 
34 As shown in Chapter One, the US position at Caracas was being informed by their national security 
agenda with respect to Arbenz and Guatemala; Dulles' promise was made with little regard for US 
economic objectives 
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with Western Hemisphere leaders... these meetings were unpleasant experiences for US 
leaders because Latin American delegations invariably made demands for changes in 
economic foreign policy that Washington refused to accommodate. ' 35 Stephen Rabe 
expands on this, stating: `the Eisenhower administration faced the "evil day" of 
discussing economic issues with Latin Americans and making good on the promises 
Secretary Dulles had made at Caracas. ' `For a time, Dulles and Holland36 hoped "things 
would develop so it wouldn't be necessary to hold it. " But the United States had 
exhausted all credible excuses for not attending a conference that had been postponed 
repeatedly since 1944.37 The administration's goals for the conference differed wildly 
from those of the Latin Americans, who saw the conference as being their chance to 
engineer a change in US economic policy. 38 
Just how wide the disparity was between the positions of the Latin Americans and 
the US, was demonstrated at a sub-cabinet meeting held to determine the position that the 
US would take at the conference. Harold Stassen, who was chairing the meeting, asked 
his colleague Mr Hardesty, `what three things Latin American governments want from 
the conference? ' Hardesty replied: `The first is psychological - they want the US to give 
them treatment in development financing that is equal to that given to other areas of the 
world; second, the formation of a Pan American Bank, and third a floor under prices paid 
for their commodities. ' Moreover, Hardesty was deeply concerned at what he perceived 
to be the negative attitude within the administration towards the conference, expressing 
`concern that it appears to be the viewpoint of many members of the Sub-Cabinet 
3i James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 184 
36 Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland 
3' Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 70; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 150-2 
38 in fact, Rabe writes that, `the Latin Americans hoped that the Eisenhower administration would welcome 
their proposals', supporting this hope by citing Eisenhower's report to Dulles on a meeting with the 
Brazilian Ambassador, who told him that 'Latin Americans "expected great things from the Rio 
Conference" and that they hoped "the United States will come there with an Eisenhower Plan. "' Stephen 
Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 76; An indication as to the overwhelming antipathy that the US had to meetings 
of this kind was revealed by Henry Holland, who revealingly told his fellow delegates: 'There are certain 
representatives at this conference who favor the adoption of a resolution to hold meetings similar to the one 
in which we are now engaged every year. Others favor holding such meetings every two years. ' Holland 
suggested 'we might try to avoid committing ourselves to a fixed schedule so far as future conferences are 
concerned by agreeing to a conference in Buenos Aires in 1956. ' Memorandum of a Meeting of Certain 
Members of the United States Delegation to the Rio Economic Conference, November 301954, FRUS 
1952-1954, Volume IV The American Republics, (1983) p 360 
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Committee that we should be ready with a defense at Rio, anticipating how we can throw 
back the Latin American requests, rather than have a positive approach as to what we 
have to offer. ' Hardesty repeated these concerns to Stassen in a later memorandum, 
stating: `I feel a directive is needed which will say not how little can we do to appease 
Latin American desires for economic cooperation with the United States, but how much 
must we do to insure the security of the United States? '39 Both Stassen and Hardesty 
believed that the US needed to take a positive stance at Rio in order to build a cooperative 
alliance between themselves and the Latin nations. 
However, the administration's regional strategy did not allow for any change in 
policy. A report produced by the Operations Coordinating Board stated, 
US interests in Latin America are three-fold: 1) political, to have friendly 
American republics that will support our international policies; 2) strategic, 
to have friendly American republics that will give us military support in war, 
permit the establishment of bases, and facilitate exports to us of raw 
materials and provisions; 3) economic, profitable opportunities for trade and 
investment 40 
By the end of August, a position paper for Rio had been developed by the Sub-Cabinet 
Committee, which ignored the position taken by the FOA41 in favour of traditional US 
aims in the region and, `adopted the position that the economic development of Latin 
American countries will be best served by adherence to the principles of the private 
enterprise system; that the United States should exert constant but discreet practical 
pressure in favor of private initiative. 
A2 In keeping with the policy outlined in NSC 
39 Minutes of a Meeting held in the Executive Office Building on the Rio Economic Conference, June 21 
1954; Memorandum by the Acting Regional Director of the Office of Latin American Operations, 
Hardesty, to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, Stassen, July 19 1954, FRUS 1952- 
1954 Volume IV The American Republics. (1983) p 323-327 
40 Memorandum for the Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board, May 6 1954, Latin 
America (FILE#1) (4) March - June 1954, OCB 091.4, Box No 71, OCB Central File Series, Eisenhower 
Library 
41 The Foreign Operations Administration, the head of which was Harold Stassen 
42 The ideological basis for US policy in the economic sphere had been dictated by an Eisenhower address 
to Congress, when he stated: `The national interest in the field of foreign economic policy is clear. It is to 
obtain, in a manner that is consistent with our national security and profitable and equitable for all, the 
highest possible level of trade and the most efficient use of capital and resources. ' Position Paper by the 
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5432/1, the position paper called for an increase in the amount of money loaned by the 
Ex-Im Bank. But these loans would only be provided if certain preconditions were met 
first, and in order to, `satisfy all applications for the financing of sound development 
projects which are in our common interest and which are not being financed by IBRD. '43 
The planning sessions for the Rio Conference revealed a growing debate within 
the administration. Even when the US position for the conference had been agreed upon, 
there was a clear divergence of opinion between officials over who should lead the US 
delegation. It was Milton Eisenhower, the president's brother, who made the strongest 
complaint, arguing that it should be he, not Treasury Secretary Humphrey that led the US 
delegation. Siekmeier writes: `In October of 1954, when Milton Eisenhower found out 
that Humphrey was to lead the US delegation... he flatly told Dulles that he did not think 
Humphrey would uphold the new US policy of increased aid" to the region. Further, 
Milton informed Dulles he would not go to Rio if Humphrey led the US delegation. '45 
The importance attached by Dr Eisenhower to building a good relationship between the 
US and the Latin nations was outlined in his memoirs, where he wrote: `Having spent a 
good many years trying to help improve relations among the nations of the Western 
Hemisphere ... I contend that good relations in this area are truly imperative to our future 
- more important, in fact, than our relations with any other area of the world. '46 
Sub-Cabinet Committee on the Rio Economic Conference, September 1st 1954, Box No 5, Latin America 
(8), White House Office - NSC Staff Papers, Special Staff Series, Eisenhower Library 
43 In addition, this proposed method of lending would depend `to a very considerable extent upon the 
degree to which the other country desires to obtain private and public capital and takes "house-in-order" 
actions to attract it. ' Memorandum by John C. Cady of the Office of Latin American Operations to the 
Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, Stassen, August 27 1954, FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV 
p 328; Rabe also highlights the debate between officials within the FOA, the Department of Defense and 
the CIA and the representatives from State and the Treasury Department; he writes, `tension did arise, 
however, at the interdepartmental meetings planning the Rio Conference... both the CIA and the 
Department of Defense supported the FOA' Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 70-1 
44 This, of course, is the `increased aid' outlined in NSC 5432/1, which called for increased use of existing 
lending institutions in Latin America - See Chapter One 
45 Memorandum from Milton Eisenhower to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, October 24 1954, File 
Strictly Confidential E-H, Box 2, Correspondence and Memoranda Series, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower 
Library; James Siekmeier (1999) p 184-5 
46 Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Biter: The United States and Latin America (New York: Doubleday and 
Company, 1963) p 46; Stephen Rabe also highlights this dispute, writing that `Milton Eisenhower protested 
to both his brother and Secretary Dulles: he doubted that Humphrey would implement NSC 5432/1 and 
labelled as "tragic" the choice of Humphrey to lead the US delegation. ' Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) 
p 72; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p151-2; Michael Weis also writes `[Merwin] Bohan's 
131 
The selection of Humphrey to lead the US delegation was an important one. It 
highlighted the fact that Eisenhower and Dulles wanted the Treasury Secretary to 
reaffirm American economic principles at the Conference. Again, it is essential to 
reiterate that at Rio the US followed a strictly economic agenda, rather than the national 
security framework that had been in evidence at Caracas. Humphrey's opening statement 
confirmed US intentions. Michael Weis writes that Humphrey `proceeded to confirm 
Latin American fears with a vigorous defense of laissez-faire capitalism and current US 
tariff policy, and stressed the role of IBRD and sound money in economic 
development. 47 The New York Times, however, attempted to adopt a positive approach, 
writing: 
The US pledged today increased financial support to Latin American 
economies in the form of accelerated loans. The pledge was made with the 
understanding that this was to be an encouragement to free enterprise rather 
than a displacement of it. 
The reference to foreign private investment was highly prescient, and Humphrey would 
go on to further disappoint Latin delegates when he made only passing reference to the 
issue of stabilising the price of raw materials, `as they were hoping the US might come 
up with some formula to halt wild fluctuations in the price of materials on which the 
economies of many Latin American countries are based. '48 
Rather than engaging with the Latin agenda at Rio, the US sought to neutralise 
Latin proposals, but without being overtly negative. This put the US in direct opposition 
to the Latin American nations - especially with regard to the rift between the 
development theories being outlined by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA) and the leading Latin American economist, Raul Prebisch, and the model being 
departure, combined with Milton Eisenhower's refusal to attend, left the orthodox hardliners (Humphrey, 
Hoover, Holland) in control of the US delegation and threatened the conference's success' Michael Weis, 
Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etat: Brazilian-American Relations 1945-1964 (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico, 1993) p 82-3 
4' Michael Weis (1993) p 83 
46 Forwarded Clip of New York Times Article, November 24 1954, Henry Cabot Lodge 1954 (3), Box No 
24, Administration Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library 
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espoused by the US 49 As Michael Weis notes, `Eisenhower had instructed Humphrey not 
to reject flatly any proposals with majority support, in order to deny the Soviets a 
propaganda weapon. Instead, the US abstained on a series of measures advocated in the 
ECLA report'; this `emphasized the growing division between the United States and 
Latin America-'50 The outcome was hugely disappointing for the Latin nations, who had 
hoped that the conference might bring about a new era in US-Latin economic 
cooperation. 51 It was not just the Latin Americans that were disappointed, however; so, 
too, was Milton Eisenhower. 
[President] Eisenhower knew that his brother was disappointed with the 
outcome of the year-long struggle over Latin America. But Milton had to 
understand geopolitical realities. "Countries like Burma, Thailand, and the 
remaining parts of Indochina are directly open to assault. This does not 
apply in South America. " The United States wanted an enduring "good 
partner" relationship with Latin America, which could be encouraged by 
loans instead of grants. 52 
The administration was content with the outcome of the Conference; 53 however, it 
had highlighted the growing discontent amongst some officials in the American 
government as to the future path of US policy in Latin America. The position taken by 
49 See: Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of 
Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); James William Park, Latin American 
Underdevelopment: A History of Perspectives in the United States, 1870-1965 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1995); James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999); 
Max Millikan and Walt Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1957) 
S0 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coup D'Etat (1993) p 83-4; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 77 
S' Mark Gilderhus writes: `Latin Americans had hoped for more. According to the Brazilian ambassador, 
Joao Carlos Muniz, government leaders had believed ever since the Second World War that "the vast 
resources of the United States were going to be brought to bear on wide and rapid economic change in 
Latin America. " But delay and inaction has caused "an intense process of disillusionment. " Brazilians 
could not understand why the United States used large-scale programs of economic aid and assistance in 
the fight against communism in Asia and Europe but depended upon "politico-police" methods in the 
Western Hemisphere. Evolving Latin American economic theories dissented from the established 
orthodoxies in the United States' Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 152 
52 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 72; Letter from President Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, 
December 11954,12/54 (2) folder, Box No 8, DDE Diaries, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library 
53 Rabe writes, `administration officials were relieved that the United States was not publicly embarrassed 
at Rio', and `because no significant agreements emerged from the conference, the final declaration merely 
emphasized the energy and frankness which characterized the discussions. ' Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower 
(1988) p 77 
Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 77; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coup D'Etat (1993) p 83-85; 
Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 151-153 
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the US had also caused a great deal of disappointment in Latin America. Economic 
concerns had clearly informed the US approach to the conference. With the region not of 
immediate concern in a Cold War context (unlike, for example, Indochina), the 
administration felt that they could be more proactive in implementing their economic 
principles 55 The proximity of events at Rio to those in Guatemala five months earlier, 
have tended to obscure the importance of the US position at Rio. In selecting George 
Humphrey as head of their delegation, and in the terms of the position they adopted, the 
US was clearly following an economic agenda at the conference. By 1956, there was 
undoubtedly a significant change occurring in the nature of the Cold War and within US 
policy toward the Third World. The next stage of this chapter will be to examine what 
impact this had on US policy in Latin America and to identify those changes that became 
apparent in the wake of this evolving global scenario. What will become apparent is that 
even though US officials became increasingly aware of the need for them to adapt their 
policy, they would continue to be constrained by the fact that there were clearly two 
separate aims underpinning US policy. This meant that even when restructuring the 
relationship became an issue of strategic concern, officials within the Eisenhower 
administration would continue to adhere to long-standing American economic principles, 
which had been demonstrated at Rio. Consequently, there would be an intense tension 
exerting itself on US policy towards Latin America between the fall of 1954 and the 
spring of 1958. 
A SHIFT IN CONTEXT: THE SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE IN LATIN 
AMERICA 
As already shown in this chapter, there was a significant shift in the nature of the 
Cold War in the mid-1950s. It is, however, vital to examine whether or not this had much 
of an impact on US policy in Latin America. Although US officials now saw the 
problems facing them in the region as being linked to the bipolar struggle, their adherence 
to both their economic and security objectives would prevent the US from considering the 
necessary changes in policy if they were to placate Latin nationalism. Crucially, however, 
s5 As outlined in NSC 5432/1 
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the argument here is that there was a major change in US thinking; it is just that the 
changes made apportioned more emphasis to US strategic and national security interests 
rather than addressing the economic concerns of the Latin nations. Once again, adopting 
this approach toward the period offers a much fuller appraisal of US-Latin relations and 
moves this study beyond the Traditionalist versus Revisionist arguments detailed earlier. 
The administration's failure in this respect would only deepen the problems they 
faced. Rabe writes: `Critics in both North and South America charged ... that the 
administration fawned over ruthless dictators and ignored Latin America's crushing 
poverty. They warned that Latin America was ripe for revolution. '56 The change in the 
traditional world order is noted by Walter LaFeber: 
Eisenhower... no longer presided over the post-war world that he and other 
North Americans had taken for granted since 1945. A new, more complex, 
and more dangerous international arena was developing, and it was doing so 
at the same time that the United States was losing its power to influence 
events in that arena.. . the first Cold War of 1945 to the mid-fifties occurred 
in a "Two camp" world of communism and capitalism in which the Soviets 
and the United States had forcefully maintained order in their respective 
camps. This simpler, bipolar world began to be transformed, however, in 
1956 and 1957 with the anti-Russian uprisings in Poland and Hungary; a 
growing split between the Soviets and Chinese; the creation of the European 
Common Market and a new Japanese industrial powerhouse that challenged 
US economic supremacy; the Soviet launching of a space capsule 
("Sputnik") that threatened US military and scientific leadership; and 
exploding nationalism in such newly emerging nations as Latin America, 
Africa, and Southeast Asia. Eisenhower started his second term in one post- 
war world and ended it four years later in a quite different world. 7 
In fact, as we have already seen, the shift in the nature of the Cold War really began in 
the aftermath of Stalin's death; the sentiments put forward by LaFeber, though, are 
accurate. Nevertheless, the pertinent question remains: what impact did this change in the 
Cold War framework have on US policy in Latin America? The answer, as will be shown 
in the remainder of this chapter, is that it would alter the administration's conception of 
56 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 84 
57ny_Ia- 7.. C-l. - 1...,..: f.. /. 1 paýnlýifinMn110021 w 120_1AA. 71...... ý. f wällGr aÄCGYGa,. i, crp, u, rs. . w. v. ussv. w ýa», i/ N J7-a'Tu, aüv, L, W iraK. vIWHiA,!! /I/Cr{ca s/7Q[JK. 6I! {Ury 
(1995) 
135 
their position in Latin America significantly. In short, US officials would become much 
more concerned about the region's status with regard to national security imperatives than 
had previously been the case. 
Once the Soviets made their offer of economic aid to the Latin nations, US officials 
perceived not only that the Cold War had "arrived" in the Western Hemisphere, but, more 
importantly, that their credibility was at stake. If the Eisenhower administration could not 
reassert their dominance in the region then, via the Manichean world view still dominant 
in Washington, US prestige would have been struck a damaging blow. Therefore, the 
focus of US policy in Latin America from January 1956 onwards, became to try and 
improve US-Latin relations and, also, to strengthen the links between Washington and the 
Latin nations. The major problem would continue to be the incompatibility of US 
economic principles and strategic objectives: in attempting to repair US-Latin relations, 
the administration would prove unable (and unwilling) to contravene its economic 
principles. As a result, the US position in the region would continue to be severely 
undermined by its reluctance to meet the Latin American economic agenda; the issue that 
had most bearing on anti-American nationalism in the region. 58 
Following the successful resolution in Guatemala, President Eisenhower 
repeatedly invoked stark Cold War imagery in an effort to illustrate to the American 
people the fact that the US was "winning" the Cold War in Latin America. 59 However, by 
38 Burton Kaufman suggests that the evolution of the US-Soviet relationship and the changing nature of the 
Cold War suggested two things to the US. `First, the apparent success of the Soviet's new policy made 
clear the prevalence of neutralism and nonalignment throughout the world and the limited success the 
United States would have in winning friends and allies in these regions'; and, `second, the success of the 
Soviet offensive underscored again the urgent need for the United States to be more responsive to Third 
World development needs' Burton Kaufman, Trade & Aid (1982) p 73 
59 On August 19,1954, Eisenhower spoke in Springfield at the Illinois state fair, where he stated: `In 
Guatemala, the people of that region rose up and rejected the Communist doctrine, and said in the terms of 
the spirit agreed at Caracas, "You shall not come here and establish yourselves. "' Eleven days later he told 
the American Legion Convention that, `During the past year the nations of this hemisphere, at Caracas, 
jointly declared international communism to be a menace to all. Heartened by this resolute stand, the 
majority of the Guatemalan people rose to defeat the first specific attempt of Communist imperialism to 
establish a beachhead in this hemisphere. This public relations effort at extolling the success of US policy 
in Latin America continued into June 1955, when he addressed a joint session of Congress, telling them, `In 
July 1954 Guatemalan patriots began an armed revolt to eject a government whose Communist sponsorship 
was becoming ever more obvious and to restore a free goverment ... today Guatemala is again securely 
restored to the community of free nations. A challenge by world communism within our hemisphere has 
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August 1955, internal government reports were beginning to recognise the fact that a 
change in US-Soviet relations might necessitate a change in US policy toward Latin 
America. 60 At the National Security Council Meeting on September 8, it was made 
abundantly clear that several US officials were concerned about the US position in Latin 
America. Secretary Humphrey stated, `the entire Progress Report61 sounded like a 
Pollyanna report to him. There were much more serious problems in Latin America than 
this progress report indicated. ' Humphrey's views were seconded by Harold Stassen, who 
argued that, `in fact the situation was not getting better but getting worse. '62 A more 
accurate appraisal of the problems facing the US in Latin America was provided in a 
National Intelligence Estimate in December 1955. It stated: 
The political instability now evident in Latin America results primarily from 
serious disturbances of the traditional social order by new economic and 
social forces. This instability is therefore much more fundamental than that 
which characterized the personal politics of Latin America in the past.. . The 
Communists have no present prospect of gaining control of any Latin 
American state by electoral means, nor even of gaining direct participation 
in national politics equal to that which they formerly enjoyed in Guatemala. 
However, despite their small numbers, they posed a threat to US security 
interests in Latin America, largely because of the ease with which a 
relatively few Communists, operating through various fronts, can exploit the 
widespread social unrest and existing "Yankeephobia. " The USSR and its 
Satellites have shown a markedly increased interest in Latin America in 
recent years. This has been reflected in a great increase in Communist- 
sponsored trips of Latin Americans to Communist countries, an expansion of 
been met and overcome. ' Address by President Eisenhower in Springfield at the Illinois State Fair, August 
19 1954, Taken From: httQ//www. presidency. ucsb. edu/ws/index Accessed on January 21st 2006; Address 
by President Eisenhower at the American Legion Convention, August 30 1954 Eisenhower would evoke 
similar imagery on at least thirteen more occasions during 1954, even using the occasion of a keynote 
speech to the National Council of Catholic Women in Boston (November 8) to remind his audience of the 
success in removing communism from Guatemala. Taken From: http: //www. presidency. ucsb. edu/ws/index 
Accessed on January 21 2006; Message by President Eisenhower to the Congress Transmitting the Ninth 
Annual Report on United States Participation in the United Nations, July 15 1955. Taken From: Ibid. 
60 An OCB Progress Report stated that: `Any change in the atmosphere of relations between the US and the 
Soviet bloc will require a careful review of the content of our information and related programs. ' National 
Security Council Progress Report, "Progress Report on United States Objectives and Course of Action with 
Respect to Latin America", August 10 1955, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume VI p 6-12; National Security 
Council Progress Report on NSC 5432/1 by the OCB, February 3 1955, NSC 5432/1- Policy Towards 
Latin America, Box No 13, White House Office, Eisenhower Library 
61 The OCB Progress Reports of February 3 1955 and August 10 1955 
62 Memorandum of Discussion at the 258" Meeting of the National Security Council, September 8 1955, 
FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 13-15 
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Soviet Bloc diplomatic representation, and a growing interest in expanding 
trade... in the long run, as social pressures increase and if economic 
problems remain unsolved, at least temporary reversion to demagoguery and 
extreme solutions for meeting national problems is probable. This would in 
turn subject the Inter-American system to new strains and adversely affect 
political, economic, and military cooperation with the United States. 6 
The NIE illustrated why the new Soviet foreign policy caused such a problem for 
the Eisenhower administration. In January 1956, the Soviet leadership made an offer of 
economic and technical assistance to the Latin nations 6a Although US officials had been 
invoking Cold War imagery as a justification for their policy in Latin America since 1953 
(and, indeed, hailing the triumph of American values in Guatemala), the prospect of an 
increasing Soviet influence in the region raised the prospect for the US that they might be 
perceived to be "losing" the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere. Since the Rio 
Conference, there had been a definite downturn in the fortunes of the US in the region 65 
63 NIE 80/90-55, National Intelligence Estimate, "Conditions and Trends in Latin America", December 6 
1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 16-45; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) 
64 Rabe writes: `On 16 January 1956, Soviet leader Nikolai Bulganin offered to expand diplomatic, 
economic, and cultural relations, extend technical assistance, and conclude trading arrangements with Latin 
American nations. ' `Bulganin's offer was part of a Soviet "economic offensive" to expand its influence in 
the developing world. Soviet officials toured newly independent nations like Egypt, India, and Indonesia, 
promising lavish economic assistance programs. ' Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 90; Mark Gilderhus, 
The Second Century (2000) writes, `as part of a larger Soviet effort in the Third World, Bulganin's 
initiatives anticipated more effective forms of peaceful competition' p 154 
65 This scenario was being played out throughout the region at the national level: the US faced intense 
difficulties in its relationship with Argentina, Brazil and Costa Rica. Perhaps most worrying though were 
the problems that were emerging in Guatemala, where despite the "fortitude" shown by the Guatemalan 
people in facing up to the Communist threat, the US continued to be plagued by serious problems in the bi- 
lateral relationship. The inability of Castillo Armas's regime to generate sufficient economic growth 
became a major problem for the Eisenhower administration. Having been directly responsible for bringing 
him to power, US credibility was now riding on the Arenas government becoming a success. After 
returning from a visit to the region, Vice President Nixon stated: `Failure abundantly to insure stability this 
government would mark loss of opportunity which may not recur for years; will discourage oppressed 
peoples everywhere in world and would reflect unpardonable inaction on part US Government. ' Nixon's 
sentiments were reaffirmed by Herbert Hoover Junior, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of State, who 
told President Eisenhower, 'it is important that we support Castillo Armas.. . 
his fall would be a serious 
blow to the prestige of the United States. ' 
See: Telegram from Secretary of State Foster Dulles to the Embassy in Guatemala, January 221955; Letter 
from Secretary of State Foster Dulles to Director of the Foreign Operations Administration Harold Stassen, 
January 241955; Telegram from Norman Armour US Ambassador in Guatemala to the Department of 
State, January 25 1955; Telegram from Norman Armour US Ambassador in Guatemala to Department of 
State containing Vice President Nixon's report on situation in Guatemala, February 15 1955; Memorandum 
from Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr to President Eisenhower, June 21 1955. FRUS 1955-1957 
Volume VII American Republics: Central and South America. (Washington: United States Government 
Printing office, 1987) pp 50-87 
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Now US officials began to realise that the Soviet Union might be able to exploit the 
problems in the Inter-American relationship in order to expand their economic influence 
in the region. This is an important moment in the narrative of US-Latin relations in the 
1950s: from this moment, US officials began to see their struggles in Latin America from 
a strategic perspective. US credibility was now being threatened, which raised the stakes 
immeasurably for the administration. The shift in the global political situation had altered 
the context of US-Latin American relations irrevocably and the result would be an ever- 
widening gap between Washington and the Latin nations. 
The Soviet offer of economic assistance was, initially, well received by the Latin 
nations who had been requesting economic aid with very little success from the US since 
1945. A report generated within the Department of the Joint Chiefs of Staff illustrated the 
reasons behind the Soviets success in entering the Latin market. It read: 
Latin American countries have been increasing trade with the Sino-Soviet 
Bloc during the past two years. This, together with the recent conclusion of 
new trade agreements establishes a discernible trend toward closer and more 
substantial commercial relations between Latin America and Communist 
countries... these trends reflect the current Communist trade offensive, the 
alertness of the Soviets to exploit Latin American complaints against 
American economic policies... [and]increasing Latin America interest in 
easing trade problems by exchanging hard-to-sell raw materials for 
Communist capital equipment, fuel, and other imports required for 
internally-politically urgent economic developments. ' 
This, however, was evidence of a wider trend, which saw Third World nations happy to 
play the two superpowers against each other. 
67 
" Memorandum from Edwin T. Layton, Deputy Director for Intelligence the Joint Staff, to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 7th December 1955, OCB 091.4 Latin America (FILE#5) (2) December 1955, Box No 73, OCB 
Central File Series, Eisenhower Library. 
6' Thomas McCormick argues that: 'Almost without exception, neutralist countries pursued state 
investment and trade regulation that defied Western modernization theory and plugged for forced 
industrialization: India's five-year plans, Egypt's Arab socialism, Yugoslavia's mixed economy, 
Indonesia's fascination with Chinese economic planning, and Iran's nationalization of its oil holdings. 
Ambitious pursuits, but these capital-intensive industries required imported capital and technology. Turning 
to the West alone for such imports would assuredly bring insistence that state planning be modified and 
principles of economic internationalism be accepted. Turning to the Soviet bloc alone would probably 
mean too little capital and technology for the tasks at hand, and it might bring Soviet demands for 
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US officials faced two problems in seeking to counter Soviet policy: firstly, how 
could they nullify the overt threat to their national security interests caused by the Soviet 
move into Latin America; and secondly, how could they achieve this basic security 
objective without contravening their aims in the economic sphere? In keeping with the 
argument of this thesis, it will become clear that the administration could not adapt their 
Latin American policy to successfully meet the challenges posed by the new world- 
system. As the administration sought to address those issues that were now perceived to 
be feeding into the national security problems they faced in the area --- economic 
underdevelopment, social inequality, political repression and poverty --- they would also 
attempt to adhere to their economic objectives developed around the principles of "free 
trade, free capital and free investment. " The result would be an increase in the level of 
anti-American nationalism in the region and the imposition of an overwhelming tension 
on US policy. 
There had, in fact, been ongoing discussions within certain areas of the 
Eisenhower administration since 1954 on how US foreign economic policy should 
evolve; those officials involved in the debate sought to illustrate the stance that the United 
States should be taking toward the issue of global economic development. CD Jackson, 
sometime presidential advisor and speech writer, organised a conference at Princeton in 
1954 to `discuss the state of United States - developing world relations. 
' A position 
paper produced at the conference stated that, 
The growth of the free world economy is important to us for much more 
than economic reasons. We believe material progress to be a necessary 
foundation for more far reaching American aspirations for a civilization in 
which human dignity, freedom, and respect for the individual can flourish, 
and in which societies based on these principles can effectively defend 
themselves. The concrete specifics of foreign economic policy must be 
related integrally to this American dream both in our own thinking and that 
deference inconsistent with the peripheral nation's autonomy. But, turning to both at once ... offered a 
possible way to sustain their ventures in economic autarky, secure necessary economic and technical aid, 
and yet not become subservient to either American hegemony or Russian pretensions. ' Thomas 
McCormick, America's Half-Century (1995) p 119 
" James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 186 
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of the rest of the world... [we] have an overwhelming interest in the 
development of world conditions which will free security from dependence 
on military strength. Where men's energies can be turned constructively and 
with some prospect of success to the problems of expanding standards of 
living in a democratic framework we believe the attractions of totalitarian 
forms of government will be much reduced... a characteristic which should 
be emphasized is that they are directed against nobody. We should make 
clear that we welcome into the partnership all those genuinely concerned 
with world economic growth and willing to contribute to it... it is a firm 
lesson of history that the growth and industrialisation of under-developed 
societies, in proper balance, leads to an expansion not a contraction of world 
trade. The United States has a major direct interest in bringing about this 
partnership and in sustaining it. This interest flows from the basic US 
political and security interests in a Free World. 69 
The message, then, was clear: it was in the US national interest to become 
proactive in fostering widespread development in the Third World. By doing so it would 
be possible to check Soviet economic expansion and to assert American pre-eminence. 
The problem, however, was in formulating a policy that would enable the US to achieve 
the aims set out above, whilst still adhering to basic US economic objectives. Jackson 
asked two participants the Princeton Conference, Max Millikan and Walt Rostow70 to 
`write a proposal for a new policy' toward the developing nations of the world. `Millikan 
and Rostow wrote a paper that strongly criticized US developing world policy ... the 
United States had to counter the Soviet offensive by reaching out to the non- 
industrialized world. 71 Published in 1957, their propsal stated that: `It is the thesis of this 
book that a much-expanded long term program of American participation in the economic 
development of the under-developed areas can and should be one of the most important 
means for furthering the purposes of American foreign policy. '72 In summarising their 
proposal, James Siekmeier writes, 
" Notes on Foreign Economic Policy, May 15 1954; Draft Document on World Economic Policy, May 
1954, Princeton Economic Conference 5/54 - Draft Papers, Box No 82, CD Jackson Papers, Eisenhower 
Library. 
70 Rostow and Millikan were both economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Boston). 
Rostow would later go on to become President Kennedy's National Security Advisor 
71 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 186-7 
72 Walt Rostow and Max Millikan, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1957) p1 
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The developing world, they argued, was "impressed by the undoubted 
achievements of the Soviet Union in building quickly a heavy industrial 
complex and by the speed of Chinese Communist land reform and unified 
national reconstruction. " The United States, along with the other non- 
communist industrialized countries, needed to demonstrate to the Third 
World that "rapid economic progress... [would be] possible" for them if they 
were to participate in the international capitalist order. 73 
There was, however, a major problem with the course of action suggested by 
Rostow and Millikan. As they themselves admitted, `the program we propose would 
require US government expenditure somewhat larger than current spending for economic 
aid'; or, as Siekmeier writes, their proposal called for `stimulating developing world 
growth through a sizeable infusion of economic aid. '74 Although the Eisenhower 
administration was deeply concerned about the Soviet incursion into Latin America's 
economic sphere, they were not prepared to consider a solution that contravened long- 
standing economic principles. The Princeton Conference, and the subsequent ideas put 
forward by Rostow and Millikan, proved that there was a clear dichotomy between US 
national security objectives and US economic objectives. The administration's refusal to 
sufficiently adapt their economic policies in an effort to facilitate closer US-developing 
world relationships would severely undermine the US position in Latin America. 
There would, though, be some room for manoeuvre within US policy; the problem 
was that it was not sufficient to placate Latin nationalism. 
75 As US officials sought to 
come up with a solution to the problems facing them in Latin America, they began to 
consider economic issues which had previously been non-negotiable. This was a strong 
indication of how seriously the administration was treating this new phase of the Cold 
War in Latin America. The fear this induced compelled President Eisenhower to 
proclaim, `the new Communist line of sweetness and light' to be `more dangerous than 
their propaganda in Stalin's time. '76 It is important to recognise the reasoning behind the 
" James Siekmeierm Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 188 
74 Wait Rostow and Max Millikan, A Proposal (1957)p2; James Sielaneier, Aid Nationalism and Inter- 
American Relations (1999) p 189 
75 For the development of Latin nationalism, see: Alan McPherson, Yankee No!: Anti Americanism in US- 
Latin American Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003) 
76 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 90 
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administration's approach. Via the Manichean world view, any anti-American sentiment 
was perceived to be a boost for the communist forces; the shift of emphasis in the Cold 
War from the core to the periphery, coupled with the undeniable reduction in the `gap' 
between Washington and Moscow, actually heightened American Cold War fears in the 
Third World. The fact that the Soviets were now able to challenge the US economically 
in Latin America was an issue of grave strategic concern for the Eisenhower 
administration. As a result, US officials were prepared to consider options that had not 
previously been available 77 Significantly, though, they would not countenance a change 
in policy that contravened the basic principles of "free trade, free capital and free 
investment. " 
In seeking to explain Moscow's success in entering the Latin economic sphere, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry Holland, outlined the 
paucity of US aims in Latin America. He wrote, 
Until sixty days ago our basic objectives in Latin America were: 1) To 
devise and apply policies that hold below danger levels complaints that the 
United States is not interested in the area. 2) To persuade governments to 
contain communist activities. 3) To achieve support in the United Nations 
and in our general policies outside this hemisphere... We have succeeded 
fairly well. Our policies have been the absolute minimum that would 
succeed 78 
The Soviets were also to capitalise on the Eisenhower administration's refusal to offer 
development loans in certain sections of the Latin economy that they felt could attract 
funding elsewhere; the most obvious sector in this category was petroleum, an area that 
79 US officials refused to provide funding for. In an attempt to broker a solution, Holland 
" Michael Weis states: `The emergence of the Cold War in Latin America provided the stimulus for new 
policies that resentment alone could not force. ' Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etat (1993) p 93 
e Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to the 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, February 22 1956, CFEP 537/1 - US Position With Respect to an 
International Coffee Agreement Box No 6, CFEP Series, Eisenhower Library 
"This decision had been made at an NSC meeting in March 1955. Using the example of PEMEX (the 
nationalised Mexican Petroleum Company) to illustrate the depth of the problem, Vice President Nixon 
stated that if the US `did assist Pemex, we would only be encouraging Pemexes in other Latin American 
countries. ' This was backed up by Assistant Secretary Holland, who `argued that it would be a major 
mistake for the United States Government to assist Pemex to finance itself, ' as `such a move would only 
encourage further expropriation and would, moreover, stifle those very encouraging signs of developing 
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began to consider proposals that marked a dramatic shift in the administration's foreign 
economic policy, including the possibility of negotiating over commodity agreements. 80 
However, although the Soviet move had caused US officials to consider a shift in policy, 
this would not be at the expense of American economic principles: even in January 1956, 
where the Soviets directly challenged the position of the US, any solution would be 
designed to fit-in with long-standing US economic principles. When Holland did propose 
an answer to the Soviet offer, he stated that the US, `must put the other country in a 
position where it is obvious to her that if she accepts Soviet credits we can quietly 
diminish or cut off continuing benefits which are more important to her than anything 
Russia can offer. 81 In other words, any solution should highlight the inherent 
disadvantages that would be incurred by any Latin nation seceding from the American 
economic system. This position would set the tone for the Eisenhower administration's 
response: although a revised US policy toward Latin America would recognise the need 
for the strengthening of US-Latin relations for security purposes, it would not do so by 
significantly altering or relaxing the administration's economic approach. 
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE: NSC 5613/1 AND A CHANGE IN PERCEPTION 
Ultimately, the Soviet offer of economic and technical assistance would falter as 
Latin dissatisfaction with the poor quality of Soviet goods, and a growing unease with 
Soviet policy in the wake of the Hungarian intervention, reduced the attractiveness of the 
private enterprise which could be discerned currently in Mexico. ' Report by Vice President Nixon on Latin 
American Trip, NSC Meeting, March 10 1955, Box No 6, NSC Series, Ann Whitman File, The Eisenhower 
Library. Henry Holland feared that the Soviet's would offer 'to finance one of the national monopolies' and 
that their offer `would be hard to refuse. ' For example, `a Brazilian government that did so might well fall. ' 
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to the Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles, February 22 1956, CFEP 537/1 - US Position With Respect to an international 
Coffee Agreement Box No 6, CFEP Series, Eisenhower Library 
t0 Commodity agreements had long been requested by Latin officials in an attempt to stabilise the prices of 
the raw materials that their economies so depended on. The US, however, had consistently turned down 
Latin requests. 
"' James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 313 
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Kremlin's offer. 82 The episode, though, had highlighted inherent flaws not just in US 
policy in Latin America, but, also, in their global approach to the changing nature of the 
Cold War. 83 It had challenged US assumptions about the Cold War and demonstrated the 
faults in the administration's Latin policy; anti-American sentiment, fostered by intense 
frustration at economic and social inequality and the belief that the US was `neglecting' 
Latin America, had, it seemed, undermined US national security interests in the region. 
Recognising these faults in US strategy, Henry Holland wrote to Secretary Dulles and 
informed him that, `we now have a new challenge, and I do not believe our existing 
policies will meet it. ' An OCB report in March 1956 offered up a similar sentiment, 
stating that they considered the policy outlined in NSC 5432/1 to be `inadequate to meet 
the intensified Soviet challenge and new Soviet tactics in Latin America. '84 The 
subsequent reappraisal of policy - which would result in the policy document NSC 
5613/1 - would see US officials give more emphasis to their strategic considerations in 
the region. But crucially it would also highlight the disparity between US security aims 
and US economic aims, as the new policy pointedly failed to recommend a shift in US 
economic policy. 85 Recognising this characteristic of the administration's policy is highly 
important as it demonstrates the continued gap between security and economics within 
US strategy; this feature of US policy has not been highlighted enough by either the 
Traditional or the Revisionist schools, which consequently, has led to the full significance 
of the impact of the Soviet Economic Offensive on US policy being overlooked. 
as In fact, Rabe states that: `by the end of 1957 and early 1958, administration officials were satisified that 
they had blunted the Soviet offensive and secured the hemisphere from communism' Stephen Rabe, 
Eisenhower (1988) p 91-92; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 154-155 
83 On the administration's policy discussions and debates over its approach toward the Third World, see: 
Kenneth Osgood, "Words and Deeds: Race, Colonialism, and Eisenhower's Propaganda War in the Third 
World" in Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and 
the Globalization of the Cold War (2006) pp 3-25 
84 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to the 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, February 22 1956, CFEP 537/1 - US Position With Respect to an 
International Coffee Agreement Box No 6, CFEP Series, Eisenhower Library; National Security Council 
progress Report, March 28 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI pp 46-58; Stephen Rabe (1988) p 88-92 
as As a result, the new policy would be severely hindered in its implementation: social and financial 
disparity in the region continued to deepen; the growing move towards more representative forms of 
government allowed anti-American dissent to become more vocal; Nationalist sentiment continued to 
thrive, destabilising the region economically and politically; and, the Eisenhower administration would be 
unable to implement the strategies that the Latin nations desired -- and which could have gone some way 
towards repairing the American position --- due to their unquestioning adherence to both their security and 
their economic aims. 
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NSC 5613/1 would attempt to address the major problems in US policy toward 
Latin America. These included the continuing problem with regard to military assistance, 
the deepening nationalist and anti-American sentiment across the region, the impact of 
the Soviet economic offensive, and the crushing economic problems in the region, which 
included the administration's failure to meet its own economic objectives. The 
overwhelming aim behind all this was the desire of US officials to bring Latin America 
firmly back into the US sphere of influence and to secure Latin America from neutralism 
or anti-Americanism. The issue of military assistance, which will be discussed at more 
length in relation to US policy in Brazil in Chapter Four, would not be solved by NSC 
5613/1. It would, though, form a major part of the new document as the administration 
continued to see a successful military policy as being a reliable way to improve the 
position of the US in the region. Although the Soviet offer of economic aid had deeply 
concerned US officials it is vital not to misread their fears. They did not suddenly assume 
that the Soviet presence in Latin America had become dangerously high; rather, it was an 
issue of perception and a matter of whether or not the US appeared to be winning the 
Cold War. 87 The Soviet offer had quite clearly undermined the credibility and the 
supremacy of the US system, leading US officials to accord much more importance to the 
issue of national security in their Latin American policy. A paper prepared in the 
Department of State Office of Intelligence Research asserted that: `the underlying 
objective of the Communists in Latin America is presumed to be the same as that of the 
Soviet Union - to weaken the United States. '88 Anti-Communism, then, would form a 
ae Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 89 
87 The OCB illustrated the lack of American concern over the relationship between Moscow and Latin 
America, reporting that, `The nature of international communist control of Latin American communist 
operations and sources of financing of these operations cannot be defined with concrete evidence' 
Operations Coordinating Board - Outline Plan of Operations Against Communism in Latin America, April 
18 1956, OCB 091.4 Latin America (File#7) (2) April 1956, Box No 74, OCB Series, Eisenhower Library; 
88 "Communism in Latin America", Paper Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of 
State, April 18 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 83-89; Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War (2006) p 
143-9 
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much more substantial part of US strategy in NSC 5613/1 than it had in either of its 
predecessors. 89 
As we have already established, the aims of the Eisenhower administration in 
formulating NSC 5613/1 were: to satisfy their own fears about the spread of communism; 
to strengthen the relationship between Washington and the Latin nations; and, to continue 
to uphold the long-term objectives of economic expansion and political and economic 
stability in the region. Rabe writes that, `beyond trying to uphold liberal trade policies, 
the administration responded to the "intensified Soviet challenge and new Soviet tactics 
in Latin America" by stiffening its resolve to combat communism. '90 The determination 
of the administration to protect Latin America from the renewed threat of communism (or 
overt anti-Americanism) can be clearly seen in NSC 5613/1. At the September 6 NSC 
Meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed for the following passage to be included, which 
quite clearly called for unilateral action in protecting American interests: 
If a Latin American state should establish with the Soviet bloc close ties of 
such a nature as seriously to prejudice our vital interests, be prepared to 
employ appropriate political, military and economic measures, in order to 
weaken the Soviet ties. 91 
`The statement, which seemed to codify and extend to Latin America the interventionist 
policies pursued against Guatemala in 1954, evoked little debate among NSC 
members. ' The document's stated objectives were, like NSC 144/1 and NSC 5432/1, 
split between economic and security aims. They read, 
A. Keep the other American Republics friendly towards the United States 
and retain their support of our world policies. 
B. Encourage the development of stable political systems along 
democratic, representative lines. 
°9 As stated earlier in this thesis, US officials often perceived anti-American sentiments within Latin 
America as being motivated by, or inextricably linked to, international communism. See: David Ryan, US 
Foreign Policy in World History (2000); Alan McPherson, Yankee No! (2003) 
9° Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 91 
91 Memorandum of Discussion at the 296'" National Security Meeting, September 6 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 
Volume VI p 101-113; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 91 
92 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 91 
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C. Encourage the growth of sturdy, self-reliant economies based upon the 
free enterprise system. 
D. Reduce and eventually eliminate Soviet bloc and Communist influence 
in the area. 
E. Obtain adequate production of and access to materials essential to our 
security. 
F. Obtain the participation in and support of measures to defend the 
hemisphere. 93 
Of these, it was the aim of reducing and eventually eliminating Soviet bloc and 
Communist influence in the area that most strongly indicated the administration's 
stronger stance towards national security issues. However, from reading the document 
fully, it is clear that US officials continued to recognise the problems caused by Latin 
nationalism, economic and social inequality and the prominent role that US foreign 
economic policy played in exacerbating these. 
There are strong nationalist feelings in all of these [Latin] Republics which 
often are expressed as anti-Americanism. In some countries, this nationalism 
expresses itself strongly against proposals for the development of natural 
resources... because the national income of the United States is roughly 8 or 
9 times that of the other American Republics combined, Latin America 
looks to us for assistance and expects that it should be forthcoming... some 
sectors in Latin America complain that our assistance is inadequate. Factors 
motivating these sectors include political pressure for more rapid economic 
development, domestic political considerations, and the feeling that any 
given level of US aid can be increased through complaints. These 
complaints are often reflected in the argument that the United States accords 
to Latin American an inadequate proportion of its total foreign aid... the 
desire for more rapid economic progress and higher standards of living is a 
major political issue in Latin America. 
It is clear, then, that despite the emphasis on correcting the problems in military 
policy and satisfying US officials communist fears, the major problem in US-Latin 
relations continued to be that of economic development. And it was this problem that the 
policy outlined in NSC 5613/1 conspicuously failed to address. As Matthew Loayza 
writes: `although Eisenhower and his advisors hoped to distance themselves from anti- 
" NSC 5613/1 "Statement of Policy on US Policy Toward Latin America", National Security Council 
Report, September 25 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 119-128 
Q' Ibid; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 92 
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American nationalism, their strict reliance on private initiative only created fertile soil for 
anti-American sentiment to flourish. '95 Even in light of the Soviet Economic Offensive, 
US policy continued to adhere to its economic principles and, therefore, encourage the 
growth of radical Latin nationalism. Just how striking this dichotomy between national 
security imperatives and economic pragmatism had become would be highlighted in the 
events surrounding the Buenos Aires Economic Conference in 1957; here, despite the 
growing number of officials recommending a change in policy, the US would continue to 
adopt a position similar to that taken at Rio in 1954. Before that, however, President 
Eisenhower would attempt to repair the position of the US in Latin America by meeting 
with all of the Latin heads of state in Panama City in August 1956. 
The Panama Presidents Meeting was timed to coincide with the one-hundred-and- 
thirtieth anniversary of the first Pan-American Congress, and was intended as a 
ceremonial forum at which Eisenhower could visit Latin America, bestow his presence on 
the maximum number of leaders possible and boost the standing of the United States in 
the region. It was made quite clear to the Latin nations that they would not be able to 
negotiate any agreements or treaties at the meeting, and that it would remain as an 
"unofficial" event. In the wake of the Soviet move into the region, US officials saw the 
Panama Meeting as an excellent opportunity to reaffirm the healthy status of the US-led 
Western Hemispheric system. Secretary of State Dulles cabled the US diplomatic 
missions in the region and told them that the meeting would, `demonstrate to the world: 
A) warm relationship among presidents and peoples American Republics B) advanced 
development and successful performance OAS, and C) veneration accorded by all 
American Governments and people to memory of Bolivar and principles he espoused. ' 
Although the administration stressed the fact that this meeting was to be `ceremonial' in 
nature and emphatically not a forum for discussing Latin economic complaints, US 
95 Matthew Loayza, "An `Aladdin's Lamp' for Free Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and 
Latin American Nationalism, 1953-61", Diplomacy and Statecr, * (Volume 14, No 3, September 2003) p 
83-103 
% Circular Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to all Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics, 
May 16 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 440-441 
" Ibid 
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officials were aware that the Latin delegates were highly unlikely to meet with President 
Eisenhower without, at some stage, raising their economic agenda. Rather than wait to be 
inundated with Latin requests for a change in economic policy, Eisenhower went to 
Panama with a suggestion of his own; namely, a multilateral economic commission. 
Having taken onboard familiar Latin complaints, the strategy advocated a system that was 
not controlled from Washington. Instead, this new committee would be run under the 
auspices of the OAS, which would give the impression that it was a regional body rather 
than one dominated by the United States. 98 The administration's actions at Panama were a 
clear attempt to try and achieve US national security goals through the very medium that 
had caused the problems in the first place: economic policy. Officials within the 
Eisenhower administration understood that the reason for the Soviets being able to make 
such a direct incursion into Latin America was because of deep-seated Latin resentment 
towards the economic policies of the US. It was, however, something of a hollow gesture 
as the commission had little actual power and certainly did not signify a wholesale shift 
in US foreign economic policy. As a result, those officials advocating a major change in 
policy - Milton Eisenhower, Thomas Mann, Harold Stassen, and Roy Rubottom - would 
continue to argue for a more dramatic change in US policy. Any change, though, would 
have to be gradual; US officials were not prepared to sacrifice their economic principles 
in order to meet their national security aims. 9 
HOLDING THE LINE: THE BUENOS AIRES ECONOMIC CONFERENCE 
9° The thinking behind this approach was revealed by Harold Randall, the US representative to the Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council, who stated that the committee's intention was to, `cause the 
Panama Meeting to produce something of concrete accomplishment of value to the Latin American 
countries and which will also contribute to US Foreign Policy objectives. ' Further enticement for the Latin 
nations was offered by the added suggestion that the committee be made up of representatives chosen by 
the Latin presidents themselves. Randall again states that the recommendations discussed by the committee, 
`having been developed by representatives of the Presidents themselves, will enjoy greater support from the 
Latin American governments than the activities of the OAS in this field have in the past' Memorandum by 
United States Representative to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council Harold Randall, July 16 
1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 445; President Eisenhower's Briefing Paper for Panamanian 
Presidents Meeting, 19 July 1956, Panama Meeting of the Presidents-1956 Briefing Papers (3), Box No 3, 
Miscellaneous Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library 
'9 As Michael Weis accurately summarises, the position taken by the US at Panama did not come close to 
addressing the full extent of the economic problems in Latin America. 'As with most inter-American 
meetings in the post war era, the Panama conference produced little except platitudes... the US had once 
again employed a delaying tactic instead of making genuine concessions or delivering more aid. ' Michael 
Weis, Cold Warriors and Coup D'Etat (1993) p 99 
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The direct legacy of the Soviet Economic Offensive was the Eisenhower 
administration's realisation that their current Latin American policy was not capable of 
meeting US objectives in the face of the evolving shape of the Cold War world. 
Manichean tendencies compelled US officials to see the Soviet offer of economic aid as a 
direct threat to US national security. Moreover, it forced administration officials to 
establish a direct link between national security and the region's economic problems. 
This recognition provided the catalyst for a more concerted call for a change in US 
economic policy and was directly tied to the shift in the US-Soviet relationship from the 
core to the periphery. 100 All of a sudden, in 1956, which, crucially, was an election year 
in the US, the Eisenhower administration feared that they would be seen to be losing the 
Cold War in Latin America. But any change in policy was directly hindered by the twin 
aims that continued to underpin US policy toward Latin America. At the Panama Meeting 
the US had proposed a new forum to discuss economic issues; however, it was at best 
little more than a sub-committee with very little prospect of achieving a change in policy, 
and was designed to ensure that the focus of US policy remained "free trade, free 
investment and free capital". The debate within the administration as to the necessity of a 
change in policy continued to gather pace in 1957 but, as we shall see, the US position at 
the Buenos Aires Economic Conference would be as steadfast as it had been at Rio three 
years earlier. 
In the period following the Panama Presidents Meeting, both George Humphrey 
and Henry Holland left the administration to return to the private sector. They were 
replaced by Robert Anderson and Roy Rubottom101, who were part of an influx of a new 
group of officials that were more open to the possibility of relaxing US economic 
100 See: Burton Kaufman, Trade & Aid (1982); Michael Adamson, "The Most Important Single Aspect of 
our Foreign Policy" (2006); Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, "Neither a Carrot Nor a Stick" (2006) 
101 Anderson became the new Treasury Secretary and Rubottom became the new Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs 
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policy. 102 This change in personnel coincided with a gradual change in economic policy, 
which, though hinted at in 1956, had still not emerged by 1957. James Siekmeier writes: 
In order to improve both the opportunity for private capital in Latin America 
and foster closer United States - Latin American ties, Washington officials, 
beginning in 1957, significantly changed their traditional policy by offering 
more economic aid, supporting the concept of regional economic zones, and 
agreeing to participate in an arrangement to regulate the price of coffee. '03 
The change in US policy had been encouraged by the events surrounding the Soviet 
Economic Offensive, but also enabled by the growing number of voices within the 
administration that were calling for a shift in the US position. Although Siekmeier argues 
that the definitive shift in US policy came after Buenos Aires, 104 the internal discussion 
had quite clearly begun in 1955 and 1956. It is important, though, not to exaggerate this 
change in policy: although the administration did indeed relax its position on commodity 
agreements, increase lending through the EXIM Bank, and inaugurate a new Inter- 
American Development Bank, 105 it did not relax its stance with respect to foreign private 
. 
investment. 106 In short, despite some changes, the main principles underpinning US 
economic policy would remain the same. With the number of democracies and 
representative governments in the region beginning to rise, it was becoming clear that the 
administration could not rely on supporting military factions or Latin dictators in the 
long-term; instead, they would have to address the global problem of how to draw those 
nations within the periphery into the US sphere of influence. 
102 This group also included the appointment of Douglas Dillon to Under Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs and Thomas Mann to Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. For more see: Milton 
Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter (1963) 
103 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 294-5 
104 Ibid p 302 
101 The introduction of the IADB would not, however, occur until 1959-60 
106 For information on the continued US commitment as to the virtues of foreign private investment see: 
Paper by the International Development Advisory Board, April 1957, which stated: `It is the policy of the 
United States to encourage the development of the free world's resources as much as possible through 
private enterprise... President Eisenhower has also announced that it was to be part of his foreign economic 
policy to encourage the flow of private American investment abroad and to encourage a hospitable climate 
for such investment. '; Letter from Under Secretary of the Treasury Randolph Burgess to Dr Milton 
Eisenhower, June 4d' 1957; Letter from Roy Rubottom to Dr Milton Eisenhower, December 17d' 1957. 
Folder - Eisenhower, Dr Milton 1957, Box No 2, Papers of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Lot 59 D 573, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. 
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Officials within the administration knew that they would be put under significant 
pressure by the Latin nations at the Buenos Aires conference. New Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy Rubottom, wrote to the Deputy Under-Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs, Douglas Dillon, and told him: `At the Conference... we can, I 
believe, expect to have a difficult task of negotiations due to the continuing impossibility 
of our acceding to Latin demands for money and measures that they say they need for 
economic development. ' 107 In their attempts to correct the problems within their policy, 
US officials had sought to redress those issues causing concern without undermining their 
economic strategy. Latin officials, though, were not prepared to pass up another 
opportunity to try and secure an increased level of investment. By 1957, the situation was 
becoming increasingly critical for the Latin nations as the US economic recession and 
balance of payments problems impacted heavily upon the Latin economy. 108 In 
anticipation of the meeting, the Latin nations had issued an Inter-American Economic 
Agreement (which the US had agreed to discuss at the upcoming conference) that had 
been drafted by Secretariat of the Pan-American Union. Despite the administration's shift 
in policy, they were highly sceptical about the merits of the draft Economic Agreement. 
At a meeting held in the Treasury Department on 27 May, it became evident that 
Treasury officials still had `very serious doubts' as to whether the US, `should undertake 
to negotiate with the Latin American governments on a text of the kind drafted by the 
Secretariat of the Pan American Union. ' As Roy Rubottom noted in the minutes of the 
meeting, though, the US had agreed to negotiate on the agreement at Buenos Aires, and 
therefore, 
We should not hesitate to decide our position and then negotiate it as 
strongly and as effectively as possible... it was unlikely that the Latin 
American countries would be satisfied with another declaration or that it 
would fulfil our commitment to negotiate for an agreement. 109 
107 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Roy Rubottom to Deputy Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs Douglas Dillon, May 29th 1957. Folder - 1957 - Economic, Box No 2, Lot 59 D 573, 
Papers of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, National Archives, 
College Park, Maryland. 
10E See: James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 293-300; Walter 
LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993) p 140 
109 Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of the Treasury, May 23 1957, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume 
VI p 503-507 
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Rubottom was aware that the US should not go to Buenos Aires and adopt the 
same stance as they had traditionally taken towards Latin economic requests. To do so 
again would undermine US national security objectives and increase the level of anti- 
American and radical nationalist sentiment in the region. Despite Rubottom's misgivings, 
though, the final recommendation of the sub-committee group set up to formulate US 
policy for the conference was: `The US platform at Buenos Aires should be the same as 
at Rio -a strong presentation of the benefits of private investment and free private 
investment. "10 The position taken by US officials - even those more progressive ones 
like Rubottom and Dillon - can only be fully understood by accepting the argument that 
the administration was pursuing two separate aims in Latin America. Though the 
Traditional school argues that `because it was winning the Cold War in Latin America, 
the Eisenhower administration saw little need to refashion its foreign economic 
policy"", and the Revisionist school contends that US policy would only change after 
the Buenos Aires Conference 112, neither argument offers a convincing explanation for the 
decision of US officials to take such a position at the conference. In fact (as Matthew 
Loayza accurately points out) even in the aftermath of Vice President Nixon's tour of the 
region, US policy did not change that much. 
Historians generally argue that the Eisenhower administration did not 
question the effectiveness of the private capital development model until 
Vice President Richard M. Nixon embarked on a tour of Latin 
America.. . while 
it is certainly true that the Eisenhower administration 
became more willing to extend economic aid to Latin America in the wake 
of the Nixon trip, the extent of this policy shift has been exaggerated... it 
[the Eisenhower administration] never intended ... to overshadow the importance of private capital investment. ' 13 
Within the context of the Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America, the global 
shift in the Cold War from the core to the periphery and the fact that the Eisenhower 
I0 Summary Notes of a Meeting of the Subcommittee on the Buenos Aires Economic Conference, 
Department of State, May 28 1957, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 503-507 
111 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 92; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 155 
112 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 302; Walter LaFeber, 
Inevitable Revolutions (1993) p 140-142 
113 Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp" (2(03) p 99; Michael Adamson, "The Most Important Single 
Aspect of our Foreign Policy" (2006) 
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administration clearly recognised that there was a need for them to appear more attractive 
to those nations in the Third World, neither the Traditional nor the Revisionist argument 
manages to convince when seeking to explain the administration's approach to the 
Buenos Aires Conference. For the Eisenhower administration to adopt a position that 
would inflame nationalist sentiment in Latin America so soon after the Soviet Economic 
Offensive and in the midst of an attempt to move closer to the Third World did not 
adhere to either US policy as outlined in NSC 5613/1 or the consistency of the 
administration's anti-communism. The US position for the conference was clearly being 
informed by an economic agenda, just as it had been three years earlier at the Rio 
Conference: this can only be satisfactorily explained by separating US economic 
principles from US strategic objectives. The impact that this split between economic and 
security issues had on US officials can be witnessed in the comments made by Douglas 
Dillon at a State Department Meeting on June 28. He stated that, `the US views on the 
agenda topics of the Conference seem to be consistently negative but... we should make 
an effort to take a positive and accommodating position whenever possible'; however, he 
went on to retract this comment and state: `since it may not be possible for the Latin 
Americans and us to reach accord on a General Inter-American Economic Agreement, we 
may wish to suggest at the Conference that, instead of a treaty, convention, or agreement, 
the delegates prepare a declaration or resolution. "14 As we can see, then, despite those 
officials advocating a change in US policy being much more prominent in the planning 
sessions for the Buenos Aires Conference, the US position was not significantly altered 
from that they had adopted at Rio. The gap between economic and strategic objectives 
14 Roy Rubottom offered further evidence of this contradictory mindset when he reaffirmed Dillon's 
sentiments in a letter to Clarence Randall, the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, and 
told him: `The recommended United States positions for the Buenos Aires Conference follow the familiar 
lines. ' The final proof that the US would adopt a position at the conference markedly similar to that at Rio 
came in August when Dulles and Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson wrote to Eisenhower to inform him 
`we plan to negotiate for a treaty in good faith, since we are committed to do so by earlier inter-American 
resolutions', but that in the absence of a viable agreement, `further negotiation might be scheduled for the 
next suitable inter-American conference, or agreement might be reached on a non-binding Declaration as a 
substitute for the treaty. Either result would be satisfactory to the United States, since an economic treaty is 
not necessary to further our objectives in Latin America. ' Memorandum of a Meeting, Department of State, 
June 281957; Letter from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson to 
President Eisenhower, August 5 1957, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 511-518; US Position on the Major 
Issues Expected to be Discussed at the Economic Conference of the Organization of American States, 
August 11957, CFEP 535 - Buenos Aires Economic Conference, Box No 6, CFEP Series, Eisenhower 
Library; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 95; James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter-American 
Relations (1999) p 305 
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was, if anything, even wider than it had been in 1954 and the affect that this had on US 
policy can be witnessed by the outcome of the conference and in the deterioration of US- 
Latin relations in the period afterwards. 
At the Conference itself, the US adopted a position strikingly similar to the one 
they had followed in Rio de Janeiro in 1954 and, `reiterated their faith in the private- 
investment driven model of development for Latin America. ' 115 In fact, the Conference's 
final communique ended up `reaffirming' US economic policy, as the American 
delegation refused to accept Latin proposals and forced the delegates to accept a final 
treaty that did not in any way alter the status quo. 116 The American press, though, 
challenged administration officials over the idea that the conference had been a success. 
One reporter asked Roy Rubottom whether `it was quite a disaster for us? ' Rubottom 
replied: `On the contrary, I think we came out of the conference very well. I think that we 
consider that the conference was a success. ' 
117 However, despite Rubottom's public 
statement, it is clear that US officials - especially those advocates of change like 
Rubottom, Dillon, Milton Eisenhower and Thomas Mann - did not consider the 
Conference to have been wholly successful. Siekmeier writes, 
Despite the final US stance at the conference, Dillon left the meeting with 
much different perceptions than had leaders of previous US delegations. He 
reflected that in the past "we [the United States] had been much too 
restrictive. " Indeed, in the months following the meeting, he began to 
implement new, more activist policies. These changes can only be 
understood against the backdrop of lower US investment in Latin America, 
faltering intra-hemispheric trade, and rising political instability in the 
region. 18 
115 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 303 
116 Ibid p 305 
"' Press and Radio News Conference given by Assistant Secretary Roy Rubottom, September 12 1957, 
Folder -1957 - Conference - Buenos Aires Economic, Box No 1, Lot 59 D 573, Records of the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, National Archives, College Park, 
Maryland. 
1' James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 306; Milton Eisenhower, The 
Wine is Bitter (1963) 206-209 takes a different perspective, claiming that `At Buenos Aires the United 
States for the first time indicated a willingness to study the possibility of joining in the formation of a 
hemispheric development institution' p 207 
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The reaffirmation of existing policy, with the emphasis heavily on expanding foreign 
private investment and promoting the American economic system, ran completely 
contrary to the wishes of the Latin nations. Those officials who had been advocating a 
change in US policy, though, recognised that this approach directly hindered the stability 
of the region and, therefore, US national security objectives. It is striking how quickly 
after the conference officials such as Rubottom and Dillon resumed their calls for a 
change in US economic policy towards the region. A National Intelligence Estimate of 
1958 would reveal to US officials what they already suspected: namely that, `Political 
instability in Latin America will continue as a major obstacle to improvement in relations 
with the United States. ' 119 With Latin nationalism an ever-increasing problem, the policy 
of the US was, as Stephen Rabe writes, `reaffirming a dismal status quo in the region. ' 12° 
The tension between economic and security aims had reached a new high in this period: 
officials like Rubottom and Dillon recognised that in order to quell the increasingly 
strident Latin nationalism and meet their security aims they would have to engineer a 
dramatic shift in US foreign economic policy; one that would, however, continue to 
adhere to the long-standing economic principles of the administration. As we shall see in 
Chapter Four, the nationalist movement in Latin America had what Rabe describes as `a 
new, influential spokesman; ' 121 that was Brazilian president Juscelino Kubitschek, who 
had come to power on a platform promising modernisation and who was determined to 
seek accommodation with the US in order to aid his policies. 
CONCLUSION: 
In April 1958, Vice President Nixon embarked on his ill-fated tour of Latin 
America. It was to be a turning point in US-Latin relations, although not as epochal as 
some commentators have suggested. Upon arrival in Caracas, Venezuela, Nixon's 
entourage was greeted by a `group made up of ruffians and riffraff ; `for fourteen 
agonizing minutes Nixon and his wife sat trapped in their separate limousines while the 
19 "Latin American Attitudes Toward the US", NIE 80/90-59, National Intelligence Estimate, December 2 
1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 61; James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations 
(1999) p 294 
120 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 99 
121 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 96 
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press captured an occurrence unique in US history - enraged demonstrators spitting on 
the Vice President of the United States. ' 122 Roy Rubottom had previously indicated to 
Secretary Dulles that a visit by a high-ranking US official (preferably the Secretary 
himself) could help to get US-Latin relations back on track. 123 Although specific events in 
US-Venezuelan relations had been the catalyst for the ferocity of the protests, 124 it has 
been noted that Nixon's tour saw, `latent anti-American sentiment' emerge `at its most 
virulent. ' 125 
The dilemma confronting the Eisenhower administration was how to react to these 
events. As we have seen in this chapter, US policy had undergone quite a significant shift 
in the period between 1954 and 1958. The shift in the nature of the Cold War, which saw 
a dramatic change in US-Soviet relations and witnessed a significant shift from the core 
to the periphery, forced the administration to reconsider its approach in the region in an 
effort to appear more attractive to those increasingly important Third World nations. By 
1956, these countries were not just important for economic reasons but, also, for strategic 
reasons: US credibility was now at stake in the contest between the USSR and the US to 
draw these nations into their respective spheres of influence, and, as a result, US policy 
clearly began to attach more emphasis to improving the relationship between Washington 
and the rest of the Western Hemisphere. 126 Now the inherent failings of the 
administration's policy had been demonstrated publicly in an outpouring of nationalistic 
anger, US officials had to decide whether to make further changes to their policy or keep 
faith with their existing strategy. 
'z2 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 100; Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States (1998) p 351 
'23 Rubottom wrote: `The economic situation in the whole area has deteriorated due to the catastrophic 
price drops in metals, and even coffee is noticeably softening ... a trip by you to South America at this time 
would contribute greatly to the cementing of our good relations with Latin America. ' Telegram from 
Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, December 26 1957, 
John Foster Dulles December 1957, Dulles-Herter Series Box No 9, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library; 
Letter from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, to Vice President Richard Nixon, March 61958, FRUS 
1958-1960 Volume VAmerican Republic,. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1991) 
222 
124 Most obviously, the granting of asylum to the recently ousted dictator Perez Jimenez and his reviled 
chief of policy Manuel Astrada 
125 Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America (2005) p 123; Alan McPherson, Yankee No! (2003) 
'26 As outlined in NSC 5613/1, the US attached much more emphasis to appealing to the Latin nations and 
in improving the state of US-Latin military relations 
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The overwhelming problem within US policy was that although security 
objectives were now a much more prominent part of US strategy, officials within the 
Eisenhower administration continued to be constrained by their adherence to American 
economic principles. This chapter has illustrated the way that this tension within US 
policy developed in the midst of a significant change in the very nature of the Cold War. 
As the Eisenhower administration's conception of Latin America's importance evolved 
from being predominantly economic to predominantly strategic in tone, those voices 
within the administration calling for a change in US economic policy in the area became 
more prominent. The Soviet Union's attempt to develop stronger links with the Latin 
nations raised fears within the administration that the credibility of the American system 
was coming under threat. In response they attempted to accord more significance to their 
relationship with the region and to address some of the major issues that were 
undermining their position in the area. Crucially, however, this would not include a 
significant change in economic policy. As a result, the biggest difficulty in US-Latin 
relations would remain and would, therefore, continue to undermine the administration's 
position in the region. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS 1954-1958 
"FROM VARGAS TO KUBITSCHEK" 
INTRODUCTION: 
Having identified the changes that occurred in US policy toward Latin America in 
the aftermath of the Soviet Economic Offensive and the shift in the nature of the Cold 
War, the next task is to analyse the impact that the events of the 1954-1958 period had on 
US-Brazilian relations. Like Chapter Two, this chapter will highlight the difficulties that 
the Eisenhower administration had in applying what was ostensibly a regional policy onto 
the bilateral relationship between Washington and Rio, focusing on the incompatibility of 
US economic and strategic objectives. This period can be divided into two distinct 
sections. Firstly, the period between Vargas's death in August 1954 and the Brazilian 
presidential election in 1955; and secondly, the period between Juscelino Kubitschek's 
election in late 1955 and the end of 1957, when the bilateral relationship had moved away 
from being predominantly about economics and now contained a more urgent national 
security element. What will be apparent across both of these sections is that in spite of 
what was motivating US policies, events in the bilateral relationship were very often 
dictated by the prevailing situation in Brazil. In the first period, chronic economic 
problems in Brazil and Washington's attempts to modify Brazilian economic practices 
(without jeopardising the upcoming election) would dominate events; whilst, in the 
second period, the agenda would be set by the actions taken by President Kubitschek, 
who came to office promising to revitalise Brazilian economic and social structures and 
his subsequent attempts to achieve this through close cooperation with the US. In each 
case it will be clear that the Eisenhower administration was not free to impose its Latin 
American strategy upon Brazil without first trying to solve the existing problems. 
The argument in this chapter will be similar to that presented in Chapter Three. 
Namely that prior to 1956, the Eisenhower administration continued to view their 
position in Latin America from a predominantly economic perspective; but that following 
the Soviet Economic Offensive and the change in the nature of the Cold War, US 
officials became increasingly concerned about the status of their strategic concerns in 
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both Latin America and Brazil. As we saw in Chapter Three, much more emphasis was 
placed on improving US-Latin American relations through the use of a more successful 
military assistance policy and by affording more importance to US-Latin diplomacy. 
However, we also saw that such an approach overlooked Latin demands for a change in 
US economic policy; the result was the outbreak of Latin anti-American sentiment during 
the Nixon trip of 1958. The crucial point is that once again we will see that the Soviet 
Economic Offensive did impact a significant change onto US policy: the fact that it was 
ultimately unsuccessful is not as important as identifying the fact that there was certainly 
a strong change in Washington's conception and approach toward their position in Latin 
America. This change in policy would be highly apparent in Brazil and will, therefore, 
form a central part of this chapter. 
US policy toward the interim Cafd Filho administration up to the Fall of 1955 
continued to be concerned with successfully resolving Brazil's economic problems in a 
manner that was compatible with American interests. ' In the six months between October 
1955 and March 1956, though, three things altered the dynamic of US-Brazilian relations. 
Firstly, the pattern of the Cold War continued to shift toward the Third World; secondly, 
the onset of the Soviet Economic Offensive caused the Eisenhower administration to alter 
its Latin American approach; and thirdly, Juscelino Kubitschek was elected as the new 
Brazilian president. The US would attempt to build a strong working relationship with 
President Kubitschek and ensure that the American strategic position in Brazil was 
strengthened - this necessitated the construction of several US military installations on 
Brazilian territory and a political alliance build around anti-communist sentiments. There 
was, however, a significant problem. President Kubitschek's support for US policies was 
part of his strategy to secure a significant change in US lending policy. The Eisenhower 
administration, though, would make any change in policy conditional upon Brazil 
implementing a series of revisions to their domestic economic policies. With neither 
Washington nor Rio prepared to shift their position, the bilateral relationship would have 
deteriorated severely by 1958. 
' Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special 
Relationship" in American Historical Review (Vol 68, No. 3, December 1981) p 616-7 
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THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL GAP: 
Adopting this approach will significantly increase our understanding of not just 
US-Brazilian relations, but, also, US-Latin American relations. As with Chapter Two, the 
existing historiography on US-Brazilian relations during this period is demonstrably 
sparse. Whilst those studies looking at general US-Latin relations do give more 
consideration to the Kubitschek era than the Vargas and Cafe Filho governments, this is 
only a moderate increase and tends to focus on Kubitschek's Operation Pan America 
proposal, which we will examine in Chapter Six 
2 Even those studies dealing ostensibly 
with US-Brazilian relations have not provided comprehensive appraisals of the way that 
the bilateral relationship and US policy evolved in the period between 1954 and 1958. 
Elizabeth Cobbs, due to the focus of her work on the private network in Brazil, provides 
some references to the Cafe administration and provides a good overview of the climate 
for foreign investment in Brazil during this period, but does not look at the wider 
elements of US-Brazilian relations at this time. 
3 
It is Michael Weis who provides the most in-depth study of US-Brazilian relations 
during the period covered by this chapter. 4 Even here, though, there is a significant gap in 
the written work provided on the Cafe Filho administration: although Weis accurately 
summarises the nature of the bilateral relationship in this period he does not do so whilst 
offering a wider critique of US policy toward Latin America or identifying the underlying 
2 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower: The Foreign Policy ofAnti-Communism and Latin America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American 
Relations since 1889 (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000); James Siekmeier, Aid 
Nationalism and Inter American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia and the United States, 1945-1961 (New 
York: The Edward Mellen Press, 1999); Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise: 
Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin American Nationalism, 1953-1961", Diplomacy & Statecraft 
(Volume 14, No. 3, September 2003). All of these studies mention Kubitschek's presidency briefly and will 
be cited accordingly here and in Chapter Six 
3 Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992) p 201-231 
4 Stanley Hilton deals with the Cafe administration, but does not go into explicit detail about the nature of 
the bilateral relationship during the 1945-56 period. Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the 
Cold War" (1981) p 616-7 
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tension between economics and security within the US approach. 5 It is this imbalance that 
this chapter will address, viewing US-Brazilian relations within the wider context of US 
regional policy and outlining the way that those themes which were so prevalent in 
Chapter Three impacted upon the bilateral relationship. Where this chapter will move 
beyond the work of Cobbs and Weis is in seeking to identify the evolution of US- 
Brazilian relations within the economics-security nexus outlined in the first three 
chapters. As the Eisenhower administration's emphasis shifted toward the achievement of 
its national security aims, the dominant features in US-Brazilian relations would alter 
accordingly. However, as outlined in Chapter Three, the change in the emphasis of US 
policy toward Latin America would not bring about a change in US economic principles. 
Therefore, as Washington and Rio moved closer together on issues of security and 
strategic importance, they would be pushed apart again by the inevitable disagreements 
over economic policy. The first stage, however, is to analyse the way that the bilateral 
relationship evolved in the period between Vargas's death and the 1955 presidential 
election. 
CAPITALISM V NATIONALISM: US-BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC DISPUTES 1954- 
1955 
The first year of US-Brazilian relations after Vargas's death revolved 
predominantly around economic diplomacy. As we have already seen, US objectives in 
Latin America during the first two years of the Eisenhower administration were mostly 
concerned with expanding the role that foreign private investment played in Latin 
development and encouraging the widespread acceptance of American economic 
principles. In Brazil, this process had led to the US termination of the Joint Commission 
in the summer of 1953; a decision that had quickly undermined the political stability of 
the Vargas administration in an effort to reshape Brazilian economic development more 
along the lines of Western capitalism. Upon Vargas's death, though, Brazil was in a 
S Weis writes that, 'while the US sympathized with the new regime, officials decided to keep Brazil on a 
"short leash" and refused to give any significant assistance. ' Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etat: 
Brazilian-American Relations 1945-1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico press, 1993) p 80 
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parlous financial state: a crash in coffee prices and an impending crisis over foreign 
exchange had left the Brazilian economy in a worse position than that which had 
triggered Vargas's fall from power. As a result, the Cafe Filho administration's greatest 
priority would be to try and stabilise the situation in order that there might be a stable 
handover of power after the 1955 presidential election. Cafe Filho had become Vargas' 
vice president in 1950, despite the fact that he had been a fierce critic of Vargas' previous 
incarnation as the dictatorial leader of the Estado Novo in the 1930s. 7 In essence, the new 
administration saw itself as being little more than a `caretaker' regime, whose main 
responsibility was to "steady the ship" until a new leader was elected in the autumn of 
1955.8 US policy was markedly different to this, however. The Eisenhower 
administration, as per the policy outlined in NSC 144/1 and NSC 5432/1, wanted to 
encourage Brazilian development through American economic principles .9 The fact that 
the Eisenhower and Cafe Filho administrations had such differing objectives impacted a 
heavy strain on the bilateral relationship as the US grew increasingly frustrated with the 
Brazilian government's refusal to adopt the changes they were recommending. 
6 For Cafe Filho's own views on his administration, see: Conversation between Robert Alexander and Joao 
Cafe Filho, June 8 1966. Taken From: Robert Alexander, The ABC Presidents: Conversations and 
Correspondence with the Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992) 
104-8 
Robert Levine, Father of the Poor?: Vargas and his Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1998) 
p 79-80; Ronald Schneider, Brazil: Culture and Politics in an New Industrial Powerhouse (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1996) 
8 Weis writes, `Without any support, save a national desire to maintain constitutional democracy, the 
administration saw itself as a caretaker regime and limited itself to pursuing stabilization ... and maintaining 
order for October's congressional elections and the next presidential election. ' Michael Weis, Cold 
Warriors and Coup D'Etats (1993) p 80; Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil, 1500-2000 (London: Pearson 
Educational Ltd, 2002) p 161 
9 Matthew Loayza explains this, writing: 'US officials believed that if Latin Americans accepted American 
tutelage, the results would redound to the benefit of the Latin American republics and the United States. 
The former stood to benefit from the importation of financial capital and managerial expertise desperately 
needed for economic development, whereas the latter would gain improved access to raw materials as well 
as new capital and commodity markets. ' Matthew Loayza, 'An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise: 
Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin American Nationalism, 1953-1961. ' Diplomacy & Statecrq/I 
Volume 14, No. 3, (September 2003). Frank Cass Publishers, p 94 
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Deepening economic problems were not the only obstacle to US objectives in 
Brazil, though. 1° The growth of Brazilian nationalism continued apace; a trend boosted 
by the anti-American vitriol displayed by Vargas in his last testament. He wrote, 
A subterranean campaign of international groups joined with national groups 
revolting against the regime of worker's guarantees. The law of excess 
profits was stopped in Congress. Against the justice of a revision of 
minimum salaries, hatreds were unleashed. I wished to create national 
liberty by developing riches through Petrobras, and no sooner had we begun 
than a wave of agitation was raised... profits of foreign enterprises reached 
500 per cent yearly. . . the coffee crisis came, and increased the value of our 
principle product. We attempted to defend this price and the reply was a 
violent pressure upon our economy to the point of being obligated to 
surrender. " 
US officials recognised that the situation in Brazil was growing increasingly serious. 12 In 
response, Secretary Dulles attempted to persuade James Dunn, the US Ambassador to 
Spain, 13 to take on a similar role in Brazil. He wrote: 
I am told that you do not look with favour on a tour of duty in Brazil...! do 
want personally to urge you to reconsider the possibility of a year to 
eighteen months in Rio.. .I want you to know from me personally that I feel 
the situation in Brazil is one with peculiarly calls for you ability and type of 
expertise ... the 
death of Vargas has created many problems. The economic 
situation is precarious. The Rio Conference next November and its 
immediate aftermath will be particularly significant. 14 
10 The best overview of Brazilian politics at this time can be found in: Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 
1930-1964 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967) Chapter 4 
1' Suicide Letter of President Vargas, August 24 1954, Jordan M. Young, Brazil: End of a Civilian Cycle 
(USA: Facts on File, 1972). p 16-17; Robert Levine, Father of the Poor?: Vargas and his Era (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998) p 88-9 
12 Weis notes that, `Vargas's political testimony energized politics in Brazil, as a wave of indignation swept 
the nation' and `crowds attacked US consulates in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte. ' Michael Weis, Cold 
Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 79-80 
11 Dunn was a long serving State Department official and, indeed, had been the US Ambassador to Italy in 
1948 during the election where the CIA attempted to covertly ensure that the Italian Communist Party did 
not win the election. See: Kaeten Mistry, "The Case for Political Warfare: Strategy, Organisation, US 
Involvement in the 1948 Italian Election and the Role of James C. Dunn" in Cold War History (Vol 6, Issue 
3,2W6) 
14 Memorandum from the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to the American Ambassador in Madrid 
James C. Dunn, August 311954, John Foster Dulles Chronological - August 1954 (1), Box No 9, General 
Correspondence and Memoranda Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library. 
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Dulles's sentiments were echoed at the NSC meeting on September 3 by Deputy 
Director of the CIA, General Cabell. He told the NSC members, `the suicide of Vargas 
had been the climax of several years of deterioration in the situation, ' and that `although 
the new cabinet was competent, experienced, conservative, and pro-US, it would have to 
face a number of difficult problems, including inflation, a foreign exchange crisis, lack of 
parliamentary majority and national and state elections on October 3. ' 15 Despite 
recognising the problems confronting them in Brazil, the Eisenhower administration 
would spend the next twelve months becoming increasingly frustrated by its lack of 
progress in encouraging a shift in Brazilian economic policy. Brazil's severe domestic 
economic situation forced the interim Cafe administration to make economic policy the 
main theme in US-Brazilian relations. The US response was to adopt a hard-line position: 
no loans would be forthcoming unless significant changes in economic policy were made. 
However, the Cafe administration - politically weak and unwilling to risk further 
political instability - was reluctant to make those changes. As a result, an impasse 
developed that left the Eisenhower administration to wait until a new leader was elected 
in October 1955 for a possible relaxation in bilateral tensions. With US economic 
objectives toward Latin America remaining unchanged, the Eisenhower administration's 
economic approach toward Brazil would continue to be one rooted in the principles of 
free market capitalism. 
On September 12,1954, Ambassador Kemper cabled the State Department and 
outlined the severity of the economic situation in Brazil. Brazilian problems stemmed 
from the fact that their balance of payments were running at a heavy deficit: Brazilian 
expenditure dwarfed Brazilian income. 16 If Brazil was unable to obtain additional funds 
to meet their repayment schedule on foreign loans then they would be forced to sell off 
some their gold reserves. As Kemper noted, however, this could have a serious impact on 
'S Discussion at the 212"' Meeting of the National Security Council, September 3 1954, Box No 6, NSC 
Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library 
16 in fact, Ambassador Kemper projected Brazilian losses in the period up until the and of 1954 to be 
somewhere in the region of $54.8 to $65.3 million, increasing to $155 million in the first six months of 
1955. See: Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954 Volume IV The American Republics 
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1983) 
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not just Brazilian politics but the future of the US-Brazilian relationship; unless, of 
course, the US agreed to provide Brazil with an emergency gold loan. 
Brazilian authorities believe that if they are obliged to sell gold, domestic 
political consequences would be severe if not unbearable to present 
administration which is trying to gain support to face financial crisis and 
take necessary measures to reorient economic policy. Brazilian officials 
assert, however, government would sell gold before defaulting exchange 
contract. Domestic effects indicated are (1) bears would enter coffee market 
with resulting reduction in sales; (2) commercial bankers reduce credit lines; 
(3) severe political blow to prestige and popular support of present 
administration. Moreover refusal by the US to grand gold loan forcing sale 
elsewhere would diminish US influence [over] new administration impairing 
our ability to persuade Brazil to take sound economic measures. ' 
For the US to be able to exert any influence on the Cafe administration to adopt American 
economic practices, then they needed, in Kemper's opinion, to offer the Brazilians some 
support at this time of impending financial crisis. Yet this was a difficult idea to 
countenance for the Eisenhower administration as it contravened their global economic 
policy. '8 The struggle to find some form of compromise between these two divergent 
positions would characterise the US-Brazilian relationship in 1954 and 1955.19 
We saw in Chapter Three that many nations in the Third World were 
increasingly prepared to use the competing geopolitical interests of the US and the Soviet 
Union to play the two superpowers off against each other 2° The continued efforts by US 
officials to impose their economic principles upon those developing areas of the world 
pointed to a misreading of Third World nationalism. As John Lewis Caddis writes, 
" Telegram from US Ambassador in Brazil James Kemper to the Department of State, September 12 1954, 
FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV 
18 See: Burton Kaufman, Trade and Aid. ' Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1982) 
19 This clash between US economic objectives and those of the Brazilians was part of a wider trend. As 
David Ryan writes: 'US aspirations to maintain its standard of living, "to maintain the position of 
disparity", and to enhance economic integration set up a contradiction between the aspirations of Third 
World states and those of the United States. ' David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (London: 
Routledge, 2000) p 143 
20 See: Thomas McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and 
After (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989) Second Edition 1995 p 118-122 
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Much of the administration's difficulty in dealing with communism21 in the 
Third World stemmed from a chronic failure to distinguish deterrable from 
non-deterrable phenomena. The theory of deterrence implies that the 
behaviour to be deterred (1) represents something less than a total 
commitment on the part of the adversary, and (2) is under reliable central 
direction. Neither of these conditions could be assumed in the Third 
World. 22 
Although Gaddis blurs the distinctions between communism and nationalism, his 
argument concerning the Eisenhower administration's lack of understanding with regard 
to the dynamics of Third World sentiment is essentially correct. 23 The strength of 
Brazilian nationalism could not be discounted and it was beyond US control to try and 
weaken its potency. And yet US officials still sought to try and engineer a change in 
Brazilian economic policy; the consequence of which was an increase in Brazilian 
nationalism and a weakening of pro-US sentiment in Brazil. In seeking to answer the 
question of why they did this, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that US ideological 
constructs committed the administration to adhering to its long-standing economic 
objectives with regard to Latin America. This - as we shall see - meant that the more the 
Cafe administration raised the issue of economics, the more Washington would continue 
to follow its existing approach. 
Much of the onus for relieving Brazil's economic situation fell to Eugenio Gudin, 
the Brazilian Finance Minister. 24 And, in September 1954, he travelled to the US `for 
discussions with EXIM, IBRD, the Federal Reserve Bank, and private banks in New 
York, as well as with Treasury and State Department officials. ' The characteristics of US 
economic policy were made quite clear to Gudin. Although he `secured a 160-million- 
dollar Federal Reserve loan against a gold pledge, ' US officials `denied a request for a 
further 100-million-dollar EXIM loan to provide the regime with some breathing 
21 In referring to communism, Gaddis was, like many Cold War historians, conflating nationalism with 
communism, which as we have already seen, is a common trait in Cold War historiography 
n John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) p 180 
23 This confusion within Washington as to how potent a force nationalism was is similar to that confronting 
the Kennedy administration in Vietnam; a point that was made to the president by his French counterpart, 
Charles de Gaulle, who told Kennedy in Paris in 1961 that: `Nationalism would always prove stronger than 
"any foreign authority. "' Frederik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation 
of the war in Vietnam (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999) p 24-5 
24 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 143-4 
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space. '25 It was now, however, that the administration made the mistake of attempting to 
use Brazil's financial problems as a tool for both obtaining Brazilian support for the 
upcoming Rio Economic Conference and for gaining concessions in other areas relating 
to US objectives. Weis writes, 
US officials offered Gudin the promise of future assistance if Brazil met a list 
of demands: changing the Petrobras law to allow US corporate investment; 
abrogating a 1938 treaty with Bolivia granting Brazil exclusive rights for oil 
development in order to allow US exploration; signing the new Joint Brazil- 
United States Military Commission agreement; revising the recent wheat-for- 
strategic-minerals agreement to give the US better terms; resuming exports of 
mica, industrial diamonds, and uranium; and collaborating with the US at the 
Rio economic conference. 6 
We have already established that the US strategy for the Rio Conference was to meet its 
economic objectives and counter Latin proposals: this blatant extortion of the Brazilians, 
however, provides strong evidence of the administration's continued adherence to NSC 
5432/i's stated aims and objectives. The Brazilian need for economic assistance was so 
desperate that the Cafe administration had little choice but to accept the terms put forward 
by the US. On October 29 Ambassador Joao Muniz told Assistant Secretary of State, 
Henry Holland, that: `Brazil will support our policies at the Rio Conference and will 
attempt to persuade other governments to do so also... Brazil's position will become acute 
in December, and it will need help to meet its dollar obligations. '27 
In the short-term, the US achieved the objectives behind this approach; Brazil did 
support the US at Rio and also signed the Military Commission treaty. 8 However, in the 
long-term, it only served to exacerbate US-Brazilian tensions and highlighted the 
differences between the two nation's policies. US success at Rio could not disguise the 
25 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 80; Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, 
and the Cold War" (1981) p 616-7 
26 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 80-81 
27 Memorandum of a Conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland and Brazilian 
Ambassador Joao Carlos Muniz, October 29 1954, Folder - Brazil 1954, Box No 2, Record Group 59, 
Entry 1132, Country File, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry 
Holland 1953-1956, Lot 57 D295, National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
2S Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coup D'Etats (1993) p 81-84; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower: The 
Foreign Policy ofAnti-Communism and Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1988) p 71-77 
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fact that the major problem in the bilateral relationship was Brazil's chronic economic 
problems. How to solve them would be a recurring theme of discussions within the 
Eisenhower administration. Secretary Humphrey, after recognising that the US would 
probably have to provide further assistance to Brazil, recommended that the US appoint 
two officials to, `go to Rio de Janeiro and examine the precise exchange situation of 
Brazil. '29 A document produced in the Office of Financial and Development Policy 
summarised the unsolved problems in the relationship by asking: `What is the financial 
position of Brazil, and is the new Government doing all that can be reasonably be 
expected? Should the US aid Brazil and if so what shall be the extent, timing and 
conditions of such aid? ' The problem for the US was that by helping the Brazilians they 
would lose their ability to encourage the Cafe administration into making necessary 
economic reforms such as a change in petroleum and coffee policy. 
If the US bails out the new Government they will doubtless relax, and while 
the program to control inflation and to institute certain other reforms will go 
forward, it will lose steam and the tendency will be not to deal with the main 
problems, particularly coffee and petroleum. 
The solution put forward was to offer aid to Brazil on an incremental basis; only offering 
the next instalment depending on stipulated changes being made in Brazilian policy. 30 
The US should extend aid to Brazil, but this should not be in one large sum. 
It should be extended piece-meal, and in each case without commitment to 
further amounts, which would depend upon developments and Brazil's 
progress in a constructive program... We should tell them that it appears they 
will not need aid until at least January, and that at that time we will consider 
aid for immediate needs, and that further amounts will depend upon 
developments. If the coffee and petroleum problems should be satisfactorily 
dealt with in the near future, and their need for aid existed the US might then 
modify the piece-meal approach. 31 
' Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, October 7 1954, FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV p 
661-662 
30 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 617 
31 Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Financial and Development policy to the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Samuel Waugh, November 17 1954, FRUS 1952-1954 Volume IV 
p 662-664 
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By the end of 1954, the Eisenhower administration's approach toward Brazil was 
clearly still being informed by the economic ideals outlined in NSC 5432/1. What is 
surprising about this is that even in the aftermath of the collapse of the Vargas 
administration, and the subsequent affect that this had on political stability in Brazil, the 
US continued to see the economic part of the bilateral relationship as being most 
pressing. The problem for the US was that even those Brazilian officials that recognised 
the need for change in Brazilian policy - like Finance Minister Gudin - were powerless to 
implement all the changes that were necessary. Some of them, such as opening up 
Brazilian petroleum reserves to foreign investment, were politically unfeasible due to the 
strength of Brazilian nationalism. 32 It was now that the gap between US policy and the 
Brazilian position began to dictate the nature of the bilateral relationship. Between 
January and August of 1955, US-Brazilian relations would be characterised by 
Washington's attempts to achieve their economic aims in the face of the Cafe 
administration's unwillingness to implement wide-ranging economic reforms. 
In the period leading up to the 1955 Brazilian presidential election, US policy 
toward Brazil continued to focus on economic issues. On February 15,1955, Secretary 
Dulles sent an instruction out to all the Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics, 
informing them of the criticisms being levelled at US economic policy and linking it to 
the problems in US-Brazilian relations. He wrote, 
Criticism of the proportional amount of United States aid to Latin America, as 
compared with economic assistance in other areas.. . is so persistent as to 
constitute a serious factor in our good relations with other governments of 
this hemisphere. The criticism is voiced by the press, by political 
campaigners, by delegates at inter-American and international conference 
tables, and, both publicly and privately, by official spokesmen at the highest 
level. An even greater potential than criticism, however emotional and 
32 In fact, Gudin was growing increasingly frustrated at his lack of progress in solving Brazil's economic 
problems and, in January 1955, was prepared to quit. The US, aware that Gudin was ostensibly on "their 
side", were concerned about this and both Secretary Dulles and Secretary Humphrey sent goodwill 
messages to offer their support to the beleaguered Brazilian Finance Minister. See: Telegram from the 
Ambassador in Brazil James Kemper to the Department of State, January 7 1955; Telegram from the 
Secretary of State to the Embassy in Brazil, January 12 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume M American 
Republics: Central and South America (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1997) p 
627-629; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 84-86 
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inaccurate, is the popular conviction among many citizens of the other 
American Republics that most of their economic ills - whether due to 
inflation, falling world markets, unbalanced budgets, discouragement of 
foreign capital, or corruption in government - are due either to the asserting 
grasping, materialistic policy of the United States or to alleged United States 
blindness to Latin America's needs ... This latter theory has at present the 
wider acceptance. It is being stressed, for example, in Brazil, a country that is 
traditionally our ally and that has a present administration which we can 
endorse and would be glad to assist, but that so far shows extreme reluctance 
to accept terms which would make US assistance remedial and not merely 
alleviating; such as, for example, permitting private enterprise to develop the 
immense oil resources which Brazil possesses but cannot itself develop, and 
taking practical measures to balance the budget so as to check the inflationary 
process. In view of the prevalence of this attitude in the hemisphere, the 
Department and the Agency33 consider it essential that officers of the 
Embassy, especially those in frequent contact with leaders in public life and 
public opinions, make a concerted, concentrated effort to prove that the 
effectiveness of United States assistance cannot be measured accurately by 
dollar totals alone ... United 
States relations with Latin America in the 
economic sphere have been and are entirely different. Latin America is the 
one sizeable area where there has been no war devastation and no impending 
threat of armed Communist aggression... United States assistance is 
motivated, not by the demands of an emergency, but by settled considerations 
of alliance and mutual interest, enunciated in the Good Neighbor policy and 
adhered to ever since as a permanent part of foreign policy. 
34 
Dulles' summary of the tensions in US-Latin relationships was an accurate one. 
Again, though, despite recognising the problems that their economic approach was 
impacting upon the US position in the region, administration officials continued to refuse 
to consider a change in basic economic policy. 
35 The impact of this tension was 
especially prominent in Brazil and, in 1955, the tension between the two nation's 
economic objectives continued to impose a negative impact on the bilateral relationship. 
Brazilian hopes of a more benevolent US policy were raised when Nelson Rockefeller - 
who had a long history of activity in Brazil - was appointed as a Special Assistant to the 
33 The Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency 
34 Instruction from the Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions in the American Republics, February 
15 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1987) p 300-303 
31 lames Siekmeier, Aic4 Nationalism, and Inter American Relations (1999) Chapter Five; Stephen Rabe, 
Eisenhower (1988) Chapters Four and Five 
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President. 36 This would, however, prove to be something of a false dawn, as 
Rockefeller's attempts to bring about a change in US policy toward Brazil would 
ultimately fail. 37 In fact, Elizabeth Cobbs writes: `Ironically, Rockefeller, in spite of the 
two official posts he held under Eisenhower38, was listened to more by Democrats than 
by fellow Republicans... Eisenhower considered Rockefeller a spender and was reluctant 
to accept his advice on matters of foreign aid. '39 
There would not, then, be any significant changes in the bilateral relationship in 
the period leading up to the Brazilian presidential election in the fall of 1955.40 The 
Eisenhower administration would continue to try and convince the Brazilian authorities 
that they needed to adopt the changes in policy they were suggesting, whilst the Cafe 
administration would continue to refuse to adopt any measures that might be perceived 
as being controversial. In reality the Cafe administration proved unable to take the 
measures being recommended by the US, even when they recognised the problems they 
faced - internal political and economic problems precluded any widespread acceptance 
of US proposals even when the Rio Government could see what steps needed to be 
taken. This much was revealed in a memorandum sent to Henry Holland by Rollin 
Atwood, the Director of the Office of South American Affairs. 
Minister Gudin outlined in Washington, and later Brazil, a constructive 
program to meet Brazil's pressing economic problems. This program 
included: 1) Slowing inflation; 2) Increasing exports; 3) Encouraging private 
foreign investment; 4) Balancing the national budget; 5) Modifying the 
36 Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) p 93-94; Cobbs also states that Rockefeller's overall 
goal in US-Brazilian relations was to promote `Brazilian development under the mantle of US capitalism' p 
117 
37 See: Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, March 18 1955; Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant 
Nelson Rockefeller to President Eisenhower, June 1 1955; Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to the President's Special Assistant Nelson Rockefeller, June 3 
1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 304-310,327-330 
36 He was also Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board 
39 Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) p 98; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats 
(1993) p 84-5 
40 As Stanley Hilton has noted, Brazil did make an effort to reignite the "special relationship" in 1955, but 
this would prove to be unsuccessful. Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) 
p 617 
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petroleum legislation; and 6) Adjusting Brazil's external balance of 
payments4' 
However, recognising what needed to be done was one thing; actually putting it 
into practice was quite another, and Gudin proved unable to implement the steps he 
himself had outlined as being necessary for Brazilian economic recovery. The failure of 
the Eisenhower administration to achieve their economic aims in Brazil posed a direct 
challenge to US officials: should they alter their policy toward Brazil, or should they 
remain steadfast in their approach? As Atwood wrote to Holland, 
We have declined to give Brazil a sizeable standby credit or new outright loan 
because this would relieve the pressure now on Brazil to do everything in its 
own power to solve its problems. We have suggested a close mutual 
continuous review of Brazil's developing financial statement with a definite 
statement that the US is ready to cooperate. This is sound financial practice 
but is leading to an unsuccessful impasse because Brazil does not agree... if 
our reply (to a further Brazilian loan request of $140 million) is negative, a 
bitter reaction is likely. Government officials and the press will probably 
claim that the US has abandoned Brazil in its worst crisis in years 42 
The internal debate within the administration as to what stance the US should 
take toward this problem continued throughout January 195543, and a growing frustration 
at the inability of the Cafes Filho administration to adopt a proactive stance became 
increasingly evident 44 US officials kept coming back to the same conclusion: they could 
not provide substantial aid to Brazil unless that assistance would `avert' and not `merely 
postpone' a financial crisis 45 Sterling Cottrell, the State Department Officer in Charge of 
4' Memorandum from the Director of the Office of South American Affairs Rollin Atwood to the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland, January 19 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume 
VII p 629-631 
42 Ibid; for further information on deterioration in US-Brazilian relations, see: Telegram from Ambassador 
in Brazil James Kemper to the Department of State, January 20 1955, [bid, p 631-2 
"'Memorandum of a Conversation at the Department of State on Brazil's Economic Problems, January 22 
1955, Folder - Brazil 1955, Box No 2, Record Group 59, Entry 1132, Records of the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland 1953-1956, Country File 1953-1956, (Brazil-Chile), Lot 57 
D 295, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. 
44 Despatch from the Ambassador in Brazil James Kemper to the Department of State, January 24 1955, 
FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VIIp 633-636 
45 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, January 28 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 637-638; See also 
the record of a State Department meeting of January 26, where Holland ran through the options available to 
the US. He even mused on whether or not Washington to should provide funding to Petrobras, although he 
recognised that they `could be criticized for financing a foreign oil monopoly. ' In the end, Holland's 
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Brazilian Affairs, attempted to put forward a solution to this problem in a memorandum 
to Rollin Atwood. Outlining three alternatives (1) Do nothing; 2) Loan them what they 
ask for; or 3) offer a loan which allows them to `squeak through'), Cottrell favoured the 
third, stating: `I believe our relations with Brazil will never be on a sound basis until 
Brazil "puts its house in order. " As long as they postpone reforms, they will be broke and 
crying for help. '46 The bilateral relationship during the Cafe Filho era saw the US 
attempting to decide upon an approach that would allow them to meet their economic 
aims and encourage the Brazilian government to adopt the measures that they deemed to 
be necessary for Brazilian economic recovery. At the same time, though, Washington 
proved unable to persuade the Cafe Filho administration to take those steps: the result 
was an impasse centred on persistent Brazilian loan requests and outright American 
"47 refusal unless Brazil "put its house in order. 
All of this, however, begs some obvious questions. Firstly, what impact did this 
have on US-Brazilian relations in the context of the evolving Cold War and the Soviet 
Economic Offensive after January 1956? Secondly, to what extent did this impasse 
between American capitalism and Brazilian nationalism continue during the Kubitschek 
period? And thirdly, why is the lack of consideration afforded by historians to the 
bilateral relationship during the Cafes period so important as to merit such attention here? 
The answer to all of these questions stems from a singular point - that of establishing a 
trend. Although the bilateral relationship during the Vargas administration had been 
fraught with difficulties, it was dominated by the Eisenhower administration's decision 
to terminate the JBUSEDC; events during the Cafes era therefore become vital as they 
established a strong precedent in the dynamic between Washington and Rio with regard 
conclusion was, in effect, a reaffirmation of the existing (although deeply unsatisfactory approach): 
`repulsive as this approach is, I don't think it is best. Over the long term I think it is best for us to maintain 
close scrutiny over any credit we extend... [as this would] provide a lever to bring them back to a course of 
righteousness and sobriety and should help us to postpone a future crisis. ' Memorandum of a Conversation 
at the Department of State on Brazil's Financial Situation, January 26 1955, Folder - Brazil 1955, Box No 
2, Record Group 59, Entry 1132, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
Henry Holland 1953-1956, Country File 1953-1956, (Brazil-Chile), Lot 57 D 295, National Archives, 
College Park, Maryland. 
46 Memorandum from the Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs Sterling Cottrell to the Director of the 
Office of South American Affairs Rollin Atwood, January 28 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume Vll p 638-9; 
Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) 84-5 
47 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 617 
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to economic policy, which would continue in the post-1955 period. This enables us to 
examine whether or not US economic policy toward Brazil was affected by the change in 
approach that emerged in 1956 and whether that is consistent with the argument put 
forward in the previous chapter. As we shall see next, whilst US policy would begin to 
emphasise strategic issues more strongly, the economic elements within US policy would 
remain unaltered. This would lead to a growing tension in US-Brazilian relations over 
the clash between strategic and economic objectives. 
THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES: THE 1955 BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION 
The impasse that had developed between the US and Brazil in the period between 
August 1954 and February 1955 had convinced the Eisenhower administration that they 
would not be able to meet their objectives in Brazil whilst the Cafe Filho administration 
remained in office. On March 22,1955, Sterling Cottrell outlined the aims of the US in 
Brazil, writing: `our immediate objective, in view of Brazil's deteriorating economic 
situation, is to prevent an economic breakdown. Our secondary objective is to promote 
economic rehabilitation. '48 Recognising that the Cafe Filho administration would not 
implement the changes necessary to solve Brazil's economic problems, the US was now 
faced with waiting for the election of a new president who would assume office in 
January 1956, whilst trying to ensure that the Brazilian economy did not collapse. Yet 
US officials doubted whether Cafe Filho's successor would be able to implement an 
economic reform programme either. A National Intelligence Estimate stated, 
The new president to be elected in October is likely to be a man committed to 
meet labor-leftist demands, assuming that free elections are held. The 
strongest labor-leftist candidate is Juscelino Kubitschek ... the election of such 
a man is likely to create a political situation similar to that which existed 
48 Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Brazilian Affairs Sterling Cottrell, March 22 1955, FRUS 
1955-1957 Volume VII p 662-3; See Also: Memorandum of a Conversation on Brazil's Financial Situation, 
Department of State, January 26 1955; Memorandum of a Conversation between Assistant Secretary of 
State Henry Holland and Brazilian Ambassador Muniz, Department of State, February 3 1955, Folder - 
Brazil 1955, Box No 2, Record Group 59, Entry 1132, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs, Henry F Holland 1953-1956, Country File 1953-1956, Lot 57 D 295, National Archives, 
College Park, Maryland 
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under the Vargas regime; i. e., chronic political tension between the executive 
and moderate-conservative elements, in Congress and especially in the armed 
forces ... There is little chance that the administration to be elected in October 
will be able to deal effectively with Brazil's deep-seated and politically 
dangerous economic difficulties. In fact, as long as any Brazilian 
administration assumes that dollar loans are readily available, there is little 
likelihood that it will incur the political risk involved in stabilizing the 
economy. However, the administration would be even less willing to follow 
politically dangerous policies in the absence of dollar loans. Rather, it would 
be under extreme pressure to seek radical, nationalistic solutions to Brazil's 
economic problems. 49 
The US did not believe that the next Brazilian president would be able to implement the 
changes in economic policy that they considered to be necessary; it was, however, the 
so best prospect they had. 
Within Brazil, the 1955 election marked the first chance to reconstruct the 
political system following Vargas' death a year earlier. Juscelino Kubitschek, the 
Governor of Minas Gerais, quickly became the front-runner. His hopes were bolstered by 
an alliance between two of Brazil's main parties - the PSD and the PTB - who embraced 
him as their candidate for president and who between them guaranteed highly effective 
electioneering in both the cities and the rural areas of Brazil. 5' Once nominated, 
Kubitschek embarked upon a marathon election campaign in an effort to ensure victory. 
As Robert Alexander notes, `he campaigned exceedingly hard, visiting virtually all parts 
of the country. He travelled... the equivalent of five times around the world. 52 The 
necessity of such exhaustive campaigning came from the opposition that was beginning 
to mass against Kubitschek: many of Vargas' former enemies - including his most 
vehement critic, Carlos Lacerda - saw Kubitschek as being a potential "heir" to the 
49 NEE 93-55 National Intelligence Estimate, "Probable Developments in Brazil', March 15 1955, FRCS 
1955-1957 Volume VII p 646-661 
5° Although, again, US officials were not convinced that the election of Kubitschek would necessarily be a 
good thing: Ambassador Dunn commented, `from our standpoint election of Kubitschek might pose serious 
problem. ' Telegram from the US Ambassador in Brazil James Dunn to the Department of State, May 1 
1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 664-5; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) 
highlights the fact that his nomination of Joao Goulart, a suspected communist, as his Vice President did 
little to appease US officials. 
5' Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 145 
52 Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (Ohio: Ohio University Center 
for International Studies, 1991) p 140 
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former president and, as such, were predictably opposed to a Kubitschek presidency. 53 
Kubitschek, however, continued with his campaign; his espousal of radical development 
techniques and the selection of the controversial Joao Goulart54 as his running-mate 
increased concerns within the US about a Kubitschek win. 55 Some of the Eisenhower 
administration's reticence toward Kubitschek was probably motivated by the vehemence 
with which he stated his campaign promises - vowing to modernise Brazil at all costs 
and with great rapidity. 56 As was evidenced in the Guatemala case study in Chapter One, 
US officials were reflexively wary of politicians espousing radical development policies, 
which might lead to them acting outside of the American economic world-order. 57 With 
the US unable to exert any influence on the electoral process and equally unable to reach 
a working agreement with the Cafes Filho administration, US attempts to achieve their 
objectives in Brazil in 1955 had reached a stalemate. 58 
For the remainder of 1955, then, US policy became one of waiting for 
Kubitschek's likely election to be confirmed. In the meantime, US policy should, in the 
words of Assistant Secretary Holland, be centred upon achieving three basic aims. 
I believe our basic interests in the Brazilian situation are: (1) in having a new 
administration in Brazil which will be responsible and able to face and handle 
 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 146-7 
54 Goulart was rumoured to be a communist with strong links to leftist parties in Brazil and had, previously, 
been forced to resign from the Vargas government due to his political stance. See: Robert Levine, Father of 
the Poor? (1998) p 84-5; Conversation between Joao Goulart and Robert Alexander in, Robert Alexander, 
The ABC Presidents (1992) p 155; Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 127-132 
55 Stanley Hilton argues that Goulart's nomination increased US fears about communism in Brazil. 
However, they also appreciated that the future course of the bilateral relationship depended on a new leader 
coming to power in Rio de Janeiro. Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 
617 
w As Weis has written: `Incorrigibly optimistic, the charismatic governor from Minas Gerais pledged to 
bring rapid and widespread prosperity and economic development to Brazil'; further to this, 'Kubitschek 
stated his policies clearly and often, using his immense political and public relations skills.. . as well as his 
boundless energy to mobilize the Brazilian people to a degree never before experienced. ' Michael Weis, 
Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 90; Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development 
o(Brazil (1991) p 140 
S Part of the problem with Arbenz in Guatemala was that he advocated a developmental structure outside 
of that prescribed by Washington; the obvious fear in Brazil had to be that Kubitschek would adopt a 
similar approach, with his planned development agenda not fitting in with the economic model that the US 
was suggesting for Brazil 
58 Any sign of overt American intervention, or support of a particular candidate, in the Brazilian 
presidential election could have lead to nationalism, or latent anti-Americanism, becoming major themes in 
the election, which might lead to the voting in of a leader campaigning on an "anti-Yankee" platform 
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Brazil's many problems; (2) in doing what we can to keep Brazil's head 
above water until a new administration takes over; and (3) then helping Brazil 
regain some measure of economic stability. Until these three things happen, 
our relations with Brazil will be very difficult. 59 
It is worth pausing for a moment to reflect upon the position that the Eisenhower 
administration found themselves in with respect to Brazil in the summer of 1955. Having 
seen the Vargas administration collapse, the US had been forced to try and achieve the 
objectives laid out in NSC 5432/1 - which although a mixture of economic and strategic 
were predominantly economic in tone with respect to Brazil - whilst dealing with an 
interim administration. This process, however, had been undermined by the crushing 
economic problems effecting Brazil and the unwillingness of the interim government to 
adopt any policies that might be deemed politically controversial. In Chapters One and 
Three we saw that the US pursuit of its economic aims in the 1954-55 period was 
consistently hindered by Latin nationalism. Brazil was no different and, by the spring of 
1955, Washington had been forced to put the achievement of its objectives on hold. 
Despite the problems that had characterised the bilateral relationship since 
January 1954, from the summer of 1955 onward the US had to consider what stance and 
what policies it would take toward the new administration once it came to office. The 
pragmatic response was to try and formulate a cooperative working alliance in order that 
Brazil's economic problems would be solved, the US could achieve its economic aims, 
and American leadership in the Western Hemisphere would be closer to being assured. 
This process would be derailed, though, by Kubitschek's economic agenda, which forced 
the US to confront the Brazilian leader over his continual calls for an expansion in US 
economic loan and aid payments. The gap between economic ideals and strategic aims 
within US policy would, in keeping with the argument of this thesis, impose an overt 
tension upon the bilateral relationship. Whilst Washington and Rio moved closer 
together over mutual strategic goals, they would be driven apart by their inability to 
59 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to the 
Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr, May 12 1955; Report by the Operations Coordinating Board, 
"Brazil - Special Status Report", June 14 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 666-672 
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reach a compromise over economic issues. Michael Weis summarises this situation, 
writing, 
Brazil under Kubitschek was an enthusiastic supporter of the United States, 
but like Vargas, Kubitschek expected the United States to reciprocate with 
increased economic assistance. This strategy proved unsuccessful and 
increasingly led to a sense of frustration, and ultimately forced Kubitschek to 
force the Eisenhower administration to give Brazil the aid it though it 
deserved 60 
A NEW ERA: US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS IN THE EARLY KUBITSCHEK ERA 
Despite the tentative concerns of the US, and in spite of the factions opposed to 
him in Brazil, Kubitschek did, indeed, win the 1955 election. 1 Kubitschek was a much 
more flamboyant character than his predecessors, and had come to office vowing to 
modernise Brazil. In addition to this, he would, in the post-1958 era, assume the mantle 
of being the Latin nation's semi-official spokesman in calling for an Operation Pan 
America (OPA) -a Marshall Plan for the Western Hemisphere - and would be far more 
prominent than either Vargas or Caf6 Filho had been, driving Brazilian modernisation 
forward at a rapid rate. 2 Although he became synonymous with Operation Pan 
America63, it is his grandiose development agenda that is of most importance in this 
chapter. For although Kubitschek was determined to energise Brazilian development, he 
was well aware that he would need a large amount of capital in order to achieve this, 
60 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 89-90 
61 For in-depth appraisals of the 1955 election and the internal battles that nearly prevented Kubitschek 
taking office, see: Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 149-158; Robert Alexander, Juscelino 
Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (1992) p 145-160; Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002) p 
161-3 
62 As Mark Gilderhus writes: `Embracing the slogan "Fifty years of progress in five" and seeking dramatic 
results, he [Kubitschek] intended to stimulate economic growth by the unorthodox means of government 
action based on deficit spending. He also instituted a national development program for building 
infrastructure, roads and railroads, and created new state enterprises such as an automobile industry. Most 
spectacularly, he built a new capital city, opening up the interior and symbolizing the advance of progress. 
Brasilia, a showplace, attracted world attention because of its advanced architectural conceptions. But the 
high costs of such endeavors also had negative consequences, notably, high levels of debilitating inflation. ' 
Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations Since 1899 (Wilmington, Delaware: 
Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000) p 156; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 96-8 
63 Which will be discussed in detail in Chapters Five and Six 
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which realistically could only come from the US. As Elizabeth Cobbs has highlighted, 
this need for capital investment saw Brazil appealing more widely to the EXIM Bank. 
`Under the strongly developmentalist Kubitschek administration, Brazil obtained 
hundreds of millions of dollars in loans from the Eximbank for port, railway, and power 
developments. The credit for this is due to Kubitschek's effective, activist leadership. ' 
However, as Michael Weis argues, EXIM loans were not as beneficial as they first 
appeared: `EXIM was an adequate instrument for American foreign economic policy, but 
not for development. Loan recipients had to purchase US products that were frequently 
more expensive than what could be purchased elsewhere. '65 Nevertheless, Kubitschek 
would prove to be highly determined to succeed in his ambitious development aims, 
even if this meant increasing the Brazilian budget deficit and causing high-inflation. 
66 
Although Robert Alexander has argued that Kubitschek's modernisation policies were 
highly successful, they were not underpinned by economic stability. 67 Writing in 1963, 
Milton Eisenhower stated that Kubitschek, `literally printed new money to finance the 
grand new capital (Brasilia), and the salaries of government employees were paid with 
the same depreciated money. Prices skyrocketed. 968 Consequently, by the end of the 
decade Brazil would be confronted by an intense balance of payments and inflation crisis 
that exerted huge pressure on the bilateral relationship. 
Even before the Brazilian presidential election of October 1955 took place, US 
officials had decided that they would have to try and formulate a working relationship 
with the new administration. Although Kubitschek appeared to be the likely winner, the 
US would not know for certain whom the next Brazilian president would be until 
October. By the summer, plans were already being made to determine the basis of the 
bilateral relationship once the new government had been installed. In August, Henry 
Holland wrote to Foster Dulles, stating: `I recommend that we obtain authority to invite 
64 Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) p 98 
es Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 94 
Both of which, of course, had been major factors in the crushing economic problems that had confronted 
Brazil in 1954-55 
67 Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (1991) p 160-7 
68 Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin America (New York: Doubleday 
And Company, 1963) p 131 
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the new president to visit the United States early in 1956. ' Holland's reasons for this 
recommendation were: 
1. The invitation would constitute recognition of the peculiar importance of 
US-Brazilian relationships in hemispheric affairs. 2. Immediately upon his 
election the new president will be subjected to intense pressures from 
nationalistic, anti-US sectors. Prompt extension of an invitation will 
somewhat offset these pressures and, perhaps, actually prevent commitments 
or decisions inimical to US interests which might otherwise be made. 3. Such 
a visit would give us an opportunity at the very outset of his administration to 
try to persuade the new president to a policy of close cooperation with the 
United States. The strength of the Communist party and of anti-US sectors in 
Brazil; the great importance of the problems, such as amendment of the 
petroleum code, Brazil's economic policies, measures to stabilize the coffee 
industry, Defense's needs for new bases in Brazil... justify the strongest effort 
on our part to establish at the outset effective working relations with the new 
president 69 
As we saw in Chapter Three, the increasing importance of the Third World to both the 
US and the Soviet Union was well underway by mid-1955. As a result, US strategic 
interests in Brazil began to become a much more prominent feature of the 
administration's policy. This planned cooperation would not stretch to a reshaped 
economic policy, however. On July 6, Holland told a meeting convened at the 
Department of State to discuss an Outline Plan of Operations for Brazil that, `there was 
no question about forming or renewing anything like the joint Brazil-US Economic 
Commission... we should do our thinking now-before the new government comes in. ' 
Mr Overby, the Treasury Department's representative at the meeting, concerned at what 
he perceived to be a potential relaxation of US economic principles, reaffirmed US 
economic aims, stating `our objective is to achieve economic stability, not economic 
development to be financed with US grants. 70 
69 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, August 30 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 673; Memorandum 
from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to Acting Secretary of State 
Herbert Hoover Jr, September 19 1955, Folder - Brazil 1955, Box No 2, Record Group 59, Entry 1132, 
Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F Holland 1953-1956, 
Country File 1953-1956, Lot 57 D 295, National Archives, College Park, Maryland; Michael Weis, Cold 
Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) 86-7 
70 Memorandum of a Conversation on Outline Plan of Operations for Brazil, Department of State, July 6 
1955, Folder - Brazil 1955, Box No 2, Record Group 59, Entry 1132, Records of the Assistant Secretary 
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It was to be this developing dichotomy between economic and strategic 
objectives within US policy that would impact an unbearable tension upon the bilateral 
relationship. The reason that this occurred is relatively straightforward and can be 
explained by highlighting the differing objectives of Kubitschek and Eisenhower. 71 
Kubitschek's main aim whilst in office was to instigate a rapid level of Brazilian 
economic development: in order to achieve this he was well aware that he would require 
access to the vast capital resources of the US - both private and public - and, as such, he 
was prepared to ally himself closely with American security and strategic objectives. 72 
The Eisenhower administration, however, wanted a close relationship with Kubitschek in 
order that they would be able to achieve those aims from both the pre-1955 period and 
those that arose in 1956 following the shift in the Cold War and the Soviet Economic 
Offensive. Therefore, US economic principles in Brazil (and in Latin America as a 
region) would not change, whilst their strategic objectives did. This meant that whilst US 
and Brazilian aims in the strategic and security spheres were highly compatible, their 
aims in the economic sphere differed significantly. 
It is important here, though, to illustrate the gap that exists in the prevailing 
historiography and outline the importance of this period to an understanding of US-Latin 
relations. First of all, as stated earlier, the majority of studies looking at US-Latin 
American relations have focused on Kubitschek's advocacy of an Operation Pan 
America as being the defining feature of his policy toward the US. 73 For a more detailed 
analysis of US-Brazilian relations during the early Kubitschek era we must again turn to 
of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F Holland 1953-1956, Country File 1953-1956, Lot 57 D 295, 
National Archives, College Park, Maryland; Michael Weis (1993) 86-7 
71 Thorough examinations of Kubitschek's development strategies can be found in: Thomas Skidmore, 
Politics in Brazil (1967) p164-185; Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil 
(1991) p 164-186 
72 As we shall see, Kubitschek tied himself closely to the US rhetoric of anti-communism and, also, allowed 
the US to construct military facilities on Brazilian territory; all the while, though, he was working to obtain 
US funding for his development projects. 
73 Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 156,187-188; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) 96-7, 
109-110; Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998) p 356; James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism 
and Inter American Relations (1999) p 317-9; Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States & Latin America: 
An Historical Analysis of Inter American Relations (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1974) p 224- 
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Michael Weis. 74 He deals thoroughly with the events surrounding US-Brazilian relations 
in 1956 and 1957, offers up an appraisal which highlights the fractured political system 
in Brazil and, also, argues that, `Kubitschek linked, even subordinated, Brazilian foreign 
policy to his economic development goals. '75 His work is of great use in identifying the 
efforts made by Kubitschek to obtain American support for his developmental agenda. 
Where Weis does not go far enough, however, is in establishing the link between the 
evolving trends in US global and regional policy and the way that they impacted on the 
relationship between Washington and Rio; most specifically, with regard to the tension 
between US strategic and economic aims. The next stage here will be to illustrate the 
way that US-Brazilian relations developed in the early-Kubitschek era in order to 
demonstrate just how the bilateral relationship came to deteriorate so rapidly after 
January, 1956. 
Unsurprisingly, given his need for American capital, it was Kubitschek that made 
the first move in trying to develop a working relationship with the US. Just two weeks 
after he won the election he met with Ambassador Dunn. Recognising that he had been 
tainted with allegations of communism during the election campaign, Kubitschek went to 
great lengths to stress to Dunn that this was not the case 
76 Kubitschek also used the 
meeting to outline his intention to visit the US as part of his drive to attract American 
capital for his economic projects. Dunn reported that Kubitschek, `after receiving his 
certificate of election... hoped to be able to go to the US to discuss some of his economic 
plans with our officials and private financial circles. ' In response, Dunn told Kubitschek 
that: `our government would be well disposed toward him in his efforts to improve the 
economy of Brazil as it was one of our earnest desires to see Brazil improve and become 
strong in the development of its own resources. ' 
74 Even Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) does not provide much analysis of US-Brazilian 
relations during the Kubitschek era, focusing instead on Kubitschek's domestic drive to increase Brazilian 
productivity and the role that private individuals such as Nelson Rockefeller and Henry Kaiser played in 
that process 
75 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup DEtats (1993) p 89-100 
76 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) 
77 Telegram from the US Ambassador In Brazil James Dunn to the Department of State, October 19 1955, 
FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 678-9 
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The Eisenhower administration's intention to try and develop a working 
relationship with Kubitschek was revealed at the NSC Meeting the following day. 
Nelson Rockefeller stated that, `the thing for the United States to do was to try to work 
with Kubitschek as much as possible and to bring him and his followers into the western 
camp', a viewpoint that both Treasury Secretary Humphrey and Vice President Nixon 
agreed with. 78 There was still an element of trying to use Kubitschek's need for US 
support as a tool for meeting American objectives, though. In August Henry Holland 
made sure that two of his subordinates were aware that US policy with regard to loan 
applications to the EXIM bank should not be approved `without thoroughly investigating 
its trading value regarding the lands the Army wants. '79 This sentiment was repeated by 
Holland in a letter to Samuel Waugh, the President of the Export-Import Bank, in 
November. `Until we are sure that the policies of the newly elected administration in 
Brazil are consistent with EXIM bank objectives and compatible with United States 
interests in general, the loan policy of the Eximbank toward Brazil should be one of 
extreme caution, '80 Holland wrote. Despite this, Kubitschek was invited to the US for a 
pre-inaugural visit and arrived in Florida on January 5,1956, where he was due to meet 
with President Eisenhower at Key West. 
Prior to the meeting, Eisenhower was issued with a briefing book reaffirming the 
US position with regard to economic policy: `Requests for medium and long-term 
financial assistance should be given due consideration, but we should be careful not to 
encourage Brazilians to expect favourable action on our part until we see evidence of 
progress by Brazil in achieving economic stabilization. '" Kubitschek's meeting with 
78 Memorandum of Discussion at the 262"d Meeting of the National Security Council, October 20 1955, 
FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 679-681 
79 This referred to communications facilities that the Pentagon wanted to construct on Brazilian territory. 
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland to Mr Dearborn and Mr Rowell of the 
Office of South American Affairs, August 20 1955, Folder - Brazil 1955, Box No 2, Record Group 59, 
Entry 1132, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F Holland 1953- 
1956, Country File 1953-1956, Lot 57 D 295, National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
80 Letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to the President of the 
Export-Import Bank Samuel Waugh, November 21955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 681-2 
Briefing Book on Informal Visit to the US of President-Elect Juscelino Kubitschek, January 1956, Folder 
- Brazil 1956, Box No 2, Record Group 
59, Entry 1132, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs, Henry F Holland 1953-1956, Country File 1953-1956, Lot 57 D 295, National 
Archives, College Park, Maryland 
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Eisenhower was conducted cordially, with both participants expressing the mutual 
goodwill between the US and Brazil. Eisenhower told Kubitschek that, `he has a 
friendship here' whilst Kubitschek replied, in kind, stating that he had come to the US in 
the `spirit of friendship. '82 A far more important discussion, however, took place when 
Kubitschek travelled to Washington to meet with Secretary Dulles. 83 The importance of 
this discussion lay not so much in what was said, but in the pattern that emerged during 
the conversation. Dulles and Kubitschek would agree with each other on matters relating 
to security, but, when it came to economic policy, Dulles would strongly reaffirm the 
existing US position. Kubitschek made a concerted attempt to align himself with the US 
Cold War agenda, beginning the meeting by asking Dulles if `he would comment on the 
world situation generally. ' Dulles did so, making direct reference to the developing 
Soviet Economic Offensive, strongly asserting the superiority of the west and "exposing" 
the hollowness of Soviet policy. 
The Secretary said that there were many problems, but that he was neither 
frightened nor pessimistic. He pointed out that the Russians have gradually 
built up a considerable amount of industrialization, but they are unable to 
meet the needs of their own economy. He emphasized that the Russians in 
their offers of aid to other countries are carefully withholding this information 
from their own people because they fear that, if the Russian people were 
aware of the Russians' offer of aid to other countries, it would cause 
widespread discontent within Russia itself... [he] emphasized the need for 
close relations between Brazil and the United States ... the 
United States 
should maintain with Brazil the same kind of relationships that we maintain 
with Canada. 
This expression by Dulles of `close relations' between the US and Brazil 
coincided with the position adopted by Kubitschek throughout his visit. There was, 
then, clearly an agreement on issues of national security between Kubitschek and Dulles. 
However, Dulles also demonstrated the fact that US economic policy toward Brazil 
would not change in spite of their general agreement on strategic issues. `He felt 
82 Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles, January 5 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VJI p 685; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 
96-7; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 87 
63 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 618 
84 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) states: `Kubitschek always expressed confidence 
in Brazil, promised amity toward the United States, and disarmed or deflected pointed questions with a 
smile, a joke, and a promise: "our policies will show our attitudes"' p 87 
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confident that there were substantial quantities of United States capital that would be 
glad to go to Brazil and make its contribution to the development of that country ... the 
United States investor would be willing to go abroad where he had assurances of fair 
treatment and security against expropriation. '85 Although Dulles's reaffirmation of US 
fiscal policies was predictable, Kubitschek continued to believe that by developing his 
relationship with the US he would be able to bring about a change in the US approach. 
(The US commitment toward expanding the role that foreign private investment played 
in Brazilian development was highlighted further by President Eisenhower's enthusiasm 
for the idea of sending a US emissary to Rio to discuss a change in Brazilian petroleum 
legislation; a move that would placate elements within the American Business lobby who 
were calling for increased oil production. US officials remained convinced that by 
"opening up" Brazil's petroleum reserves, many of the deficit problems confronting the 
Brazilian economy would be solved and, therefore, Washington continued to advocate a 
change in the Brazilian petroleum code). 86 
The developing cooperation between Washington and Rio over security issues 
continued into April, when Brazilian Vice President Joao Goulart visited the US. 
Although treated with barely disguised enmity by US officials due to his rumoured links 
to Brazilian communist groups87, Goulart reprised the position taken by Kubitschek in 
January. As Weis has written: `Kubitschek... attempted to secure American support by 
communicating directly and forming a personal relationship with Eisenhower', and also 
85 Memorandum of a Conversation between President-elect Kubitschek and Secretary of State Dulles, 
Department of State, Washington, January 6 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 685-689; Stephen Rabe, 
Eisenhower (1988) p 96-97 
86 Eisenhower wanted to send a `friend down' to `consult to see what he (Kubitschek) wanted to do and 
then ... Kubitschek would propose 
his own plan. ' The idea was that under American tutelage, Kubitschek 
could concoct his own "petroleum plan" that fit US objectives. See: Memorandum of a Telephone 
Conversation Between President Eisenhower Secretary Dulles, January 11 1956; Memorandum from 
Secretary Dulles to President Eisenhower, January 12 1956; Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to Secretary of State Dulles, January 131956; Letter from 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to the Ambassador in Brazil 
James Dunn, February 20 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 689-695 
87 In fact, Michael Weis writes, `if US officials were sceptical of Kubitschek, they clearly disliked 
Goulart ... the former 
labor minister had a reputation for demagoguery, unscrupulous dealings with 
communists, and unabashed admiration for Juan Peron. Michael Weis (1993) p 98; see also: Memorandum 
from Robert Crenshaw of the OCB Staff to the Executive Officer of the OCB, November 9 1955, OCB 
091.4 Latin America (FILE#4) (7) August-November 1955, Box No 73, OCB Central File Series, 
Eisenhower Library 
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`attempted to take advantage of the North American preoccupation with communism. '88 
In keeping with this aim, Goulart made great efforts to impress those US officials he met 
with. 89 Again, though, as with Kubitschek's visit the most striking factor that emerges 
from a reading of the historical record relating to the Goulart trip is the separation 
between strategic and economic issues in the position taken by US officials. 90 Whilst 
Goulart attempted to link Brazilian underdevelopment with communist expansion in an 
effort to elicit a more favourable attitude by the US, Dulles and Henry Holland both 
refused to consider a change in the US position with regard to providing capital to 
Brazil-91 
We can quite clearly see the intention of the Brazilian approach: by aligning 
themselves firmly on the side of the US in the Cold War struggle, the Kubitschek 
administration hoped they would be able to attain a favourable relationship with the US, 
which would lead to an increased level of economic funding 
92 For their part, the 
Eisenhower administration were seeking to reappraise its position in Latin America 
following the shift in the Cold War and the emergence in Latin America of the Soviet 
Economic Offensive and were happy to ally themselves with Brazil on issues of strategic 
concern. However, as we saw in Chapter Three, this reshaped US policy toward Latin 
America would not include a significant change in US economic policy. In order to 
demonstrate the bifurcated nature of US policy in the aftermath of the Soviet move and 
Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 97 
He told Henry Holland and Foster Dulles that, `every time Brazilian workers are in a difficult situation 
because of increased costs of living, the communists gain ground as they are bound to thrive on any 
hardships that beset large numbers of people. ' 
90 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 618 
91 Dulles chose to bypass Goulart's comments on underdevelopment and, instead, focused on the problem 
of communism and the importance of Brazilian-US cooperation, telling him: 'I) The error of the Soviet 
leaders in wanting to become strong by ruling ever increasing numbers of subjugated peoples ... 2) Our 
realization that true greatness lies not in making people do what they don't want to do but in enabling them 
to fulfil their aspirations. 3) The basic fact that if we help one another there will be true greatness for all. ' 
Goulart repeated his professions of avowed anti-communism at a further meeting with Holland and, again, 
the issue of economic development was bypassed. See: Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary 
Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland, Brazilian Vice President Goulart and Ambassador 
Muniz, Department of State, Washington, April 30 1956; Memorandum of a Conversation between 
Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland and Brazilian Vice President Joao Goulart, Blair House, 
Washington, May 2 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 695-700 
n As we shall see, this will become even more obvious toward the end of 1956-57 when Kubitschek began 
making overt calls for increased US economic assistance to Brazil 
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the build-up toward NSC 5613/1, and to demonstrate the impact of the change in policy 
outlined in the previous chapter, it is necessary to illustrate the way that this impacted 
upon the bilateral relationship between Washington and Rio. A demonstration of US 
intentions with regard to the administration's national security concerns in Latin America 
after January 1956 is the negotiations between Washington and Rio over planned US 
military installations on Brazilian territory. Our first step in analysing US-Brazilian 
relations in the post-Soviet Economic Offensive era is to examine these negotiations in 
order to highlight not just the aims of US policy, but, also, the lengths that Kubitschek 
was prepared to go in order to secure a strong US-Brazilian alliance. 
FERNANDO DE NORONHA: US-BRAZILIAN SECURITY NEGOTIATIONS 
The effort made by Kubitschek and Goulart to build a strong, anti-communist 
alliance was so determined that Gaddis Smith has gone as far as to suggest that although, 
`the conservatives of the Eisenhower Administration considered Kubitschek out of touch 
with reality... he was still a good friend of the United States. '93 Although this viewpoint 
is somewhat simplistic, it is easy to see where the belief that Kubitschek was a `friend' of 
the US might have come from; especially when considering his attitude during the early 
stages of the Fernando de Noronha negotiations. By acceding to American desires to 
construct a missile tracking facility on the Brazilian island of Fernando de Noronha, 
Kubitschek believed that he would be rewarded by a more cooperative US approach to 
Brazilian development. In attempting this, though, Kubitschek would have to balance the 
various competing political elements that he faced domestically - including the Brazilian 
military and the Brazilian Congress. 
94 Crucially, however, the US - in keeping with its 
reshaped regional strategy - was acting solely in accordance with its heightened strategic 
concerns and did not see the negotiations as being part of any future discussions on 
economic policy; there would be no quid pro quo for the Brazilian government. 95 By 
highlighting the way that the negotiations over Fernando de Noronha evolved - and the 
93 Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine (1994) p 116-7 
" Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 101; Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002) p 
192 
91 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 618-9 
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risks taken by Kubitschek - we can begin to understand the impact that they had on the 
US-Brazilian relationship. 
The Eisenhower administration would, during the course of their re-evaluation of 
NSC 5432/1, single out improving the status of their military objectives in Latin America 
as being vital in their attempts to shore up their position in the region and to improve the 
overall standing of US-Latin American relations. Since the first progress report on NSC 
144/1 in 1953, US officials had recognised that they were failing to meet their military 
objectives in Latin America. The supply of military materiel was continually slow and 
expensive; leading Latin governments to seek replacement supplies in Europe. In an area 
where the military retained such an important role in terms of politics and prestige, the 
inability of the US to meet their targets was severely undermining the stability of the US 
position . 
96 In light of the shift in the Cold War and the Soviet Economic Offensive, 
remedying this situation became of paramount importance for the Eisenhower 
administration. It would be within this context of attempting to improve the standing of 
Washington's strategic position that the Fernando de Noronha negotiations would take 
place. The reason that this context is of such importance is that the Brazilian military - 
who although continuing to be close to their American counterparts in the Pentagon were 
growing increasingly frustrated at US military assistance efforts - would attempt to use 
the negotiations as a tool for obtaining an increased level of military aid. Kubitschek, 
encumbered by the traditional splits within the Brazilian political structure, would have 
no other choice but to try and support the position of the military. The negotiations 
% See: NIE 80/90-55 which states, `The military have not only continued to be predominant but have even 
further extended... their influence over Latin American politics... Many Latin American military and 
political leaders have been dissatisfied with the area's low priority in relation to Europe with respect to US 
military aid. Rivalries and mutual suspicions among Latin American states have also led to complaints 
about inequitable treatment in the bestowal of US aid.. . desired US equipment has 
not been made available or has been slow in delivery ... continuation of this trend would not only create 
severe logistic problems in time of war but also undermine the US military mission program' NIE 80/90-55 
National Intelligence Estimate, "Conditions and Trends in Latin America", December 6 1955, FRUS 1955- 
1957 Volume VI p 16-45; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 88 
97 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 100 writes: `Kubitschek sought to build military 
support with a policy of "bribing" the military ... salaries for military personnel doubled and Brazil 
increased requests for US military assistance and purchases'; also see: "Department of State Biographic 
Information - Juscelino Kubitschek", Memorandum from Secretary of State Foster Dulles to President 
Eisenhower, January 4 1956, Brazil (10), Box No 4, International Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower 
Library 
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over Fernando de Noronha, then, would be split in three directions: between the US, the 
Kubitschek administration and the Brazilian military. The Brazilian military would make 
their agreement to the proposal conditional upon an increased level of US military 
assistance, whilst the Eisenhower administration wanted to buttress their position in the 
region through the construction of further military installations and iron out the problems 
in their military assistance policy in order to ensure a strong US-Latin relationship. 
Kubitschek was caught between the two. 98 
Throughout 1955 officials within the administration had registered their 
dissatisfaction at the progress of US aims in the military sphere 99 At a meeting in the 
Pentagon on December 12, Henry Holland told Gordon Gray, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, that: 
Due to the lack of clarity in our Government's policy on military relations 
with Latin America the Latin Americans do not know what to expect from us. 
The lack of clarity in policy leads to three major consequences: (a) The Latin 
Americans make many unreasonable proposals and requests, and when we 
turn them down, the result is bad feelings towards us. (b) We make 
conflicting decisions. (c) We are less able effectively to discourage arms races 
in Latin America-' 00 
With US military policy lacking direction, the Latin nations - whose enthusiasm for 
"bigger and better" military equipment remained undimmed - looked toward Europe 
instead for a more reliable and cost-effective source of military materiel. This brought 
about three major problems for the US. 1) US hopes of preventing internal Latin arms 
races were severely diminished due to Washington's inability to halt the sales of 
's As Weis has written: `perhaps the best example of Kubitschek's efforts to support the US and to cultivate 
military support is seen in his decision to accept and fight for congressional ratification in 1957 of the 
Fernando de Noronha treaty. ' Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 100 
" See: Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr to the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Robert Anderson, June 91955; Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Regional 
American Affairs Edward Cale to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry 
Holland, December 5 1955, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 234-238 
100 Memorandum of a Conversation between Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry 
Holland and Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray, The Pentagon, Washington, December 12 1955,; 
similar sentiments on the need to clarify US military policy were also expressed by Holland in a 
memorandum to his deputy, Cecil Lyon. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs Henry Holland to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Cecil 
Lyon, April 13 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 239-241,244-246 
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European arms to the region. 2) Funds that could have been channelled toward economic 
development were, instead, being appropriated for arms expenditure to nations acting 
outside of American influence. And 3) In the wake of the Soviet Economic Offensive, 
when administration fears about being seen to be losing the Cold War intensified, the 
most viable method that Washington had of repairing their standing with the Latin 
nations was failing to function successfully. One of the major intentions behind the 
reappraisal of policy that would become NSC 5613/1 was to eradicate the problems in 
US military assistance policies. 101 
As was hinted at in the previous chapter, however, this would not prove to be 
easy. In summarising NSC 5613/1, Rabe notes, `the revised document ... did not clarify 
the purposes of military aid. ' 102 The major question is: why were the administration 
unable to solve the problems inherent within their military strategy? It was not for a lack 
of purpose or awareness. In May 1956, Robert Murphy wrote Gordon Gray and informed 
him, 
We are concerned over the apparent deterioration of the preponderant military 
influence of the United States in Latin America and the effect of this 
deterioration on our general relations with the countries of the area. To find 
solutions to the outstanding problems in our military relations with Latin 
America is, we believe, of the utmost importance. The significance of these 
problems is increased by the recent Soviet bloc offers of military equipment 
to several of the countries in Latin America. '03 
Nor was it due to the fact that the administration did not recognise what the problems 
were in their military policy. We have already seen that US officials were well aware of 
both a lack of clarity and direction in their military strategy and of a certain 
powerlessness to prevent European sales of arms to the Latin nations. The problem was 
that not only were US officials struggling to clarify just what their military objectives in 
101 For information on this decision see: National Security Council Progress Report, "Progress Report on 
United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America (NSC 5432/1)", March 28 
1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 46-59 
102 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 89 
103 Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for International Security Affairs Gordon Gray, May 8 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VIp 257-261 
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Latin America were104, but the boundaries between economic pragmatism and national 
security continued to be blurred, preventing the administration from reaching a concrete 
conclusion about the future of US military assistance. 105 With the administration now, in 
the wake of the Soviet Economic Offensive, increasingly viewing Latin America via its 
relation to a strategic framework, eradicating the problems in the field of military 
assistance was a central component of the administration's revised strategy for the 
region. 106 Understanding the inherent confusion surrounding US military assistance 
policy is vital in analysing the Fernando de Noronha negotiations in Brazil: the role 
played by the Brazilian military during the negotiations exposed the continued flaws in 
US policy, and led to a situation which made an eventual agreement more difficult to 
reach. 107 As a result of the lengthy and arduous negotiations, the US would eventually 
relinquish its plans to construct further military installations on Brazilian soil. 
The Defense Department had outlined the necessity of establishing a missile 
tracking station on Brazilian territory in 1952; however, the political instability of the 
Vargas administration, coupled with the unwillingness of the Cafe administration to 
court any kind of political controversy, meant that by early 1956 the plans were still in 
their formative stages. 108 Starting in July, the Eisenhower administration began to make a 
concerted attempt to broker an agreement with the Brazilians over the use of Fernando 
de Noronha. Crucially, they would encourage Kubitschek to become more vocal in 
104 For a discussion between the Departments of State and Defense over the objectives of US military 
policy, see: Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Cecil 
Lyon to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland, May 9 1956; Letter 
from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Gordon Gray to the Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy, August 11956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 261-3,266-8; 
also of importance is the NSC meeting of September 6 where Foster Dulles and Admiral Radford, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, debated the intentions and objectives behind US military policy. See: 
Memorandum of Discussion at the 296'" Meeting of the National Security Council, September 6 1956, 
FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VI p 101-113; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 88-9 
105 Rabe writes: `Over the next year, administrators ... debated whether the United States intended to expand 
or restrict military aid. ' Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 89 
106 As Rabe writes, `the administration wanted powerful, anti-communist friends in Latin 
America... defining national security as anti-communism, the administration decide to bolster repressive, 
often murderous, governments' Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 89-90; Mark Gilderhus, The Second 
Century (2000) p 154 
107 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 619 
108 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 101; Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom to the Deputy Under-Secretary of State Robert 
Murphy, July 20 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 714-717 
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linking his tacit support of the US security agenda to Brazil's need for increased 
development funding-109 But, as we shall see, the Eisenhower administration would 
remain steadfast in their refusal to consider any significant change in their economic 
policy. The result would be a gradual fracturing of the bilateral relationship, as 
Kubitschek's continual attempts to elicit a more favourable fiscal policy from the US 
were consistently turned down. This was, of course, entirely in keeping with the policy 
outlined by the Eisenhower administration in NSC 5613/1 in September 1956. 
Again, apart from Michael Weis' work, this period of US-Brazilian relations has 
been neglected by historians, which makes this study's linkage of it to regional events of 
primary importance. A strong indication that the Eisenhower administration's approach 
was being driven by the bipolar concerns raised by the Soviet Economic Offensive - 
rather than actual military necessity - came from the fact that it was the State 
Department (rather than the Pentagon) who were pushing the Fernando de Noronha 
project forward. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Roy Rubottom, sent a 
memorandum to Deputy Under-Secretary Robert Murphy. `As you pointed out in your 
letter to him (Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray) of May 25, the [State] 
Department could not undertake to negotiate an agreement until such time as Defense 
gave us the draft it wanted negotiated. We received an advance copy of the proposed 
agreement.. . 
but formal Defense approval of the agreement was not received, ' Rubottom 
wrote. He went on to further highlight the fact that the Defense Department had delayed 
the Fernando de Noronha negotiations. `Mr Gray should be aware that his own 
Department has not handled this matter on a priority basis and that the difficulty we have 
109 By the time of the Panama President's Meeting, Kubitschek was becoming more direct in his linkage of 
Brazilian Cold War support of the US and the desperate need in Brazil for increased development funding. 
He told Ambassador Dunn that: `it was his policy to commit Brazil to the closest collaboration with the US, 
but that the elements who were promoting extreme nationalism... were taking every advantage of this 
attitude to try to weaken his position before the country ... if he did not have strong support from the US in 
carrying out his policies, he would be very much weakened and his administration would fail to achieve the 
high objectives which it had undertaken. ' Telegram from the US Ambassador in Brazil James Dunn to the 
Department of State, July 3 1956; Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to the Embassy in Brazil, July 
17 1956, FRUS 1955-195 7 Volume VII p 710-2; President Eisenhower's Briefing Book on Brazil for 
Panama President's Meeting, July 19 1956, Panama Meeting of the Presidents - 1956 Briefing Papers (3), 
Box No 3, Miscellaneous Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & 
Coup D'Etats (1993) p 95-100 
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in getting answers from Defense has held us up considerably. "' 0 The fact that it was the 
State Department taking the lead on this issue highlights the way that national security 
had become a more prominent theme of US policy toward Latin America after January 
1956. 
It would, however, be January 1957 before any agreement between Washington 
and Rio would be reached. (In fact, in November 1956 it appeared possible that the 
negotiations might come to an end due to a breakdown in cordiality between US officials 
and Brazilian negotiators over the duration of the agreement11). One of the major 
obstacles was the Brazilian military's `lingering resentment' at the slow-paced and 
unreliable provision of arms and military materiel from the US. 
112 In mid-December, 
Kubitschek told Ambassador Ellis Briggs 113 that he was hopeful that the `matter will be 
brought to conclusion soonest (i. e., "within the next few days") with qualification 
however that he may decide.. . to submit project to Congress for approval', which could 
slow down the agreement's ratification considerably. ' 14 The problem for Kubitschek was 
that he still did not have the full support of the Brazilian military or, indeed, the Brazilian 
Congress. Therefore, in an effort to obtain domestic approval he was prepared to submit 
the Fernando de Noronha treaty to the Brazilian Congress in an effort to confer 
legitimacy upon his efforts at forging a strong bilateral alliance. As the negotiations 
entered their final phase, there would be three issues to resolve: 1) Kubitschek would 
need to ensure that he could obtain Congressional and/or military approval for the treaty; 
2) The US would need to make sure that Kubitschek felt that his strategy of bilateral 
accommodation was working; and, 3) a solution to the Brazilian military's insistence on 
the treaty including a clause promising increased military aid in the future would need to 
be brokered. 
10 Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom to 
the Deputy Under-Secretary of State Robert Murphy, July 20 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 714-7 
"1 See: Telegram from US Ambassador in Brazil Ellis Briggs to the Department of State, December 5 
1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 724-5 
12 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 101; Telegram from the Acting Secretary of 
State Herbert Hoover Jr to the Embassy in Brazil, December 12 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 726 
13 Who had replaced James Dunn in July 1956 
114 Telegram from the US Ambassador in Brazil Ellis Briggs to the Department of State, December 13 
1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 727 
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In order to break the domestic deadlock, Kubitschek decided to seize the 
initiative. Instead of waiting for the treaty to pass through Congress, the Brazilian leader 
decided to use unconfirmed promises of increased military aid from the US in an effort 
to break the impasse. in the supply of military materiel and obtain the military's support. 
As Weis writes, 
Instead of caving into nationalist opposition and lingering military resentment 
from long-standing equipment requests still pending, Kubitschek and Lott 
(War Minister Lott) decided to take the offensive. He [Kubitschek] leaked to 
the press a proposal for an enormous aid request as a quid pro quo for treaty 
approval, initially suggesting 500 million dollars in new equipment needed 
for Brazil's "increased responsibilities for hemisphere defense. " The press 
leak gave Brazil the necessary leverage to secure much of the outstanding 
loan request! 15 
The US, too, played their part, with President Eisenhower sending a message to 
Kubitschek - via Ambassador Briggs - outlining his pleasure at the near-conclusion of 
the negotiations. He wrote: 
I wish you to know that I have been following the negotiations closely 
because of my very great personal interest in the guided missile program, 
which is of the highest priority in the race against time, seeking to develop 
weapons vital for the defense not only of the western hemisphere, but perhaps 
of the entire free world. Your personal attention to this urgent matter is most 
gratifying to me, as is your agreement that the United States shall have access 
to a station on Fernando De Noronha Island... 116 
And yet, despite Kubitschek breaking the domestic impasse blocking the treaty, 
President Eisenhower indicating the friendship between Washington and Rio, and the US 
being so close to achieving its pressing security aims in the region, there still remained a 
problem. Once again it was the Brazilian military. Recognising that the Fernando de 
Noronha negotiations had been vital in enabling Kubitschek to speed up the supply of 
US military equipment, the Brazilian Generals wanted to guarantee that a clause was 
"S Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 101 
16 Telegram from the US Ambassador in Brazil Ellis Briggs to the Department of State, December 15 
1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 728-9; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 101 
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included in the document that would assure that future supplies were not subject to any 
similar hold-ups. The lack of clarity in US military policy (as outlined earlier) meant that 
the administration's response was inconclusive; the net result was that the agreed clause 
did, in fact, provide for future discussions on increased levels of military aid, despite 
Secretary Dulles's attempts to prevent it. 
NSC 5613/1 had outlined a "new" military strategy for US policy in Latin 
America that was aimed at securing the US position in the region. Clause 34b of the 
document stated that, `in order to be in a position effectively to supply military 
equipment on a reimbursable basis', the US should: `(1) Offer to Latin American 
governments military equipment at competitive prices and under competitive delivery 
dates. (2) Make sales of military equipment to Latin American governments on credit, 
which should normally be limited to three years. ' 117 The intention of US officials had 
been to streamline their military policy and make it more successful; thus addressing 
some of the strategic concerns that had arisen in the wake of the Soviet Economic 
Offensive. However, as Rabe highlights, although, `the president and his closest advisors 
had discussed inconsistencies and contradictions in military aid to Latin America; they 
had not resolved them. i18 This was clearly highlighted in the final stages of the 
Fernando de Noronha negotiations as the US struggled to counter the position of the 
Brazilian military. It would be Clause 6 of the Fernando de Noronha treaty that would be 
the point of contention - calling, as it did, for vastly increased levels of US military aid 
to Brazil. Kubitschek informed Ambassador Briggs that the Military had `insisted' on the 
inclusion of Article 6.119 
Foster Dulles, however, refused to accept the Brazilian military's clause: instead, 
he replied to Ambassador Briggs, inserting a rewritten Clause 6, which only promised 
future discussions over expanded military aid to Brazil. Dulles' counter-proposal was an 
"7 NSC 5613/1 National Security Council Report, "Statement of policy on US Policy Toward Latin 
America", September 25 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 119-127 
1E Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 89 
19 Telegram from the US Ambassador in Brazil Ellis Briggs to the Department of State, December 18 1956 
- 5pm; Telegram from US Ambassador in Brazil Ellis Briggs to the Department of State, December 18 
1956 - 6pm, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 729-730 
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effort to adhere to US policy as outlined in NSC 5613/1 and to ensure that Washington 
was not committed to a significant increase in the amount of materiel they sent to Brazil. 
`We regard [re]interpretation of Article 6 along above lines as essential to avoid future 
misunderstandings and the granting to Brazil of a virtual blank check against the US for 
military equipment', Dulles wrote. 120 Eventually, in early 1957, an agreement was signed 
for the US use of Fernando de Noronha. However, the negotiations had highlighted the 
continuing problems in the reshaped military policy that the administration had 
implemented in NSC 5613/1. And, in addition to this, the rewritten Article 6 did not 
conclude the issue of military assistance. 
121 US military strategy had been shown to be 
deeply flawed. Nevertheless, both the Eisenhower and Kubitschek administrations felt 
content once the negotiations were over. The problem, however, came in what the two 
nations expected after the agreement was finalised. Brazil would expect some form of 
"reward" - ideally economic assistance - for their support, whilst the US would consider 
this achievement of their strategic objective as wholly separate from their economic 
relationship. As we shall see next, the lack of middle-ground between these two positions 
would begin to seriously undermine the bilateral relationship. 
A CRUMBLING ALLIANCE: US-BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1956-58 
In order to understand why it was the economic relationship between the US and 
Brazil that caused the tentative alliance to gradually fall apart, it is necessary to 
understand three key factors. Firstly, a major part of Kubitschek's painstaking efforts to 
tie Brazil to the American Cold War effort had been in the hope of obtaining economic 
120 Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles to the Embassy in Brazil, December 22 1956; also telegram 
detailing a meeting between State Department official, Maurice Bernbaum, and Brazilian Ambassador 
Peixoto, where the US official `stressed' the `general US Government unhappiness over... indications 
Brazilian efforts to take advantage Fernando de Noronha station for bargaining purposes on military 
equipment and military assistance. ' Telegram from Acting Secretary of State Robert Murphy to the 
Embassy in Brazil, December 31 1956; Telegram from the US Ambassador in Brazil Ellis Briggs to the 
Department of State, January 2 1957, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 732-7 
121 indeed, Weis writes: "Negotiations on the amount of military hardware due Brazil dragged on for 
months. ' In fact, so disconcerted with Brazilian requests for military assistance were US officials that they 
`quietly dropped plans for a communications facility in Maceio (an area of Brazil) in favour of Puerto 
Rico. ' Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 102 
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concessions to aid Brazil's ambitious development proposals. 122 Secondly, Kubitschek's 
efforts in this direction had been aided immeasurably by the onset of the Soviet 
Economic Offensive and the shift in nature of the Cold War - as this enabled Kubitschek 
to take advantage of the American desire for a reaffirmation of unity in the Western 
Hemisphere. And thirdly, as we have seen throughout this thesis, the Eisenhower 
administration's sustained adherence to its economic beliefs remained consistent 
throughout the period - even when they reappraised their policy in NSC 5613/1. The 
confluence of these three factors caused the deepening rift in the bilateral relationship 
that finally became irreparable in late 1958. A reading of the documentary record 
confirms that whilst Kubitschek was attempting to bring Washington and Rio closer 
together, there was a developing tension emerging in the bilateral economic relationship 
that severely hampered his plans. 
It is highly evident that US-Brazilian relations in the period between January 
1956 and March 1958 began to seriously deteriorate due to economic disagreements 
between Washington and Rio. Throughout this period there were strong signals that the 
US would not, in spite of Kubitschek's policy of close accommodation, alter their 
economic policy toward Rio. In fact, US officials were becoming increasingly concerned 
about the state of the Brazilian economy; as that concern increased, they would adopt an 
increasingly hard-line approach toward the Kubitschek administration. The first issue to 
deal with is that of why the US refused to consider a change in their economic policy 
toward Brazil. The argument put forward by the Traditional school - that the 
administration's economic approach was linked intrinsically to anti-communism - does 
not convince here. Even in the wake of the Soviet Economic Offensive, and an expected 
increase in Soviet-Brazilian trade123, US officials were not prepared to consider a change 
in economic policy. It should also be remembered that this was in spite of the calls of 
'22 Michael Weis writes, `because Kubitschek's economic-development strategy relied heavily on securing 
massive foreign investment and government aid, Brazilian-American relations retained its traditional, 
paramount importance. ' Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 96 
123 A paper prepared in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs highlighted the fact that 'Brazil's trade with 
the Soviet bloc in 1955 showed a decided increase over the 1954 total of $42,000,000... it [is] virtually 
inevitable that there will be some additional increase in Brazil's trade with the Soviet bloc. ' Paper Prepared 
by Spencer King the Special Assistant in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, May 29 1956, FRUS 1955- 
1957 Volume VII p 701-2 
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some administration officials - Douglas Dillon, Milton Eisenhower, and Harold Stassen 
- for a change in America's fiscal approach toward the region. Whilst there was an 
ongoing debate within the administration - State Department versus the Treasury 
Department, or officials like Milton Eisenhower versus George Humphrey, Foster Dulles 
and the president - there was a consensus amongst US officials that basic American 
economic principles had to form the centrepiece of US economic policy toward Latin 
America. Therefore, basic US objectives - based on the expansion of free market 
capitalism - would remain resolutely as the basis of US economic strategy in the 
region. 124 
This position of intransigence was confirmed at a meeting of the National 
Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems in July 1956. Here 
the participants discussed whether or not the US should `refund' EXIM Bank loans to 
Brazil. 125 Seeing such a move as `bad banking', the decision was taken to postpone the 
repayment schedule, thus giving the Kubitschek administration part of what it wanted. 126 
This decision, however, leaves something of a gap in the Traditional and Revisionist 
arguments: if it was not either anti-communism or economic principles driving US 
policy toward Brazil, then what was it? In order to answer that question we need to 
accept the argument that the US was pursuing a strategy based around both its strategic 
and its economic objectives in Latin America. We saw in Chapter Three that the shift in 
the Cold War and the Soviet Economic Offensive did not alter the economic principles 
underpinning US policy. Although there was some relaxation on certain issues - for 
example, commodity agreements - the overriding economic aims of the administration 
124 See: Michael Adamson, "'The Most Important Single Aspect of our Foreign Policy'?: The Eisenhower 
Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World" in Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (eds), The 
Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) 
125 The Brazilians wanted the Bank to refund the balance of the $300 million credit over 20 years. ' 
'26 See: Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland to 
the Deputy Director of the Office of South American Affairs William Belton, June 71956; Minutes of the 
2461h Meeting of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, 
Washington, July 3 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 702-710 
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remained the same. It is this fact that comes through most strongly when considering US- 
Brazilian economic relations in the period covered by this chapter. 127 
Throughout 1956 the US made no significant alteration to its economic approach 
toward Brazil. In December of that year - as the Fernando de Noronha negotiations 
neared their conclusion - Kubitschek became more overt in his calls for an increased 
level of economic assistance from the US. Meeting with Ambassador Briggs, he outlined 
his belief that his support over Fernando de Noronha merited an increased level of 
economic support. Briggs reported that, 
As far as Kubitschek [is] personally concerned he said that while he 
acknowledges and recognizes importance of continuing collaboration 
between Brazilian-US armed services it is closer and more effective economic 
collaboration that he has primarily on his mind... President said Brazil desires 
to depend primarily on US and he implied success or failure his 
administration would be in measure we are able to aid him. 128 
However, such a request contravened basic US economic principles in Latin America. 
Seven months earlier, in May, the Department of State had dispatched a circular telegram 
to all diplomatic posts in Latin America'29 , reaffirming the administration's faith in its 
economic principles and advocating a more efficient use of the Export-Import Bank to 
nullify Latin economic requests at the forthcoming economic conference at Buenos 
Aires. 
127 In fact, the Brazilian economy was - somewhat against the odds - actually performing quite favourably 
in mid-1956, which meant that the US was able to give more attention to meeting its strategic aims. At the 
National Advisory Council Meeting in July cited above, Hawthorne Arey, the Director of the Export- 
Import Bank, outlined that fact that: 'Brazil was in a good position-with $90 million in lines of credit 
with commercial banks which were not being used, and with average dollar earnings about $72 million a 
month as against $47 million, ' the year before. This meant that the balance of payments problem had been 
alleviated slightly. However, this period of economic prosperity was not forecast to continue. Despite this, 
US policy would remain unaltered: a fact that can only be satisfactorily explained by the presence of two 
separate goals - economic expansion and national security - within the Eisenhower administration's 
approach in Latin America. Minutes of the 246' Meeting of the National Advisory Council on 
International Monetary and Financial Problems, Washington, July 3 1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 
705-710 
128 Telegram from the US Ambassador in Brazil Ellis Briggs to the Department of State, December 18 
1956, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 729-730 
'29 Except those in Buenos Aires, Santiago and La Paz 
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At both the Caracas and the Rio Conferences the US opposed the strenuous 
efforts of many Latin American countries to pass resolutions which would 
have favoured development grants, soft loans, a regional development bank, 
price stabilization schemes for major Latin American exports, targets for 
loans to Latin America by public lending agencies etc. To meet the capital 
hunger of the Latin American countries we undertook, instead, to intensify 
and expand the activities of the Export-Import Bank... It is clear ... that the 
greater increase in the Bank's Latin American lending activities the less likely 
is the United States to be faced with impossible demands and with a challenge 
to its prestige and influence at the scheduled Buenos Aires Conference. '30 
By December 1956, Kubitschek was becoming increasingly desperate to obtain 
further funding from the US. Despite the mildly improving economic position referenced 
earlier, there were several pressing problems - political and economic - impacting upon 
Kubitschek. Weis notes that: `by 1957... Brazil was more stable than it had been since 
the election of Vargas... economic growth had stimulated Brazilian pride, nationalism, 
and support for the government. ' 131 This, though, does not tell the whole story. 
Relatively favourable economic statistics could not hide the fact that Brazil's economy 
remained excessively reliant upon coffee exports, leaving Brazilian stability overly- 
dependent upon a product whose price was becoming increasingly unstable. In addition 
to this, Brazil continued to spend huge amounts on importing petroleum and supporting 
Petrobras. 132 
Although we have already established that overt nationalism made a change in 
this situation extremely unlikely, its economic consequences cannot be ignored. Robert 
Anderson, who had moved from the Pentagon to replace George Humphrey as Treasury 
Secretary, met with Foster Dulles in August 1957. Anderson told Dulles that: `about 40% 
of the country's foreign currency expenditure went for fuel imports, while coffee 
10 Department of State Instruction to all ARA Diplomatic Posts, May 2 1956, OCB 091.4 Latin America 
(FILE#7) (3) May - September 1956, Box No 75, OCB Central File Series, Eisenhower Library; See also: 
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom to Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Douglas Dillon, May 29 1957,1957 - Costa Rica -L 
Miscellaneous, Box No 2, Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom, Subject Files 1957-1959, Lot 59 D 573, National Archives, College 
Park, Maryland 
131 Michael Weis (1993) p 106 
132 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 174-182; Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002) p 175- 
7; Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (1991) p 169-173 
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compromised from 60 to 70% of exports, making the country heavily dependent on 
coffee as an export commodity, and much in need of a better solution of its fuel 
problem. ' 133 (This problem would become even more acute in 1958 as Brazilian coffee 
sales dropped due to increased competition) There was also a third problem looming, 
which threatened to expose the rather shaky economic foundations that Kubitschek's 
development drive had been built on. In seeking to finance his development agenda 
Kubitschek had implemented policies that led to Brazil building up a huge amount of 
foreign debt; with those loans due to mature in 1958, the Brazilian economy would be 
faced with an increasingly troublesome balance of payments problems. With outgoings 
forecast to dwarf income, the Brazilian economy faced the increasing likelihood of not 
being able to generate a necessary amount of capital to meet its foreign obligations. 
The American Charge in Brazil detailed this in a dispatch to Washington on 
October 4, writing: `Serious economic difficulties face Brazil during the next 2 or 3 
years: a) The balance of payments outlook is critical, with a probable deficit for 1957 of 
as much as $250 million and a worsening situation thereafter ... b) Internally inflation 
continues, though at a slower rate ... c) Combined effects of payment trouble and inflation 
exacerbate an imbalance in the economic growth of Brazil. ' 134 Each of these factors 
increased the pressure on Kubitschek and made him more desperate in his attempts to 
obtain US economic aid. `Kubitschek had expended much political capital in proving his 
fidelity to the United States, and he had supported the US on controversial issues such as 
the Fernando de Noronha missile station. Yet critics pointed out that the returns to Brazil 
quickly diminished once the US achieved its strategic goals. ' 135 As a result, Kubitschek 
needed a change in US policy not just to counter the impending economic problems he 
faced, but, also, to legitimise his policy of seeking accommodation with the Eisenhower 
administration after coming to office in 1956. 
'33 Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Treasury Secretary Robert 
Anderson, Department of State, Washington, August 22 1957; Memorandum of a Conversation between 
Secretary Dulles and US Ambassador to Brazil Ellis Briggs, Department of State, August 281957; 
Memorandum from the US Ambassador in Brazil Ellis Briggs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs Roy Rubottom, October 16 1957, FRUS 1955-1957 Volume VII p 759-763,764-5 
'3' Telegram from the Charge in Brazil Wallner to the Department of State, October 4 1957, FRUS 1955- 
1957 Volume VIIp 763-4 
135 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 106 
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Yet, it was not to be. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Eisenhower 
administration would not implement a change in their economic approach toward Latin 
America in the wake of the Soviet Economic Offensive and NSC 5613/1. Stark 
confirmation of this would come at the Buenos Aires Economic Conference in August 
1957. Even before then, US economic principles were reaffirmed once again in a paper 
created by the International Development Advisory Board in April. They stated 
unequivocally that: `It is the policy of the United States to encourage the development of 
the free world's resources as much as possible though private enterprise and the 
Government of the United States and representatives of American business are 
concerned with devising ways and means of improving the climate for foreign 
investments. "36 Even those members of the administration advocating a change in US 
economic policy in Latin America retained a strong belief in the core ideals of the 
American system that was wholly at odds with the kind of assistance Kubitschek was 
looking for. Under-Secretary of the Treasury, Randolf Burgess, wrote Milton 
Eisenhower in June 1957 and informed him that, `your letter of the 9t' of May 
encourages me to further reflections on the vital question of encouraging continued 
investment in Latin America. Your emphasis on the need of relying strongly on private 
investment, and on creating a favourable atmosphere for such investment, is of course in 
accord with my own line of approach. ' 137 There was, then, quite clearly very little 
support within Washington for a reshaped economic policy toward Brazil in keeping 
with that outlined by Kubitschek: loan payments would not be increased unless Brazilian 
economic policies met those stipulated by the EXIM Bank, and the US-Brazilian alliance 
on strategic issues would not transpose into a more favourable fiscal policy. Any notions 
that Kubitschek might have harboured about being able to change this situation were 
dispelled at the Buenos Aires Economic Conference. 
16 Paper by the International Development Advisory Board, April 1957, Folder - Eisenhower, Dr Milton 
1957, Box No 2, Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs Roy R Rubottom, Subject Files 1957-1959, Lot 59 D 573, National Archives, College 
Park, Maryland 
137 Letter from Under-Secretary of the Treasury Randolf Burgess to Milton Eisenhower, June 4 1957, 
Folder - Eisenhower, Dr Milton 1957, Box No 2, Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R Rubottom, Subject Files 1957-1959, Lot 59 D 573, 
National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
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Here, as we saw previously, the US position was informed by their traditional 
economic objectives rather than the ongoing internal debate as to the future of US 
economic policy in the region. As Weis writes, `Buenos Aires succinctly showed the 
fundamental differences between the two sides' interests and development policies. For 
Brazil, whose traditional role in inter-American meetings was that of the conciliator 
between the US and Spanish America, the conference produced much anguish. ' 138 By the 
end of 1957, we can clearly see that Kubitschek's attempt to force a close bilateral 
alliance through the deliberate use of overt Cold War sentiments had failed. Although he 
had been assisted by the change in the Cold War and the Soviet Economic offensive, he 
had not been able to bridge the gap between US economic objectives and US strategic 
objectives. And consequently by `the beginning of 1958, United States-Brazilian 
relations were at their lowest ebb since the crisis of 1954. ' 139 The question was: would 
the clear and present tension between economic and strategic factors in US policy be 
resolved sufficiently during the Eisenhower administration's remaining years in order to 
ease the growing enmity between Washington and Rio? Or, would Kubitschek's need for 
capital and the refusal of the US to alter their economic policy drive a wedge between 
the two nations? 
CONCLUSION: 
The answer, as we shall see in the final two chapters, is that in spite of the 
increasing problems confronting the US in Latin America - namely the events of 
Nixon's trip and the rise of Castroism in Cuba - the Eisenhower administration would 
remain committed to its long-standing economic principles, even as strategic 
considerations became increasingly important in the administration's approach. Although 
the debate within the administration over the future course of US economic policy would 
continue, the actual changes would not be of the magnitude that the Latin nations desired 
or, indeed, extensive enough to solve the problem of chronic underdevelopment in the 
18 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 107 
139 Ibid p 110 
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region. This will be starkly demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, as President 
Kubitschek attempted to implement his grand development scheme - Operation Pan 
America - whilst the US attempted to shore up its crumbling national security agenda in 
the region, which was directly challenged by the ascendancy of Fidel Castro and the 
realignment of Latin political circles toward more democratic, less militaristic forms of 
government. The crucial point, however, is that whilst the administration quickly 
addressed the strategic problems confronting them in Latin America (and Brazil) in the 
post-1956 era, they did not perceive that any change was necessary in its basic economic 
approach. Therefore, when the changes of policy outlined in NSC 5613/1 and later, NSC 
5902/1, were implemented, they did not successfully appease the increasing frustration 
of the Latin nations. This pattern, as we shall see in Chapter Six, would be especially 
noticeable with regard to US-Brazilian relations. 
In this chapter we analysed the evolution of US-Brazilian relations in the wake of 
the Soviet Economic Offensive and the shifting paradigm of the Cold War. By starting in 
the immediate wake of Vargas's death, however, we were able to establish the dominant 
trends in the US-Brazilian relationship before the onset of the Soviet Economic 
Offensive and the shift toward the periphery in the Cold War. What emerged was the 
situation whereby the US continued to follow the economic agenda outlined in NSC 
144/1 and NSC 5432/1, in spite of the fact that this approach had imploded so tragically 
in Brazil with the suicide of President Vargas in August 1954. Between then and mid- 
1956, US policy would, crucially, adhere to the idea of expanding Brazilian economic 
development along the lines of "free trade, free capital and free investment. " This 
approach illustrates two key points about US policy. Firstly, the fact that the Eisenhower 
administration continued to believe that once the benefits of the American system began 
to become apparent in Brazil then many of Brazil's economic woes would be solved. 
And secondly, that US regional policy was too generic to be successfully implemented in 
many Latin nations - in Brazil, fervent economic and political nationalism prevented 
widespread economic reform whilst continued poverty increased the potential for a 
radical shift in Brazilian politics. Nationalist factions in Brazil concerned with what they 
saw as the "selling off' of Brazilian resources to US companies, continued to make it 
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increasingly difficult for the Brazilian government to accede to US suggestions on 
economic policy. 
When Juscelino Kubitschek came to office, the Brazilian economy was in a 
desperate state; burdened by debt and with an undiversified economy hindering any 
chance of dynamic growth. Kubitschek aimed to change that by implementing an 
aggressive and ambitious development strategy: one that would transform Brazil from a 
potential world power to an actual one. This, however, brought its own problems. 
Kubitschek's scheme depended on a huge influx of capital - from both private and 
public sources - and, as a result, Kubitschek needed to ally himself closely with the US. 
In an effort to achieve this, Kubitschek courted Eisenhower determinedly, using a shared 
concern over the Cold War as a tool for eliciting a close relationship. For the US, 
however, this alliance was one based solely on strategic pragmatism: the Soviet 
Economic Offensive and the shift in the Cold War made Brazil's Cold War political 
allegiance highly desirable for the US. Despite internal divisions with the Eisenhower 
administration about the shape of US economic policy toward Latin America, there was 
a consensus of opinion which agreed upon the viability of retaining the principles of free 
market capitalism as the driving force behind US economic policy toward the region. 
This would impact huge tensions on the bilateral relationship. In keeping with the 
argument of this thesis, then, we can quite clearly see that US policy toward Brazil in the 
1954-58 period was entirely consistent with the argument outlined in Chapter Three. 
Although national security concerns would become far more prominent considerations 
for the Eisenhower administration, economic principles would remain unaltered. And, as 
such, there would be little discernible change in the administration's fiscal policies. 140 In 
the next chapter we will analyse how, in the wake of Nixon's disastrous tour of the 
region, the US would attempt to meet its twin objectives of national security and 
economic preponderance in the final years of the Eisenhower administration's time in 
office. 
140 There were, as outlined in Chapter Three, some changes to US policy, but these were relatively muted 
and, crucially, were in keeping with US economic ideologies. See: Burton Kaufman, Trade & Aid (1982); 
James Siekmeier, Aica Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) 
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CHAPTER FIVE: US-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 1958-1961 
"STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES VERSUS PRIVATE INVESTMENT" 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapters Three and Four outlined the impact that the Soviet Economic Offensive 
and the ongoing shift in the nature of the Cold War, had on the Eisenhower 
administration's conception of events in Latin America and Brazil. What we saw was that 
the Soviet Economic Offensive compelled the administration to pay far more attention to 
the status of their strategic aims in Latin America than they had at any other time since 
1953. This chapter will look at the way that US policy evolved during the final years of 
the Eisenhower administration; with the focus once again being on the economics- 
security nexus that has underpinned our analysis thus far. The most striking conclusion to 
emerge will be that even as the administration accorded more emphasis to its national 
security objectives in Latin America, leading US policymakers remained unwilling to 
relax their position on long-standing economic ideals. This dichotomy between 
economics and security would continue to dominate US-Latin relations: indeed, by 1961, 
the relationship between Washington and the Latin nations was severely imperilled due to 
the Eisenhower administration's inability to reconcile its economic and strategic goals. 
Our starting point here, though, needs to be with the recognition that US policy in Latin 
America during the 1958-61 period was predominantly concerned with issues of strategic 
concern. The overwhelming flaw in this approach would come from the fact that US 
officials attempted to pursue their strategic objectives whilst retaining their traditional 
economic aims: in fact, pre-existing economic policies were subsumed into the national 
security framework that was coming to dominate US policy in the Third World, 
irrespective of the fact that they were wholly incompatible. ' 
' As we have seen in the first four chapters, American economic objectives - based on "free trade, free 
investment and free capital" - often served to undermine the US strategic position and inflame anti- 
American sentiment in Latin America. By incorporating traditional US economic aims into the national 
security context that administration officials were increasingly applying to the Third World, the problem 
was only heightened. See: Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the 
Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) 
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By May, 1958, the situation was one of irreconcilable tensions within US policy; 
the administration recognised that they needed to address their strategic position toward 
Latin America, but in doing so they refused to significantly alter their basic economic 
principles. In fact, as the administration came to accord more importance to its national 
security approach in the region, its position with regard to economic policy became 
increasingly inflexible. By the time of the Nixon trip, those economic objectives that had 
formed such a central part of US policy toward Latin America since 1953 had been 
subsumed into the Cold War framework that the US was imposing upon its approach 
toward the region. This was in spite of the fact that they were clearly undermining the US 
strategic position, as an increasing number of people in the Latin nations continued to 
protest at what they believed to be their economic subservience to the US. 2 The 
administration's increasing emphasis on its national security considerations in Latin 
America would prove to be wholly incompatible with US aims in the economic sphere. 
As a result, the status of US-Latin relations continued to deteriorate until Eisenhower left 
in office in January 1961. 
Outlining the clash between the administration's emphasis on national security 
and its adherence to basic US economic doctrine, then, will form the central theme of this 
chapter. Before that, however, it is necessary to demonstrate what changes were 
occurring in US-Soviet relations during the same period. Achieving this will give a fuller 
background picture to the regional study and, also, demonstrate the impact that the 
changing nature of US-Soviet relations had on the Eisenhower administration's policy in 
Latin America. Following this, we will consider what impact the Nixon trip had on US 
policy toward Latin America: as we will see, scholars in both schools of thought have 
debated the affect that the Nixon trip had on the administration's approach toward the 
region, with many seeing it as the catalyst for the eventual changes in approach that 
would emerge in February 1959. However, as will be made clear, the Nixon trip needs to 
be evaluated for its relationship to those events that had come before; particularly, the 
2 See: Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States & Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter- 
American Relations (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1974) p 223-4 
3 importantly, even those officials within the administration advocating a change in US foreign economic 
policy - Milton Eisenhower, Thomas Mann, Roy Rubottom, and Douglas Dillon - retained a strong belief 
in the basic principles of capitalism. 
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Soviet Economic Offensive. The internal debate within the administration as to how US 
policy should change in the aftermath of the Nixon trip would be driven by the overriding 
fear that US national security interests were at risk in Latin America. This was, as we 
shall see, an extension of the ongoing debate that had been developing since the Soviet 
Economic Offensive in January, 1956. 
After several months of debate and re-evaluation, the administration would 
eventually - in February 1959 - produce NSC 5902/1, which would outline a new 
approach for the US in Latin America. The most striking point about this document 
would be the changes in economic policy that it outlined. Crucially, however, these 
changes would once again be in accordance with traditional US economic principles and 
would not address the majority of the concerns raised by the Latin nations relating to 
their chronic underdevelopment. This was a crucial caveat. As we shall see in more detail 
in Chapter Six, the changes in US economic policy were implemented in order to placate 
the Latin nations and improve the status of US-Latin relations. They were very much a 
solution to the administration's increasing national security concerns; with the 
administration's belief in the ideals of "free trade, free investment and free capital" 
continuing to endure, the changes in economic policy would be of a limited nature only. 4 
Most importantly, however, the entire context of US-Latin relations would be altered in 
January 1959 by the Cuban Revolution, which saw the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista by 
Fidel Castro. The Eisenhower administration's response to the Cuban Revolution would 
be similar to their response to Arbenz in 1953 and 1954, due to the fact that like in 
Guatemala, both US strategic and economic interests were threatened by the Cuban 
Revolution. The narrative contained in this chapter, then, will highlight the continuing 
clash between economic and strategic objectives within US policy. And it will do so by 
looking at the aftermath of the Nixon trip, the development of NSC 5902/1, the impact of 
the Cuban Revolution and the last years of the Eisenhower administration's time in 
office. The predominant conclusion will be that though US officials were focused 
I See: Michael Adamson, "`The Most Important Single Aspect of our Foreign Policy'?: The Eisenhower 
Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World" in Kathryn Statier and Andrew Johns (eds), The 
Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) 
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increasingly on meeting their national security aims in Latin America, their inability to 
reconcile this approach with their basic economic objectives would come to severely 
undermine the US position in the Western Hemisphere. Firstly, however, we need to look 
at the global events in this period in order to outline the changing nature of US-Soviet 
relations that underpins our analysis of this period. 
THE GLOBAL COLD WAR: US-SOVIET TENSIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD 
This section will outline the way that the US-Soviet relationship evolved in the 
1958-1960 period and illustrate the growing importance of the Third World to both 
Washington and Moscow. What will become apparent is that despite the continuance of 
the trend outlined in Chapter Three - namely that direct US-Soviet tensions over Europe 
began to dissipate - the transposition of east-west tensions onto the Third World 
continued to escalate. This is vital for an investigation of US-Latin American relations, as 
it provides an explanation for the administration's continuing reversion to Cold War 
concerns when evaluating its strategic position in the region. By outlining the growing 
importance of the Third World from a global perspective, we will build on the trends 
outlined in Chapter Three and highlight the reasons behind the Eisenhower 
administration's deepening concerns over its position in Latin America. The importance 
of this lies in the fact that it helps us to deconstruct both the US economic approach, and, 
also, the nature of US-Soviet tensions in the Third World. This will highlight the 
administration's increasing emphasis on national security issues in the periphery. More 
importantly, however, it will also demonstrate the continuing presence of Washington's 
economic objectives in the Third World; illustrating the fact that the tensions within US 
policy between economic and strategic objectives were not unique to US policy in Latin 
America. 
Washington's interest in the Third World was not a new development: since the 
end of World War Two, US officials had consistently highlighted the Third World's 
economic importance to the United States. But there was an important difference during 
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the late-1950s. Prior to 1955-56, US aims toward the Third World were constructed 
around mainly economic goals - such as access to markets, an economic open door and 
the provision of raw materials. However, once the Third World began to assume an 
importance in terms of the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration needed to adapt its 
approach. By the late-1950s both the US and the Soviet Union were attempting to expand 
their influence in the Third World. 5 Most importantly for this study of US-Latin 
American relations, though, is the fact that whilst this was occurring, US economic goals 
in the periphery remained the same as they had been since 1945. The inevitable outcome 
was that of the US attempting to attain the support of the Third World nations in the 
ideological standoff with the USSR whilst - at the same time - continuing to try and meet 
their long-standing economic aims with regard to the provision of raw materials and 
access for US capital. As the Third World became increasingly important to both the 
White House and the Kremlin, the irreconcilable tensions between economics and 
security within US policy became ever-more apparent. 
US-Soviet relations had undergone a dramatic change since the death of Stalin in 
March 1953. His successors had gradually implemented a more bellicose foreign policy, 
which coupled with rapid developments in both nations' nuclear and missile technology 
had reduced the possibility of a direct US-Soviet confrontation in Europe. In fact, by 
March of 1958 Secretary Dulles was telling President Eisenhower that: "There has been a 
definite evolution within the Soviet Union toward greater personal security, increased 
intellectual freedom and increased decentralization. This also increases the chances of 
peace: ' The way in which the relationship between Washington and Moscow had 
changed dramatically can be seen in the events spanning from the 1957 launch of 
sputnik' to the infamous downing of an American U-2 spy plane just before a planned 
5 Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad 
(Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2006) pp 104-150 
6 Dulles to Eisenhower, March 25 1958, quoted in: John Lewis Gaddis, "The Unexpected John Foster 
Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians", in Richard Immerman eds, John Foster Dulles 
and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990) p 73 
As Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson write, `Khrushchev was able to parlay this accomplishment into 
an assertion of Soviet strategic superiority'; a fact that enabled him to stave off both internal and foreign 
criticism of his premiership. ' Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War 
II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984) Second Edition 1989 p124; William Taubman, Khrushchev: The 
Man, His Era (USA: Free Press, 2003) p 378 
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Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit in Paris in 1960. Despite a series of inflammatory 
gestures and one-upmanship manoeuvres during this period, US-Soviet relations never 
appeared likely to deteriorate into direct superpower confrontation. 
In Washington, following the successful Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite, 
Eisenhower faced strong calls to react by increasing American arms expenditure, with 
fears of a "missile gap" being used to criticise Republican defense strategy. Both the 
Gaither Committee and the Rockefeller Foundation strongly recommended a significant 
increase in the US military budget8, and a dramatic increase in US defense spending had 
strong support from both sides of the political spectrum -9 And yet, the administration's 
reaction to the launch of Sputnik was decidedly calm, and the recommendations of the 
Gaither Committee and the Rockefeller Foundation were rejected. The reason for this 
was that the much vaunted "missile gap" did not, in fact, exist; a point recognised by both 
Eisenhower and Khrushchev. 10 Eisenhower could reject the recommendations for 
increased defense spending safe in the knowledge that Soviet technology was not more 
advanced than that of the US. 
11 Khrushchev knew about the U-2 flights over Russia, but 
8 Both the Gaither Committee and the Rockefeller trust `argued that a Soviet military build-up had 
established superiority in long-range ballistic missiles and that Soviet success in putting the first satellite in 
orbit had created a clear lead in the space race. They concluded, in a manner reminiscent of NSC-68, that 
the United States ought to up the military budget by 50 percent. ' Thomas McCormick, America's Half- 
Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1989) Second Edition 1995 p 129 
9 As Gaddis writes: `Given the circumstances in which it appeared, the Gaither Committee report could 
have affected the American defense establishment almost as dramatically as NSC-68 had seven years 
earlier. Certainly it had no lack of supporters: when portions of the top-secret document leaked to the press, 
Congressional Democrats, concerned both with its national security implications and domestic political 
possibilities, quickly endorsed its rumoured conclusions... Several months later, a private study group 
commissioned by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and headed by Henry Kissinger confirmed the 
committee's findings, thus suggesting that even among members of the President's own party its 
conclusions carried considerable weight ... None of this would have much effect, though, without sympathy 
in the White House, and there the reaction was decidedly lukewarm. ' John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of 
Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post-War American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1982) p 184-5 
10 As Stephen Ambrose notes, 'The CIA, in one of the great intelligence coups of all time, had in 1956 
inaugurated a series of flights over the Soviet Union in specially built high-altitude airplanes called U-2s. 
The photographs that resulted from the flights revealed, as Eisenhower later put it, "proof that the horrors 
of the alleged bomber gap and the later missile gap were nothing more than imaginative creations of 
irresponsibility. " The United States still had a substantial lead in strategic weapons' Stephen Ambrose 
(1997) p 160; Thomas McCormick, America's Half-Century (1995) p 129; Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's 
New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-1961 (London: Macmillan Press, 1996) p 211-3 
11 Gaddis and Ambrose disagree over whether Eisenhower's judgement on this issue was the result of sheer 
good fortune that fiscal conservatism - on this occasion - fit geopolitical realities, or whether it was a brave 
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the Soviets did not possess the technical expertise to intercept aircraft flying at such a 
high altitude. And so, both sides kept quiet: Khrushchev, not wanting to undermine the 
publicity generated by Sputnik, continued to talk about Soviet superiority and the 
"missile gap", whilst Eisenhower continued to let him12, content that by doing so the U-2 
flights would continue to remain secret. 13 This diplomatic manoeuvring strongly suggests 
a more restrained relationship between Washington and Moscow in the late 1950s. 
(When US-Soviet tensions did worsen in this period it tended to be due to domestic and 
international pressures on either Khrushchev or Eisenhower that necessitated a strong 
stance; the most obvious example of this being the 1958 Berlin Crisis14) 
Yet, in spite of this relative relaxation in direct east-west confrontation, anti- 
communism and national security continued to provide the dominant context for US 
foreign policy. The difference was that the battle between East and West had now shifted 
conclusively to the Third World. Although this process began in the mid-1950s, it was, 
by 1958, clearly exerting a major influence on the Eisenhower administration's foreign 
policy and was necessitating an increased level of resolve and commitment from the US. 
call taken as a result of intelligence data received from the U2 flights. See: John Lewis Caddis, Strategies 
of Containment (1982) p 185-6; Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (1997) p 129-130; 
'Z This policy would come back to haunt the Republicans during the 1960 presidential election when 
Democratic nominee, Senator John F Kennedy, was able to attack the Republican candidate, Vice President 
Richard Nixon, over the present of a supposed "missile gap" and an inferiority in US defense policy 
" Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (1997) writes: `The fact that Eisenhower made no strong statements 
about Soviet inferiority during the American domestic controversy about the missile gap should have 
reassured the Soviets and convinced them that Eisenhower really was a man of moderation who was 
sincerely interested in some sort of modus vivendi' p 161 
14 Khrushchev had come dangerously close to being removed from office in 195714, and continued to see 
Chinese Premier, Mao Zedong, challenge Soviet leadership of the Communist world. Briefly, in the wake 
of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in February 1956, Mao's opinion of the Soviet leader had 
improved. However, the Soviet approach toward internal revolt in Poland and Hungary had compelled Mao 
to change his mind. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday write: `Mao had concluded that Khrushchev was 
something of a "blunderer", who was "disaster prone. " The awe he had felt for Khrushchev at the time 
when the Soviet leader denounced Stalin was rapidly fading, replaced by a confidence that he could turn 
Khrushchev's vulnerability to his own advantage. ' By 1958, Khrushchev needed to reassert his authority 
and chose to do so over Berlin, announcing that control of the Soviet section would now be in the hands of 
the East German government, posing a problem for the west in terms of access as they did not recognise the 
East German government. After issuing a deadline of six months, Khrushchev felt he had secured his 
position: Eisenhower, as he had with Sputnik, simply waited the immediate period of crisis out, recognising 
that the Soviets would not make good on their initial threats. See: William Taubman, Khrushchev (2003) p 
310-324,399-406; Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Jonathon Cape, 
2005) p 421-4; Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy (1989) p 123-132; Stephen 
Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (1997) p 162-7; Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New-Look National Security 
Policy (1996) p 246-256; Thomas McCormick, America's Half-Century (1995) p 132-5 
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Moreover, once this increased commitment was made and, in light of the developing 
economic and technical challenges posed by the USSR, the US commitment to be seen to 
be "winning" the Cold War in the Third World took on an added importance. It is only by 
recognising this that we can fully understand the full-range of motivations and objectives 
of the administration in Latin America. For its part, the US continued to present the 
ideological battle between Washington and Moscow as being the defining feature of the 
1950s. After being comfortably re-elected in 1956, Eisenhower's second inaugural was 
imbued with the same anti-Soviet rhetoric that had characterised his first presidential 
address four years earlier. Eisenhower stated, 
We live in a land of plenty, but rarely has this earth known such peril as 
today... The divisive force is International Communism and the power that it 
controls. The designs of that power, dark in purpose, are clear in practice. It 
strives to seal forever the fate of those it has enslaved. It strives to break the 
ties that unite the free. And it strives to capture--to exploit for its own 
greater power--all forces of change in the world, especially the needs of the 
hungry and the hopes of the oppressed... And, we-though fortunate be our 
lot--know that we can never turn our backs to them... May the light of 
freedom, coming to all darkened lands, flame brightly - until at last the 
darkness is no more. '5 
A year later, in his State of the Union Address, similar sentiments were 
expressed. 16 By invoking traditional Manichean images, Eisenhower was able to frame 
world events within the bipolar framework that had become so ingrained. Yet it is also 
important to note that by doing so, the administration increased the pressure on it to be 
seen to be winning the Cold War. Therefore, as the Third World's geopolitical 
importance increased, US officials were compelled to emphasise the attainment of their 
national security goals as being of the utmost importance in the periphery. The result, in 
an extension of the trend outlined in Chapter Three, would be for the US to apply their 
enduring Cold War framework to revolution and development in the Third World. It is 
'S Second Inaugural Address of President Eisenhower, January 21 1957, Taken From: 
www. presid -ncy. uscb. edu/ws/index. Accessed on July 30 2006 
16 At the 1958 State of the Union Address, Eisenhower stated: `The threat to our safety, and to the hope of a 
peaceful world, can be simply stated. It is communist imperialism... the only answer to a regime that wages 
total cold war is to wage total peace. ' Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union by President 
Eisenhower, January 9 1958, Taken From: www. gresidency. uscb. edu/ws/index Accessed on July 30 2006 
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necessary to emphasise here that this was very much a global development: the 
administration's increasing emphasis on national security objectives in Latin America 
was matched by their approach toward other areas of the world - most notably South- 
East Asia and the Middle East. A by-product of this shift in emphasis was that 
Washington's pre-existing economic objectives in the Third World were subsumed into 
the national security framework; as those events in US-Latin American relations have 
demonstrated to us, though, this led to a situation whereby the inherent incompatibility 
between American economic and strategic objectives came to dominate US policy toward 
the Third World. Whilst this process undoubtedly began in the mid-1950s - as the US 
reaction to the Soviet Economic Offensive outlined in Chapters Three and Four 
demonstrated - it only fully came to maturity in the period after 1958. " 
Defeating regimes that were perceived to be communist or inimical to US 
interests, then, became the dominant rationale behind US policy toward the Third World 
in the post-1955 period. But, crucially, this was counter-balanced by the retention of a set 
of basic economic objectives and principles that did not complement the creation of a 
stable, pro-American world. Put simply, American efforts to engender the widespread 
acceptance of capitalist economic principles continued to raise the ire of those nations in 
the Third World who were blighted by underdevelopment. Michael Hunt has linked US 
economic policy to the Eisenhower administration's "crusade" to prevent the spread of 
communism-18 However, such an approach does not explain why US officials continued 
to pursue this economic approach when it was being continually proved to be deeply 
unpopular. 
By the late-1950s, this American-led program of development was being 
consistently undermined by the growth of indigenous nationalism. Increasingly, though, 
this collision between US economic doctrine and local resistance was being presented 
and analysed via the constructs of the Cold War, due to the incorporation of US economic 
policy into the national security framework. As David Ryan writes: `The Cold War 
" See: Thomas McCormick, America's Half-Century (1995); David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World 
History (2000); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2004) 
18 Michael Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) p 159-160 
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created intellectual and institutional straitjackets that reduced most challenges to Cold 
War dimensions, whether communist or not. i19 In the late-1950s, then, the Eisenhower 
administration increased its commitment toward combating what it perceived to be the 
crucial national security problems confronting it in the Third World. There was, by 1958, 
a very real sense that it was in the Third World that the Cold War would be won or lost. 
An example of this can be witnessed in South East Asia - or, more specifically, 
Vietnam. US commitments there arose initially due to economic self-interest, with 
Vietnam's natural resources forming a vital component in the regional economy. 0 
Increasingly, however, US interests in Vietnam became predominantly concerned with 
national security imperatives: by 1958, US credibility and prestige was at stake in South 
East Asia. 2' By the end of the Eisenhower era the US military representative, General 
Lansdale, was telling Secretary of Defense, Thomas Gates, that: `The US should 
recognise that Vietnam is in a critical condition and should treat it as a combat area of the 
Cold War, as an area requiring emergency treatment. '22 A similar escalation of American 
commitment was apparent in the Middle East with the announcement of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine in 1957. Like in Vietnam, US interests in the Middle East during the early Cold 
War had been focused on economic interests: however, after 1957, the Eisenhower 
Doctrine legitimised US intervention into the region in order to defeat the spread of 
international communism. 3 We can, then, clearly see that the wider trend in the Cold 
'9 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000) p 151 
20 David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History (2000) p 145-152; Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: 
Vietnam, the United States and the Modern Historical Experience (New York: The New Press, 1984) p 79 
21 The American "commitment" to defeating the spread of communism in Vietnam in the mid-to-late-1950s 
was outlined in Graham Greene's novel, The Quiet American, in which the American mission in Saigon 
consistently seeks to find a `third way, ' 
between communism and strident (but anti-American) Vietnamese 
nationalism. See: Graham 
Greene, The Quiet American (London: 1955) New Edition 2004; Stanley 
Karnow also details the rationale behind US policy in Vietnam in writing: `The administration was 
crusading against its foggy notion of an 
international communist conspiracy. ' Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A 
History (New York: Penguin Books, 1983) Second Edition 1991 p 221 
22 Memorandum from General Lansdale to Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, January 17 1961, Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1961-1963 Volume I Vietnam 1961 p 12; see also: Gabriel Kolko (1984) p 
80-96; George Herring, "A Good Stout Effort: John Foster Dulles and the Indochina Crisis, 1954-1955", in 
Richard Immerman, John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (1990) p 213-235; Robert 
Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997); David Anderson, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953- 
1961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991) 
23 However, as McCormick has written: `unrest in the Middle East in 1957 had, produced the Eisenhower 
doctrine, giving congressional authorization for aid or even military intervention for nations threatened by 
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War during the late 1950s was for the rise in importance of the Third World for both 
Washington and Moscow. Moreover, as a result of this, US officials were increasingly 
viewing events in the Third World through the perspective of the bipolar worldview. 24 
However, rather than abandoning its pre-existing aims in the economic sphere, the 
Eisenhower administration incorporated them into a wider Cold War strategy, which they 
then applied throughout the Third World in the late-1950s. We have already outlined in 
Chapters One and Three that US economic principles were generally incompatible with 
US strategic objectives; a fact that emerged consistently in US-Latin American relations. 
Now, as we go on to consider US-Latin American relations in the post-1958 period, we 
will see that the administration's emphasis on its security aims would only deepen the 
problems arising from the incompatibility of US economic and strategic aims. Firstly, 
though, we need to evaluate what impact the Nixon trip had on the thinking of US 
officials. 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE NIXON TRIP: THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL GAP 
Much of the debate surrounding the Nixon trip has focused on the impact that it 
had on the Eisenhower administration's approach toward Latin America. It is the 
contention here, though, that such an approach overlooks the most important feature 
relating to the Nixon trip. By conducting a debate on whether or not the events of the 
Vice President's tour of Latin America significantly altered the Eisenhower 
administration's policy, the episode has, essentially, been viewed outside of its wider 
global and historical context. As we will see, the events of Nixon's trip and the 
subsequent shift in US policy were, in fact, a continuation of the process that had begun 
in 1956. If anything, the trip demonstrated the failure of US policy as outlined in NSC 
5613/1 and forced the administration to extend the re-evaluation of policy that had started 
two years earlier; moving away from military assistance toward a reappraisal of their 
international communism, a concept quickly broadened to mean any threat to territorial integrity and 
independence. ' Thomas McCormick, America's Half-Century (1995) p 139; Niall Ferguson, Colossus 
(2004) p 108-112 
24 See: Chester Pach, "Thinking Globally and Acting Locally" in Kathryn Stotler and Andrew Johns (eds), 
The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War (2006) 
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regional economic policies. 25 Understanding this last point is crucial: in keeping with the 
wider trends in the Cold War, US policy toward Latin America would emphasise national 
security factors as being the major rationale behind the administration's approach. 
However, the manifest failure of the policy outlined in NSC 5613/1 compelled the 
administration to consider implementing some changes in its regional economic 
strategy. 26 After five years of being made aware of how unpopular US economic policy 
was in Latin America, the administration would - in the wake of the Nixon trip - finally 
heed the advice of officials like Milton Eisenhower and Roy Rubottom and countenance 
a change in economic policy. But, crucially, this would be a shift motivated by Cold War 
concerns. US officials still retained an overwhelming belief in the propriety of their pre- 
existing economic policies; it was just that the Cold War exigencies demonstrated by the 
events of the Nixon trip demanded some wider changes in US economic policy. 
Therefore, those changes in policy that would emerge in 1959 did not alter Washington's 
position with respect to its basic economic principles. Instead, it recommended a number 
of modifications to US economic policy, which it was believed would placate Latin 
nationalism and enable the administration to meet its strategic goal of securing its 
position in the Western Hemisphere. 
In essence, then, the debate needs to move beyond the question of whether or not 
the Nixon trip significantly affected US policy. 27 It is somewhat axiomatic that the Nixon 
25 The failure of NSC 5613/1 to bring about a change in US fortunes in Latin America would see the end of 
military assistance policies being used as the main focus of US policy toward the region; instead, it would 
remain a central part of the administration's approach, but would no longer be the central tool within US 
efforts to bring about an improvement in US-Latin relations. This will, however, be outlined in more detail 
in Chapter Six. 
26 Michael Adamson, "The Most Important Single Aspect of Our Foreign Policy" (2006); Oscar Calvo- 
Gonzalez, "Neither a Carrot Nor a Stick: American Foreign Aid and Economic Policymaking in Spain 
During the 1950s" in Diplomatic History (Volume 30, No. 1, January 2006) 
27 Those scholars arguing that the Nixon trip was an vitally important moment in US-Latin relations 
include: Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998) p 351; Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin 
America: A History ofAmerican Diplomacy, 1776-2000 (London: Routledge, 2005) p 123; see also: Walter 
LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York W. W. Norton & 
Company, 1993) p 138; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etat: Brazilian-American Relations, 
1945-1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993) p 114; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower: The 
Foreign policy ofAnti-Communism and Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1988) p 100. Rabe later goes on to qualify this approach, suggesting the actual US response to the Nixon 
trip was not that significant. Two other scholars that argue that the Nixon trip was not a significant turning 
point are: Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations Since 1889 (Wilmington, 
221 
trip did have a strong impact on the Eisenhower administration's approach toward Latin 
America; but only when it is considered alongside the shift in the nature of the Cold War 
and the affect that the Soviet Economic Offensive had on the way US officials perceived 
their position in the region. Of far more importance here is in demonstrating the 
significance of the Nixon trip in the long-term view of US-Latin American relations in 
the 1950s. With US officials increasingly applying a security framework onto their 
approach in Latin America, the events of the Nixon trip severely threatened the 
administration's attempts to secure its strategic position in the region. Perhaps the most 
obvious outcome of the reassessment of policy that followed the Nixon trip was that the 
administration, for the first time, began to seriously consider modifying its economic 
policy toward the region 28 
This is of critical importance for two reasons. Firstly, it gave those voices who 
had been calling for a change in US economic policy - Milton Eisenhower, Thomas 
Mann, Douglas Dillon, and Roy Rubottom - the chance to shape a new economic 
approach for the US in Latin America. Secondly, and more importantly, we will see that 
even when critical national security considerations were at stake, and even when those 
officials cited above were given the opportunity to take the lead in determining the US 
approach, the US commitment to its long-standing economic objectives would continue 
to endure and, ultimately, to undermine the US position in the region. This is not, 
however, to argue that the administration's approach toward Latin America was dictated 
by economic concerns: rather that by incorporating traditional American economic 
objectives into its national security approach, the administration unintentionally imposed 
severe limits on the efficacy of the policy that it would implement in early-1959. As we 
shall see in the next section, the major consequence of the Nixon trip was that it built 
upon the process begun in the wake of the Soviet Economic Offensive and forced the 
Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000) p 156; James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism, and Inter-American 
Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United states 1945-1961 (New York: Edward Mellen Press, 1999) 
317 
As we have seen in the previous four chapters, US economic policy had altered in the 1953-1957 period 
-a point made ably 
by James Siekmeier - but this was different: this marked a need for the administration 
to actually address its most basic economic principles, such as: commodity agreements; increased loans; a 
regional lending institution; and, the freedom to repay EXIM loans in local rather than American currency. 
Even considering these issues marked a huge departure for the administration. 
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administration to escalate the reappraisal of policy that had resulted in NSC 5613/1. For 
the first time in the administration's time in office, national security imperatives in Latin 
America would necessitate a change in economic policy. As we saw earlier, however, this 
was very much a response to a perceived strategic threat; consequently, those changes 
that were introduced would be politically expedient rather than the wide-ranging changes 
called for by the Latin nations. 
THE NIXON TRIP: WHAT CAUSED THE PROTESTS? 
The extent to which national security and the Cold War had become conflated 
with nationalism and economic expansion in Latin America was demonstrated in the 
aftermath of the Nixon Trip. As the Eisenhower administration sought to understand just 
what had caused the protests, a dichotomy emerged that considered the protests both 
within the bipolar framework that was so dominant in the Cold War era and as a result of 
previous US policies in the economic sphere. It was an outcome that demonstrated just 
how confused the national security framework and pre-existing US goals in Latin 
America had become 29 
For the administration, the problem would lie in attempting to reconcile their 
national security priorities in the region with the actual causes of the protests that greeted 
Nixon. With Latin anti-American sentiment being driven by widespread dissatisfaction 
with US economic policies, the administration was forced into trying to reshape its 
economic approach while still adhering to basic US economic principles. This is not, 
however, to contend that economic objectives were dominating US policy. Instead, it is to 
suggest that whilst the administration was applying an increasingly Cold War oriented 
perspective onto its position in Latin America, it was not making any major changes to its 
economic ideals. The outcome, as we will see in the remainder of this chapter, was that 
those tensions that had been so apparent in US policy since 1953 would come to the fore 
and impact severely upon the US position in Latin America. 
29 For an excellent analysis of the Nixon trip, see: Alan McPherson, Yankee No!: Anti Americanism in US- 
Latin American Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003) 
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Once Nixon had escaped from Caracas, he wasted little time in returning to 
Washington. 30 On May 15 he reported on his trip to the Cabinet and cited Communist 
incitement as the catalyst for the protests. `Communist inspiration was evident from the 
similarity of placards, slogans and techniques, ' stated Nixon. Secretary Dulles agreed, 
noting that, `the Soviet Union had cleverly infiltrated mass political movements in Latin 
America. '31 CIA Director Allen Dulles took issue with this argument, though. Stephen 
Rabe notes that he, `challenged his brother's views, arguing that turmoil in Latin America 
transcended any possible political manipulation' and that, `his agency could find no 
evidence that Moscow had orchestrated the Nixon incidents. '32 Yet, despite Allen Dulles' 
misgivings, US officials would continue to evaluate the Nixon incident within the 
dualistic world view, which - as we have seen - was in keeping with the way that US 
policy toward the Third World had changed in the mid-to-late-1950s. As a result, their 
attempts to reconstruct their foreign policy approach toward Latin America would be 
undertaken purely from a strategic perspective; meaning that despite recognising the fact 
that US economic policies were partly to blame for the outbreak of Latin American 
anger, there would be no significant changes to US economic principles. 33 The 
administration's approach of citing both communist and justifiable Latin anger at US 
economic policies as being behind the anti-Nixon protests was outlined by Assistant 
Secretary of State Eric Snow, who had himself been on the trip. In a memorandum of 
May 15, he wrote: 
30 The administration went out of its way to welcome the Vice President home, with even Eisenhower 
himself taking `the unusual step of going to the airport to greet Nixon. ' There was, however, a break with 
tradition: as Nixon descended the steps from his aircraft he chose to `emphasize the region's 
underdevelopment, ' when explaining the reasons for Latin discontent, stating: `They are concerned, as they 
should be, about poverty and misery and disease which exist in so many places. They are determined to do 
something about it. ' Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States (1999) p 351-2 
31 Minutes of Cabinet Meeting, May 16 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 238-9; Stephen Rabe, "The 
Caribbean Triangle: Betancourt, Castro, and Trujillo and US Foreign Policy, 1958-1963", Diplomatic 
History (Volume 20, No 1, Winter 1996) p 57 
32 Stephen Rabe "The Caribbean Triangle" (1996) p 57; Memorandum from CIA Director Allen Dulles to 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 19 June 1958, Folder - Conversations with Dulles, A. W, Box 8, John 
Foster Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library 
33 Statistical evidence that there was much more behind the anti-Nixon protests than communist 
insurrection was provided at the May 22 NSC Meeting, where Allen Dulles highlighted the fact that: `99 
persons in Caracas, 12 of them Communists, have been arrested in connection with the riot against the Vice 
President' Memorandum of Discussion at the 366"' Meeting of the National Security Council, May 22 
1958, Box No 10, NSC Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library 
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such as tariffs, quotas, surplus disposals, and the magnitude of financial 
assistance. 34 
Although there had undoubtedly been some short-term causes of the protests, 35 
the administration recognised the need for it to address the long-term causes behind US- 
Latin disharmony. Up until this moment, there had been little domestic input with regard 
to action in Latin America: the region had not featured heavily in the 1956 election, nor 
had it aroused much interest from Congress or the American people. However, the anti- 
Nixon protests suddenly made US-Latin relations far more visible and energised both the 
Congress and some sectors of American society in calling for the problems in intra- 
hemispheric relations to be addressed. 36 As the internal inquest progressed, a consensus 
began to emerge within the administration. Communist insurgency had played some role 
in facilitating the protests, but there was quite clearly a deep rooted animosity within 
Latin America toward the US, which was in the main fired by a deep mistrust of US 
economic policies. 37 This approach was outlined by the Operations Coordinating Board 
in a report of May 21, in which they wrote, 
Continuing political instability and intensified economic problems in most 
of Latin America-have overshadowed other progress in the political field 
and have led to increased social unrest. These adverse factors, coupled with 
increased Soviet Bloc attention to the area, call for prompt effective action 
to help solve some of the economic problems and to give greater political 
and psychological emphasis to US policy in the area ... the principal factors deterring more substantial progress were: a sustained and widespread 
decline in markets and prices for basic export commodities... reduction in 
3` Memorandum from ARA Eric Snow to Secretary of State Dulles, May 15 1958,1958 - IBRD -N( 
Miscellaneous), Box No 7, Papers of the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Roy R 
Rubottom, Lot 60 D 553, National Archives, College Park, Maryland; FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 236-8 
3s The main one of these was the decision of the US to afford political asylum to the recently deposed, and 
much-hated, Venezuelan dictator Perez Jimenez and his former Chief of Police, a move that inflamed the 
huge number of Venezuelans that had suffered under his rule 
36 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) highlights the wide-ranging calls for action from within US society 
and political circles p 102-3 
37 Lars Schoultz highlights the way that this process evolved by citing the comments made by Under- 
Secretary of State Robert Murphy in several appearances before congressional committees. He writes: 
'Like most of his colleagues, Under-Secretary Murphy was torn between two analyses... Murphy captured 
the growing Washington consensus by merging the two separate causal agents. Communists were involved, 
but only as an intervening force, not as the root of the problem: "The trouble in Caracas was caused by the 
intensive exploitation of communist and other anti-American elements of grievances against our policies. "' 
Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States (1998) p 353 
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the foreign exchange holdings in most countries... the failure of some Latin 
American governments to put their own economic and political houses in 
order; an increase in the propaganda and activities of the Soviet Bloc... the 
failure of most countries effectively to curb communist activities; an 
intensification of ultra-nationalist, anti-US sentiment; and the increased 
political instability in some countries. 38 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, the administration was clearly attempting to fit 
their appraisal of the events of the Nixon trip into the national security framework, which 
they had been increasingly imposing onto Latin America since the aftermath of the Soviet 
Economic Offensive. 39 Despite the rather rigid application of a traditional Cold War 
perspective, though, we can quite clearly identify the fact that US officials were now 
admitting that Latin discontent over economic and social disparity and an increasing 
frustration with US economic policy were the major causes of Latin anti-Americanism. 
As Stephen Rabe writes, `while publicly blaming Communists for the attacks on Nixon, 
the administration knew it needed a new approach to restore public confidence and to 
assuage the Latin Americans-'40 A further OCB report on Latin America directly outlined 
the problems that had caused the discontent behind the Nixon protests. It read, 
A major threat to the achievement of US policy objectives in Latin America 
is the feeling prevailing among Latin Americans that a much too low 
priority has been placed by the US Government on operations in the area, 
particularly when compared to US policies, objectives, programs and 
approaches in other parts of the world ... they point with resentment to the 
minuscule economic and military assistance funds which have gone their 
way and tend to use these as a measure of our respect and consideration for 
them... Consequently, in the entire range of US relationships with Latin 
America, we should strive to convince the governments and peoples of the 
38 Report from the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council, "Report on Latin 
America", May 21 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 2-13; OCB Report on Latin America for President 
Eisenhower, June 191958,369'" Meeting of the National Security Council, Box No 10, NSC Series, 
Whitman File, Eisenhower Library 
39 In a Memorandum of June 19 1958, State Department official, Henry Hoyt, told Roy Rubottom that: 
The paper concludes that the Communists unquestionably played a prominent part in organizing and 
directing the incidents but that there was no pre-arranged Communist plan envisaging violent disturbances. ' 
Memorandum from Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry 
Hoyt to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom, June 19 1958, Folder - 
1958 - Nixon Trip to South 
America, Box 7, Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom 1957-1959, Lot 59 D 573, National Archives, 
College Park, Maryland 
40 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 104 
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area that the United States is aware of and sympathizes with their legitimate 
interests and aspirations and considers them equal partners in undertakings 
of mutual interests and benefits 41 
For the Eisenhower administration, addressing the status of US-Latin American 
economic relations could not be postponed any longer. And the US had quite clearly been 
delaying Latin attempts to bring about a much-needed shift in US economic policy. In a 
memorandum to Assistant Secretary Roy Rubottom, US Ambassador to the Organization 
of American States, John Dreier, highlighted the dominant trends in the current US-Latin 
American economic relationship. Latin concerns over economic issues had been 
disregarded and, as seen at the Buenos Aires Conference in 1957, the US had deliberately 
tried to derail any proposed change in economic policy. Dreier wrote, 
A strong interest continues to exist among the representatives of the Latin 
American countries... for an Inter-American economic agreement as 
recommended by Resolution 2 of the Buenos Aires Economic 
Conference... Up to this point, the US position has been one of attempting to 
go along with Resolution 2 of Buenos Aires but to apply delaying tactics, 
and otherwise avoid being drawn into a full-scale negotiation... sooner or 
later - and probably sooner - we will have to make a pretty clear statement 
of our position on this matter ... I see two alternatives open to us at that 
stage: a) to inform the other governments that we do not intend to enter into 
an economic agreement now or at Quito42 and that they might as well stop 
talking about it; or b) to inform the other governments that we think a 
general economic agreement of the kind discussed at Buenos Aires is 
impossible... From a practical point of view, there is no doubt but that the 
first alternative is preferable ... I 
believe, therefore, that we should take 
another look at the possibility of drafting a harmless economic agreement 
which we could urge the Senate to ratify for political purposes. 3 
As late as April 1958, then, there was clearly very little enthusiasm within the upper 
levels of the Eisenhower administration for any concession toward the Latin nations on a 
reshaped economic agenda. Yet as the inquest into the events of Nixon's trip began to 
41 Operations Plan for Latin America Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board, May 28 1958, FRUS 
1958-1960 Volume Vp 20-7 
42 Reference to the planned Economic Conference in Quito, Peru in 1960 
43 Memorandum from US Ambassador to the OAS John Dreier to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
American Affairs Roy Rubottom, April 10 1958, Folder - 1958 - Economic, Box 6, Record Group 59, 
Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom, Subject 
Files 1957-1959, Lot 59 D 573, National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
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As late as April 1958, then, there was clearly very little enthusiasm within the upper 
levels of the Eisenhower administration for any concession toward the Latin nations on a 
reshaped economic agenda. Yet as the inquest into the events of Nixon's trip began to 
gather pace in Washington, it became increasingly obvious that a shift in economic policy 
would be required. 
But the crucial point here is that in addressing the status of the intra-hemispheric 
economic relationship, the administration would not renounce its belief in the basic 
principles underpinning its economic approach. Therefore, whilst implementing a new 
policy that was designed to mollify the Latin nations' complaints about economic and 
social underdevelopment, the actual aims of the administration's economic programme in 
Latin America would not change at all. 44 The expansion of "free trade, free investment 
and free capital" continued to underpin the administration's economic approach. But - as 
a result of the process begun in the wake of the Soviet Economic Offensive and 
heightened by the Nixon trip - the US would come to view its economic problems in 
Latin America as being essentially a problem related to the national security concerns 
that had come to dominate US-Latin relations. As a result, the pattern highlighted earlier 
- whereby the economic and strategic aims within US policy essentially undermined each 
other - would be exacerbated further by the process that was implemented in the post- 
Nixon trip period. 
In keeping with the ongoing changes in the nature of the Cold War45, the 
Eisenhower administration would fit the events of the Nixon trip around their pre-existing 
bipolar world view. However, in a marked change, the administration's internal 
appraisals had concluded that there were legitimate grievances within the region, which 
44 For more general discussions on this, see: Michael Adamson, "The Most Important Single Aspect of our 
Foreign Policy" (2006); Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, "Neither a Carrot Nor a Stick" (2006); Burton Kaufman, 
Trade & Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1982) 
45 This, as we have seen, saw the focus of east-west tensions moving toward the Third World and away 
from the European mainland. 
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would be consistent with pre-existing US economic goals and be designed to solve a 
problem of strategic not economic proportions. 
NATIONAL SECURITY -V- ECONOMICS: NSC 5902/1 &A "NEW" ECONOMIC 
POLICY 
Having outlined both communist agitation and long-standing Latin discontent 
with US economic policies as being behind the anti-Nixon protests, the Eisenhower 
administration's reassessment of its Latin American policies was beset by a troubling 
paradox. In attempting to repair the damage done to US-Latin American relations, how 
did the US alter to its economic policy without undermining its actual economic 
principles? It is vitally important here to understand that although the economic aspects 
of US policy had been incorporated into the now dominant national security approach to 
Latin America, they remained identical to those objectives that had been a pre-eminent 
part of US foreign policy since the early-1940s. 
46 As we saw above, strategic imperatives 
necessitated a modification of US foreign economic policy toward Latin America by the 
summer of 1958. It is of fundamental importance here to stress that this acceptance of a 
need for a change in economic policy was being driven by strategic concerns. This 
section will illustrate the internal debates and considerations that led into NSC 5902/1, 
and, also, highlight the way that leading administration officials attempted to address the 
problems in US-Latin economic relations whilst still adhering to basic US economic 
objectives. 
The understanding that something needed to be done about US-Latin economic 
relations had been accepted at all levels of the Eisenhower administration. Indeed, as the 
internal record shows, the OCB, the CIA and several members of Vice President Nixon's 
touring party agreed that the anti-American protests in Caracas had been caused by more 
46 Namely the expansion and extension of the American economic system of liberal capitalism 
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The understanding that something needed to be done about US-Latin economic 
relations had been accepted at all levels of the Eisenhower administration. Indeed, as the 
internal record shows, the OCB, the CIA and several members of Vice President Nixon's 
touring party agreed that the anti-American protests in Caracas had been caused by more 
than simply communist agitation. 7 The acceptance by US officials of the fact that Latin 
discontent was being partly fostered by dissatisfaction with US economic policies 
inevitably brought the president's brother, Milton, and those advisors advocating a 
change in US economic policy into a position of hitherto unknown prominence. 
48 Despite 
this enthusiasm for reappraising existing economic policies, though, it is important to 
make two observations. Firstly, that the developing recommendation within the 
administration for a change in economic policy had only come about due to strategic 
concerns - not because of any change in economic objectives or priorities. And secondly, 
that as a result of this any changes in US economic policy would be designed to adhere to 
long-standing economic objectives within US foreign policy. 49 
In an effort to try and assuage both domestic and international concerns about the 
US role in Latin America, the decision was taken to send Milton Eisenhower on a fact- 
finding50 tour of the region in the summer of 1958.51 Washington's effort toward reaching 
47 It will be remembered that both Nixon and Foster Dulles had been slapped down by CIA Chief Allen 
Dulles when placing too much emphasis on the role of the Soviets in the protests. See: Lars Schoultz, 
Beneath the United States (1998) for a good account of this debate p 351-4 
48 Milton Eisenhower himself has identified 1958 as being a pivotal year in the re-shaping of US economic 
policy, writing: `The year was an important one in Latin American-United States relations... all records 
were broken by the flow of private and public capital to Latin America... Dillon, Mann, and Rubottom 
quickly recognized the need for changes 
in our policies. They began setting up commodity study groups', 
and `agreed that the time had come for us to take the lead in creating an Inter-American Bank, thus 
discarding a century-old policy. ' Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter: The United States and Latin 
America (New York: Doubleday and Company Inc, 1963) p 209 
091n fact, this much is revealed by Rabe, who writes: `Administration officials remained sanguine about 
inter-American relations. They actually concluded that the vice-president's unhappy experience had had 
salutary effects, for it had alerted them and the US public to potential dangers ... Until 1960, the Eisenhower 
administration continued to hold that a secure and stable hemisphere could be achieved basically with free 
trade and investment policies, military aid, and admonitions to Latin Americans not to form ties with 
Moscow or with local Communist parties. ' Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 115 
50 The possibility of titling it a "goodwill tour" was discounted following the Nixon trip 
51 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993) p 139-141; Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter (1963) 
p 209-211; Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States (1998) p 353-4; Memorandum from the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom to Secretary of State Dulles, May 21 1958; 
Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to Secretary of State Dulles, May 27 
230 
of some $40 billion52 - certainly did not (This will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 
Six; but it is necessary to be aware of it here in order to understand the limited appeal to 
the Latin nations of those changes advocated by the US in Milton Eisenhower's report 
and in NSC 5902/1). The report filed by Milton Eisenhower on his return from Latin 
America did indeed reaffirm many of the themes that had emerged in the immediate 
aftermath of the Nixon visit. Namely, that increasing communist influence was a problem 
in the region; that the US needed to accord far more importance to its relationship with 
the Latin nations; and, that there needed to be a shift in US economic policy. However, 
the economic changes it advocated would be a long way short of those proposed by 
Kubitschek and, as a result, would see the US failing once again to engage with Latin 
American economic concerns. 
In Chapter Three we saw that US officials were becoming increasingly concerned 
at the lack of dynamism within the Latin economies and with the potential balance of 
payments problems that were likely to emerge in the next few years (This was also highly 
prominent in the administration's appraisals of the Brazilian economy in the 1956-58 
period). The continuing problems in the majority of the Latin economies were 
highlighted in a report produced by the Business Advisory Council in January 1958. This 
report highlighted the fact that although Latin American gold and dollar holdings - 
`measured by balance of payments residuals' - actually improved by $511 million, this 
was wholly dependent upon the fact that Venezuela's holdings alone improved by $797 
million; the remaining Latin nations lost $286 million (These statistics were even more 
troubling when it was revealed that the vast majority of the Venezuelan "profit" was a 
result of non-repeatable investment - i. e. a one-off capital investment in the petroleum 
industry). 53 A further indicator of US concern was their decision to consider introducing a 
coffee pricing agreementTM in order to reduce the risk of an inevitable crash in prices as 
sz Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 157 
s3 Report by Maurice McAshan of the Business Advisory Council Committee on Latin America, "That 
Dollar Gap", January 24 1958, Folder -1958 - Business Advisory Council, Box No 5,1958 American & 
Foreign Power -D (Miscellaneous), Lot 60 D 553, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. 
' In March 1958, the Business Advisory Council stated: 'if the United States continues in its present 
policy, sometime in 1958 coffee prices will break to a point where the burden which the Latin American 
coffee producing countries have to take upon themselves will be heavier than they can bear. ' Report on 
Coffee by the Business Advisory Council's Committee on Latin America, March 31 1958, Folder - 1958 - 
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global supplies increased and demand stabilised. 55 This was a major shift in US policy. 56 
The Eisenhower administration believed that by participating in such an agreement they 
would be able to implement more appropriate economic principles in the region and 
boost their goodwill with regard to the Latin nations. 57 This pattern of events concurs 
with the view put forward by Sieluneier, who has argued that there were some changes in 
US economic policy being implemented in 1957 and 1958.58 
Business Advisory Council, Box No 5,1958 American & Foreign Power -D (Miscellaneous), Lot 60 D 
553, National Archives, College Park, Maryland; CFEP 569 - International Coffee Problem, Box No 9, 
CFEP Series, NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower Library; 
55 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993) writes: `After having refused for years to join any 
arrangement to stabilize roller-coaster coffee prices, he [Eisenhower] decided to join producers in a one- 
year deal. ' p 141; James Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 311-5 
56 Just how big a shift this was for the US is determined by a glance at existing US policy on commodity 
agreements at this time, which was set out by the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP) at a meeting 
in October 1955. Here they stated: `The United States believes that there are few situations where 
international commodity agreements may be appropriate or desirable and the United States would be 
prepared to participate in a particular commodity agreement only when such participation can be 
demonstrated to be clearly in the national interest of the United States. ' By 1958 the situation in Latin 
America was such that a commodity agreement could quite feasibly be argued as being in the national 
interest of the United States. Memorandum from Secretary of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy 
Paul H Cullen to the Members of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, May 12 1958, CFEP 569 - 
International Coffee Problem, Box No 9, CFEP Series, NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower Library; Letter sent 
from Executive Director of the Business Advisory Council George Wyeth Jr, to Assistant Secretary of State 
Roy Rubottom, February 26 1958, containing minutes of BAC meeting on February 4 1958, Folder - 1958 
- Business Advisory 
Council, Box No 5,1958 American & Foreign Power -D (Miscellaneous), Lot 60 D 
553, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. 
57 In May, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon, sent a memorandum to Clarence Randall, 
the Chairman of the CFEP, outlining the growing need for a commodity agreement. He wrote: `Unless a 
basic adjustment of the growing imbalance in the production and consumption of coffee is sought.. . the cost 
to the United States of maintaining economic stability and security in the Western Hemisphere may become 
excessive. ' Dillon went onto tell Randall that entering into a coffee agreement would benefit the US in two 
ways: firstly, the US `would gain a psychological and political advantage by demonstrating that we do not 
seek the lowest possible price for coffee'; and secondly, the US `would have the opportunity to influence 
international planning along sound lines, thereby supplementing the efforts of the international Monetary 
Fund' which would also mean that, `demands on the United States by these countries for balance-of- 
payments assistance would be substantially less than would otherwise be the case. ' Memorandum from the 
Deputy Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, to the Chairman of the CFEP Clarence Randall, May 5th 
1958. CFEP 569 - International Coffee Problem, Box No 9, CFEP Series, NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower 
Library; see also memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State Harry Turkel to Assistant Secretary Roy 
Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann, Secretary Dulles and Under-Secretary Douglas 
Dillon, April 10th 1958, which outlines the evolving US position with respect to the Latin economy and 
commodity agreements. Folder - 1958 - Economic, Box 6,1958 - Economic - Inter-American Regional 
Development Institution, Lot 60 D 553, National Archives, College Park, Maryland; James Siekmeier, Aid 
Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 315 
58 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) argues that this change in 
approach may have had something to do with the worsening economic position of the US, writing: `Latin 
American instability also occurred within another crucial context that was unfolding in the United States. 
The crumbling US balance of payments position seriously limited Washington's policy alternatives. ' Under 
these circumstances, the Eisenhower administration had to attempt to alleviate the economic problems in 
Latin America but whilst also taking into account their own economic problems p 295-301 
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The final report submitted by Milton Eisenhower recommended a more inclusive, 
more engaging and more developed form of US policy toward Latin America: building 
on the suggestions made by Vice President Nixon and calling for more attention to be 
paid to US-Latin relations and for a modified US stance toward Latin dictators. 59 The 
majority of the recommendations, though, were in the economic field and were in 
keeping with those outlined consistently by Milton Eisenhower and officials like Thomas 
Mann, Douglas Dillon and Roy Rubottom since 1956.60 He wrote, 
So far as United States lending institutions are concerned, I am convinced 
that the time has arrived for us to take a more positive approach in using 
credit as an effective means of forwarding American foreign policy; this 
clearly involves helping Latin America achieve its sound economic goals 
and thus serving the best interest of the United States itself ... 1 urge the 
United States proceed as rapidly as possible to cooperate with leaders of the 
Latin American Republics in creating an Inter American Bank Such a new 
institution should coordinate its operations closely with those of the World 
Bank, United States lending institutions and private lending agencies to the 
end that the total flow of development capital into Latin America may be 
increased. 6l 
However, as argued throughout this chapter so far, the true importance of the 
events of 1958 lay not in the momentousness of the changes, but in the fact that US 
officials were - as a matter of strategic concern - considering making changes to their 
economic policy at all. Internal administration assessments on the state of US-Latin 
American relations at the end of 1958 substantiated Milton Eisenhower's assertion that 
there needed to be rapid changes made in US policy. Once this had been established, the 
path toward NSC 5902/1 was assured: but to what extent did the policy put forward in the 
document address those problems identified by administration officials as impacting upon 
3I in fact, as we have seen, many of these changes had been implemented - or had begun to be discussed - 
before Dr Eisenhower's report was even submitted. As the Baltimore Morning Sun wrote on January 5 
1959, the report has special value because some of its recommendations are already being acted upon. ' 
Price Day "Dr Eisenhower Recommends", Baltimore Morning sum January 5 1959, Box 7, Milton S 
Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library 
60 Milton Eisenhower, The Wine is Bitter (1%3) p 221-3 
61 "United States-Latin American Relations, 1953-1958", Report to the president by Milton Eisenhower, 
December 27 1958, Box 7, Milton S Eisenhower Papers, Eisenhower Library 
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US-Latin relations? The answer is that due to the continuing tension between economic 
and security aims within US policy, the impact of these changes would be severely 
limited. US support for a new regional lending institution was revealed in August 1958; 62 
by November, though, the announcement of this institution and the discussions over 
possible commodity agreements, had failed to address many of the problems confronting 
the US in the region. A special report on Latin America produced by the OCB noted that 
the challenge for the US lay in implementing the proposed changes in policy 
successfully, stating: 
The underlying political and economic maladjustments in the area which 
were reported as the problems six months ago remain much the same and 
are not subject to rapid solution... progress will depend on the ability of the 
United States and Latin American Governments to move smoothly from the 
phase of consultation and planning to the phase of concrete action which lies 
immediately ahead. 
The report was far more specific when outlining the overwhelmingly economic nature of 
those problems, which now confronted the US in Latin America. 
The six months since our last report have brought further illustrations of the 
basic economic, political, psychological and other problems which affect the 
attainment of US operations goals in Latin America... Latin Americans 
have... become more sensitive to the actions of the United States, tending to 
judge everything that does not in their eyes contribute sufficiently to the 
achievement of these [economic] aspirations as obstructionism. Underlying 
these frustrations is a concept held by large segments of Latin American 
opinion that the United States - rather than the Latin American peoples and 
governments themselves - is primarily responsible for the solution of Latin 
American economic and political problems... Experience has shown that 
Latin Americans frequently react negatively to exhortations from the United 
States to put their houses in order... [and] Latin American responses to 
announcement of US economic policies have fluctuated between 
62 James Siekmeier outlines the process, writing: `In part, the administration took the critical step of 
committing itself to a regional development bank because of the recent decision to set up a similar 
institution for the Middle East nations. The United States could not, without considerable diplomatic 
backlash, create such a bank in the Middle East and not in Latin America. On 12 August Dillon informed a 
group of diplomats from the Western Hemisphere that at long last the United States is "prepared to consider 
the establishment of an inter-American regional development institution which would receive support from 
all its member countries. "' James Siekmeier, Ai4 Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 320; 
Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 112 
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exaggerated expectations of large-scale US underwriting of the area's 
modernization to hyper-critical condemnation of the US disregard for Latin 
needs. In this atmosphere, we have not found - and it may not be possible to 
find - an approach which will entirely meet the problem of identifying the 
United States satisfactorily as a wholly constructive force in the area. 63 
There was quite clearly a major problem in US-Latin American economic 
relations, which had impacted severely on the status of the relationship. And yet it is the 
last sentence of that quote that is of most significance: US officials, for the first time, 
recognised the fact that they might never be able to iron out all of the problems in the 
inter-hemispheric economic relationship. National security concerns, though - heightened 
by the spectacle of the Vice President being assaulted in Caracas - dictated that the 
Eisenhower administration needed to be seen to be reasserting their position in the region 
and fighting back against the communist threat that had been portrayed as being behind 
all foreign policy reverses. Scholars from both the Traditional and Revisionist schools 
have not developed a framework that examines the conflicting tensions between 
economics and security in US policy toward Latin America during this period 64 By 
highlighting them here, we will see that the ultimate failure of the process leading up to 
NSC 5902/1 was down to the administration's enduring faith in its economic principles 
and its continued emphasis on national security concerns when appraising the situation in 
the region. The incompatibility of these two separate aims would be exacerbated by the 
policy outlined in NSC 5902/1, and would come to dominate the Eisenhower 
administration's policies in the region until it left office in January 1961. 
63 Special Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council, November 26 
1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 36-60 
64 One early appraisal that did seek to draw out the inconsistencies and fragmentations in US policy toward 
Latin America was by Christopher Mitchell. He stated: `Most critical observers have assumed that since the 
United States has been the dominant hemispheric power, her policies have also been centrally determined, 
rationally interlaced, and coherently executed... but the record of the last 20 years indicated, I think, that 
North American policy has not been as unified as many have maintained. ' Christopher Mitchell, 
"Dominance and Fragmentation in US Latin American Policy" in Julio Cotler and Richard Fegen (ads), 
Latin America & the United States: The Changing Political Realities (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1974) pp 176-204. Since then, studies of US policy in Latin America have focused on a 
singular aspect of US policy - for examples, see: Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988); James Siekmeier, Aid 
Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999); Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000); Lars 
Schoultz, Beneath the United States (1998); Joseph Smith, The United States and Latin America (2005) 
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The inherent differences between the administration's recognition of the fact that 
it was US economic policy that was souring inter-hemispheric relations65 and the actual 
policy outlined to address these problems, can be clearly seen in the document NSC 
5902/1. Having outlined the administration's deliberations over how to change US policy 
in the aftermath of the Nixon trip it would seem logical to suppose that NSC 5902/1 
would be predominantly concerned with addressing the economic problems in US-Latin 
relations. And yet this was not the case. Although NSC 5902/1 did address some areas of 
concern with regard to economic matters, these were recommendations that had already 
been implemented or suggested by officials such as Milton Eisenhower, Roy Rubottom, 
Thomas Mann and Douglas Dillon. Instead, the document outlined a policy that was 
predominantly concerned with meeting Washington's strategic aims. For an explanation 
of why, we need to return to the central argument of this chapter: that the Eisenhower 
administration did not perceive any need for it to alter its basic economic principles - 
those changes in economic policy which were outlined in NSC 5902/1 were designed to 
placate Latin nationalism and meet overriding US security concerns. 
This disparity between economics and security was demonstrated at the NSC 
Meeting on February 12,1959. Most of the meeting focused on overwhelming security 
concerns in Latin America. CIA Director, Allen Dulles, outlined a number of problems 
confronting the US in Cuba, Venezuela, Mexico, Panama, Argentina and Chile, whilst 
much of the discussion was taken up with a debate over the US stance with regard to 
trade between the Soviet Bloc and Latin America (predominantly a security not an 
economic concern) and outlining the US stance with regard to dictatorships and military 
assistance. ' Milton Eisenhower, in a document representing his views, tried to reaffirm 
his advocacy of a change in economic policy, stating: `we should rigidly limit our 
military assistance to Latin America and maximise our economic assistance. We should 
do everything we can to encourage the Latin American countries to devote every 
65 These sentiments were outlined once more in a Special National Intelligence Estimate in December 1958, 
which highlighted the reasons for Latin disenchantment with the US being mainly because of economic 
factors. NIE 80/90-58 "Latin American Attitudes Toward the US", National Intelligence Estimate, 
December 21958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 60-78 
66 Memorandum of Discussion at the 396'" Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 
February 12 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 79-91; 
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assistance. Milton Eisenhower, in a document representing his views, tried to reaffirm 
his advocacy of a change in economic policy, stating: `we should rigidly limit our 
military assistance to Latin America and maximise our economic assistance. We should 
do everything we can to encourage the Latin American countries to devote every 
available resource to economic development. '67 But at the NSC Meeting this appraisal 
was rejected, with both the Planning Board officials and President Eisenhower 
reaffirming the importance of military assistance 68 This highlights the fact that the 
advice and recommendations of those officials advocating a change in US economic 
policy was only countenanced when it proved to be compatible with the national security 
aims and objectives of the US. 
The same disparity between security and economics is apparent in NSC 5902/1 
itself. Indeed, a reading of the document demonstrates the extent to which national 
security and strategic considerations were impacting upon US officials at this time. Rabe 
highlights the administration's intention with the new policy, writing: `In pursuit of the 
"fundamental objective" of asserting US leadership in the Western Hemisphere, President 
Eisenhower modified his Latin American policy. ' `By praising representative 
governments and by encouraging commodity agreements and a regional development 
bank, the president and his advisors hoped to mollify Latin Americans and restore calm 
and stability to inter-American relations. '69 Although this was, indeed, the aim of the 
policy, it was also its biggest fault: the continued dominance of a bipolar perspective 
when considering foreign policy events, and an enduring faith in the US model of 
economic development, meant that the administration singularly failed to engage with 
66 Memorandum of Discussion at the 396th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 
February 12 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 79-91; 
67 Memorandum from Philip Halia of the NSC Staff to Special Assistant for National Security Affairs 
Gordon Gray on Milton Eisenhower's views concerning NSC 5902, February 9 1959, Latin America (3), 
Box No 5, White House Office - NSC Staff Papers, Special Staff Series, Eisenhower Library; Briefing 
Note for NSC Meeting 2-12-59, "US Policy Toward Latin America", February 11 1959, Latin America (5), 
Box No 64, Disaster File Series, NSC Staff Papers, Eisenhower Library 
68 In fact, President Eisenhower stated: `this was an example of excess caution by his brother and that no 
revision was really required to meet this point. ' Memorandum of Discussion at the 396th Meeting of the 
National Security Council, Washington, February 12 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 79-91 
69 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 115 
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Even with Washington's new policy, United States relations with Latin 
America were not friendly. According to John Moors Cabot71... the manner 
in which the policy shift took place actually worsened intra-hemispheric 
ties. He believed that the norteamericanos had given Latin America "nibbles 
as their demands became so strident we felt something must be done. " In 
addition to creating resentment, the United States "has instilled in them [the 
Latin Americans] the conviction that they will not get anything except by 
exerting maximum pressure. " He gloomily concluded, "I fear that if we do 
not do more than what is forced upon us, we are going to find that we will 
increasingly lose control of the situation in Latin America. "72 
It was not only Cabot's prescience that was remarkable about this statement; his 
summary of the "new" US policy was also highly acute. What Cabot does not mention is 
that the reason for this is that US objectives in the economic sphere were wholly 
incompatible with those in the strategic sphere. 
The emphasis on security issues in Latin America becomes even more apparent in 
NSC 5902/1, with the document reading: 
Latin America plays a key role in the security of the United States. In the 
face of the anticipated prolonged threat from Communist expansionism, the 
United States must rely heavily on the moral and political support of Latin 
America for US policies designed to counter this threat. A defection by any 
significant number of Latin American countries to the ranks of neutralism, 
or the exercise of a controlling Communist influence over their 
governments, would seriously impair the ability of the United States to 
exercise effective leadership of the Free World, particularly in the UN, and 
constitute a blow to US prestige. Apart from the Communist threat, the long 
term security of the United States requires the maintenance of harmonious 
relations with the other American Republics, whose rapidly growing 
population and expanding economies will make them of increasing 
importance. 73 
Of the objectives listed in the document, eight out of ten were concerned with strategic 
issues. Crucially, however, those economic objectives that were listed remained rooted in 
traditional US economic theory. Whilst by no means the predominant feature of US 
" Who, it will be remembered, had been Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until 1954 
before falling out with Dulles; he returned to the region in 1959 as US Ambassador to Colombia 
72 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 323 
73 NSC 5902/1 "Statement of US Policy Toward Latin America", February 16 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume Vp 91-104 
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population and expanding economies will make them of increasing 
importance. 73 
Of the objectives listed in the document, eight out of ten were concerned with strategic 
issues. Crucially, however, those economic objectives that were listed remained rooted in 
traditional US economic theory. Whilst by no means the predominant feature of US 
policy, their inclusion and their constancy ensured that US aims in the strategic sphere 
would be severely hindered by US aims in the economic sphere. 
The economic aims in NSC 5902/1 were: `Sound and growing economies capable 
of providing rising living standards within the general framework of a free enterprise 
system'; and the, `Increased flow of US and other Free World investment capital to Latin 
America, and increased trade among Latin American countries and between them and the 
United States and other Free World countries. '74 These aims were wholly consistent with 
the administration's economic goals in Latin America since coming to office in 1953.75 
The overriding problem was the impact that their inclusion had on US strategic interests: 
Latin dissatisfaction could not be quelled unless there was a wholesale change in US 
economic policy. With such a prospect negated by the economic objectives outlined in 
NSC 5902/1, the ultimate failure of the Eisenhower administration's security-motivated 
attempt to rescue its position in the region was assured. 
Just how this imbalance between economic and security ideals would impact on 
actual US policy was demonstrated in the negotiations for the creation of the 
aforementioned Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The administration's main 
objective in formulating the Bank's structure would be to make it compatible with 
traditional US economic objectives, which would seriously undermine the effectiveness 
of the Bank as a policy initiative. The IADB would be severely hindered by the ongoing 
tension between economics and security in US policy toward Latin America. Created for 
73 NSC 5902/1 "Statement of US Policy Toward Latin America", February 16 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume Vp 91-104 
74 Ibid 
75 Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin 
American Nationalism, 1953-1961", Diplomacy and Statecraft (Volume 14, No 3, September 2003); 
Burton Kaufman, Trade & Aid (1982); Michael Adamson, "The Most Important Single Aspect of our 
Foreign Policy" (2006) 
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Washington's rejection of Kubitschek's OPA was due to its inherent lack of 
economic feasibility and because it so directly contravened American economic 
principles. The IADB, though, was designed in accordance with US economic ideals: as 
Rabe points out, in spite of the events of 1958, Eisenhower continued, `to hold that Latin 
Americans needed to attract private investment and to root out radicalism. i76 On March 5 
1959 a group of officials - including Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson and Under- 
Secretary of State Douglas Dillon - called on President Eisenhower to discuss the 
IADB's formation. They presented him with a finished proposal for the IADB, which 
confessed that: 'We have been reluctant to make this institution too large because (1) our 
influence over the use of our money once it has been committed will be limited; (2) we 
do not wish to have the operations of the new institution impinge too heavily upon the 
Latin American lending activities of the EXIM Bank and the International Bank... ' The 
problem for the US was that such had been the shock of the anti-American protests in 
1958 that the new institution would have to be constructed on a more equal footing than 
traditional financial institutions; this meant that the US control over the IADB would be 
more limited that it had been with earlier institutions like the EXIM Bank and the World 
Bank. However, Anderson and Dillon presented Eisenhower with a solution. Their 
memorandum stated, 
We feel it is essential to insist upon a reasonably strong role for the 
management in relation to the Board of Directors and upon weighted voting 
in the latter; We would insist upon maintaining our long standing principles 
with respect to avoiding excessive competition with private enterprise; We 
intend to insist on including a provision which would enable the bank to 
limit or prohibit expenditure of its funds in communist areas; The US 
Delegation will continue to insist upon the general use of weighted voting 
procedures closely related to the value of capital subscriptions by member 
countries. 77 
76 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 114 
77 Memorandum from Special Assistant to the President Don Paarlberg to Ann Whitman on conversation 
between President Eisenhower, Secretary Anderson and Under-Secretary Dillon, March 5 1959, Whitman 
File, Eisenhower Library 
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Delegation will continue to insist upon the general use of weighted voting 
procedures closely related to the value of capital subscriptions by member 
countries. ' 
These proposals meant that the US could, in effect, ensure that Bank policy was 
compatible with existing US economic objectives; more importantly, the policy with 
regard to weighted voting meant the United States would have a strong voice in the new 
institution. 78 
The way the IADB was created, then, ensured that the US would have a powerful 
voice in the Bank's activities, as well as being able to ensure that Bank policy was 
commensurate with existing western capitalist ideals. In addition to this, the Bank's 
structure would prevent the Eisenhower administration from being wholly responsible for 
its actions; that the Latin nations were, in theory, equal partners' devolved US 
responsibility for the Bank. 79 The creation of the IADB had come about due to the 
Eisenhower administration's need to alter its Latin American policy for reasons of direct 
national security concern. Herein lay its biggest fault: underpinning the Bank's activities 
was the administration's enduring belief in its long-standing economic values - which 
continued to form the basis of US policy in Latin America, even in light of the increased 
security problems. As a result, the administration would not be prepared to violate some 
of its most basic economic principles in order to address Latin underdevelopment. As 
Matthew Loayza writes, `Although the United States created new institutions and 
increased the powers of existing ones to extend public credits to Latin America... it never 
intended those programmes to overshadow the importance of private capital 
" Memorandum from Special Assistant to the President Don Paarlberg to Ann Whitman on conversation 
between President Eisenhower, Secretary Anderson and Under-Secretary Dillon, March 5 1959, Whitman 
File, Eisenhower Library 
7" Siekmeier writes: `Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Thomas Coughran ... thought that 
Washington 
could have its voice heard within the 
inter-American bank with as little as thirty percent of the voting 
rights, which matched its contribution to the institution. In sum, if the United States contributed a 
significant plurality but not a majority of the Bank's funds, it would have a strong say over bank policy 
but 
be free of the responsibility of the problems. The IADB was capitalized at $1 billion... the US contribution 
was forty-five percent. ' James Siekmeier, Aia Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 321 
79 See also: Working Paper No 13, Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on United States Foreign 
Economic Policy, "The Projected Interamerican Development Bank: Some Preliminary Considerations, 
prepared by Walter Sedwitz, May 8 1959, Council on Foreign Relations and the American Assembly (1), 
Box No 2, Dennis Fitzgerald Papers, Eisenhower Library 
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investment. '80 There quite clearly remained a significant gap between what the Latin 
nations wanted and what the US was prepared to give. It is unavoidable to conclude that 
this was mainly because of the fact that the Latin Americans were being motivated purely 
by economic concerns, whilst the US approach was being driven by both economic and 
strategic concerns. 
The IADB was created as a solution to those tensions that were causing Latin 
anti-Americanism to increase. By 1959, however, the economic problems in the region 
were so serious that a much more significant change in economic policy was needed if 
the US was going to solve the region's financial crises. At the very time that such 
concerns should have been at the heart of US policy, though, the Eisenhower 
administration's primary focus once again moved to the political sphere: the outbreak of 
revolution in Cuba, and the subsequent shift in the geopolitical structure of the region, 
meant that US officials continued to focus their energies on addressing their national 
security objectives rather than those problems that had been identified in US-Latin 
economic relations. The result was the ultimate disintegration of the US position in the 
region as the paucity of the measures outlined in NSC 5902/1 became evident and the 
administration became too concerned with events in the Caribbean to be able to regain 
control of events on a regional level. 
THE FAILURE OF NSC 5902/1: THE CUBAN REVOLUTION & THE FINAL 
YEARS OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION 
If, for a moment, we consider what might have happened to the US position in 
Latin America if Fidel Castro had not come to power on January 1 1959, then it is 
difficult to see the US position in the region deteriorating quite as rapidly as it did 
between early 1959 and January 1961.81 Although the policies outlined in NSC 5902/1 
were not as wide-ranging or as dramatic as the Latin nations would have liked, they did 
S0 Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise" (2003) p 99 
81 By the time that the Eisenhower administration left office, the US was faced with looming interventions 
in both Cuba and the Dominican Republic, their relationship with Brazil had completely deteriorated and 
anti-American nationalism continued to pose a serious threat to US objectives 
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economic concerns. But it is difficult to see something like the "Alliance for Progress" 
that President John F Kennedy announced in 1961 emerging: the Alliance for Progress 
was very much a response to how crisis-stricken US-Latin relations were by 1961, and, 
also, is highly indicative of the Kennedy administration's penchant for aggressively 
solving foreign policy problems. 82 
Stephen Rabe argues that had Eisenhower served a third term then it is likely that 
due to the Castro threat he, too, would have opted for a grandiose development institution 
like the Alliance for Progress; but there is little actual evidence to suggest this. 83 As we 
will see, even when the US position had hardened against Castro, any changes in US 
economic policy were limited to those which appeared likely to provide a much-needed 
public relations boost to the US position in the region; short-term measures such as the 
Social Development Fund (which came about following President Eisenhower's tour of 
the region in 1960) and an expanded program of economic assistance would not be 
supported with the sort of financial sums that were required to alleviate Latin economic 
problems. As Walter LaFeber writes, `The administration finally pledged a one-shot, 
half-billion dollar aid program in early 1960. The gesture was, of course, inadequate. ' 94 
In addressing these issues, this section will outline the way that US-Cuban relations 
deteriorated after January 1959 highlight the way that US policy toward Latin America 
altered as a result, and depict the administration's final efforts to repair its position in the 
region. What will become most evident is that even as the administration continued to 
make meeting the strategic challenges confronting them in the region its main priority, 
these efforts would be consistently undermined and sabotaged by the continued influence 
of basic US economic principles on the administration's foreign policy. 
Rather than the quick-fix solutions outlined above, there was a desperate need for 
a pragmatic commitment to a long-term development scheme that would eventually bring 
about a reduction in Latin impoverishment, make wealth distribution more equal and 
diversify the economies of the Latin nations. Such a program - with any benefits a 
82 Stephen Rabe, "The Caribbean Triangle" (1996) 
83 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 138-144,149-152 
8' Waiter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions (1993) p 144-5 
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these efforts would be consistently undermined and sabotaged by the continued influence 
of basic US economic principles on the administration's foreign policy. 
Rather than the quick-fix solutions outlined above, there was a desperate need for 
a pragmatic commitment to a long-term development scheme that would eventually bring 
about a reduction in Latin impoverishment, make wealth distribution more equal and 
diversify the economies of the Latin nations. Such a program - with any benefits a 
number of years off - was not acceptable under the conventions of the Cold War mindset 
or, indeed, in the short-term electoral cycle of American politics. 85 (Significantly, at no 
time did the administration consider a funding proposal along the lines of Juscelino 
Kubitschek's Operation Pan America). In addition to these problems, the position of the 
US would be undermined even further by its problems in forming an anti-Castro alliance, 
which ultimately forced them to adopt an aggressive stance toward Rafael Trujillo the 
leader of the Dominican Republic sb As we will see in this final section, then, although 
US policy was subject to some alterations in the period after January 1959, they were not 
substantial or long-term enough to successfully solve the problem of Latin 
underdevelopment. The reason for this was that as they had been since 1953, US 
economic objectives remained unchanged and the administration refused to consider any 
relaxation on its basic economic goals: those changes that were made to US fiscal policy 
were implemented for strategic not economic reasons. It is in this latter period of the 
administration's time in office that we will see the tensions between economics and 
security within US policy demonstrated most effectively. 
Like in Guatemala, the rise of Castro, the Cuban Revolution and the subsequent 
US response has been accorded a great deal of significance in the prevailing 
85 The looming presidential election in 1960 meant that the Eisenhower administration could not risk 
adopting a long-term policy that might initially result in a deterioration in US-Latin relations, before things 
improved at a future date. The Democrats would be certain to emphasise any overt problems in the 
Eisenhower administration's foreign policy and, as a result, the administration needed to try and iron over 
any major problems that they faced during its last years in office. In fact, during the 1960 election, 
Democratic candidate - John F Kennedy - would use the situation in Cuba to harass Republican nominee 
Richard Nixon. 
86 See: Michael Hall, Sugar and Power in the Dominican Republic: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Trujillos, 
1958-1952 (USA: Greenwood Press, 2000) 
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historiography. 87 It is not necessary here to repeat the narrative of the revolution. 88 But it 
is vital that we draw out the major themes that the Cuban Revolution imposed on US 
policy and identify the impact that it had on hemispheric relations. By achieving this we 
will be able to pinpoint the ultimate reasons for the failure of the Eisenhower 
administration's Latin American policy. (This is of significant importance: as we will see 
in Chapter Six, the US-Brazilian relationship would collapse amidst disputes about 
economic policies as the US sought to secure Brazil's allegiance for a move against 
Castro, whilst Kubitschek became more strident in his demands for an increased level of 
economic aid) 
Both the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools of thought have seized upon the 
Cuban Revolution as being vital in substantiating their relative appraisals of US policy in 
Latin America. Ultimately, the question all scholars are attempting to answer when 
examining the Cuban Revolution is: why did the relationship between the US and the 
Castro regime deteriorate so rapidly? The Traditionalist school have highlighted the 
Cuban Revolution as being indicative proof of the Eisenhower administration's 
continuing crusade against communism in the Western Hemisphere, as Castro's move 
toward accommodation with the Soviet Union violated US security principles. On the 
other hand, Revisionist scholars have seen the US response to the Cuban Revolution as 
substantiating their argument that US policy was dictated by economic determinism and 
the quest to eradicate Latin economic nationalism. 89 Again, as with the Guatemalan case 
study, both the Traditionalist and Revisionist schools of thought adopt analytical 
"See: Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 117-173; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 163- 
171; Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States & Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter-American 
Relations (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1974) p 226-235; Joseph Smith, The United States and 
Latin America (2005) p 126-132; Gaddis Smith, The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993 (USA: 
Hill and Wang, 1994); Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: US Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin 
America 1910-1985 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976) Revised Edition 1985 178-211; 
James Siekmeier (1999) p 371-411; Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1997) p 375-443 gives the Cuban perspective; ); Richard Welch, Response to Revolution: 
The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1985); Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 
88 For information on Castro's accession to power and the role played by the US, see: Thomas Paterson, 
Contesting Castro (1994); Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara (1997) p 269-337 
89 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988); Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000); James Siekmeier, Aid 
Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999); Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free 
Enterprise" (2003) 
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to identify the similarities between the Cuban and Guatemalan case-studies and fully 
understand the administration's reaction. 90 The Brazilian case-study will, as we shall see 
in Chapter Six, offer a direct counterbalance to the events in Cuba: US policy in Brazil 
would be markedly different to that in Cuba, as despite the growing differences between 
the two nations in the economic sphere, the Brazilian position did not significantly 
threaten US security interests in the region. 
After Castro had seized power on January 1,1959, the US was swift to recognise 
the new regime. 91 This made sound economic sense: US companies had approximately 
$900 million invested in Cuba and exerted a powerful grip over the nation's economy, 
therefore the Eisenhower administration could expect to come under increasing pressure 
from the business lobby to protect US investments in Cuba. 92 In an effort to develop a 
relationship that would protect these investments and potentially "de-radicalize" the 
Revolution, the administration appointed its former representative to Bolivia, Philip 
Bonsai, as the new Ambassador to Cuba. (Bonsai's role in helping to stabilise US- 
Bolivian relations earlier in the decade had been crucial, and it was hoped that he could 
perform a similar task in Cuba) 
93 In keeping with the policy outlined in NSC 5902/1, the 
Eisenhower administration did not want any further period of instability affecting US- 
Latin relations; therefore, if they could forge a working relationship with the new Cuban 
government then it would directly benefit the attainment of US strategic objectives. 
However, it would, once again, be the tension between economics and strategic 
objectives within US policy that would come to dominate the US position in Cuba: as a 
result of Washington's enduring belief in its own economic principles, the US-Cuban 
relationship would begin to collapse once Castro's economic policies began to take 
shape. 
90 Although Rabe and Siekmeier both offer up a wider analysis of the US response to the Cuban 
Revolution, they do so whilst retaining their singular analytical approach: as a result, they see the post-1959 
period as being a continuation of the themes outlined throughout th eir works. 
' Editorial Note Referring to meeting between Ambassador Smith, Acting secretary of state Herter and 
Assistant Secretary Rubottom, January 6 1959; Telegram from the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of 
State, January 6 1959; Memorandum from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to President Eisenhower, 
January 7 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume VI p 344-347 
92 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 119-120; James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American 
Relations (1999) p 376-7; Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant (1985) p 187 
93 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 122-3 
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Latin relations; therefore, if they could forge a working relationship with the new Cuban 
government then it would directly benefit the attainment of US strategic objectives. 
However, it would, once again, be the tension between economics and strategic 
objectives within US policy that would come to dominate the US position in Cuba: as a 
result of Washington's enduring belief in its own economic principles, the US-Cuban 
relationship would begin to collapse once Castro's economic policies began to take 
shape. 
American unease with Castro's regime had begun to develop almost as soon as 
diplomatic recognition had been granted. The new regime's brutal cull of any potential 
political opponents deeply concerned US officials94; however, it was not until Castro's 
economic reforms began to be implemented that the administration began to discuss the 
possibility of removing it from office. 95 In early February the extent of Castro's 
radicalism began to emerge. The Embassy in Havana reported that: `Castro is reported as 
attributing Cuba's perennial economic problems to dictation by US ambassadors. '96 
Castro's intentions, like those of Arbenz in Guatemala discussed in Chapter One, were to 
eradicate poverty and overwhelming wealth disparity in Cuba and end the Caribbean 
island's economic dependence to the US. `He intended to bury Plattism97 once and for all, 
and had long challenged Washington's presumption that its word was fiat in the Western 
94 One notable exception was Allen Dulles who stated that he thought it sensible of Castro to remove any 
potential opponents who may undermine his regime, stating `that you kill your enemies. ' See: Stephen 
Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 123; Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro (1994) p 241; Aleksandr Fursenko 
and Timhothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1997) p8 
95 Again, like in Guatemala, the CIA would take the lead in designing policies to remove Castro. For more 
on Eisenhower's use of the CIA and psychological warfare, see: Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War (2006); 
John Prados, "The Central Intelligence Agency and the Face of Decolonization under the Eisenhower 
Administration" in Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third 
World and the Globalization of the Cold War (2006); Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: 
Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London: 
HarperCollinsPublishers, 1996) 
96 Telegram from US Ambassador in Cuba Philip Bonsai to the Department of State, February 5 1959, 
FRUS 1958-1960 Volume VI p 395 
97 "Plattism" was in reference to the Platt Amendment that had been inserted in the Cuban constitution of 
1903, which had been drafted by the US and which accorded Cuba virtual protectorate status 
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toward forcing Castro from power. "00 However, as we have seen in the chapters dealing 
with US-Brazilian relations, bilateral disagreement over economic issues were not 
enough on their own to warrant intervention; there needed to be an overt national security 
threat as well. Importantly, though, like the earlier situation in Guatemala, differences in 
opinion over economics were enough to turn the US against Castro; all it needed to make 
intervention inevitable was for the presence of a direct national security threat to emerge. 
In outlining the national security threat that Castro posed to the US position in Latin 
America, it is crucial to keep in mind the outline provided in the Introduction to this 
thesis as to what constituted a "national security" threat. 
Throughout this work we have seen that Soviet or, indeed, communist 
involvement in a situation was not a pre-requisite to a situation being perceived to be an 
issue of strategic concern. Overt anti-Americanism, or a direct willingness to promote a 
political or economic agenda not in keeping with that of the US, was enough to threaten 
the strategic position of the US and, therefore, to become an issue of security concern. 
(As we observed earlier in this chapter, this was not a trend unique to Latin America 
either). In both this chapter and Chapter Three, we identified the fact that the Eisenhower 
administration had been increasingly applying a Cold War framework to events in Latin 
America as it perceived its strategic interests to be coming under threat from both 
nationalist and communist forces. Now, in Cuba, those elements of economic and social 
radicalism within the Castro program that had turned the US against him caused the 
administration to consider the Cuban situation via the strategic framework that had been 
increasingly prominent since 1956. 
The key in identifying the reasons for the Cuban situation's shift from an 
economic to a national security crisis lies with the Eisenhower administration's 
perception of the threat that Castro posed to the US position in Latin America. Viewed 
solely from an economic perspective, Castro's radicalism was not a direct strategic threat. 
The appointment of Philip Bonsai as Ambassador strongly suggests that the 
administration felt that they may be able to de-radicalize the Cuban government as they 
10° Ibid (1999) p 396 
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radicalism within the Castro program that had turned the US against him caused the 
administration to consider the Cuban situation via the strategic framework that had been 
increasingly prominent since 1956. 
The key in identifying the reasons for the Cuban situation's shift from an 
economic to a national security crisis lies with the Eisenhower administration's 
perception of the threat that Castro posed to the US position in Latin America. Viewed 
solely from an economic perspective, Castro's radicalism was not a direct strategic threat. 
The appointment of Philip Bonsai as Ambassador strongly suggests that the 
administration felt that they may be able to de-radicalize the Cuban government as they 
had done in Bolivia earlier in the decade. 101 Castro, though, refused to compromise with 
the US; the defining goal of his administration was to become independent of 
Washington - in both economics and foreign policy -a situation that developed further 
with the rumours that Cuba would adopt a neutral position in the Cold War. 102 More 
worrying than any of this, however, was the highly visible anti-American spectacle that 
Castro presented, urging further revolutions in Latin America and, in September 1959 
speaking before the United Nations, he `denounced US imperialism as the fundamental 
cause of Cuba's plight. ' 103 Such overt anti-Americanism directly challenged American 
leadership in the Western Hemisphere and, like Arbenz in 1954, set a dangerous example 
for other Latin nations. As Rabe writes: `By the end of 1959, the Eisenhower 
administration had essentially decided that it could no longer abide Castro or Cuban 
nationalism, which threatened US leadership and endangered, by example, US 
investments throughout the hemisphere. ' (John Foster Dulles had passed away earlier in 
1959, and it was his replacement - former Governor of Massachusetts and Under 
Secretary of State Christian Herter - that led the calls for Castro to be removed from 
power). 104 
101 On this see: Kenneth Lehman, "Revolutions and Attributions: Making Sense of Eisenhower 
Administration Policies in Bolivia and Guatemala" in Diplomatic History (Volume 21, No. 2, Spring 1997) 
'°2 One writer has noted: `As he [Castro] had repeatedly said, tossing out Batista but leaving the United 
States and its substantial interests in place would once again rob Cuba of an historic moment to affirm its 
independence. ' Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro (1994) p 254-5 
103 Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 168; Cole Blasier, The Hovering Giant (1985) p 187; 
Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 125 
104 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 127 
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Both David Ryan and Noam Chomsky have cited State Department Reports 
produced during the 1960s as providing a clear illustration of the reason for the US 
becoming so opposed to Castro and viewing his continuance in power as being an issue 
of prime national security concern rather than just an economic dispute. 105 Thomas 
Paterson substantiates this point, writing `Cuba, as symbol and reality, challenged US 
hegemony in Latin America. ' 106 As we can see, then, by prominently promoting an 
alternative economic and political model in Latin America, Castro made his continuance 
in power an issue of direct strategic concern for the Eisenhower administration. 107 By 
April 1960, the administration was clearly referring to the Cuban situation through the 
perspective of the national security framework and was considering a change in policy to 
meet the strategic threat posed by Castro. 108 
The pattern of economic and security factors conspiring together in Cuba is 
strikingly similar to that in Guatemala in 1954. Establishing the way that the Cuban 
situation became an issue of national security concern as well as an issue of economic 
concern, allows us to bridge the gap between the Traditional and Revisionist schools: we 
can see that the US became vehemently anti-Castro mainly due to his economic 
1os Ryan cites a report by Walt Rostow in April 1961, which outlined the threats that Castro posed to the 
US. The most pertinent among them was that which read, "`its [Cuba's] ideological contours are a moral 
and political offence to us; and we are committed, by one means or another, to remove that offence, " 
because the ideological contours might "inflame" others in Latin America, "accentuating existing 
economic, social and political tensions which we, in any case, confront. "' Chomsky makes a similar point 
by using a State Department report from 1964, which read: "`The primary danger we face in Castro is... in 
the impact the very existence of his regime has upon the leftist movement in many Latin American 
countries... the simple fact is that Castro represents a successful defiance of the US, a negation of our 
hemispheric policy of almost a century and a half. "' David Ryan, US Foreign Policy in World History 
(2000) p 155; Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2003) p 90 
106 Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro (1994) 
107 For information on Castro's policies and the deteriorating relationship between the US and Cuba see: 
Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara (1997) p 416-423,492; Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro (1994) p 
255-260; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 121-9; James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter- 
American Relations (1999) p 371-411 
108 An OCB Progress Report on NSC 5902/1 stated: `The apparent increasing influence of international 
communism in the present Cuban government, and the growing subversive and anti-US activities of the 
Cuban government in collaboration with the Communists throughout the area, have raised serious problems 
which make advisable a review of NSC 5902/1. ' Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the 
National Security Council - "Report on Latin America (NSC 5902/1)", April 6 1960, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume Vp 134-140 
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There was, however, one major difference between Castro and Arbenz: Castro 
would prove much trickier to remove from power than Arbenz had been. 10 In their 
attempts to construct a regional alliance through the OAS - which would give them legal 
cover in moving against Castro - the US sought out the support of Venezuelan leader 
Romulo Betancourt. After coming to power in 1958, Betancourt had outlined his 
opposition to non-democratic regimes in the region: during his inauguration address he 
stated that, `we shall solicit cooperation of other democratic governments of America to 
request jointly that the OAS exclude from its midst the dictatorial governments. ' 111 
Betancourt's main target in this proposal was Rafael Trujillo, the totalitarian leader of the 
Dominican Republic; ' 12 Trujillo and Betancourt had a long-standing rivalry, and the 
Venezuelan leader wanted to remove Trujillo from office. However, in 1959 US support 
for this proposal was non-existent. ' 13 Yet, just a year later, Secretary of State Herter 
reversed the US position at a meeting of the OAS and suggested that the organisation 
move against the Dominican leader. As Rabe writes, 
Herter proposed that the organization take control of the political machinery 
of the Dominican Republic, oversee the end of the Trujillo tyranny, 
establish political parties, and conduct free elections. As he [Herter] 
explained to President Eisenhower, his plan had two objectives: a peaceful 
transition of power would avoid "a revolution which might well produce a 
communist or Castro-type government in Santo Domingo"; furthermore, "if 
we prove successful in this, a very useful precedent will have been set for 
possible later action when the Cuban matter is before us. "114 
This was, quite clearly, a huge reversal in policy. The question is: why had the US 
position changed so significantly with regard to the Trujillo government in the twelve 
10 Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro (1994) details the US attempts to move against Castro, as does 
Stephen Rabe (1988) Chapter 9 
"' Robert Alexander, Romulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela (USA: Transaction Books, 
1982) p 525 
112 For information on US-Dominican Relations during the Trujillo era, see: Eric Paul Roorda, The Dictator 
Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 
(Durham, North Carolina: 1998); Michael Hall, Sugar and Power in the Dominican Republic (2000) 
Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) 
13 See: Memorandum of a Conversation between President Betancowt of Venezuela and Governor 
Thomas Dewey, February 14 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume V Microfiche 30 - Venezuela; Stephen Rabe 
(1988) p 158-9 
14 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 159 
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for this proposal was non-existent. 113 Yet, just a year later, Secretary of State Herter 
reversed the US position at a meeting of the OAS and suggested that the organisation 
move against the Dominican leader. As Rabe writes, 
Herter proposed that the organization take control of the political machinery 
of the Dominican Republic, oversee the end of the Trujillo tyranny, 
establish political parties, and conduct free elections. As he [Herter] 
explained to President Eisenhower, his plan had two objectives: a peaceful 
transition of power would avoid "a revolution which might well produce a 
communist or Castro-type government in Santo Domingo"; furthermore, "if 
we prove successful in this, a very useful precedent will have been set for 
possible later action when the Cuban matter is before us. " 114 
This was, quite clearly, a huge reversal in policy. The question is: why had the US 
position changed so significantly with regard to the Trujillo government in the twelve 
months between 1959 and 1960 to the extent that they were prepared to use the OAS as a 
tool for regime change in the Dominican Republic and possibly Cuba? There were, in 
fact, three reasons for this change in approach. 1) As we have seen, the problem facing 
the US in Cuba had gone from being one of economics to one of economics and national 
security, making it a much more pressing concern for the Eisenhower administration. 2) 
The US need for strong, democratic allies meant that they needed Betancourt's support 
for an anti-Castro resolution - and he made his support conditional upon a simultaneous 
move against Trujillo. And 3) The continuing failure of the policies outlined in NSC 
5902/1 to fully repair the US position in the region meant that the US was growing 
increasingly desperate for a clear foreign policy success in the region. It is instructive that 
within a year of being implemented the plan for repairing US-Latin relations (NSC 
5902/1) had been derailed by the situation in Cuba and had now become a possible policy 
of pre-emptive intervention in both Cuba and the Dominican Republic. The tensions 
between economics and security that had blighted the document's creation had, by 1960, 
completely undermined the attempts of the US to repair their position in Latin America. 
13 See: Memorandum of a Conversation between President Betancourt of Venezuela and Governor 
Thomas Dewey, February 14 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume V Microfiche 30 - Venezuela; Stephen Rabe 
(1988) p 158-9 
114 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 159 
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in the region. Siekmeier argues that in the wake of the president's visit, and the 
increasing problems caused by the Cuban situation, that US policy would change 
significantly' 16; however, only part of this is true. Although US policy would be subject 
to some changes and modifications in light of the developing geopolitical situation they 
would not be a departure from traditional US economic aims in Latin America. And, as 
we will see, the bifurcated nature of US policy in the Eisenhower era - pursuing both 
economic and strategic goals independently of each other - would continue until the 
administration left office. 
The president's visit was part of his "farewell tour", and was in keeping with 
Eisenhower's increasing presence on the world stage in the period following Foster 
Dulles's death in May 1959.117 During his tour, Eisenhower was shocked by the poor 
living standards of many Latin Americans and, in the words of Rabe, `Eisenhower 
viewed the trip as both a revelation and a sharp disappointment: he was stunned by the 
ghastly poverty and unspeakable living conditions he encountered in countries that were 
among the wealthiest and most socially advanced in Latin America. US foreign economic 
policy had failed. ' 
118 And yet, despite these realisations, there would still be no major 
change in US economic policy toward Latin America. It is crucial that we clearly identify 
the problems confronting the US in the region at this time in order to understand just how 
immovable the US was with regard to economic policy. The Cuban situation had, by mid- 
1960, reached a point of crisis, with the go-ahead having been given for planning to 
commence on ways to oust Castro from power; 
119 at the same time, the US was being 
compelled to plan a similar move against the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic 
by the Venezuelan government of Romulo Betancourt; NSC 5902/1's outline of a policy 
to repair US-Latin American relations had quite clearly failed; and, President Eisenhower 
had returned from a trip to the region convinced that US foreign economic policy had 
"'James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter-American Relations (1999); Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower 
(1988) 
i» Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 136 
e Ibid 
19 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter-American Relations (1999) p 407-9; Stephen Rabe, 
Eisenhower (1988) p 137; Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro (1994) p 258 
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viewed the trip as both a revelation and a sharp disappointment: he was stunned by the 
ghastly poverty and unspeakable living conditions he encountered in countries that were 
among the wealthiest and most socially advanced in Latin America. US foreign economic 
policy had failed. ' 118 And yet, despite these realisations, there would still be no major 
change in US economic policy toward Latin America. It is crucial that we clearly identify 
the problems confronting the US in the region at this time in order to understand just how 
immovable the US was with regard to economic policy. The Cuban situation had, by mid- 
1960, reached a point of crisis, with the go-ahead having been given for planning to 
commence on ways to oust Castro from power; 119 at the same time, the US was being 
compelled to plan a similar move against the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic 
by the Venezuelan government of Romulo Betancourt; NSC 5902/1's outline of a policy 
to repair US-Latin American relations had quite clearly failed; and, President Eisenhower 
had returned from a trip to the region convinced that US foreign economic policy had 
failed to raise Latin living standards and had helped create an environment where 
"communism" could thrive. 120 
The most probable explanation for the administration's reluctance to countenance 
a wide-ranging reappraisal of their economic policy is that they continued to hold true to 
the belief that there was, in essence, very little wrong with their economic approach. 
National Security concerns in Latin America were at their most fevered point since the 
Eisenhower administration had come to office; yet, still the administration only made 
limited changes to its economic policies. The obvious conclusion to arrive at is that 
despite the overwhelming strategic concerns confronting the administration, their faith in 
US economic objectives and approaches remained undimmed. This model - of a 
bifurcated policy, split between economics and national security - fits in with the wider 
trends in evidence throughout the Cold War world. But this model has not been 
18 Ibid 
19 James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 407-9; Stephen Rabe, 
Eisenhower (1988) p 137; Thomas Paterson, Contesting Castro (1994) p 258 
120 Rabe writes: `Poverty and frustration seemed to be fuelling the turmoil that, in 1960, enveloped the area 
of traditional US strategic interest - the Caribbean littoral. ' Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 138; James 
Siekmeier, Aica Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) p 402-4 
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in an attempt to address some of the problems in the area. As outlined earlier, upon 
Eisenhower's return a Social Progress Fund would be created - with a budget of $600 
million - that was designed to build houses, schools and public health institutions in the 
region. However, as the earlier quote from LaFeber noted, this was an inadequate 
solution to the scale of the problem facing the US. It is clearly evident that there was no 
easy solution to the Latin economic problems; but it remains equally apparent that the 
administration was still adopting a political or strategic solution to what was quite clearly 
an economic problem. The tension between economics and national security, which was 
perhaps the defining characteristic of the administration's stance in the region, was still 
exerting a dominant influence over US policy toward Latin America in 1961. Even when 
strategic imperatives had made a change in policy a necessity, US economic goals had 
remained the same as they had been since 1945; this had severely hindered the 
effectiveness of the policy that the Eisenhower administration had pursued in Latin 
America since 1956. By refusing to look beyond its long-standing economic aims, the 
Eisenhower administration had assured the continuance of the developing feelings of 
fervent anti-Americanism throughout Latin America that had become so evident in the 
late-1950s. 
CONCLUSION: 
We have seen throughout this chapter that the Eisenhower administration engaged 
in a wide-ranging reappraisal of policy in the wake of the Nixon trip; a process that was, 
in effect, a continuation of the process that had begun in the wake of the Soviet Economic 
Offensive in January 1956. Strategic concerns dominated the thinking and the appraisals 
of US officials, a trend that was wholly in keeping with the developing nature of the Cold 
War. Consequently, the major policy goal for the US in the period covered by this 
chapter was to eradicate the growing phenomenon of Latin anti-American sentiment and 
to shore up American hegemony in the region. Yet, despite this emphasis on national 
security and the Cold War, long-standing US economic aims in the region would remain 
an integral part of US policy. The administration's enduring belief in its traditional 
economic aims would have two major effects on US policy toward Latin America. 
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Firstly, as outlined in this chapter, by enveloping traditional US economic objectives into 
the national security framework that had come to dominate US-Latin relations the 
Eisenhower administration unintentionally ensured that the irreconcilable policies of 
economic expansion and strategic concern would severely undermine Washington's 
approach toward the region. This was, of course, most evident in Cuba. 
Secondly, as we shall see in the next chapter, the impact of this approach in a 
nation that was not an overt area of national security concern for the administration 
would be for the economic aspects of US policy to assume a position of dominance. 
Despite the continual problems in US-Brazilian relations during the Eisenhower era, 
Brazil was not a country of prime strategic concern; mutual self-interest between the two 
nations ensured that there should be some semblance of bilateral cooperation in the 
foreseeable future. In fact, President Kubitschek would actively court American support 
for his policies through a strong rhetorical emphasis on US-Brazilian Cold War 
allegiance in the immediate aftermath of the Nixon trip. But when Kubitschek attempted 
to use this approach to engineer a major change in US economic policy, the bilateral 
relationship would begin to unravel. The steadfastness of US economic aims would - in 
the case of Brazil - come to dominate the bilateral relationship, despite the fact that we 
have clearly identified that fact that it was not the priority aim in the administration's 
Latin American policies. The intention of the next chapter, then, will be to illustrate the 
way the changes in US policy as outlined here, impacted upon US-Brazilian relations in 
the final years of the Eisenhower administration. 
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CHAPTER SIX: US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS 1958-1961 
"THE END OF THE KUBITSCHEK-EISENHOWER ERA" 
INTRODUCTION: 
As we saw in Chapter Five, the Eisenhower administration's attempts to reshape 
its Latin American policy in the post-1958 period had been severely undermined by the 
incompatibility of the economic and strategic aspects of that policy. This, of course, was 
a problem that had been apparent in US-Latin relations since 1953. However, as the fall- 
out from the Soviet Economic Offensive, the Nixon trip and the shifting nature of the 
global Cold War began to impact upon US officials and compel them to accord more 
emphasis to their strategic aims in the region, the inherent tension within US policy 
began to exert a growing influence. By 1961, the US position in Latin America had 
deteriorated severely for one simple reason: that a pro-American, anti-Soviet region, 
developed in accordance with the American model, could not be fostered in Latin 
America by a US administration espousing the foreign economic policies of free market 
capitalism. As has been highlighted in some detail, the administration had - since January 
1956 - been increasingly applying a national security framework to its approach in Latin 
America. Crucially, though, this change in approach and a subsequent shift in policy had 
not provided the catalyst for any significant change in US economic policy in the area. 
The aim, then, of this chapter is to analyse what impact the changes implemented by the 
Eisenhower administration in 1958 and 1959 had on the status of US-Brazilian relations. 
Throughout this thesis, we have illustrated the fact that Brazil was a nation of 
major importance in the Western Hemisphere. Being both geographically large and 
blessed with an abundance of natural resources, Brazil was widely thought to be a 
potential global power in the making, 
' Yet it has been equally apparent that the 
Eisenhower administration was not prepared to make any concessions to the Brazilian's 
in order to develop a "special relationship"; in fact, quite the opposite occurred. Upon 
coming to power in 1953, the Eisenhower administration systematically "ran down" the 
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US-Brazilian relationship in order to bring it into line with the relationship between 
Washington and the other Latin nations. This had, of course, led to severe tensions within 
the bilateral relationship, which had only been exacerbated by Washington and Rio's 
inability to come to an agreement on the economic nature of their relationship. By the 
time of the Nixon visit, the bilateral relationship between the US and Brazil was at its 
lowest ebb than at any time since 1945. But, significantly, by the time that Eisenhower 
left office in January 1961, US-Brazilian relations had actually reached an even lower 
point. The key question to be addressed by this chapter, then, is: how did an American 
government that was predominantly concerned with bolstering its strategic position in 
Latin America reach a position of near-collapse in its relationship with one of the 
region's most important states? 
The answer to the question posed above, is that those problems which we have 
outlined as being inherent in overall US policy toward Latin America, impacted a serious 
effect on US-Brazilian relations. Put simply, the disparity between economics and 
national security within US policy came to dominate the bilateral relationship in the latter 
stages of the Eisenhower era; even more fully than it had in the period before 1958. It is, 
perhaps, only by considering the case-study of Brazil2 that we can come to fully 
understand some of the complexities within the Eisenhower administration's approach 
toward Latin America in the late-1950s and the early-1960s. The major problem that 
emerged in Chapter Five, and that will be addressed here, is in explaining how it came to 
be that economic ideals - which, as we have seen, were not the most prominent part of 
US policy - came to exert such an influence over the US approach in Brazil. For as we 
saw in the previous chapter, the administration's main focus in Latin America in the post- 
1958 period was in meeting its increasingly urgent national security objectives. What this 
chapter will illustrate is that despite economic objectives not being the main priority for 
the US, the influence that the basic economic principles within US strategy exerted over 
US policy remained considerable. In fact, it would be the economic aspects within US 
' The belief within the US that Brazil would, one day, emerge as a great power had been in place since the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. See: Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues 
(Boston, Massachusetts: South End Press, 1993) Chapter seven 
2 Or, indeed, another individual Latin nation outside of the Guatemala-Cuba axis 
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policy that would be of most importance in determining the nature of the bilateral 
relationship during 1958-61. 
There are two reasons for this strategic imbalance within US policy. Firstly, it is 
illustrative of the way that Kubitschek and the Brazilian Government were able to make 
economics the centrepiece of the bilateral relationship during this period. The deepening 
economic problems in Brazil - increasingly severe budget deficits, a growing balance of 
payments crisis and high inflation - meant that Kubitschek was under severe domestic 
pressure to address the crippling economic problems that Brazil faced. 3 As a result, the 
Brazilian leader would make bringing about a change in US foreign economic policy the 
main aim of his foreign policy toward the US. Secondly, despite the consistent nature of 
the problems in the bilateral relationship since 1953, Brazil was not a country that was an 
overt national security concern for the Eisenhower administration. The administration's 
national security goals in Latin America - which had been emphasised by the Soviet 
Economic Offensive and the events of the Nixon trip - did not demand that the 
relationship between Washington and Rio be especially warm, just that Brazil continued 
to support the US in the United Nations and the OAS and that any anti-American 
sentiment was kept to a minimum. This meant that the US could remain steadfast in their 
position with regard to the economic aspects of the bilateral relationship: the more that 
Kubitschek brought up issues such as increased development funding, and a relaxation on 
International Monetary Fund criteria for loans, the more the Eisenhower administration 
was able to maintain its previous position with regard to economic policy. 
As Matthew Loayza has outlined, the Eisenhower administration retained its 
inherent faith in its economic principles until it left office. 'US officials remained 
consistent in their advocacy of private capital development and fiscal conservatism', 
writes Loayza. `Indeed, Eisenhower and his advisors never abandoned their convictions 
3 For information on the domestic pressure on Kubitschek, see: Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coup 
D 'Etat: Brazilian-American Relations 1945-1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993) p 
95-6,108-113; Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (Ohio: Ohio 
University Center for International Studies, 1991); Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil, 1500-2000 (London: Pearson 
Educational Ltd, 2002) 
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that the proper way to finance economic development was through private, rather than 
public, capital. '4 Yet, this was not the predominant objective within US policy by mid- 
1958. Importantly, however, when we consider a country - like Brazil - where national 
security imperatives were not as urgent as in other countries, the administration's 
economic principles could exert more of an influence. This is especially true in Brazil, 
where President Kubitschek desperately needed to bring about a change in US economic 
policy in order to underwrite his grandiose development schemes. The crucial point is 
that these two factors combining together conspired to apportion more importance to 
economic factors in US-Brazilian relations during the period covered in this chapter. This 
was, in fact, a mirror to events in Latin America generally, as the Latin nations sought to 
emphasise their economic complaints despite Washington's preoccupation with national 
security. 5 
° Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise: Eisenhower, Fiscal Conservatism, and Latin 
American Nationalism, 1953-1961" Diplomacy and Statecraft (Volume 14, No. 3, September 2003) p 101- 
2 
5 Possibly one of the most striking elements in US-Brazilian relations at this time is the lack of importance 
(or emphasis) accorded to the role played by military assistance in seeking to bring about a closer bilateral 
relationship. This, however, was in keeping with the regional approach of the administration in the post- 
Nixon visit period. The simple reason for this was that the policy outlined in NSC 5613/1 - to secure the 
position of the US in Latin America via improved US-Latin relations in the military sphere - had failed; a 
fact born out by the events of the Nixon trip and the subsequent reappraisal of policy (NSC 5902/1) placed 
far more emphasis on meeting over national security objectives through a modified economic policy than 
through any reshaped military assistance program. (In fact, in Chapter Four we saw the difficulties that had 
emerged in the bilateral relationship as a result of the Military Assistance Program and due to the 
negotiations over Fernando de Noronha: it was outlined there that the "good" relationship between the 
Pentagon and their Brazilian counterparts endured in spite of US military policy, not because of it). The 
failure of the policy outlined in NSC 5613/1 saw the Eisenhower administration's approach toward Latin 
America come under severe domestic scrutiny. Eisenhower's response was to create a special commission 
- The Draper 
Committee - to review American military assistance programmes and report back to those 
critics of the administration's policies: however, `its conclusions seemed preordained: of the committee's 
nine members, three were retired generals, one a retired admiral, and one a former assistant secretary of 
defense. ' Predictably, given its constituent members, the Draper Committee's final report reaffirmed the 
value of Military Assistance programmes in US foreign policy, stating: `the Mutual Security Program is a 
sound concept and an essential tool of our 
foreign and strategic policies.. . We stress the need 
for a new and 
intensive effort to inform the American public of the problems and achievements of mutual security and its 
vital importance to the security of the United States. ' And yet, despite this, the post Nixon period would 
see a significant deterioration in the extent that military assistance programmes were used to try and build 
better intra-hemispheric relations: from reading NSC 5902/1 it is quite clear that military assistance 
policies are given far less emphasis with respect to achieving US aims than they had been in NSC 5613/15 
They would, of course, still be a prominent part of US strategy; but, crucially, they would no longer be the 
major feature of the administration's approach. In fact, an OCB Regional Plan for Operations produced in 
July 1959 did not see any significant changes made to US military strategy in the region; this was in stark 
contrast to the emphasis that was placed on attempting to police or defend the region from the perceived 
"communist" or strategic threat. The impact that this had on US policy toward the region can be witnessed 
in Brazil by the near-total absence of any developments in the bilateral military relationship at this time. 
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In order to illustrate the way that economics impacted upon US-Brazilian 
relations in this period, this chapter will analyse the way that the bilateral relationship 
evolved in the aftermath of the Nixon trip. Firstly, it will look at President Kubitschek's 
Operation Pan America (OPA) proposal, which emerged soon after the Nixon trip and 
which called for a show of hemispheric unity and a vast aid programme to help boost the 
Latin economies. Secondly, it will consider the American response to this proposal: as we 
shall see, the Eisenhower administration's enthusiasm for the political aspects of OPA 
would not be matched when it came to economic aid part of the proposal. Thirdly, it will 
examine the ongoing debate between the two nations over economic policy and illustrate 
the way that US economic objectives came to dominate. And fourthly, it will look at the 
US position with respect to the 1960 Brazilian presidential election, when it became 
apparent just how far US-Brazilian relations had deteriorated as a result of economic 
disagreements. The ultimate outcome of all of this will be that Washington's strategic 
aims of ensuring Brazilian support in international organisations and quelling the growth 
of anti-American sentiment would be undermined by events in the economic sphere. 
OPERATION PAN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Like much of the Eisenhower period, scholars of US-Latin American relations 
have overlooked the collapse in US-Brazilian relations in the late 1950s. The majority of 
regional studies have not mentioned the actual breakdown in the bilateral relationship, 
merely noting that the Eisenhower administration turned down Kubitschek's OPA 
proposal. Shortly after Vice President Nixon arrived back in Washington, Kubitschek 
used the apparent "crisis" in intra-hemispheric relations to launch a programme aimed at 
repairing hemispheric unity - Operation Pan America. This programme, though, quickly 
evolved into a call for a vast amount of American aid to help develop the Latin 
See: Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower: The Foreign Policy ojAnti-Communism and Latin America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1988) p 106-9; Final Report of the President's Committee "To Study 
the United States Military Assistance Program", August 17 1959, Draper Committee (1), Box No 13, 
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economies. Much of the academic debate on OPA has centred on what was motivating 
Kubitschek in his calls for OPA: was it economic self-interest or a concern that the 
"west" might be losing the Cold War? 6 On a different note, Stanley Hilton has argued 
that Kubitschek's move was born out of Brazilian dissatisfaction with US policy and that 
Washington overlooked the importance that the Brazilians were attaching to the OPA 
proposal. However, the debate over what was motivating Kubitschek's proposal 
overlooks a far more important question: what caused the US to reject OPA as a viable 
solution to the problems they faced in Latin America? 
In addressing this issue, Gordon Connell-Smith has noted: `Kubitschek's 
Operation Pan America was accepted only in principle - and shelved. '8 Both Rabe and 
Gilderhus have explained Washington's stance toward OPA as being due to the 
Eisenhower administration's refusal to countenance such a vast economic aid 
programme. 9 This argument is expanded upon by Loayza, who writes: 'US officials 
genuinely sympathized with the objectives of OPA... [but)in private they balked at 
Kubitschek's call for a significant US role in financing the programme, as they believed 
that underwriting OPA would impose unacceptable financial burdens on the American 
economy. ' 10 Yet the argument adopted by the scholars cited above does not go on to 
identify the major consequence of the US position with regard to OPA: namely, that the 
Administration Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library; Regional Operations Plan for Latin America 
prepared for the Operations Coordinating Board, July 1 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 117-134 
6 For the debate on what was motivating Kubitschek over OPA - either the beginning of an independent 
streak in Brazilian foreign policy, the aim of forming a strong Cold War alliance with the US or political 
and economic self-interest - see: Elizabeth A. Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in 
Brazil. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992) p 251; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats 
(1993) p 115-8; Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century: US-Latin American Relations Since 1889 
(Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2000) p 156-7; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 110; 
James Siekmeier, Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and the United 
States, 1945-1961 (New York: Edward Mellen Press, 1999) p 317-9 
Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War, 1945-1960: End of the Special 
Relationship" in The Journal ofAmerican History (Vol 68, No. 3, December 1981) pp 599-624 
8 Gordon Connell-Smith, The United States & Latin America: An Historical Analysis of Inter-American 
Relations (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1974) p 225 
9 In seeking to explain this Gilderhus argues that whilst, 'US officials withheld endorsement from anything 
so grandiose... they did display new readiness to take part in commodity agreements ... [and] announced US 
support for a regional development bank in Latin America' Rabe makes a similar point, arguing: `few US 
officials supported President Kubitschek's grandiose plans', but they were prepared to `consider a slight 
change in economic policy. ' Mark Gilderhus, The Second Century (2000) p 157; Stephen Rabe, 
Eisenhower (1988) p 110-1 
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fact that US policy was determined by economic considerations strongly suggests that 
the Eisenhower administration's stance toward Brazil was not being driven as heavily by 
strategic considerations as the policy outlined in Chapter Five would suggest. This is a 
crucial distinction. For it demonstrates the fact that although the main aim of the US in 
Latin America during this period was shoring up its strategic position, economic factors 
within US policy could still exert a powerful influence - especially in a nation such as 
Brazil where the security threat was not as urgent. Brazil's emphasis on economic 
development issues during this period would force the US to address the concerns raised 
by Kubitschek; a trend that had been ongoing since Eisenhower came to office. What is 
instructive in this final period is that economic concerns would remain as the central 
theme of the bilateral relationship even though this was not in keeping with US aims. In 
order to highlight the way that this situation evolved, and demonstrate the impact that 
economic factors had on US-Brazilian relations, we will begin by examining the 
development of Kubitschek's OPA proposal and the American response. As we shall see, 
Washington's response to Kubitschek's proposal would vary considerably. Whilst OPA 
appeared to be a political show of hemispheric unity, the US response would be positive; 
but once the economic side of the programme became apparent, the Eisenhower 
administration's position would become far more negative. 
OPERATION PAN AMERICA - PHASE ONE: THE POLITICAL SIDE 
In evaluating President Kubitschek's motivations in calling for a "Marshall Plan 
for Latin America", the work of Elizabeth Cobbs and Michael Weis makes it clear that 
Kubitschek saw OPA as a chance to engineer a change in US economic policy, assure 
Brazil's position at the head of the Latin American hierarchy and, hopefully, bring about 
a desperately needed influx of private and public capital to stave off the financial crisis 
10 Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise" (2003) p 100 
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that was looming in Brazil. " As we saw in Chapter Four, the Brazilian economic 
situation was, by 1958, growing increasingly serious. Kubitschek had borrowed heavily 
to fund his development plans; a worldwide downturn in coffee prices had deeply 
hindered Brazil's exports; inflation continued to increase rapidly; and, Brazil did not 
have enough dollars in its economy to pay back the large number of loans it had taken 
out. As Thomas Skidmore has outlined, Kubitschek's successes in the economic sphere 
were underpinned by a pressing problem. He notes, `the ambitious program of 
Kubitschek had an Achilles' heel: financing-because the government refused to 
compromise its ambitious plans for industrialisation, the symptoms of financial 
disequilibrium soon appeared. ' By 1957, Brazil's balance of payments deficit was at 
approximately $286 million. '2 Inevitably, this impacted upon Brazil's economic 
development. Although Kubitschek's grandiose schemes had imbued Brazil with an aura 
of self-confidence, the problems outlined above by Skidmore were deeply problematic. 
Indeed, as Joseph Smith has argued: `pursuing a policy of sustained high government 
spending brought rapid economic growth but at the price of stimulating rising inflation. 
Economies were introduced as early as 1958 in order to combat the rise in prices. The 
result, however, was a slowing down of economic growth that provoked criticism of 
government policy from political opponents, business and trade union leaders. ' 13 
These problems were compounded by `the terms of world trade' moving `sharply 
against Brazil during the 1950s. ' The result was a simultaneous downturn in capital 
investment and a deepening balance of payments crisis. 14 Short-term loans were seized 
upon as a way of seeing Brazil through a period of financial difficulty; as a result, 
Brazil's international debts increased dramatically. These were the very obvious 
downsides to Kubitschek's development policies. Generally speaking in terms of 
macroeconomic policy, `existing debt must be fully funded in the long run by cumulative 
" Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992); Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats 
(1993); Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 620-1 
12 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 174 
Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002) p 163 
14 Ibid p 176; Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 174-5; Conversely, Robert Alexander actually 
argues that Kubitschek should not be held responsible for the inflationary crisis that `engulfed' Brazil. 
Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (1991) Chapter 12 
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budget surpluses' 15; however, Brazil had not been racking up years of budget surplus to 
ease their burden of debt - far from it in fact. Kubitschek had followed his predecessors 
in borrowing heavily to fund Brazilian development and, despite this ever-increasing 
amount of debt, the problems mentioned above meant that the Brazilian economy had 
not been generating enough capital to address these foreign commitments, which were 
due to mature in the late-1950s. 16 Indeed, as the report compiled by the Business 
Advisory Council in January 1958 (and cited in Chapter Five) pointed out, in the twelve 
months between September 1956 and September 1957 Brazil's gold and dollar holdings 
were down by 21 percent or $125 million, with little sign of any immediate 
improvement. 17 
The depths of the economic problems in Brazil were highlighted in February 
1958, when Ambassador Peixoto and Henrique Valle from the Brazilian Embassy met 
with Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom and requested a $100 million Export- 
Import Bank loan for three months. The Brazilian delegation told Rubottom that: 
`Brazilian coffee exports have been falling off and for this and other reasons the 
exchange situation has deteriorated to a serious point. If Brazil is unable to obtain 
immediate relief, her imports from the United States will be affected. ' 18 By mid-1958, 
then, it is clear that Kubitschek needed urgent support from the US in an effort to stave 
off an impending economic crisis. Kubitschek saw the events of the Nixon trip as 
offering him a chance to resurrect Operation Pan America and, possibly, solve Brazil's 
economic problems. 19 As Michael Weis has written, `On May 12, Brazil exhausted its 
15 Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World 1700-2000 (Oxford: Penguin 
Books, 2001) p 138 
16 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 176-8; Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002) p 176; For 
Kubitschek's view of his development approach during his presidency, see: Robert Alexander, The ABC 
Presidents: Conversations and Correspondence with the Presidents of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1992) pp 108-118 
" Document produced by Maurice McAshan of the Committee on Latin America within the Business 
Advisory Council, January 24 1958, Folder - 1958 - Business Advisory Council, Box 5, Record Group 59, 
Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom, Subject 
Files 1957-1959, Lot 60 D 553, National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
'8 Memorandum of a Conversation between Brazilian Representative to the US Ambassador Peixoto and 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom, Department of State, February 14 
1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 657-9 
19 Kubitschek had first mentioned OPA at his inauguration in 1956; but both regional and domestic support 
for such a proposal had been negligible and it was duly dropped 
265 
dollar holdings and commercial credit lines. In desperate need of ajeito (a way around), 
Kubitschek would soon find in Richard Nixon a golden opportunity to force a change in 
US foreign economic policy. '20 
Kubitschek saw Operation Pan America as a method by which he could 
potentially bring about a change in US economic policy: although scholars such as 
Elizabeth Cobbs have highlighted OPA as being the start of Brazil's independent foreign 
policy, it is clear that initially it came about due to Brazil's desperate need for financial 
assistance. 21 Ambassador Peixoto's meeting at the State Department in February had 
demonstrated to the Brazilians that the US would not, under current circumstances, alter 
their economic policies. In fact, in response to the Brazilian request for an EXIM loan, 
Rubottom had stated: 
The Eximbank normally does not give stand-by credits. In the single instance 
wherein it had been done (the Suez loan to Britain of $500 million), the Bank 
had required 120 percent collateral and a commitment fee. In the case of the 
Federal Reserve stand-by to Brazil of 1952, full gold collateral had been 
required... it is his understanding that Brazilian gold reserves are already fully 
committed ... The case... seems to be exactly the sort of thing the IMF was 
created to deal with... if it should prove possible to be of some assistance... he 
is certain that a real interest would be manifested not only in the 
circumstances and conditions leading to Brazil's present condition, but also in 
corrective measures and means which should be adopted in order that the 
assistance would do permanent good 22 
Rubottom's response demonstrated the position of the US toward Brazilian economic 
problems in early 1958: despite the overwhelming problems confronting the Kubitschek 
administration, the US would not consider a relaxation in their loan procedure unless 
Brazil implemented measures that would prevent further economic crises in the future. 
Moreover, Rubottom's suggestion about applying to the IMF actually marked a 
hardening in Washington's approach; although going through the IMF would dilute the 
20 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 112; Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, 
and the Cold War" (1981) p 621 
21 Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002) p 163-4; Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 173 
22 Memorandum of a Conversation between Brazilian Representative to the US Ambassador Peixoto and 
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom, Department of State, February 14 
1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 657-9 
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impression that Brazilian economic survival was dependent upon US assistance, US 
officials were well aware that the IMF would make any economic assistance dependent 
upon certain preconditions being met. 3 In linking the events of the Nixon trip to a call 
for increased economic assistance to Latin America, Kubitschek faced an intensely 
difficult task. However, such was Kubitschek's need for an influx of capital that he had 
little choice but to try and link the threat to free world security to a concerted call for 
widespread economic assistance in the region. But, initially, Kubitschek was careful not 
to emphasise OPA's economic context; instead, he presented it to the US in terms of 
being an urgent opportunity to reaffirm Pan-American unity. 24 
As the Eisenhower administration began the process of analysing just why the 
Nixon protests had occurred, Kubitschek was quick to pledge his allegiance to the 
American cause. This, in itself, is instructive: given the way that the bilateral relationship 
had deteriorated over the issue of economic assistance since 1956, the fact that 
Kubitschek was now siding with Washington indicates two things. Firstly, that as Weis 
indicates, Kubitschek was concerned to some degree about the position of the West in 
the Cold War25; secondly, and far more importantly, Kubitschek recognised that the US 
need for allies at this time might make them more amenable to the idea of OPA. 
Kubitschek's approach, however, overlooked one crucial factor: whilst Washington 
would - in the aftermath of the Nixon visit - recognise the need for a change in 
approach, a more solid pan-American alliance and a slight modification in economic 
policy, they would not consider wholesale changes in their fiscal policy as being 
necessary or, indeed, desirable. 
26 In fact, as Rabe has written, the administration did `not 
believe' that the problems in US-Latin relations, `meant spending vast sums in the 
23 An example being full currency exchange reform, which the Brazilian's did not want to implement due to 
deep-rooted nationalist sentiment in Brazil that was firmly opposed to such a move. 
24 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1%7); Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold 
War" (1981)p621 
25 This was not, of course, just a matter of Cold War loyalty: any descent in the position or stability of the 
west would only deepen those problems confronting Brazil 
26 As we saw in Chapter Five, the administration's deliberations over a reshaped policy - which became 
NSC 5902/1 - never challenged the long-standing belief in basic economic principles such as "free trade, 
free investment and free capital"; even those advisors, like Milton Eisenhower, who recommended a 
change in policy did not lose sight of the suitability of US economic principles as a tool for meeting not just 
US objectives, but, also, those desires of all the free peoples of the world 
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region. '27 And yet, by the spring of 1958 the bilateral economic relationship was being 
dominated by Brazil's need for economic assistance and the refusal of the US to consider 
such a change. 28 
The initial Brazilian response to the Nixon trip was somewhat cautious; 
Kubitschek's approach was to identify Brazil with the idea of reaffirming Pan-American 
unity. On May 23, Kubitschek met with Ambassador Briggs and showed him a copy of a 
letter he intended to send to President Eisenhower, in which he recommended that Brazil 
and the United States hold a, `consultation with the view of examining present status of 
Pan-Americanism in light of the experiences of Vice President Nixon, in order thereupon 
to take steps to re-establish continental unity. '29 In the finished version, which 
Kubitschek sent five days later, he wrote, 
It would be hardly feasible to conceal the fact that, before world public 
opinion, the ideal of Pan American unity has suffered serious impairment... it 
would be utterly inconvenient and unfair to allow this false impression to 
prevail, morally weakening the cause of democracy, to the defense of which 
we are pledged. 30 
As Michael Weis notes: `the vague but constructive letter was a hemispheric apology 
that provided Eisenhower with a chance to lessen the damage caused by Nixon's visit. '31 
It is important here to recognise that the initial US response to operation Pan America 
was not overtly negative at all; instead, the administration was highly receptive to 
27 Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) p 113; Matthew Loayza, "An Aladdin's Lamp for Free Enterprise" 
(2003) p 100 
28 In February, Kubitschek met with Ambassador Briggs and informed him that: 'In difficult economic 
situation facing Brazil... administration is under great and growing pressure to deal with Soviet bloc.. . 
his 
government's ability to resist that pressure might be affected by extent to which US is able to assist Brazil 
to meet current economic crisis. ' In response, Foster Dulles warned the Brazilian leader that, to open doors 
to Soviet agents through a mission in Rio at this time would in our opinion maximize problems Kubitschek 
will face in difficult months ahead as he tries to solve Brazil's basic problems and would make more 
difficult his constructive cooperation with the US in this regard. ' See: Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil 
to the Department of State, February 25 1958; Telegram from the Department of State to the US Embassy 
in Brazil, March 3 1958FRUS 1955-1958 Volume Vp 660-3 
29 Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, May 23 1958, FRUS 1955-1958 
Volume Vp 676-8 
30 Letter from Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek to president Eisenhower, May 28 1958, Brazil (8), 
Box No 4, International Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library 
31 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 114 
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Kubitschek's proposal. 32 The reason for this is that the political aspect of OPA appealed 
greatly to US officials. Kubitschek's original proposal did not call for a $40 billion aid 
program; it was more to do with a strong, unified reaffirmation of the ideal of Pan- 
Americanism, which would help to reassert the idea that the US was, indeed, master of 
its own hemisphere. 33 This explains why Eisenhower's response to Kubitschek's letter 
adopted such an encouraging tone. Eisenhower wrote to Kubitschek on June 5 and stated 
that he was, `delighted that you have taken the initiative in bringing the subject to my 
attention, ' and that, `while your Excellency did not suggest any specific program to 
improve Pan American understanding, it seems to me that our two governments should 
consult together as soon as possible'34 
In an effort to begin preliminary negotiations, the Eisenhower administration sent 
Assistant Secretary Rubottom to deliver Eisenhower's reply to Kubitschek and to meet 
with the Brazilian leader in the second week of June. Upon meeting with Rubottom, 
Kubitschek went out of his way to express his fealty to US leadership of the Western 
Hemisphere and to disassociate OPA from being an attempt to improve the rather parlous 
state of US-Brazilian economic relations. Rubottom reported that: 
He [Kubitschek] stressed his desire to have our consultation on the highest 
and broadest possible basis, aimed at correcting any misimpression in the 
world that the relations between the United States and Latin America were 
any less close and vital than before Vice President Nixon's trip. He had no 
desire to discuss any US-Brazilian problems. While the present financial 
discussions in Washington might have been carried out at a faster pace, he 
said, he was fully aware of our cooperative attitude and did not want to 
engage in any talks on this or any other matters pending between his country 
and the United States... (I was struck by the President's reiterated concern that 
the United States not interpret his initiative as bearing on any US-Brazilian 
problem, but rather as one designed to strengthen the US position in the eyes 
32 It should be noted, however, that this view disagrees with Stanley Hilton, who has labelled the US 
response as `unenthusiastic. ' Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 621 
33 This rather Machiavellian approach is highlighted by Thomas Skidmore. See: Thomas Skidmore, Politics 
in Brazil (1967) p 173-4 
34 Draft of Letter from President Eisenhower to President Kubitschek of Brazil. June 5 1958, DDE Diary - 
June 1958, Box 34, DDE Diary Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library; Michael Weis (1993) p 114-5 
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of the world. He seemed quite sincere on this approach, and did not overplay 
his hand... )35 
However, toward the end of the meeting, Kubitschek tied together his appraisal of the 
Cold War world with the ongoing problem of Latin underdevelopment. He said, 
Communists are opposed to the economic development of any 
underdeveloped country. They recognize that that cannot achieve for sinister 
design if economic development is carried out. Yet they criticize the United 
States for encouraging economic development such as making loans and rale 
against private investment and all of the other steps designed to achieve 
economic progress. Therefore, it is all the more important that economic 
development proceed toward fulfilment as rapidly as possible. 36 
This marked the first occasion on which Kubitschek had linked together the problems 
caused by Nixon's trip and the issue of Latin underdevelopment. Rubottom, whilst 
remaining non-committal on the issue of combating underdevelopment, did promise 
`Kubitschek that the US would work closely on the proposal now known as "Operation 
Pan America. "' 37 US support for OPA was still in place by the time Rubottom left Brazil 
with an aide-memoire prepared by the Brazilians outlining the next stage of Operation 
Pan America. However, once the economic aspect of OPA began to emerge over the 
coming weeks, US support for Kubitschek's proposal would begin to deteriorate rapidly. 
It is the US response to Operation Pan America that definitively proves the presence of a 
cogent set of economic objectives within US policy: by being able to highlight them so 
clearly, this thesis moves beyond existing studies that do not emphasise the bifurcated 
nature of US policy in Latin America. 
OPERATION PAN AMERICA - PHASE TWO: THE ECONOMIC SIDE 
For an indication of the way that US support for OPA deteriorated once the 
economic aspect of OPA emerged, June 20,1958 is the vital date for highlighting the 
35 Memorandum of a Conversation between President Kubitschek of Brazil and Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom, Kubitschek's Residence, Rio de Janeiro, June 10 1958, FRUS 
1958-1960 Volume Vp 679-683 
36 Ibid 
37 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 115 
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change in the administration's approach toward Kubitschek's proposal. On that day, 
Secretary Dulles wrote to President Eisenhower and reaffirmed US support for OPA in 
its present format, writing: `1 believe that President Kubitschek's aide-memoire should 
be answered promptly, through normal diplomatic channels, as a means of retaining the 
initiative on this matter, buoying up Brazilian enthusiasm and preventing harmless 
speculation. '38 Later, Dulles sent a telegram to the US Embassy in Brazil and repeated 
US support. `We are impressed with Kubitschek's statesmanlike motivations and 
disassociation of US-Brazilian bilateral interests from the broader consideration of 
strengthening Pan-Americanism, ' wrote Dulles. `We agree that a re-examination of 
programs devoted to strengthening Pan-Americanism is timely and suggest that general 
proposals contained in President Kubitschek's aide-memoire be further developed at 
diplomatic level for discussion during visit of Secretary Dulles to Rio in August. '39 
The reason for Washington's continued support was twofold. 0 Firstly, US 
officials still believed that the political aspect of Kubitschek's plan offered them a good 
chance to reaffirm hemispheric unity under US leadership; secondly, and more 
importantly, the proposal outlined in the aide-memoire that Kubitschek gave to 
Rubottom did not call for a major change in US economic policy. Kubitschek's proposal 
called for a louder voice for Latin America in international affairs, recognition that 
bilateral relationships would exist independently of OPA and that there was an urgent 
need for the continuing cordiality of hemispheric unity to be established. 41 Moreover, the 
clause relating to economic policy was deliberately vague, reading: 
[Kubitschek] expresses his conviction that existing bilateral and multilateral 
programs for combating underdevelopment are inadequate and must be 
reappraised since: a) the success of Pan-Americanism will depend on the 
success of the attack on underdevelopment, and b) Latin America will not be 
38 Memorandum from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to President Eisenhower, June 20 1958, FRUS 
1958-1960 Volume Vp 685-6 
39 Telegram from the Department of State to the US Embassy in Brazil, June 201958, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume Vp 687-8 
4° Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (1991) p 282-5 
41 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 621-2 
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able to render effective service to the cause of the West unless a solution to 
underdevelopment is found 42 
In response, Dulles told Ambassador Briggs, `we agree that economic development can 
strengthen [the] ability of LA nations to resist communist subversion and enable them 
render more effective service to Western cause. This has, in fact, long been a 
fundamental principle of US foreign policy. '43 However, as we saw in Chapter Five, it is 
quite clear that US officials believed that the introduction of the IADB and the ongoing 
work toward implementing regional commodity agreements would go a long way toward 
addressing the economic complaints of the Latin nations. Now, Kubitschek's OPA 
proposal seemed to support this assertion, giving extra credence to the arguments put 
forward by Milton Eisenhower, Thomas Mann and Douglas Dillon during the policy 
discussions that were ongoing throughout 1958. Kubitschek, though, was about to raise 
the stakes significantly, and by doing so would jeopardise US support for Operation Pan 
America. 
On the same day that Dulles was reaffirming US support for OPA, Kubitschek 
gave an "open speech" to all the Latin nations that outlined in much more detail just 
what Operation Pan America's intentions were. As Weis writes, `Kubitschek stressed the 
global struggle between communism and Christian Democracy, linked 
underdevelopment to the communist threat in the region, and called on the US to make 
economic development a priority. 
' Kubitschek stated: 
It is no longer possible for us to keep up an attitude almost as uninterested 
bystanders, when the consequences of the drama that is developing will affect 
us as if we took an active part in it... the position of not being heard or 
consulted, yet being subject to the risks arising from its execution - all this is 
no longer convenient to Brazil.. . In Brazil and, I believe, in the other 
countries of the Continent, there has awakened the consciousness that it is no 
longer convenient for us to form a mere chorus, a featureless rearguard, a 
42 Summary of President Kubitschek's Aide-Memoire, enclosed in: Memorandum from Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles to President Eisenhower, June 20 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 685-6 
43 Telegram from the Department of State to the US Embassy in Brazil, June 20 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume Vp 687-8 
44 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 116 
272 
simple background to the picture. This type of role in the world drama 
appeals to no one, much less to the great American democracy as 
Kubitschek had moved dramatically beyond a simple call for economic assistance in 
Latin America that had characterised his early period in office. He stated that, `no greater 
service can be rendered to the Pan American ideal than that of trying to eliminate its great 
blemish - underdevelopment. ' Addressing this issue, though, was not just a matter of 
economics; the burden of solving Latin underdevelopment was crucial to protect not just 
the west, but all those people who depended upon western society. 
This is not a question of solving a simple economic situation... a state of 
misery and the absence of a minimum of comfort for human beings are not 
phenomena that should be viewed in purely economic terms.. . It is difficult to 
spread the democratic ideal and proclaim the excellence of private enterprise 
in the world when in our hemisphere economic and social conditions prevail 
that lead to statism as a reflex of underdevelopment... it is impossible for 
peoples having such disparity in living standards to fight together in the same 
campaign, to be integrated in the same battle, and to be forced to adopt the 
same values and to have the same reactions to certain happenings and 
doctrines. This is a truth that has to be recognized and proclaimed while there 
is still time. The union of the Americas is an ideal, but it is also an imperative 
of our survival ab 
This speech marked a significant departure from Kubitschek's original proposal: 
as Weis accurately notes, `Kubitschek's speech underscored his differences with the 
United States on the issues of communism and economic development. '47 In effect, it 
called for the US to address the Latin American problem of underdevelopment through a 
huge funding program similar to the Marshall Plan. The American response came at a 
meeting between Assistant Secretary Rubottom and Ambassador Peixoto four days later, 
where the Brazilian emissary attempted to backtrack from Kubitschek's call for a 
solution to economic underdevelopment. `Peixoto deplored press interpretation 
Kubitschek speech as asking [for a] Marshall Plan for Latin America. Said President 
only seeks to create a better US-Brazilian and Pan-American understanding of the 
as Speech by the President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil Juscelino Kubitschek, Rio de 
Janeiro, June 20 1958, Brazil (7), Box No 4, International Series, Whitman File, Eisenhower Library 
46 Ibid 
273 
importance of the development problem in order [to] improve atmosphere for solution. ' 
In reply, Rubottom stated that the US whilst, 
according to its long-standing policy appreciates how accelerated 
development can strengthen LA countries' contribution [to] Free World 
strength and is willing to review extent to which it can contribute this end 
Kubitschek's speech unfortunately did not stress the importance of LA 
nations doing their part more efficiently and effectively marshal their own 
and foreign private capital resources for development. 8 
In an effort to prolong the impression that the ideal of hemispheric unity might still be 
reaffirmed through OPA, Rubottom suggested to Ambassador Peixoto that he `might 
wish to clarify Brazil's aims to [the] press' in order to end the `speculation that [the] two 
governments views are in conflict. '49 However, it is clear that US officials were now 
beginning to temper their enthusiasm for the Brazilian proposal in the wake of 
Kubitschek's speech. 
Rubottom's comments to Peixoto can be attributed to a desire on behalf of the 
Eisenhower administration to limit any economic aspect of OPA to being compatible 
with those changes that were being implemented within US policy. This episode, though, 
marked a key moment in the bilateral relationship: it signified the fact that the 
Eisenhower administration would not be forced into making sweeping changes to their 
economic approach and were only enthusiastic about the political aspects of OPA. It also 
indicated that if Kubitschek persisted in espousing the radical economic approach that 
had begun to emerge as one of OPA's defining features, then there would, inevitably, be 
a reduction in US support for OPA. 50 When Roy Rubottom met with Kubitschek in early 
'Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 116; Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek 
and the Development of Brazil (1991) p 286-7 
48 Telegram from the Department of State to the US Embassy in Brazil detailing meeting between Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom and Ambassador Peixoto, Washington, June 
24 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 688-8 
49 Ibid 
so It is, however, important to make a significant point here comparing the developing situation in US- 
Brazilian relations to that which would emerge between the US and Cuba once Castro came to power. As 
we saw in Chapter Five, the relationship between Washington and Havana began to deteriorate once 
Castro's economic radicalism began to come to the fore; there would, though, be no comparative 
deterioration in US-Brazilian relations over Operation Pan America's economic subtext. The reason for this 
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June, the US had given its consent to participating in a regional meeting to discuss the 
issue of Pan-American unity. 51 However, now that the economic aspect of OPA had 
become apparent, US officials began to consider distancing themselves from the 
Brazilian proposal. These deliberations were given extra impetus by the comments of the 
Mexican Ambassador to the Organization of American States, who told his counterpart 
John Dreier that: `President Kubitschek has laid a trap for the United States by proposing 
in his letter to President Eisenhower that a high-level meeting be held at which both 
political and economic questions could be discussed, but then in his speech, after he had 
received President Eisenhower's favourable reply, he advocated consideration of only 
economic questions. '52 Although Kubitschek would encounter both domestic and 
international criticism over OPA53, the unfavourable economic situation in Brazil meant 
that Kubitschek had little choice but to continue with the advocacy of his proposal. 
Crucially, the extent to which the shift in OPA's context - from a mostly political 
alliance to widespread economic reform - impacted upon US-Brazilian relations would 
be demonstrated when Secretary Dulles visited Brazil in August. 54 
Immediately prior to Dulles' trip, Ambassador Peixoto had written to Kubitschek 
urging him to proceed carefully, telling him: 'OPA should not take precedence over 
bilateral negotiations and relations... Dulles had to be convinced that OPA was not a 
hostile initiative, but was consistent with US goals. '55 American support for OPA was 
vital if it was to be successful; if Kubitschek continued to call for a vast funding 
initiative to eradicate Latin poverty then, as Peixoto suggested, US support for the 
is that whilst OPA did propose a radical shift in intra-hemispheric economic relations it did not overtly 
challenge the US model of development in the same way that Castro would. 
51 However, this assent had been given despite the fact that Rubottom and Kubitschek disagreed over the 
causes of the protests. Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 621; Robert 
Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (1991) p 286 
52 Memorandum of a Conversation between Mexican Representative to the OAS Dr. Luis Quintanilla, 
Ambassador John Dreier and Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, June 24 1958, Foreign 
Ministers Meetings, Box No 6, Economic - Inter American Regional Development Institution, Record 
Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs Roy R. 
Rubottom, Subject Files 1957-1959, Lot 60 D 553, National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
53 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 117 details the fact that domestic opponents of 
Kubitschek disagreed fervently with his expressions of Pan-American unity 
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venture in its current form was likely to be withdrawn. When Dulles arrived in Rio he 
wasted little time in challenging Kubitschek's linkage of the threat of communism - 
which had been "highlighted" so dramatically during Nixon's visit - and Latin 
underdevelopment. In fact, Dulles directly linked the question of Brazilian (and, 
therefore, Latin) underdevelopment to the need for increased private investment. He said, 
The United States not only sympathizes with but welcomes the concept of a 
dynamic and growing Brazil, a Brazil which could grow without sacrificing 
freedoms, such as occurs under communist regimes... Economic development 
under communism gains rapidly but at a high cost in terms of human 
freedom; the right of people to choose their own occupation; to hold their 
own beliefs; to enjoy liberty. This... is a heavy price to pay. But that is what 
happens under communism. It is important that the Free World maintain both 
a rate of growth and freedom for which men will sacrifice. The 
US.. . recognizes that, being a relatively 
highly developed country, it has a 
duty in the interest of the free world to help the less developed countries 
achieve a satisfactory rate of development. We remember that we, having 
achieved great results through private free enterprise, tend to believe that 
other countries too should count on private capital, which exists in 
abundance. Use of government capital should be the exception, not the rule. 56 
Dulles clearly reaffirmed the US belief in its economic principles of "free trade, free 
capital and free investment. " It was a direct message to the Kubitschek administration, 
using Kubitschek's professed Cold War concerns as a cue to repeat the importance of 
adopting US economic principles. According to Dulles, the threat of international 
communism could only be defeated through the continued embracement of Western 
ideals such as liberal capitalism. This is an important moment in the OPA negotiations; 
especially following on from the Kubitschek speech in June. Kubitschek, by presenting 
OPA as essentially a Cold War construct had enabled the Eisenhower administration to 
adopt a position that supported the political sentiments but not the economic ones. 57 
ss Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 118 
56 Memorandum of a Conversation between US delegation including Secretary Dulles, Ambassador Briggs, 
Assistant Secretary Rubottom and Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann and Brazilian Foreign Minister de 
Lima, Finance Minister Lucas Lopes and the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Brazilian Foreign Office, Rio de Janeiro, August 5 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 692-6 
S' Stanley Hilton notes this divergence between Kubitschek and Dulles, writing: 'Dulles... insisted on 
channelling conversation toward the communist threat and even proposed a bilateral anti-communist 
agreement, whereas Kubitschek pounded on a familiar theme of economic development as the path to 
hemispheric security. ' Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 622 
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This, though, raises an important point: namely, what other choice did 
Kubitschek have? Had OPA been presented solely as an economic proposal then it would 
have been rejected by US officials. At least by initially attaining US support for OPA's 
political aspects, there was a chance that Washington might agree to move on the 
economic agenda. Kubitschek believed that his only hope of engineering a change in US 
economic policy lay in attaining their tacit agreement for all of OPA. We can, then, see 
quite clearly that the US response to OPA altered significantly once the economic side of 
the proposal was revealed by Kubitschek: the earlier noises of moderate enthusiasm had 
given way to outright suspicion. The debate over what shape OPA should take now 
entered its final stage. As we will see, the US would only agree to support an OPA that 
was predominantly based on reaffirming hemispheric unity and which advocated 
economic policies in keeping with those basic American objectives and those changes 
outlined by the administration in the wake of the Nixon trip. 
US disapproval of Kubitschek's linkage of underdevelopment and the spread of 
communism was reiterated by Dulles throughout his Brazilian trip. 58 At a second 
meeting in Rio - this time with Kubitschek himself - Dulles took a similar position to 
that which he had taken at his meeting at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. Kubitschek, 
disregarding the earlier advice of Ambassador Peixoto, `emphasized that the first step 
was to agree on the major aspects of an economic program (to solve the economic 
crisis). ' In response, Dulles once more invoked stark Cold War imagery and challenged 
the Brazilian assertion that underdevelopment was, indeed, the major threat to 
hemispheric peace. He said, 
It is an oversimplification to say that the communist problem can be solved 
by solving the problem of underdevelopment. Highly developed countries 
such as Italy and France also have acute communist problems. Communism 
must be opposed "on all fronts and by all means. " The strongest element is 
faith: the creative power of free men. The spiritual values of free men should 
58 Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (1991) p 287 
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be stressed... our efforts should not be limited to economic problems but 
should also include those in the political field. 59 
Dulles had worked hard to dispel any lingering impression within Brazil that the US 
might support OPA's economically radical program. 60 Following Dulles' departure, both 
Kubitschek and Lucas Lopes, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, were understandably 
anxious about the next stage of OPA. 61 As we saw in the previous chapter, the approach 
outlined by Dulles was entirely in keeping with the Eisenhower administration's 
appraisal of its position in Latin America. There we highlighted the fact that despite an 
increasing tendency within the administration to view Latin America's position with 
respect to the US in predominantly strategic terms, there had not been any significant 
shift with regard to the administration's basic economic objectives 62 
That Kubitschek should be anxious when Dulles left Rio is understandable. Since 
coming to office in 1956, he had staked a great deal of his political credibility on seeking 
a close accommodation with the US in order to fund his ambitious development scheme. 
By the end of 1957, this approach had looked like failing due to the inability of the US 
and Brazil to reach an agreement over economic issues; however, the events of the Nixon 
trip had provided Kubitschek with the opportunity to revive his Operation Pan America 
scheme and, hopefully, bring in a new phase in the bilateral relationship, one that would 
help solve Brazil's crushing economic problems. Support from the US was vital. As 
s9 Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary Dulles and President Kubitschek, Laranjeiras Palace, 
Rio de Janeiro, August 5 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 696-9; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup 
D'Etats (1993) p 118-9; Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower (1988) highlights the fact that, `Dulles reported to the 
president that he was mystified by the Brazilian's "reluctance to have used the word Communism in our 
communique. "' P 114 
60 At a later speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in Rio, Dulles reaffirmed the position with 
regard to economic principles that he had taken in his earlier meetings with Brazilian officials, stating that: 
-'the economic well-being of a nation always depends primarily on its own efforts", that the best the US 
could do was to help a nation help itself. ' Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 119 
61 Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, August 7 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume Vp 702-3 
62 See: Michael Adamson, "The Most Important Single Aspect of our Foreign Policy?: The Eisenhower 
Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World" in Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (eds), The 
Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) 
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Weis writes, `if the US opposed OPA, most Latin nations would not support OPA... thus, 
to be successful, an understanding with the US was vital. '63 
Dulles delivered his verdict on his return flight to Washington. `I feel that the 
discussion of "underdevelopment" is a little too much mechanistic, as though there were 
some measurable point which could be achieved and which if reached would enable 
further development safely to cease, ' wrote Dulles. `In my thinking "underdevelopment" 
is a symptom of the lack of that dynamism which must prevail in a society if it is to 
survive. The United States is, and I hope always will be, "underdeveloped" in the sense 
that there will always be before us the vision of something better to be achieved. ' Dulles 
went on to note that if Washington was criticised over this, then there was a possibility 
that the US would refuse to participate in hemispheric schemes: `If what we have done 
merely evokes criticism, then there will be a tendency to revert to isolationism. ' Since 
Kubitschek announced the economic aspects of Operation Pan America, US support had 
quite clearly deteriorated. During his visit to Brazil and, indeed, in his letter to President 
Kubitschek, Dulles had outlined the continuing American belief in the viability of its 
economic principles as a model for fostering Latin prosperity. The US would not support 
the vast funding proposal outlined in Kubitschek's speech and continued to hold that 
Latin development could be achieved via the American economic system. US support for 
OPA, then, would be dependent upon the call for a radical change in economic funding 
being removed from the proposal. Ultimately, as we will see, the negotiations over OPA 
would collapse due to the incompatibility of the economic objectives of the US and 
Brazil, thus proving the presence of a clearly identifiable set of economic objectives 
within US policy toward Latin America that were separate from the administration's 
national security considerations. 
OPERATION PAN AMERICA - PHASE THREE: THE COLLAPSE OF OPA 
63 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 117 
64 Letter from Secretary of State Dulles to President Kubitschek, August 7 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume 
Vp 700-1 
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The reaction of the Eisenhower administration to Kubitschek's Operation Pan 
America proposal had quite clearly altered dramatically since the economic side of the 
proposal came to light. Ever since Kubitschek's speech on June 20, US officials had 
been refuting the Brazilian argument that economic underdevelopment was entirely to 
blame for communist gains in the region and that the only solution was a vast increase in 
the level of economic funding in the area. As we have seen, neither Dulles nor 
Eisenhower - nor indeed any of the prominent officials within the administration - 
believed that US strategic objectives in Latin America necessitated a dramatic shift in 
economic principles 65 Following Dulles' rejection of the economic theory underpinning 
OPA's underdevelopment thesis, Kubitschek dramatically altered his proposal, calling 
for the convening of a Foreign Minister's Meeting and a significantly watered-down 
version of Operation Pan America's initially radical economic proposals. As we saw 
earlier, without US support OPA would stood very little chance of succeeding; therefore, 
Kubitschek's only hope of obtaining Washington's support was - as Ambassador 
Peixoto had pointed out - to make his proposal compatible with US objectives. 
On August 9, Kubitschek dispatched an aide-memoire to the American Republics 
outlining his revised vision of OPA. As Michael Weis highlights, it was significantly 
altered from the proposal outlined in his speech of June 20. 
As with Kubitschek's earlier statements, the noted advocated economic 
measures to consolidate a political-military alliance. Among the specific 
suggestions for discussion (at the informal meeting of foreign ministers) were 
ways to increase private investment and public loans, to create an Inter- 
American Development Bank, to promote commodity price stability, to create 
a Latin American Common Market, and to expand technical assistance. For an 
initiative that had been described as bold, visionary, divisive, and communist 
inspired, the suggestion were neither revolutionary nor even very 
innovative. 
In fact, as we saw in the previous chapter, these suggestions were almost totally in 
keeping with those ideas being put forward by Milton Eisenhower, Thomas Mann, 
65 Michael Adamson, "The Most Important Single Aspect of our Foreign Policy" (2006); James Siekmeier, 
Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) 
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Douglas Dillon and Roy Rubottom as a solution to the economic problems that the US 
was facing in Latin America. Indeed, the actual policy outlined in NSC 5902/1 would - 
in terms of economic policy - be very similar to Kubitschek's latest OPA proposal. This 
change in approach is important for two reasons. 1) US support for OPA had atrophied 
dramatically once the economic aspect of the proposal became evident, and Kubitschek's 
response, therefore, was a reaction to the reduction in US support; and, 2) we can clearly 
see that the US wanted to modify OPA's economic sections so that it was more in 
keeping with the recommendations being made within the Eisenhower administration for 
regional commodity agreements and a regional lending institution. 
Unsurprisingly, the Eisenhower administration's support for OPA was 
rejuvenated by this change. Moreover, US officials were now happy to support a proposal 
that they believed was, once again, advocating a policy approach in keeping with their 
own reinterpretations. Roy Rubottom sent Foster Dulles a memorandum stating: `Recent 
initiatives such as Brazil's "Operation Pan America", and our own in support of an Inter- 
American regional development institution, make it urgent that we formulate a schedule 
to provide for adequate consideration of these proposals, along with those of other 
countries, to achieve our mutual objectives. ' Rubottom believed that the best forum for 
this type of debate would be a Foreign Ministers Meeting, as this would be, `well 
received in the US and throughout the hemisphere, ' and would `provide us with an 
opportunity to stress the importance which we attach to "OPA", but at the same 
time ... require 
Brazil to place the operation clearly within OAS channels. '67 
By viewing the evolution of Operation Pan America through these three distinct 
periods - the early stage of political cooperation; the secondary stage of declining US 
support due to issues over economic policies; and, finally, the third stage, illustrating the 
way that US support ebbed and flowed depending on the economic aspect of the proposal 
I Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coup D'Etats (1993) p 120; Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek 
and the Development of Brazil (1991) p 290-1 
67 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Roy Rubottom to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, August 
20 1958, Folder -1958 - Brazil, Box 5, Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary 
of State for Inter American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Subject Files 1957-1959. Lot 60 D 553, National 
Archives, College Park, Maryland 
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- we can see once and for all the impact that the economic side of US policy in Latin 
America was having on the administration's approach. We have already determined that 
in response to the Nixon trip, the US was increasingly using a security perspective when 
considering their approach in Latin America. 68 And yet, Washington's ultimate stance 
with regard to OPA makes little sense from a strategic standpoint: the only argument that 
offers a satisfactory explanation for the fluctuating level of US support for the proposal is 
that the Eisenhower administration was pursuing a bifurcated policy in Latin America at 
this time; in the case of OPA they were adhering to long-standing economic principles, 
not national security concerns. 
In an attempt to regenerate the previous level of US support for Operation Pan 
America, Kubitschek had dramatically watered-down his original proposal. Just how 
much was illustrated at the aforementioned Foreign Ministers Meeting in September, 
which upon completion issued a joint communique that stated: `The Meeting concurred 
in the belief that private capital offers the primary source for financing economic 
development in the lesser developed areas and that their individual governments desiring 
the introduction of the maximum private capital possible should undertake to provide 
appropriate conditions to encourage such investment. '69 As Weis notes, `with unity 
ostensibly preserved, the ministers issued a communique that praised OPA and promised 
greater cooperation and intensified efforts to promote economic development. '70 As we 
have seen throughout these sections on Operation Pan America, the Eisenhower 
administration's support for the political aspects of the proposal was continually strong; 
but once Kubitschek began proposing an agenda that challenged US economic ideals then 
US support deteriorated rapidly. And it was this pattern that would continue to dominate 
the bilateral relationship when it came to OPA: continued domestic criticism, and the 
" Although, as we have also seen, the same economic principles that had underpinned US policy in Latin 
America since 1953 continued to play a dominant role in those areas that were not immediately 
encompassed by the Eisenhower administration's perception of the national security problems that they 
faced in Latin America. Therefore, in Brazil, economic factors assumed more importance. 
69 Final Draft of Communique from Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Relation to Economic Topics of 
Brazilian Aide-Memoir6,16 September 1958 Folder - 1958 - Brazil, Box 5, Record Group 59, Entry 1135, 
Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Subject Files 
1957-1959, Lot 60 D 553, National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
70 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 121 
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deepening economic problems in Brazil, meant that Kubitschek was forced to return to 
his original approach of trying to incorporate a vast funding program into an OPA that 
would, hopefully, be accepted by the US. " 
As Kubitschek attempted to rejuvenate his proposal, though, the US would refuse 
to consider any changes in economic policy beyond those already revealed by Dulles at 
the September meeting. 72 As we saw in Chapter Five, the administration felt sure that the 
introduction of the IADB and regional commodity agreements would be enough to meet 
their strategic aims in the region and promote hemispheric stability. 73 These prevailing 
tensions between the US and the Brazil came to a head at the November meeting of the 
"Committee of 21", which was the group set up following the Panama President's 
Meeting in 1956.74 The Brazilian emissary to the meeting - Augusto Schmidt - warned 
the Americans during a break in proceedings that, `if the US did not support OPA, then 
Brazil might as well leave the meeting. ' Worse was to come: later on in the meeting 
Schmidt, `presented a three-part, two-hundred page treatise -a bombshell, really - that 
presented a history of inter-American economic cooperation and post-war problems ... the 
well-prepared proposal ... was more a condemnation of post-war US policy than anything 
else ... 
by the time Schmidt addressed the delegation on November 25, Brazilian- 
American cooperation on OPA was virtually impossible. 05 Once again, we can see that 
as soon as the Brazilians began to push their economic agenda with regard to OPA, US 
support diminished immediately. 
76 This clearly indicates the presence of a clear set of 
economic principles within US policy at the time when - as we have already noted in 
" Weis write, `For six weeks following the Foreign Minister's meeting, Kubitschek attempted to repair the 
damage and make OPA appear a success. He took the offensive with a series of speeches that emphasized 
that he still attached great importance to OPA and criticized opponents of the initiative as unpatriotic. ' 
Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coup D'Etats (1993) p 122 
72 Ibid p 122-3 
77 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 622; Robert Alexander, Juscelino 
Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (1991) p 288-290 
74 It will be remembered that Eisenhower went to Panama with the Committee of 21 as a proposal to divert 
expected Latin complaints about 
US economic policy following the impact of the Soviet Economic 
Offensive. 
7' Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 123-5 
76 It is worth noting that Schmidt may have been acting without Kubitschek's consent at the "Committee of 
21" meeting; but his ultimatum was symptomatic at the Brazilian frustration over their failure to bring 
about a change in US policy 
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Chapters Three and Five - US officials were viewing events in Latin America from a 
predominantly strategic perspective. 
By early-1959, Kubitschek's OPA proposal was finished; a fact that caused 
intense anger among leading Brazilian officials. 77 Thomas Mann outlined the nature of 
US-Brazilian disagreement to Douglas Dillon and emphasised the fact that economic 
disputes between the two nations had brought about the breakdown in negotiations. In an 
internal State Department memorandum he wrote, 
Brazil is attempting through Operation Pan-America to obtain the assurance 
of continuing large-scale financial assistance from the United States 
Government for a general program of economic development in Latin 
America. The program would set a series of goals and support levels, and the 
United States would be expected to underwrite the attainment of these support 
levels. The United States cannot accept the Brazilian proposals, and the 
problem is to resolve the issue constructively, with as little discord as 
possible. 78 
Mann made it quite clear that the US would only support OPA if it proved to be 
compatible with pre-existing economic objectives. In effect, the position of the 
Eisenhower administration over OPA was a direct representation of the themes outlined 
as underpinning the administration's reappraisal of policy in the 1958-61 period. Though 
strategic concerns had necessitated an alteration in some elements of US policy, and 
though US officials had recognised that the majority of the problems confronting them in 
the region were economic in nature, the solution put forward in NSC 5902/1 would be 
overtly concerned with national security imperatives. There would not be any major 
changes in US economic policy, and it is this fact that undermined any chance of 
Kubitschek being able to secure US support for his proposal. 
The final hope for OPA was the next "Committee of 21" meeting in January 
1959. However, once again, the US and the Brazilian's clashed over economic 
" Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) p 622; Robert Alexander, Juscelino 
Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (1991) p 290-1 
284 
differences. 79 As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, any hopes of US-Brazilian 
cooperation over OPA ultimately ended due to the incompatibility of each side's 
economic objectives. Brazil continued to call for a "Marshall Plan for Latin America", 
whilst the US, in keeping with its regional policy would refuse to countenance such a 
proposal. 80 OPA remained as part of the lexicon of intra-hemispheric relations after 1959, 
but it was an ideal far-removed from that originally outlined by Kubitschek in the wake 
of the Nixon visit. 
In fact, when it did re-emerge in 1960, it was as a reshaped American version; one 
that although advocating the unity within the Western Hemisphere proposed an economic 
program that adhered to traditional US economic objectives as outlined in NSC 5902/1. 
In February 1960, Eisenhower wrote to Kubitschek to `thank' him for proposing 
Operation Pan America, citing Kubitschek's proposal as being the catalyst for the version 
of OPA that the US had now adapted to meet its own objectives. 
You were thoughtful enough to write to me to express your own eloquent 
ideas for a dynamic joint effort in which all of the American Republics could 
devote themselves ... I have now concluded that, notwithstanding our past 
efforts, we all need to exert additional strength in our common program to 
meet the challenge of this new decade during which our peoples are 
determined to progress to a new high plane of dynamic living, socially, 
economically, politically and spiritually. 8' 
78 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann to the 
Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Douglas Dillon, January 26 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume 
Vp 708-10 
79 As Michael Weis has written on summarising the meeting: `Brazilian-American differences dominated 
the meetings... Brazil did not deviate from its insistence on a long-term program with concrete goals, a 
multilateral programa de metas, that the US refused to consider. Instead, US officials convinced the 
committee to accept a bilateral structure with each nation formulating its own program. United States 
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Eleven days later, Eisenhower spoke at a press conference in Newport, Rhode Island, 
where he outlined the US version of Operation Pan America. Predictably, at the heart of 
the US plan was the enduring economic ideal of development through the expansion of 
foreign private investment. `Widespread social progress and economic growth benefiting 
all the people and achieved within a framework of free institutions are the imperatives of 
our time, ' said the president. `Our nation's history and traditions place us in accord with 
those who seek to fulfil the promise of the future through methods consistent with the 
dignity of free men. ' Once he had finished his statement, Eisenhower agreed to take 
questions from the press, the most interesting of which concerned what shape this 
"investment program" would take: 
Q. Felix Belair, New York Times: Mr. President, is it possible at this time to 
give any kind of estimate as to the order of magnitude of assistance 
contemplated, and would the proposed program operate as did the European 
recovery program with the so-called shopping lists? 
THE PRESIDENT. No. You are talking about the so-called Marshall plan? 
Q. Mr. Belair: Yes, sir. 
THE PRESIDENT. Well, the Marshall plan was to repair and rehabilitate a 
destroyed industrial plant already existing. This is an entirely different 
problem, and I think it would be unfair to compare the effort we are now 
talking about --raising the social and economic standards of the people--with 
the effort of the Marshall plan. But I do want to say this, which I have said so 
often: the only real investment that is going to flow into countries that will be 
useful to them in the long term, is private investment. It is many times the 
amount that can be put in from the public coffers. And normally, the public 
loans are made so as to encourage and make better opportunities for the 
private investments that follow. 2 
The idea of Operation Pan America, then, was now being presented as a 
hemispheric effort to eradicate poverty and reaffirm unity in the Western Hemisphere 
through the economic model put forward by the US. Kubitschek's economic radicalism 
had been replaced and, it is fair to say, the version being referenced by US officials in 
1960 bore very little resemblance to that put forward by the Brazilian leader in 1958. Yet 
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the disagreement between the US and Brazil over OPA was not enough on its own to 
bring about a final break in the bilateral relationship; it was, however, a catalyst. In 1958, 
1959 and 1960, the deepening economic crisis engulfing Brazil would force Kubitschek 
to become increasingly insistent that the Eisenhower administration offer Brazil the 
financial assistance it so desperately needed. 83 The US, adhering to its pre-existing 
economic strictures, would refuse to consider any change in approach unless Brazil 
reached a prior agreement with the IMF over exchange reform. As we shall see in the 
next section, despite the increasing national security concerns that we outlined in Chapter 
Five as dominating US official's appraisals of Latin America, it would be economic 
issues that would come to dominate US-Brazilian relations for the remainder of the 
Eisenhower era. 
FINANCIAL DISAGREEMENTS: ECONOMIC POLICY & THE BILATERAL 
RELATIONSHIP 
In seeking to outline the reasons behind Kubitschek's eventual decision to pursue 
a more independent form of foreign policy, Michael Weis argues that the Brazilian leader 
was motivated by `the failure of OPA and the break with the IMF. ' 84 This section will 
analyse the period leading up to the Brazilian decision to break-off negotiations with the 
IMF and illustrate the way that it was the economic elements within US policy that 
brought this eventuality about; ultimately, as we shall see, to the detriment of 
Washington's strategic objectives in the region. Weis is the only scholar to have offered 
an in-depth appraisal of the reasons for the split in the bilateral relationship; however, he 
does so without linking the position taken by the US to the wider global and regional 
themes which have been outlined throughout this thesis 85 The importance of this 
82 The President's News Conference at Newport, Rhode Island, July 11th1960. Public Papers of the 
Presidents: Dwight D. Eisenhower 1960. www. presidency. ucsb. edu/ws/index. Accessed on November 7th 
2005. 
83 For an excellent account of Brazil's ongoing economic problems, see: Thomas Skidmore, Politics in 
Brazil (1967) p 174-8 
84 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 133 
85 Stanley Hilton does, too, but his approach is contained in an article that situates the breakdown in the 
bilateral relationship within a narrower argument detailing the growing enmity between the two nations as a 
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approach lies in the fact that the position taken by the US was a continuation of the 
economic approach that they had pursued since coming to office in 1953: in effect, their 
actions toward Brazil in the 1958-60 period reaffirmed the contention here that economic 
principles continued to impact heavily upon US policy toward Latin America even when 
strategic concerns had become of such pressing importance within the mindsets of US 
officials. 86 
We have already seen that a significant part of Kubitschek's enthusiasm for OPA 
was due to pressing domestic economic concerns. The problem for Kubitschek lay in the 
fact that US officials were reasonably satisfied with their economic approach toward 
Latin America. At the same time that Ambassador Peixoto was imploring US officials to 
provide Brazil with a $100 million EXIM loan 
87, Assistant Secretary of State William 
MaComber was writing to Senator Joseph Clark to refute claims made in a Philadelphia 
Inquirer editorial about US economic policy in Latin America. He wrote, 
As for the stated "neglect" of Latin America, I am pleased to inform you that 
while we may not always have been able to do everything we would have 
liked in this very important area, we do have a positive record of cooperation 
and support.. . of which we, as a nation, can 
be proud and which, I am 
confident, is both recognized and appreciated by our Latin American 
friends... in the field of private capital investment, about forty percent of the 
United States direct private investment is located in Latin America... The 
Export-Import Bank has authorized a total of more than three billion dollars 
in loans for Latin America, and more than forty percent of all the Bank's 
loans have gone to that area in the last decade. These loans are made to 
support both private and governmental development projects.. "88 
The message was clear: the Eisenhower administration did not believe that there was 
anything fundamentally wrong with its economic development policies toward Latin 
consequence of the Cold War context. Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" 
(1981) p 621-3 
86 As the bilateral relationship deteriorated, it was only the relationship between the Pentagon and their 
Brazilian counterparts that remained consistently amicable. However, the role of private American business 
officials like Nelson Rockefeller and Henry Kaiser did go some way toward alleviating the tensions that 
had emerged in the diplomatic relationship. Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy (1992) p 251 
87 Reference is to the meeting at the Department of State in February 1958 at which the Ambassador made 
an urgent request for US aid; see the first section on Operation Pan America in this section 
88 Letter from Assistant Secretary of State William Macomber Jr to Senator Joseph Clark, January 17 1958, 
Folder - 1958 - Brazil, Box 5, 
Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State 
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College Park, Maryland 
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America (This appraisal endured even in the aftermath of the Nixon trip when the 
reappraisal of policy that took place did not recommend a significant change in basic US 
economic policy). 89 The problem for Kubitschek was that Brazil's parlous economic 
position required a significant influx of foreign capital, which could only come from the 
United States. The refusal of the Eisenhower administration to consider a change in 
policy meant that economic disagreements would continue to be the dominant feature in 
Kubitschek's final two years in office. 
In Chapter Four, we demonstrated that US officials were insisting that any 
provision of economic aid would be dependent upon measures being taken to ensure that 
similar financial crises would not occur again; the feeling within Washington was that 
unless such steps were taken, Brazil would need similar balance of payments, 
inflationary or commodity assistance every financial year. The Brazilians complained 
that to take those measures being suggested - exchange reform, opening up Brazilian 
petroleum resources to private investment, implementing a new coffee policy - would be 
impossible due to strong internal nationalistic factions and to adopt such policies would, 
according to the Kubitschek administration, spell political disaster. This position 
continued to underpin US economic policy toward Brazil in 1958 and 1959. In May 
1958, a telegram from the State Department to the Embassy in Brazil emphasised that 
any EXIM Bank balance of payments assistance at this time would be, `highly 
inadvisable from Brazilian point of view since [it] would increase indebtedness without 
being likely to lead to real, basic solution of Brazil's problems. ' The telegram made it 
expressly clear that no EXIM Bank assistance would be forthcoming without a prior 
agreement being reached with the IMF. 90 State Department official, Harry Turkel, 
outlined the thinking behind the US approach with regard to the IMF in a memorandum 
produced in April. 9' `Brazil, Chile and Colombia are pressing us for what amounts to 
89 Michael Adamson, "The Most Important Single Aspect of our Foreign Policy" (2006); James Siekmeier, 
Aid Nationalism and Inter American Relations (1999) 
90 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil, March 3 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume Vp 661-3; Similar sentiments were expressed at a meeting between Ambassador Peixoto and 
Assistant Secretary Rubottom on March 14. See: Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 
Washington, March 14 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 663-5 
91 As Skidmore notes, `The IMF had a central role not because of the funds it could release, which were 
relatively small, but because its imprimatur was the precondition for the further cooperation of the principal 
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balance of payments assistance to tide them through periods of depressed commodity 
prices, ' wrote Turkel. `It is necessary that we respond to these situations, whilst at the 
same time maintaining pressure, through the International Monetary Fund, for needed 
internal reforms and endeavour to encourage policies which will help stabilize their 
economies. ' 92 
As Kubitschek began to try and obtain US support for OPA, the Eisenhower 
administration was continuing to adopt a hard-line approach toward Brazilian requests 
for economic assistance. This, of course, was not in keeping with Washington's strategic 
agenda. But, as we have seen throughout this thesis, the clear tension between economic 
and security objectives continued to exert a strong influence over US policy even when it 
was to the obvious detriment of US aims in either field. As 1958 went on, the US 
position with regard to the economic situation in Brazil continued to harden, with US 
officials continuing to insist that Brazil reach an agreement with the IMF. 
93 At his 
August meeting with President Kubitschek, Secretary Dulles reiterated the fact that US 
economic policy toward Brazil would - in spite of any progress made over OPA - 
continue to be predicated on traditional American economic ideals. Dulles warned 
Kubitschek `against the pitfalls of inflation' and `unbalanced budgets' and, then, 
`referring to the development of the United States in the last century, pointed out that the 
development of resources is primarily a job for private capital. '94 In fact, despite the 
continuing emphasis being attached by US officials to meeting their strategic aims in 
Latin America, there continued to be a strong emphasis placed on traditional US 
economic objectives. This was, of course, exacerbated by the Kubitschek 
administration's continuation of its policy of emphasising the economic side of the 
creditors, such as North American and European private banks and the United States government. 
' Thomas 
Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 176 
92 Memorandum by Director of the Office of Inter-American Affairs Harry Turkel to Secretary Dulles, 
Assistant Secretary Roy Rubottom and Deputy Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs Douglas Dillon, 
April 10 1958, Folder-1958 - Economic, Box 6, Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Subject Files 1957-1959, Lot 60 D 553, 
National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
93 See: Telegram from the Department of Stat to the Embassy in Brazil, March 211958; Telegram from the 
US Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, March 24 1958; Telegram from the Department of State 
to the Embassy in Brazil, March 29 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 666-671 
94 Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary of State Foster Dulles and President Kubitschek, 
Laranjeiras Palace, Rio de Janeiro, August 5 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 696-9 
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bilateral relationship. The relative importance that continued to be attached to economic 
aims within US policy was demonstrated in an Embassy telegram dispatched to the State 
Department on August 18. It stated, 
Objectives of US in Brazil continue to those enunciated previously and 
include following. 1. Effective collaboration by Brazil with US in support of 
common objectives of world peace and security... 2. Cooperation by Brazil 
with US in peaceful solution hemisphere problems and constant development 
and strengthening inter-American relations. 3. Continued awareness that 
Brazil's interests best served by close political, military, economic, scientific 
and cultural cooperation with US. 4. Recognition Communist threat and its 
many disguises and its use of ultra-nationalism, anti-Americanism and 
neutralism to attain its objectives. 5. Development of increased political 
stability based on democratic foundation. 6. Sound economic development 
providing maximum freedom of movement of goods, services and capital and 
maximum free enterprise. 95 
As we can see from the list of objectives provided above, the majority of US 
goals in Brazil in the summer of 1958 were strategic or security based. Despite the 
administration clearly emphasising its strategic aims in Latin America following the 
Soviet Economic Offensive and the Nixon trip, actual strategic objectives in Brazil had 
remained relatively unchanged. Consequently, economic factors continued to play a 
highly prominent part in the US approach toward Brazil. Economic principles continued 
to exert a strong influence over US policy. NSC 5902/1, although predominantly 
concerned with issues of national security, would reaffirm the Eisenhower 
administration's commitment to its traditional economic objectives. This refusal to 
consider a change in economic ideals had undermined any chance of an agreement over 
OPA; in terms of US-Brazilian economic relations it would bring about a split in the 
bilateral relationship as neither country was prepared to alter its position. The major 
problem would be the US insistence that Brazil reach an agreement with the IMF, 
specifically over the issue of full exchange reform. Kubitschek had made it clear that 
95 Telegram from the US Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, August 18 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume Vp 703-5 
96 As the report by the BAC cited here and in Chapter Five highlighted, a major cause of Brazil's economic 
problems was that it continued to be a "non-dollar country. "; for US position on this, see: Memorandum 
from Charles Adair the Director of the Office of International Financial and Development Affairs to 
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he refused to countenance any move to implement exchange reform; a stance reaffirmed 
when the limited measures that had been implemented so far, began to fuel `social unrest 
in urban areas. '97 Kubitschek did not believe that his political position was strong enough 
to implement a policy that was so deeply unpopular with Brazilian nationalists. 98 
By January 1959, Kubitschek began to be faced with the possibility of 
abandoning his much-heralded development program 99 Weis writes: `Kubitschek 
struggled with increasingly apparent but difficult choices. He could abandon the metas to 
fight inflation, which would alienate key support groups and thus was politically 
difficult, or he could complete the targets through inflationary financing, which might 
stifle foreign investment and destroy Brazil's credit rating. A third option was to 
convince the US government to modify its loan policies. ' 
100 In February, Kubitschek met 
with Ambassador Briggs and outlined his increasingly desperate take on the Brazilian 
economic situation. `In long talk with Kubitschek this morning I found him far more 
concerned over economic situation than on any previous occasion, ' reported Briggs. 
Brazil's financial problems - which as we have seen stemmed from lack of currency 
convertibility, an undiversified economy, continued budget deficits, high inflation and a 
chronic balance of payments problem - meant that Kubitschek was prepared to `take 
every step recommended in Washington (except "complete exchange reform" which he 
declared his government could not survive. )' 101 It would, though, be the issue of 
exchange reform that proved to be vital: the IMF would not sanction any funding 
program for Brazil unless full exchange reform was implemented and Kubitschek 
continued to argue that to implement such a change in policy could cause his government 
to collapse. Kubitschek went on to claim that even if he did implement all the other 
proposals made by the IMF that Brazil would still require `$300 million balance of 
Thomas Mann the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, February 101959, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume V, p 713-715 
97 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 176-180; Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the 
Development of Brazil (1991) p 296-300 
9s Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 127 
99 Although Kubitschek's ambitious development program had brought about some successes - most 
notably the construction of a new interior capital at Brasilia - it had failed to meet many of the targets laid 
down for it when Kubitschek took office in 1956. Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 178 
100 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 128 
101 Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, February 3 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume Vp 711-3 
292 
payments assistance, which can only come from the US. ' Ambassador Briggs repeated 
the standard US response that, `our assistance... would have to be based on prior 
arrangements between Brazil and the IMF. ' l02 
As the impasse between Brazil and the IMF continued Kubitschek began to 
consider the option of breaking off negotiations with the IMF and pursuing his own route 
to economic stability. 103 By doing this he hoped that he might be able to convince the 
Eisenhower administration to offer Brazil the balance of payments assistance that she 
continued to need. But, as Weis has pointed out, `United States officials saw the break as 
a desperate gamble to force them to make [an] EXIM loan without implementing the 
conservative fiscal policies they deemed necessary. ' 104 Kubitschek's intense frustration 
with the IMF became apparent in March when after a dinner between the Brazilian 
leader and Ambassador Briggs, the US representative reported that: `He is disappointed 
[in the] IMF technicians who although, well disposed and technically highly competent 
fail to understand facts of Brazilian political life. ' 105 As Peter Flynn has noted, by the 
spring of 1959 the growth of nationalism in Brazil was making it increasingly difficult 
for Kubitschek to even consider acceding to the demands of the IMF. `Criticism ranged 
across the political spectrum, making the question of foreign involvement in, and control 
of, Brazil's economy the most fiercely debated issue in national politics, ' writes Flynn. 106 
The nationalist factions in Brazil believed that by implementing full exchange reform - 
as stipulated by the IMF - Brazil would be sacrificing yet more of her economic 
independence; at a time when she was beset by economic crises, this was a highly 
volatile issue. Washington, however, continued to refuse to consider a change in its 
position regarding economic assistance. 107 Again, we can quite clearly see the influence 
that economic objectives continued to exert over US policy in Brazil. National security 
102 Ibid 
103 Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development of Brazil (1991) p 296-8; Joseph Smith, A 
History of Brazil (2002) p 176-7 
104 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 129 
105 Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, March 27 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume Vp 715-6 
106 Peter Flynn, Brazil: A Political Analysis. (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1978) p 206; Thomas 
Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 179 
107 See: Memorandum of a Conversation between Brazilian Ambassador Peixoto, Henrique Valles of the 
Brazilian Embassy, Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom and William Briggs of the Office of East 
Coast Affairs, Department of State, Washington, April 8 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 716-720 
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imperatives, which had been brought into sharp focus by the events of the Nixon trip, 
could have necessitated a strong effort by the US to form an alliance with Brazil. Yet, the 
Eisenhower administration continued to pursue a policy that they knew would be deeply 
unpopular in Brazil as a matter of economic principle. 
With no prospect of an agreement in sight, Kubitschek took the step of breaking- 
off negotiations with the IMF on June 9. He told Ambassador Briggs, `there would be no 
more Brazilian mission to the Fund. He had made his final proposals and they had been 
rejected-the fund continued to insist on exchange reform in a manner which was 
politically impossible for him to carry out. ' Kubitschek continued to say that if Brazil did 
not receive urgent financial assistance, he would be placed in a `situation where he 
would be obliged to choose the only alternative available to him and which he felt sure 
the Brazilian people would understand: a graduated default of Brazil's external 
obligations and an arrangement to keep the country going at a reduced economic tempo 
for the next few months. ' 108 It was a decision certain to play well in Brazil. As Thomas 
Skidmore has noted, `the President tried to make maximum political capital out of his 
break with the IMF. ' 109 
And yet, despite this severe split in US-Brazilian relations, US officials continued 
to maintain that their policies were correct. `Mr Jacobsson of the IMF, held that the 
proposed Brazilian stabilization program was not strong enough because it failed to unify 
exchange rates to the desirable extent and maintained a system of import subsidies, did 
not consolidate the public finances and make efforts to reduce the substantial railroad 
deficit and failed to call for adequate credit controls, ' wrote Roy Rubottom to Robert 
Murphy. `President Kubitschek refused to accept the IMF suggestions. ' 110 Immediately 
after Kubitschek broke with the IMF he requested economic assistance from the US; the 
108 Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, June 9 1959, Ibid, p 724-6; Michael 
Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 129-30 
109 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 181; Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the 
Development of Brazil (1991) p 297-9 
10 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom to the Deputy 
Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Murphy, June 17 1959, Folder - 1959 - Brazil, Box 
11, Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs 
Roy R. Rubottom, Subject Files 1957-1959, Lot 61 D 279, National Archives, College Park, Maryland; W. 
Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 134 
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US refused, but they did agree to reschedule some of Brazil's debts in order to ease the 
immediate burden on the Brazilian economy. However, this was certainly not a solution 
to the inherent problems in US-Brazilian economic relations and, in effect, the impasse 
remained the same. "' A National Intelligence Estimate, produced in late-July, stated 
that, 
President Kubitschek almost certainly is counting on the US relenting 
somewhat and being willing either to put enough pressure on the IMF to 
cause it to modify its position or, in the end, coming to Brazil's assistance 
without an IMF agreement. He probably believes that the US, apprehensive 
regarding the security of US military rights and US investments in Brazil 
(about $1,000 million), will act as he desires, lest a continuation of the 
impasse open the floodgates of ultra-nationalism and anti-Americanism. He 
appears to believe these considerations will outweigh US reluctance to make 
an exception to the IMF stabilization program approach. ' 12 
In many ways this is a remarkable document. The reason for its significance is 
that it quite clearly highlights the presence of economic and strategic factors within US 
policy: not only that, but also, it demonstrates the administration's commitment to their 
economic principles even when there was a chance that in doing so they might 
contravene their national security objectives. This is a crucial moment in demonstrating 
the central argument of this thesis; it clearly demonstrates that US strategic objectives in 
Brazil were being undermined by their economic polices. John Moors Cabot, who had by 
now been appointed as the new US Ambassador to Brazil13, outlined his belief that the 
US was pursuing the right economic approach in Brazil. He sent a report via Alton 
Hemba of the Office of East Coast Affairs that told Rubottom: `We [must] not permit 
Brazil to pressure us into receding from our position regarding balance of payments loans 
to Brazil... given the present financial policies and conditions in Brazil, a balance of 
payments loan would no good and might even do harm, ' wrote Cabot. `Brazil must be 
I" Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 129-130; Telegram from the US Embassy in 
Brazil to the Department of State, June 13 1959; Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary of 
State Christian Herter, Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom and Henrique Valles the Brazilian 
Charge D'Affaires, Department of State, Washington, July 8 1959; Letter from the Charge in Brazil 
Earnest Wallner to the Director of the Office of East Coast Affairs Clarence Boonstra, July 10 1959, FRUS 
1958-1960 Volume Vp 726-733 
112 SNIE 93-59 Special National Intelligence Estimate, "The Financial Crisis in Brazil", July 21 1959, 
FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 733-9 
113 And who, it will be remembered, was one of the leading voices in the administration advocating a 
change in US policy 
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allowed to "stew in its own juice" unless it's willing to make financial reforms. ' 4 For 
his part, Kubitschek continued to receive the acclaim of his countrymen for standing up 
to the "Yankee Imperialists" in the IMF and, fatefully, began to move toward an 
independent foreign policy. ' 15 Somewhat fortuitously, the immediate crisis over the IMF 
negotiations would dissipate as Brazil's coffee exports proved to be far higher than 
expected, although the factors that had caused the problems in the first place had still not 
been addressed. As Weis argues, `Although Brazil avoided bankruptcy, nothing was 
resolved. ' 16 The tension between economic and security factors within US policy has 
been highly visible in our analysis of the US position with regard to OPA and the 
financial crisis confronting Brazil in 1959; we will now conclude by demonstrating the 
continued impact of this trend by briefly looking at the events surrounding the 1960 
presidential election. 
THE 1960 ELECTION: THE US AND THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION 
With US-Brazilian relations at an all-time low, anti-Americanism and overt 
nationalism would prove to be prominent themes in the 1960 Brazilian presidential 
election campaign. These events also forced the US to consider their position with 
respect to the election, as they were faced with either a pro-nationalist, economic radical 
coming to power, or the likely appointment of Kubitschek's hand-picked successor; a 
move that would enable Kubitschek to return to power in 1964.117 Again, in a 
continuation of the main argument of this thesis, we will see that the US approach 
toward the election was overshadowed by economic concerns and considerations rather 
than strategic interests. 
I4 Memorandum from Alton Hemba the Deputy Director of the Office of East Coast Affairs to Assistant 
Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, October 16 1959; Memorandum from Dwight Scarborough of the Office 
of East Coast Affairs to Assistant Secretary Roy Rubottom, November 3 1959, Folder - 1959 - Brazil, 
Box 11, Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American 
Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Subject Files 1957-1959, Lot 61 D 279, National Archives, College Park, 
Maryland 
115 Thomas Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 180-3; Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the 
Cold War" (1981) 
116 Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and Coup D'Etats (1993) p 129-130 
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The first candidate to take a stance with regard to US-Brazilian relations in 
anticipation of the 1960 election was Kubitschek's successor as Governor of the State of 
Minas Gerais. In February 1959 he signed a decree that directly contravened the interests 
of the MA Hanna Company. "g John Ingersoll, of the Office of East Coast Affairs, 
reported to Roy Rubottom that, `this move is suspected to have been politically 
motivated' and that it was `another example of nationalist pressures in Brazil and the 
difficulties which they create for US private investment. ' 19 The problems in the bilateral 
relationship were used as a tool for political gain by Brazilian officials who were 
interested in running for the presidency. 120 In April, Joao Goulart, the Brazilian Vice 
President, backed a move to block the remittances that foreign companies received on 
the profits they made in Brazil. William Briggs, Deputy Director of the Office of East 
Coast Affairs, told Rubottom: `You will recall that recent public statements by high 
Brazilian Government Officials seem to foreshadow steps designed either to limit profits 
of US firms or to restrict their remittances... there are indications that the Vice 
President's Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) may be planning to use this matter as a plank 
in its platform for the 1960 presidential elections. ' 121 
An almost identical example occurred in May, over the continued pressure within 
Brazil to expropriate the facilities of the American and Foreign Power Company 
117 For information on this, see: Sheldon Maram, "Juscelino Kubitschek and the 1960 Presidential 
Election, " Journal of Latin American Studies (Volume 24, No 1, February 1992) pp 124-145 
118 A large US steel company that was run by former Treasury Secretary, George Humphrey, and also 
numbered from Assistant Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr amongst their employees 
119 Memorandum by John Ingersoll of the Office for East Coast Affairs, to Assistant Secretary Roy 
Rubottom, February 20 1959, Folder -1959 - Brazil, Box 11, Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Subject Files 1957-1959, Lot 
61 D 279, National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
120 For information on the growth of "populism" and "nationalism" in Brazilian politics, see: Thomas 
Skidmore, Politics in Brazil (1967) p 183-7; Robert Alexander, Juscelino Kubitschek and the Development 
of Brazil (1991) p 336-343; Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil (2002) p 164-6 
121 Briggs suggested to Rubottom that he take the next possible opportunity to inform Ambassador Peixoto 
of the US position regarding this move. At a meeting on April 8, Rubottom conveyed Briggs' concerns to 
Ambassador Peixoto on the issue of profit remittances, as well as reiterating the necessity of Brazil 
reaching an agreement with the IMF before any assistance would be forthcoming from the US. See: 
Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of East Coast Affairs William Briggs to Assistant 
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom, April 71959, Folder - 1959 - Brazil, Box 11, 
Record Group 59, Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs Roy 
R. Rubottom, Subject Files 1957-1959, Lot 61 D 279, National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
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(AMFORP) at Porto Alegre. 122 John Ingersoll again reported on the situation to 
Rubottom, telling him: `however this works out, it appears certain that AMFORP will 
surrender its property to the state but insist on just compensation... at the same time, we 
are disturbed by this action because of the precedent it may establish... and particularly 
because it's contrary to our understanding of the serious desire of Brazil to attract foreign 
private investment. ' 123 These events were beginning to establish a worrying trend, and it 
was one that was increasingly starting to concern the Eisenhower administration. As with 
their stance over IMF and OPA, the US position toward the 1960 election would come to 
centre on economic not strategic concerns. In addressing this, US officials needed to 
consider one absolutely crucial question: who did they want to win? They were faced 
with one of two choices: either the election of an administration campaigning on a pro- 
nationalist and anti-American platform with whom they would have to rebuild the 
bilateral relationship all over again, or the victory of Kubitschek's self-anointed 
successor, which would probably mean that Kubitschek would return to power in the 
mid- I960s. 
The overriding aim for the US was to have somebody in power that they could 
work cooperatively with and who would take the necessary steps to address Brazilian 
122 William Briggs sent a memo to Rubottom on May 14 outlining the events with the expropriation of 
AMFORP assets, telling him that the situation had arisen due to an internal dispute in the PTB between 
Joao Goulart and Janio Quadros over who would be the party's nomination for president. Briggs wrote: 'It 
is beginning to be clear that Goulart and the PTB, in order to stop Quadros, plan immediately to begin the 
creation of a mass sentiment of ultra-nationalism which Goulart can head ... the move against AMFORP is 
probably only the opening gun in the PTB election campaign. We may expect ... that 
US interests in states 
controlled by the PTB will be subject to constant political pressures. ' Memorandum from William Briggs 
of the Office of East Coast Affairs to Assistant Secretary Roy Rubottom, May 14 1958, FRUS 1958-1960 
Volume V 723-724 
123 This time the appeal carried some weight, as Kubitschek was still hopeful of persuading the US to offer 
his government some form of financial assistance, and as a result he intervened to protect the holdings of 
AMFORP. Washington was well aware of Kubitschek's reasons for such a move; so much so that 
Rubottom called Mr Balgooyen at AMFORP and warned him: `President Kubitschek was tying together in 
his mind, his intervention in this problem, with the assistance of the Company (AMFORP) in Brazil's 
efforts to get financial assistance from us in the future', before pointing out `that the Company would not 
wish to be in such a position, and moreover really could not do anything in the way of helping to get such 
assistance for Brazil. ' Memorandum from William Briggs the Deputy Director of the Office of East Coast 
Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, April 7 1959; Memorandum from John Ingersoll of 
the Office of East Coast Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, May 18 1959; Memorandum 
of a Phone Conversation between Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom and Mr Balgooyen of the 
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economic problems. As Ambassador Cabot reported to Washington in late-December 
1959, `Brazil has been able to scrape by for six months primarily because of coffee 
exports which were much bigger than expected. This is a process which can scarcely 
continue. ' More significant was Cabot's assertion that: `The cold shoulder we have given 
the Brazilians in their economic plight has had its inevitable repercussions on the political 
orientation of the Brazilian government. One symptom of this is the trade mission which 
is now in Soviet Russia. ' Although we saw in Chapter Five that the Eisenhower 
administration was predominantly concerned with its strategic position in Latin America, 
we can see here that despite this, the focus of US policy in Brazil had, by 1960, been 
overtaken by the perennial question of economic issues. In Cabot's opinion, the only 
viable solution was to make sure the Kubitschek administration did not collapse and then 
look toward building a relationship with the new administration. 124 
Our short-term objective is obviously to see that Brazil gets through the 
present administration without some major over-turn and survives in such a 
shape that a new government taking office can restore Brazil's economic 
stability... Our present concern should be to get through the next fourteen 
months with as little damage as possible to Brazil's economy and 
development, and to the relations between the two countries. '25 
On balance, the administration decided that they stood more chance of being able 
to develop a working relationship with a leader outside Kubitschek's political sphere 
even if they did come to power on the back of a platform espousing nationalist and anti- 
American principles. This was an inherently risky strategy; but it does demonstrate just 
how far US-Brazilian relations had deteriorated by 1960, and, also, the importance that 
the administration was apportioning to meeting its economic aims in Brazil. The dilemma 
for the US had been outlined by William Briggs in a memorandum to Roy Rubottom as 
early as June 1959, in which he wrote: 
Entry 1135, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, 
Subject Files 1957-1959, Lot 61 D 279, National Archives, College Park, Maryland 
124 Of course, this position was markedly similar to that in 1955 when the US was forced to tide the Cafe 
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125 Letter from the US Ambassador in Brazil John Moors Cabot to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- 
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We may now safely assume that President Kubitschek's intention is only to 
maintain the economic and political status quo during the remainder of his 
term and to influence the choice of his successor in the October 1960 
elections. There is therefore little chance that an agreement on a sound 
economic stabilization program will result from Brazilian talks with the IMF 
or that such a program would be implemented if undertaken. The US will 
therefore be expected by the Kubitschek administration to make sufficient 
balance of payments credits available to Brazil on the GOB's terms to stave 
off a financial crisis for the next 18 months and to enable Kubitschek to 
maintain his reputation as a promoter of economic development. We have 
already had indications that should he decide that such credits are unlikely to 
be forthcoming, Kubitschek would be willing to destroy the climate of 
Brazilian-US relations in order to either force credits from us or to shift the 
blame for Brazil's economic difficulties to this country... We should therefore 
seek a third course which would be designed to afford Brazil barely enough 
balance of payments relief of all sorts to deter Kubitschek from an all out 
campaign of demagoguery, but not enough to build up his prestige to the 
extent that Kubitschek men and policies will control the 1960 elections. 126 
As we can see, then, the Eisenhower administration's stance over who to support in the 
1960 Brazilian presidential election came down to a question of economic pragmatism. 
Taking the position that a continuation of the Kubitschek era would not bring about the 
necessary changes in Brazilian economic policy, the US decided to ensure that they did 
not provide Kubitschek with enough political and financial support to enable him to 
anoint his own successor. Instead, they were prepared to take the risk that he might be 
replaced to a new leader committed to a strong nationalistic agenda. 127 
CONCLUSION: 
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Charge d'Affaires Henrique Valle, Department of State, July 8`s 1959, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume V. p 729- 
730 
127 Like the situation in 1955, the US quickly began to make efforts to make an early impression on Janio 
Quadros the winner of the 1960 election, inviting him to the US as they had done with Kubitschek. See: 
Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etats (1993) p 137-9; Telegram from the US Embassy in Brazil to 
the Department of State, October 7 1960; Memorandum from Secretary of State Christian Herter to 
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By the time that President Eisenhower left office in January 1961, US-Brazilian 
relations were at yet another all-time low. 128 The US was faced, once again, with trying 
to develop an amicable relationship with a new Brazilian government and none of those 
issues which had so severely strained the bilateral relationship - Brazil's failure to reach 
an accord with the IMF, high inflation and balance of payments problems in Brazil, the 
US refusal to consider a change in economic policy - had been addressed satisfactorily 
and would, in fact, continue to plague US-Brazilian relations during the Kennedy- 
Quadros era. 129 As we have seen in these final two chapters, the switch toward 
prioritising national security aims in Latin America had impacted a major change onto 
US-Latin relations. But, crucially, within that strategic approach, the same economic 
objectives that had underpinned US policy throughout the Eisenhower era continued to 
exert a strong influence on US-Latin relations. 
Throughout this chapter we have seen that US economic objectives in Brazil 
exerted a powerful influence over US policy that was in excess of the emphasis accorded 
to them in the actual policy statements produced by the administration. This, of course, is 
in keeping with the main argument of this thesis; even so, it is still somewhat surprising 
to see the extent to which economic factors did influence the position of the US toward 
Brazil in this period. The explanation for this is, perhaps, twofold. Firstly, apart from 
Kubitschek's attempts to force a close political alliance with the US over OPA, there was 
very little sign of US-Brazilian political cooperation in this period. Had OPA not become 
so predominantly economic in tone, then it is quite possible that a strong bilateral, Pan- 
American alliance could have been formed between Washington and Rio, but this is 
somewhat speculative. 
Secondly, and more concretely, the depth of Brazil's economic crises meant that 
there was no easy solution for Kubitschek to take. On the one hand he would run into 
President Eisenhower, October 29 1960; Despatch from the US Embassy in Brazil to the Department of 
State, December 13 1960, FRUS 1958-1960 Volume Vp 790-7 
128 Stanley Hilton, "The United States, Brazil, and the Cold War" (1981) 
129 See: Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etat (1993) Chapter 6; Stephen Rabe, The Most 
Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communism in Latin America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999) 
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trouble with the US, on the other he would inflame those factions espousing nationalist 
sentiment in Brazil. Therefore, the role of economic issues in the bilateral relationship 
became highly important and, as we saw in Chapter Five when looking at the breakdown 
in US-Cuban relations, despite the changes made in US economic policy in NSC 5902/1, 
the Eisenhower administration was still not prepared to countenance any nation 
attempting to pursue an economic agenda that contravened US objectives. 
US national security objectives in Latin America in the late-1950s made a healthy 
US-Brazilian relationship important, but not so much so that it became more important 
than continuing to adhere to long-standing US economic principles. As we saw earlier, 
US strategic aims did not necessitate a "special relationship" with Brazil just that Brazil 
continued to support the US position in the Cold War and remained committed to the 
ideals of capitalism. IN As a result of this, and the Brazilian administration's 
determination to bring about a change in US fiscal policy, it was the economic side of the 
bilateral relationship that came to dominate US-Brazilian relations in this period. The 
continual clash between the economic policies of the US and Brazil directly undermined 
the bilateral relationship and heavily influenced the US position toward the 1960 
election; negotiations over OPA and the IMF had both collapsed due to economic 
disagreements. The case study of Brazil, then, has strongly suggested that even when 
national security considerations dictated otherwise, the economic side of US policy 
continued to exert a very powerful influence over the administration's approach; 
especially in a nation such as Brazil where strategic concerns were not as urgent as they 
were in other Latin nations. '31 
130 Prior to 1961, both of these things were taken as read: although Brazil had flirted with the Soviet offers 
of economic and technical assistance, there was never going to be a wholesale rejection of capitalism from 
the Brazilian's and, similarly, under Kubitschek Brazilian support in the UN was also relatively constant. 
131 Obviously, this is not to discount the role of strategic concerns in US policy. As we have seen, they were 
a central part of US-Brazilian relations. But - at no stage - did they look like becoming the 





"A NEW PERSPECTIVE? " 
On January 17,1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower addressed the American people for 
the final time as president. Although the speech has now become synonymous with 
Eisenhower's stark warnings `against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether 
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex, ' it was also noteworthy for its 
reiteration of the guiding principles that lay behind Eisenhower's foreign policy 
approach. 
Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes 
have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and 
to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. 
To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any 
failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to 
sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad. 
Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict 
now engulfing the world. It commands our whole attention, absorbs our very 
beings. We face a hostile ideology--global in scope, atheistic in character, 
ruthless in purpose, and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses 
promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully, there is called 
for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather 
those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely, and without 
complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle--with liberty the 
stake. Only thus shall we remain, despite every provocation, on our charted 
course toward permanent peace and human betterment. ' 
The predominant ideological constructs of the Cold War are clearly visible. And 
this is in keeping with the way that the rhetoric of the bipolar struggle had impacted upon 
US foreign policy throughout Eisenhower's time in office. As we have seen, the idea of a 
good versus evil struggle between the American way and communism had been a 
prevalent theme in the Eisenhower period. Increasingly, throughout the years 1955 to 
1961, however, the focus of that conflict had been in those areas known as the Third 
World. The relative stabilisation of Europe, significant changes in Soviet foreign policy, 
the increasing nuclear parity between Washington and Moscow and the need to secure 
' Farewell Address by President Eisenhower, January 1714 1961. www. presidency. ucsb. edu/ws/index 
Accessed on February 10th 2006. 
2 See: Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad 
(Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2006); John Lewis Caddis, Strategies of Containment: A 
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 
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the allegiance of the developing nations all affected the shifting of Cold War tensions 
away from Europe and onto the Third World. Despite the change in location, the anti- 
Soviet rhetoric and the commitment of US officials to being seen to be facing up to the 
communist threat continued to be an integral part of US foreign policy during the second 
Eisenhower administration. 
Throughout this thesis, though, we have demonstrated the inherent problems with 
the application of such a singular narrative onto US policy in Latin America; it made US 
officials inflexible with regard to understanding Latin American complaints as all traces 
of anti-Americanism were channelled through the bipolar perspective. The Eisenhower 
administration became more concerned with being seen to be winning the Cold War in 
the Western Hemisphere than addressing the overwhelming concerns that the Latin 
nations had with US pre-eminence and their lack of prosperity. This process began in 
earnest following the Soviet Economic Offensive of January 1956, when US officials 
began to increasingly view their position in Latin America with respect to national 
security considerations and was expedited by the events of the Nixon trip in April/May 
1958 and the Cuban Revolution eight months later. Crucially however, despite this 
change in perspective, and the continued use of the Cold War to present actions taken by 
the administration in Latin America, US economic aims remained resolutely the same. 
In 1958, when the administration identified Latin discontent as being the biggest 
cause of anti-American sentiment in the region and, therefore, an issue of overwhelming 
strategic concern, the changes made to US policy would be designed to address the 
impending political crisis rather than the actual economic causes of the problem. 
Policies such as: supporting military or totalitarian regimes; increasing military aid to the 
region; attempting to accord more importance to the Latin nations through the OAS; 
implementing a regional lending institution and limited commodity agreements; making 
EXIM Bank loans repayable in local currencies rather than dollars; forming anti- 
communist resolutions; and, launching covert operations against unfavourable regimes, 
were all designed to meet US aims relating to either economic or strategic objectives. 
However, these two divergent goals very often undermined the success of US policy and 
deepened the level of anti-American sentiment in the region. Those changes made to US 
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policy in the late-Eisenhower era, saw pre-existing tensions within US policy become 
more prominent as the emphasis on national security concerns heightened the dichotomy 
between economic idealism and strategic imperatives. 
As Thomas McCormick notes, the inability of the Latin nations to bring about a 
significant change in US economic dominance and control brought long-held frustrations 
to the fore. 
Even without the Cuban revolution, developments in Latin America as a 
whole conceivably moved American policy toward accommodations with a 
middle ground between the entrenched oligarchies and pluralistic pressures 
for change. Throughout the 1950s, a strong residue to anti-Americanism 
remained, half-hidden in the shadows of history. It showed itself in the 
Caribbean periphery's hostility toward past American interventionism and the 
racism and cultural arrogance that accompanied it, in the South American 
semi-periphery's resentment of American regional hegemony in an area 
where some nations, like Brazil, entertained such pretensions themselves, and 
in the whole hemisphere's sensitivity to the reality of its economic 
dependence on the North American colossus. 3 
In surveying the prevailing historiography on US-Latin American relations in the early- 
1990s, Mark Gilderhus also notes the differences between US and Latin American 
objectives, concluding that: `the main body of historical literature reviewed here 
emphasizes the disparities and divergences of national aims and aspirations. The United 
States and Latin America have had much less in common than Pan-American 
mythologies have claimed. '4 Furthermore, Elizabeth Cobbs also makes this distinction 
between US and Latin objectives, writing 
Within the larger Latin American context, however, the Kaiser-Rockefeller5 
activities could do little, limited as they were, to ameliorate the 
oppressiveness of the power imbalance between North and South. Given the 
wide disparity in resources of all kinds, the imbalance would have existed 
regardless of policy on either side, but it was made intolerable by the 
arrogance, continued interference, and deepening economic control of the 
I Thomas McCormick, America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989) Second Edition 1995 p 141 
4 Mark Gilderhus, "An Emerging Synthesis? US-Latin American Relations since World War II" in Michael 
Hogan (eds) America in the World: The Historiography ofAmerican Foreign Relations since 1941 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p 461 
5 Henry Kaiser and Nelson Rockefeller 
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United States, combined with the increasing nationalism of Latin American 
nations 6 
But these observations regarding American and Latin differences over their relative aims 
and objectives do not explain why the Eisenhower administration continued to pursue an 
economic policy that was so unpopular with the Latin nations. In order to understand 
this, there was a clear need to adopt a framework that considered both economic and 
strategic elements within US policy, and which persevered with such an approach even 
when the distinctions between these two elements became blurred in the late-1950s. 
This thesis began by outlining the necessity of understanding why the 
Eisenhower administration persisted in adhering to its economic principles even when 
they were clearly undermining Washington's strategic position in Latin America. As we 
have seen, the administration's faith in its basic economic principles remained 
undimmed throughout its time in office; even when national security considerations 
became more pressing with regard to Latin America the administration did not recant 
from their previous economic ideals. In fact, when US policy toward the Third World did 
begin to alter after 1955, the actual economic aims within that approach remained 
unchanged. Burton Kaufman highlights the administration's failure to successfully 
reshape its economic policies toward the Third World, writing 
The funds the administration asked for and received for economic 
development abroad always fell far short of what many Third World leaders 
and economic experts believed was minimally necessary to promote 
economic growth, especially when compared to the billions of dollars the 
United States had poured into Europe under the Marshall Plan in the late 
1940s and early 1950s. Moreover, the debate over foreign economic policy 
was circumscribed and narrowly conceived throughout the entire Eisenhower 
administration. Concern with Communist expansion continued to be the 
major motivating force behind the nation's policy toward the Third World as 
administration officials remained persuaded that economic development 
would lead to the type of government the United States desired. 
6 Elizabeth Cobbs, The Rich Neighbor Policy: Rockefeller and Kaiser in Brazil (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992) p 251 
' Burton Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1982) p 208; Michael Adamson, "`The Single Most Important Aspect of our 
Foreign Policy? ': The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World" in Kathryn Statler 
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If anything, the administration's commitment to the ideals of "free trade, free 
investment and free capital" actually increased, as US officials began to associate 
liberalised, thriving economic structures with the fight against anti-Americanism. 8 The 
evidence presented here suggests that there were two separate objectives underpinning 
the Eisenhower administration's policies toward Latin America - 1) the widespread 
expansion of the American economic system; and 2) the need to be seen to be winning 
the Cold War by quelling any Latin nationalist or anti-American sentiments. Throughout 
this thesis, the need to view US-Latin American relations within a framework that 
incorporates both the economic and strategic considerations within US policy has 
become increasingly apparent. It is, however, important to reiterate the fact that this was 
not a deliberate construct within US policy; it was, instead, a by-product of the way that 
US aims and objectives had evolved in the aftermath of World War Two. The fact that 
this bifurcated structure within US policy was not a deliberate development has meant 
that its full importance has gone un-interrogated by scholars dealing with this period. 
Moreover, it has some stark implications for our understandings of American policy and 
the notion of American "power" during the Cold War era. 
The main objective of this thesis was to examine US policy toward Latin 
America via a "new" framework: one that challenged existing assumptions and built 
upon pre-existing studies, and which sought to offer a more nuanced appraisal of the 
Eisenhower administration's foreign policy. Yet it was when this approach was adopted 
with regard to US relations with Brazil that we were able to see the full range of 
complexities underpinning US policy during the Eisenhower era. The fact that there has 
been so little scholarship produced on US-Brazilian relations (or, indeed, many nations 
outside of the Guatemala-Bolivia-Cuba axis) during the Eisenhower era has been one of 
the main reasons why the study of US-Latin American relations has been so beset by the 
stark divergence of opinion between Traditionalism and Revisionism. As one of the 
region's largest and most important nations, Brazil should serve as a crucial case study 
and Andrew Johns (eds), The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the 
Cold War (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) 
8 This is a point clearly made by James Siekmeier. See: James Siekmeier, Aia Nationalism and Infer- 
American Relations: Bolivia, Guatemala and the United States 1945-1961 (New York: The Edward Mellon 
press, 1999) 
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for an analysis of the administration's regional strategy; the reason it does not is that the 
events in the bilateral relationship do not fit easily into an argument based on either 
economic determinism or national security. Put simply, US-Brazilian relations were - as 
outlined throughout this work - incredibly complex. 
And yet, this complexity was consistent with the patterns in evidence in the US 
approach toward Latin America as a region. As we saw in Chapters One and Five, US 
intervention in Guatemala and Cuba cannot be ascribed to one particular cause; instead, 
those cases of intervention came about due to the collision of US economic and strategic 
concerns. In fact, perhaps the most significant point to come out of this re-evaluation of 
US policies toward Latin America in Brazil is that the factors impacting upon the 
decisions of US officials were very rarely attributable to one particular point or 
objective. 9 It is this conclusion that makes the Traditional and Revisionist unable to fully 
explain the Eisenhower administration's policies in Latin America. As we have seen, at 
no stage did the administration follow a policy that was solely informed by economic or 
strategic concerns; both factors were always exerting a strong influence over the 
decisions taken by US officials. 
What, then, are the consequences of this study? There are, I would argue, three 
main outcomes. Firstly, it has implications for the future study of US-Latin American 
relations during the Cold War and, also, for our understanding of US policy throughout 
the early Cold War period. Speaking generally, it goes some way toward identifying the 
synthesis that Mark Gilderhus sought to classify in the 1990s and, in some ways, seeks to 
move beyond the long-standing debate between competing schools of thought. This, as 
Melvyn Leffler has argued, is of the utmost importance. 
Our field has the potential to make significant contributions to the larger 
enterprise of American history. We will do so if we can overcome our own 
tendencies to fragment into topical sub-specialties and warring schools of 
interpretation. We need to write more monographs and more syntheses that 
transcend our traditional categories of analysis. We need to sharpen and 
9once again, it is worth noting that this was very much a direct legacy of the way that US policy evolved 
in the early Cold War era; not a deliberate construct by US officials. 
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reconfigure our older interpretations and at the same time assimilate the new 
approaches. 10 
Identifying an approach that moves beyond traditional academic debates is vital in 
furthering our understanding of US foreign policy as a discipline. Achieving this allows 
scholars to transcend previous arguments and offer up a multi-faceted appraisal of the 
underlying aims and intentions behind US policy. The foreign policy making apparatus 
of the Eisenhower administration often, as we have seen in the case of Latin America, 
created policies that were both highly complex and multi-factorial; as such, our analysis 
of these policies needs to be similarly diverse. There are, however, other more immediate 
impacts on the field of US-Latin American and US-Brazilian relationships. 
The second major impact of this thesis is that it makes it necessary to reappraise 
our understanding of the Kennedy administration's policies toward both Latin America 
and Brazil. Whilst Eisenhower and Kennedy were clearly very different presidents, the 
ideological commitment to being seen to be winning the Cold War continued to form a 
major part of the Kennedy administration's foreign policy. Famously, at his 
inauguration, Kennedy reaffirmed the US commitment to "winning" the Cold War, 
stating: `Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any 
price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure 
the survival and the success of liberty. '" But, as we have seen throughout this thesis, 
avowed anti-communism was not as simple as merely opposing the USSR: the ingrained 
American commitment to protecting US national security interests necessitated the 
quelling of overt anti-American sentiment that might undermine US credibility and, also, 
creating the impression that Washington was winning the bipolar struggle. 12 However, 
like Eisenhower, US policy under Kennedy would also retain a strong belief in 
traditional American economic principles and objectives. With regard to US-Latin 
10 Melvyn Leffler, "New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations" in Michael 
Hogan (eds), America in the World: The Historiography ofAmerican Foreign Relations since 1941 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p 67-8 
" Inaugural address by President John F. Kennedy, January 20 1961 Taken from: 
www. presidencv. ucsb. edu/ws/index Accessed on August 28 2006 
12 This was, as shown earlier, equally prominent during Eisenhower's time in office. See: Kenneth Osgood, 
Total Cold War (2006); Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped 
an Enduring Cold War Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 
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American relations, then, the trend outlined in this thesis - of US aims in the economic 
and security spheres undermining each other - continued to impact a huge influence 
during the administrations of Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. As Stephen Rabe has noted, 
the Kennedy administration's grandiose scheme for solving Latin underdevelopment - 
the "Alliance for Progress" - was undermined by US national security policies. He 
writes, 
The Kennedy administration gradually realized that Latin America was not 
set for miracles. But it also undermined the Alliance for Progress with its 
Cold War initiatives... Through its recognition policy, internal security 
initiatives, and military and economic aid programs, the administration 
demonstrably bolstered regimes that were undemocratic, conservative, and 
frequently repressive... the president and his advisors opted for the short-term 
security that anti-Communist elites, especially military officers, could provide 
over the benefits of long-term political and social democracy. 13 
This pattern was also highly visible in US relations with Brazil during the Kennedy era. 14 
In fact, US-Brazilian relations would continue to deteriorate whilst Kennedy was in 
office; a process that led up to the eventual support of the Johnson administration for the 
1964 coup that removed President Joao Goulart from office. ' 5 
The third consequence of this thesis is what this analysis of US-Latin and US- 
Brazilian relations tells us more generally about US foreign policy during the Cold War 
era and, more importantly, about the notion of US "power". Most immediately it has 
suggested that US foreign policy during the Eisenhower era - and, by extension, the 
early Cold War era - cannot be ascribed to one particular aim or objective. This is a 
point made recently by Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, who has sought to separate US economic 
"Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F Kennedy Confronts Communist 
Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999) p 196-7 
14 As Weis argues: `Unfortunately, by the time Kennedy and Janio Quadros [the winner of the 1960 
Brazilian presidential election] assumed office, mistrust permeated high levels of both governments. In the 
opening months of 1961, the United States and Brazil switched roles, with the US becoming the ardent 
suitor. Unlike his predecessors, however, Quadros spurned the Americans. Brazilian-American relations 
became openly confrontational, and the United States began to intervene covertly in Brazilian affairs, to the 
point of aiding groups conspiring against the government. This ultimately led to the military coup of March 
31 1964, and the establishment of a military dictatorship. ' Michael Weis, Cold Warriors & Coup D'Etat: 
Brazilian-American Relations 1945-1964 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993) p 142 
'S Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World (1999) p 64-7; Michael Weis, Cold Warriors and 
Coup D'Etat (1993) p 142-159 
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objectives from US strategic objectives when looking at the case study of US foreign 
economic policy toward Spain. He writes, 
Despite Eisenhower's pledge to cut aid, the foreign assistance programs 
developed in the aftermath of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan 
remained an important element of American economic diplomacy throughout 
the 1950s... During the years between 1953 and 1961, the so-called Mutual 
Security Act period, foreign aid programs were explicitly guided by national 
security considerations. Aid, which was referred to as "defense support", was 
provided on a bilateral basis to foreign countries in order to contribute to the 
global struggle against the Soviet Union. However, as stated by Eisenhower in 
his 1954 address to Congress16... American foreign economic policy went 
beyond that. Economic policies such as free trade, currency convertibility, and 
free movement of capital were seen as key for promoting private investment 
and economic growth among developing countries. '7 
The potential absence of an enduring "grand strategy" in this period - whether motivated 
solely by economic or strategic concerns - points to the need for us to reappraise our 
understanding of US power. 18 Any evaluation as to the relative success of US policy 
needs to be mindful of the multi-faceted nature of US aims and objectives: for example, 
Eisenhower may have kept the peace, but did he succeed in meeting the economic 
objectives within US foreign policy? 19 Similarly, did the administration's pursuit of its 
economic objectives undermine the attainment of its national security aims? Lastly, why 
was the administration's approach toward the Third World so unsuccessful? 20 Even 
within a certain field there are various aspects that demand to be considered. As the 
excerpt from Calvo-Gonzalez shows us, there were differing levels within US foreign 
16 This refers to President Eisenhower's Special Message to Congress on Foreign Economic Policy, March 
30 1954 
17 Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez, "Neither a Carrot Nor a Stick: American Foreign Aid and Economic 
policymaking in Spain during the 1950s", Diplomatic History (Volume 30, No 3, June 2006) p 409-410; 
Michael Adamson, "The Most Important Single Aspect of our Foreign Policy" (2006) 
Ia This, of course, counters John Lewis Gaddis's argument that there was a "grand strategy" underpinning 
US policy during this period. See: John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (1982); John Lewis 
Caddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Niall Ferguson, 
Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004) 
19 Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, Soldier and President: The Renowned One- Volume Life (USA: 
Touchstone Books, 1990); Stephen Rabe, "Eisenhower Revisionism: The Scholarly Debate" in Michael 
Hogan (eds), America in the World: The Historiography ofAmerican Foreign Relations since 1941 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
20 Robert McMahon, "Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists" in 
political Science Quarterly (Volume 101, Fall 1986) pp 453-473; Kathryn Statler and Andrew Johns (eds), 
The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World and the Globalization of the Cold War (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) 
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economic policy that related to both strategic and economic objectives. Likewise, the 
internal debate as to whether or not the administration should attempt to `liberate' Eastern 
Europe and `roll-back' communism illustrated the absence of a defining policy goal 
within the administration's approach with regard to national security. 21 
On a more localised level, this study of US-Latin and US-Brazilian relations 
raises an important point with respect to US power and hegemony in the Western 
Hemisphere. It highlights the fact that US policy toward both Latin America and Brazil 
was very much a two-way street. Although the US was far more powerful than the Latin 
nations, Washington could not adopt a unilateral approach to its dealings with the 
region. 22 The situations in both Guatemala and Cuba highlighted the fact that the US 
needed the support of the OAS to legitimise its positions toward those two countries. Nor 
could US officials assume sole responsibility for setting the diplomatic agenda: as we 
have seen in those chapters dealing with US-Brazilian relations, Presidents Vargas and 
Kubitschek were able to force the Eisenhower administration to engage with their 
economic proposals even if they could not engineer a change in US policy. This meant 
that Brazil's domestic concerns - especially with regard to economic underdevelopment 
and social inequality - very often became important themes in the bilateral relationship. 
3 
Most importantly, however, the way that the US conception of its position in 
Latin America changed was, in many ways, driven by the ongoing tension within US 
policy between economics and security. In Chapter One, we saw that upon coming to 
office the Eisenhower administration adopted a pro-active approach toward implementing 
21 See: Scott Lucas, Freedom's War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union 1945-1956 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999); Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 
1938 (USA: Penguin Books, 1971) Eighth Edition 1998 
22 This, as many scholars have outlined, is a trend symptomatic of US-Latin relations in this period. For 
excellent summaries of these works, see: Mark Gilderhus, "An Emerging Synthesis" (1995); Max Paul 
Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States- 
Latin American Relations" in Diplomatic History (Volume 27, No. 5, November 2003) 
23 The same was, of course, true in other Latin nations: whilst US power was secure enough to negate any 
threat of a Latin nation forcing a change in US policy, Washington was clearly unable to prevent a Latin 
government from taking the lead on a particular issue. For examples see US relations with Cuba, 
Guatemala, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic in the 1955-60 period. For more on Brazil's domestic 
agenda, see: Joseph Smith, A History of Brazil, 1500-2000 (London: Pearson Education, 2002); Thomas 
Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1967) 
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its economic and - to a lesser extent - its strategic vision of US-Latin American relations. 
But, by 1958, the administration was reacting to what it now perceived to be the rather 
urgent strategic threats confronting it in the region. The clash between economics and 
security, coupled with the role played by the Latin nations themselves, had conspired to 
severely undermine the US position in Latin America. With the ongoing shift in the 
nature of the Cold War, and the developing threat posed by Khrushchev's foreign policy, 
the reduction in ostensible US power in the region was perceived to be an issue of prime 
national security importance. By 1958, the Cold War framework had assumed a position 
of primacy in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration when considering its policy 
toward Latin America. Yet the crucial factor was that in acclimatising to this change in 
conception, the Eisenhower administration did not implement any wholesale changes to 
its basic economic principles. The inevitable outcome was that Latin dissatisfaction with 
US economic policies continued to increase and US strategic goals - aimed at repairing 
Washington's position in the region - were, once again, undermined. 
An obvious addendum to the findings contained here, would be to extend the 
framework used in this study to other areas of the world in order to examine the range of 
American power during the 1950s. As we have seen in Latin America, whilst the US was 
the dominant force it was not able to adopt a position of unilateralism when pursuing its 
policy objectives as this would only have exacerbated existing anti-American tensions. 
The key question to emerge from this study, then, is: to what extent was this trend 
repeated in other areas of the world? In Chapter Five we saw that the US position in both 
South East Asia and the Middle East was significantly altered following the mid-1950s 
changes in Soviet foreign policy and the nature of the Cold War. Localised geopolitical 
imperatives intersected with the ideological constraints of the Cold War to impose an 
irreconcilable tension onto US policy in Latin America. Anti-Communism might have 
served as the justifying rationale underpinning US policy (especially in the post-1956 era) 
but more traditional objectives such as economic preponderance continued to impact a 
significant influence onto US policy. For Eisenhower administration officials, the 
constraints that these bifurcated aims imposed on their approach presented them with an 
unsolvable dilemma. How could the US achieve its increasingly urgent strategic aims 
314 
without altering or contravening its economic principles and objectives? In Latin 
America and Brazil, as we have seen in this thesis, the answer was that they could not: 
the next stage would be take this reanalysis further and examine whether this clash 
between economic and strategic objectives in US policy was as prominent in other areas 
of the world. 24 Addressing this key question would give us a much deeper understanding 
of our conception of American "power" in the early Cold War era and begin to bridge the 
"gap" between the Orthodox and Revisionist schools of thought by looking beyond the 
quest to identify a specific element of US policy - traditionally either economics or 
security - as being the sole rationale underpinning US aims and objectives. 
24 In one of the leading texts on Eisenhower's New Look policy, Saki Dockrill highlights the need for 
further academic work on this period, noting `... there is certainly room for further research. ' Said Dockrill, 
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